

GOD *and* MAN

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ON DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

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GOD AND MAN

LECTURES ON DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

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
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MAN

INTRODUCTION

The Word, the second Person of the Blessed Trinity, whilst preserving all the fullness of His divine essence, took upon Himself our humanity, in order to effect the redemption of mankind. In other words, His Incarnation gained for all men the privilege of becoming, whilst retaining all the elements of their created being, participants in the life of the Godhead, as St. Augustine has well expressed it in his celebrated quotation : *Factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus*¹.

1. Sermo CXXVIII; P. L., XXXIX, 1997 : *Dominus noster Jesus Christus, fratres charissimi, qui in æternum est cunctorum creator, hodie de matre nascendo, factus est nobis salvator. Natus est nobis hodie in tempore per voluntatem, ut nos perducat ad Patris æternitatem. Factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus. Ut panem Angelorum manducaret homo, Dominus angelorum hodie factus est homo. Hodie impleta est prophetia illa quæ dicit : « Rorate, cæli desuper; et nubes pluant Justum : aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem » (Is., XLV, 8). Factus est igitur qui fecerat, ut inveniretur qui perierat. Sic enim in Psalmis homo confitetur : « Priusquam humiliarer, ego peccavi »; et iterum : « Erravi sicut ovis quæ periit » (Ps. cxviii, 67, 176). Peccavit homo et factus est reus : natus est homo Deus, ut liberaretur reus. Homo igitur cecidit, sed Deus descendit; cecidit homo miserabiliter, descendit Deus misericorditer : cecidit homo per superbiam, descendit Deus cum gratia. Sic namque mater Domini ab angelo audivit : « Ave, gratia plena, Dominus tecum » (Luc., I, 28). Qui natus est primo sine matre in*

This is a pregnant summary of all the elements of *Christology* and of all the features of what is called *supernatural anthropology*. Over and above this, it emphasizes the mutual relations of these two essential parts of dogmatic theology. For the divine Word became incarnate and offered up through His human nature, a sacrifice of expiation, in order to merit man's reinstatement in divine grace.

In the beginning God created man and destined that he should be united with Him in the closest bonds of life and love. Other created beings there were, destined also to serve God, but their service sprang from the ordinate exercise of their natural activity. Man, on the contrary, was granted a higher sphere. He was destined to abide with his Creator in the sweet communion of friend with friend, and accordingly he was to share in His divine life. God on His part, willed that man should remain entirely free in giving or withholding his love. This is the *state of justice* in which the first man was constituted and in which according to the divine plan, all his descendants were to be created. It is also called, in the language of theology, *the state of original innocence*.

Man, however, abused this signal mark of the divine favor. He rejected God, when He, in the fervor of His infinite love, offered Himself for man's acceptance. To us, such a manifestation of contempt must ever appear of such unparalleled gravity, that by its very nature it precludes all hope of pardon. As a matter of fact, God, in consequence of the commission of this sin, broke off the vital connection, that He himself had established with Adam, a connection which enabled him to converse familiarly with his Creator. Further-

calis, hodie natus est sine patre in terris. O miracula! O prodigia, fratres charissimi! This ought to be always the attitude of the Catholic theologian, when it is question of a dogma presented on the authority of God. The dogma should be accepted in all simplicity. Philosophy enters the discussion only inasmuch as it can throw light on the truth which has been definitely received.

more, He decreed that all of sinful man's descendants should come into the world lacking these evidences of the divine goodness. Thus shorn of the favor that had been bestowed upon him in creation, man found himself in a condition never intended by God, out of all harmony with his destiny, wherein his will was fixed in rebellion against the divine will. In short, he had placed himself in a state of sin. This is likewise the state in which all of Adam's descendants are born, and this *state of sin* is called *original sin*.

Yet God, in His infinite mercy, could not abandon man to a condition totally irreconcilable with his original destiny. The advent of a mediator who was to re-establish man's lost communion, was promised. This mediator was to become man, was to take upon himself the flesh of the race that had fallen, and is none other than the Son of God, true God, the Word Incarnate. He was to bear in His humanity all the infirmities of guilty humanity, sin excepted. He was to live the life of a victim, during the whole course of His earthly existence, by giving Himself to all entirely and unceasingly in love. And, as the final act of that life, He, the representative of fallen mankind, would voluntarily accept death in order to offer to the Creator the homage of obedience, which divine justice demanded, so that in His mercy, God could accord man the privilege of once more being united with his Creator in that sweet intimacy for which he was made. This is the *state of grace* to which man can be restored by means of the redemption accomplished by Christ.

Still man can possess the grace merited by Christ only by a gradual process and in proportion to his appropriation of the sufferings of Christ. In its fullness, this grace is only achieved in heaven, and whoever, in this life, repeatedly resists it, places himself in the impossibility of ever receiving it. This is the *state of glory* or the *state of damnation*.

From these few remarks it follows that the study of man in relation to God, embraces the *state of original in-*

nocence, original sin, grace, glory or damnation. Under these four headings may be grouped all that Catholic theology teaches in regard to man. Hence our studies may be divided into four great divisions. Thus :

First Division. — *The State of Original Innocence.*

Second Division. — *Original Sin.*

Third Division. — *Grace.*

Fourth Division. — *Man and His Future State : in Heaven in Glory, or in Hell in Misery.*

FIRST DIVISION

THE STATE OF ORIGINAL INNOCENCE

The destiny of man is to serve God, but it differs from that of inferior creation inasmuch as God, in creating man, intended that he should be united with Him in the closest bonds of friendship. In order to enable man to the attainment of this end, God not only endowed him with all the qualifications befitting his natural being, but, over and above this, He imparted to him a life wholly supernatural which is the divine life itself. Rendered like unto God Himself, by the infusion of this supernatural life, man was made capable of intimate relation with his Creator.

Naturally this doctrine, more than any other, was to meet with strong opposition. Whilst human reason can accept, easily enough, that which is revealed to it on the subject of the inmost nature of God, it experiences greater difficulty in admitting the external teaching of revelation on the subject of grace. For we are told that a new life, supernatural in its essence, of which we have no experience or consciousness, penetrates, envelopes and dominates, at least the highest activities of our natural conscious life ¹.

1. It is only when considering a long period of our life that we can possibly perceive the traces of this supernatural life. One may then affirm with absolute sincerity, that he clearly perceives that an altogether supernatural Providence directed his life, and brought him to the perfection reached by him. Still this statement expresses rather an *induction of faith* than an *intuition*.

Though we cannot be conscious of grace itself, it is nevertheless the principle

As a matter of fact, the trend of the discussion of these matters has been towards denying the existence of the supernatural life, or toward ascertaining the precise point at which the supernatural life begins to influence the natural life. All the questions on grace are bound up with one or the other of these two problems ¹.

The Catholic Church clearly teaches that the first man's natural life was thoroughly impregnated with a supernatural life, or to put it in technical language, that he was *constituted in the state of original innocence*. This teaching, as we shall see further on, is a clearly defined dogma. Since human reason must necessarily experience great difficulty in conceiving such a mode of life, it will be useful to compare *the natural and the supernatural order*, and incidentally to mark their distinguishing characteristics ². Hence we divide this section into two chapters.

Chapter I. — *The Distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural Order.*

Chapter II. — *The State of Original Innocence.*

which inspires all the acts of our Christian life. God mysteriously present in the Christian soul directs its imagination, its mind, its heart. He takes man such as he is, with all his faculties, normally or abnormally developed, to bring him up to that for which he is destined. When we see the effects of grace, we can to some extent realize and feel its cause. A man realizes and feels his friend's intervention, even though he ignores, or before he can perceive the real presence or influence of his friend. So the Christian, under the veil of the phenomenon of which he is conscious, can realize and feel that God is energizing here.

1. The existence of the supernatural life or the supernatural order belongs rather to *General Dogma*. The distinction between the supernatural and the natural order belongs to *Special Dogma*. This is in reality, the direct or indirect object of all the controversies on grace.

2. Far from being *a priori* assertions, these are the principal conclusions derived from a study of grace. The knowledge of the results of a controversy helps much in determining its origin and understanding its true sense.

CHAPTER I

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER.

To make as sharp a distinction as possible, between the natural and the supernatural order, we must, as a first step, endeavor to give a *description* of these two orders. Two questions have to be answered. First, is the supernatural order demanded by the natural? Secondly, if it is not, what must be thought of those scholars who maintain that it is in total contradiction to our moral nature, to admit that the supernatural, can, as it were, be engrafted on the natural? To put it otherwise. Admitting the existence of both the natural and the supernatural order, *does the former demand the latter*, or on the contrary, *does the former exclude the latter*?

ARTICLE I

The Natural and the Supernatural Order Defined.

Definition of the Natural Order. — In general, order may be defined as the harmonious disposition of means to an end. Order, therefore, necessarily supposes a being pursuing an end by means proportionate to its attainment, employed according to a constant and invariable action, which is called law¹.

1. Here we shall consider exclusively the means and the end of both orders. The investigation of the law according to which, in the supernatural order at

God owes it to Himself to establish order in all His works. Man's creation requires that God should fix an end for him to attain, and place within his reach the means necessary and sufficient for this purpose.

The end which God prescribed for man, consisted in humanity's destination to a progressive knowledge, whereby man is enabled to reach *a more and more perfect knowledge of the truth*, so that he might become nearer and nearer to the Absolute Truth, God Himself, and that he might do *good more and more perfectly*, so as to approach by a gradual process, a higher conformity with the Absolute Goodness, which is also God Himself¹.

The means accorded by God to man for this end, consisted in his body and his immortal soul, the two elements which constitute man's *essential principles* (*essentialia*). Body and soul were in turn endowed with faculties necessary for their action, and the divine concurrence indispensable for the energizing of these faculties was to be always at hand. These are the exigencies (*exigentiae*) of man's essence, which when acting co-ordinately result in the acquisition of virtues (*vires*)².

Human nature then, is nothing more than the essential principles of man together with the faculties necessary for their action. The end for which man was endowed with that nature is called his natural end, and from the harmonious disposition of natural means to this natural end, results *the natural order*.

least, means must be used to obtain the end, is the subject of controversies grouped under the general heading of *actual grace*.

1. It is clear that we merely intend to deal here with the end of man considered in his philosophical nature and in the limits of his earthly life.

2. The words essence, faculties, divine concurrence are not necessarily to be understood here in their strict scholastic sense. It is sufficient to take them in a broad sense, such as they have in all philosophies: essence designating what is most fundamental in man, faculties, meaning our modes of activity, whilst divine concurrence means the Providence of God acting upon us, and virtues designate the development of the human person which results from the exercise of its activity.

A fuller development of this analysis will shed more light on the subject. Both the elements which make up human nature and the end for which it was so made, are so many gifts of God, since He was at liberty to create or not to create such an order of things. Hence they are called *the natural gifts* of man.

Yet, granting that God had determined the creation of man, He owed it to Himself to assign a prescribed end for which as a matter of fact man was destined and to clothe him with the nature which he really possesses. Therefore, the elements which make up human nature and the end to which it tends, represent all that to which man *has a right*, or what God *owes to Himself* to give to man, always, however, postulating the fact of creation¹. Thus the natural order may be defined : *Debitum naturae humanae* ².

The Supernatural Order Defined. — In placing man on earth, the divine Will did not intend to confine his activity within the limits of the natural order, but it resolved that he should be raised to a higher sphere.

The end of this new order was to be a participation in the divine life which carried with it the intuitive vision of God and the infinite happiness resulting from its possession.

During his earthly life man was to be initiated into the divine life by the communication of grace, which would develop into greater and greater strength, according as man corresponded faithfully with it. When this life was done, God would reward man with the beatific vision in proportion to the degree of grace that had been obtained on earth, thus making the divine remuneration depend on man's merits.

1. Still these *debita* are above all *gifts* divine, for they are subsequent to the fact of creation, a free decision on the part of God. Should a prince make a gift, it must be a royal gift worthy of his office. *God could hardly give to man less than the natural end* he assigned to him as long as He expected to be glorified through man's love.

2. Cf. PALMIERI, *De Deo Creante et elevante*, thes. XXXII.

To put it briefly, man would possess God in the same measure that he sought God during his earthly pilgrimage¹.

It can be seen at a glance that the beatific vision is but a continuation of the life of grace imparted to man by the merits of Christ. In heaven, grace reaches its fullest development and its full perfection. The only difference is, that this development and this perfection are made dependent upon the preparation made for the heavenly life, here on earth. This highly superior order to which God destined man when creating him, is what we mean by *the supernatural order*.

From the brief description that we have given, it requires little perception to see that this order transcends not only the natural order of man, but that of any other created being, for it is an *order altogether divine*.

In making this last assertion, may it not be argued that we have employed rather a strong expression? How, it may be asked, can the supernatural order, rise far superior to all creation, and be an order divine in every sense of the word? In order to answer this question, we have to keep before our minds the theological idea of sanctifying grace. According to theologians, sanctifying grace is God coming into the soul, transforming it so as to fit it for the divine presence. This transformation which is effected in the soul is something finite and created. Yet, it is the foundation of an altogether divine relation, viz., the union of God with His creature; this being its only *raison d'être*. This relation, a created something at its very basis, is nevertheless an uncreated something in its direction and

1. This doctrine that heavenly happiness is given in proportion to man's merit, is defined by the Council of Florence. *Illorumque animas qui post baptismum susceptum, nullam omnino peccati maculam incurrerunt, illas etiam, quæ post contractam peccati maculam, vel in suis corporibus, vel eisdem exuta corporibus, prout superius dictum est, sunt purgatæ, in cælum mox recipi et intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius. Illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere penis tamen disparibus puniendas.* DENZINGER-BANNWART, 693.

term. And hence, we can easily perceive that grace *transports us to an order entirely divine.*

No doubt, this explanation does not dispel the mystery altogether. It does not attempt to give any answer to the question, How can created grace be the foundation of an altogether divine relation?

As a concluding remark, here, let us not lose sight of the fact that just as God was free to create or not to create man, He was perfectly free to let him remain in the natural order, without elevating him to a higher and superior sphere. Therefore, we may define the supernatural order, *Indebitum naturae humanae et illam perficiens supra ordinem suum et supra ordinem cujusvis naturae creatae, scilicet in ordine divino*¹.

The Difference between the Natural and the Supernatural Order. — The definitions that we have given of these two orders reveal that they differ in themselves and in the necessity of their existence.

1. *They differ in themselves.* — The end of the natural order is an indefinitely perfectible knowledge and an indefinitely perfectible moral life. On the contrary, the end of the supernatural order is the immediate possession, through the beatific vision, of the infinite Truth and the infinite Goodness, that is to say, the divine Essence itself. Moreover, just as the end of the natural order is attained by the energizing of proportionate means, so the end of the supernatural order is reached by the energizing of commensurate means. There is, as it were, between these two orders, or between these two lives, *a difference of kind*². They develop on parallel lines without the first ever merging into

1. Cf. PALMIERI, *De Deo creante et elevante*, thes. XXXIII.

2. Cf. St. THOMAS, *Summa theol.*, I^a II^{ae} q. cxii, a, 1: *Donum autem gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae, cum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem aliam naturam.*

the other, or the second becoming the first, even when the natural life is deeply penetrated by the supernatural in a soul, so as to appear absorbed by it¹. It is then, from the end of the supernatural life that we are enabled to determine the character of the means necessary for its attainment².

2. *They differ as to the way in which their full realisation is obtained.* — The creation of the natural order depends absolutely on the will of God and not on man's, although the latter may retard its full accomplishment in his life by his transgressions. The fulfilment of the supernatural order, on the contrary, although willed by God in the case of each soul, may, by man's free will, be prevented either in its final or even in its incipient stage³.

This is the plan followed by God in the economy of the supernatural life. On the one hand, He wills that man should be elevated to the supernatural order; but on the other, He wills that he should be raised to that higher life with the free consent of his will. Man, therefore, is free to discard this new life, even after he has accepted it. The Church has always kept in mind this divine plan and has let no opportunity slip to emphasize it⁴.

1. PASCAL, *Pensées*, sect. XII. éd. Brunschvigg, p. 697.

2. It is the end of the supernatural order that is the criterion by which the supernatural character of the means can be distinguished. [*Visio beata*] *in genere*, writes SUAREZ, *finis est et quasi prima radix totius ordinis gratiae, omniumque supernaturalium donorum. De divina substantia*, l. II. c. ix. n. 1. It is plain, then, how inaccurate is the language of some modern philosophers who seem to consider the possession of infinite truth and the *summum bonum* as the natural end of man. See in particular, J. SIMON, *Relig. naturelle*, 310.

3. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Sermo CLXIX*, 13; *P. L.*, XXXVIII, 923 : *Eris opus Dei, non solum quia homo es, sed etiam quia justus es. Melius est enim justum esse, quam te hominem esse. Si hominem te fecit Deus, et justum tu te facis; melius aliquid facis quam fecit Deus. Sed sine te fecit te Deus. Non enim adhibuisti aliquem consensum, ut te faceret Deus. Quomodo consentiebas qui non eras? Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te justificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, justificat volentem.*

4. The doctrine of the Church in regard to the liberty of man under the

An intermediary order, the preternatural, described. — Speculatively, God could have merely created the natural order and inaugurated the higher life that He destined for man. But religion is more a matter of fact than a matter of speculation. The theologian, must, above everything else, preoccupy himself, not with Christian religion as it might be, but as it really is, which means, its historical manifestation and its developments in the Christian soul, under the direction of the Spirit of Christ, living in the Church and through the Church.

According to the teaching of the Church, besides the supernatural order, and as a consequence of it, God granted to Adam a certain number of gifts, such as *immunity from*

action of grace, as been well brought out by ST. FRANCIS DE SALES, *Treatise on the Love of God*, b. 2, c. 12. « To conclude, if any should say that our free-will does not co-operate in consenting to the grace with which God prevents it, or that it could not reject and deny consent thereto, he would contradict the whole Scripture, all the ancient Fathers, and experience, and would be excommunicated by the sacred Council of Trent (sess. VI. can. 4). But when it is said that we have power to reject the divine inspirations and motions, it is of course not meant that we can hinder God from inspiring us or touching our hearts, for as I have already said, that is done in us, yet without us. These are favors which God bestows upon us, before we have thought of them, He wakens us when we sleep and consequently we find ourselves awake before we have thought of it; but it is in our power to rise or not to rise and though He has awakened us without us, He will not raise us without us. Now, not to rise, and to go to sleep again, is to resist the call, seeing that we are called only to the end we should rise. We cannot hinder the inspiration from moving us, and consequently from setting us in motion, but if as it drives us forwards we repulse it by not yielding ourselves to its motion, we then make resistance. So the wind having seized upon and raised our apodes, will not bear them very far unless they display their wings and co-operate, raising themselves aloft and flying in the air, in which they have been lifted. If, on the contrary, allured maybe by some verdure they see upon the ground, or benumbed by their stay there, in lieu of seconding the wind they keep their wings folded and cast themselves again upon the earth, they have received indeed the motion of the wind, but in vain, since they did not help themselves thereby. Theotimus, inspirations prevent us, and even before they are thought of, make themselves felt, but after we have felt them, it is ours either to consent to them, so as to second and follow their attractions, or else to dissent and repulse them. They make themselves felt by us without us, but they do not make us consent without us ».

death. Now these gifts cannot belong to the supernatural life, since their end is not the beatific vision, nor do they belong to the life of grace which leads to heaven. Do they belong to the life of nature which leads to death? It seems that life continued without the necessity of passing through the shadows of death, is directed towards the natural end of man, and is a means leading thereto. But these means require a special concurrence which God is free to give to humanity. In one word, it is a gift which is not due to human nature, but perfects that nature in its own order. This is what we call the *preternatural order*¹, and may be defined : *Indebitum naturae humanae sed illam perficiens in ordine suo*².

Some theological formulas explained. — We can now give the precise meaning of the theological terms that we shall meet with again and again in the course of our *Studies*.

1. The state of man in the natural order is called *the natural state*; that of man in the supernatural order is called *the supernatural state*.

2. The state of man in the natural order, endowed only with the means necessary and sufficient for the attainment of the end of that order, is called *the state of mere nature*³. If besides he is endowed with preternatural gifts, his state is called *the state of integral nature*, or more exactly, *the state of privileged nature*⁴.

3. The state of one created in the natural order, elevated

1. Miracle, for instance, is a fact which belongs to the preternatural.

2. Cf. PALMIERI, *De Deo creante et elevante*, thes. XXXIII.

3. All theologians now admit that God could have created man in the state of *mere nature*. But would this state have been the same as that of fallen nature, considered independently of all destination to the supernatural end? The common opinion is that it would. Cf. SUAREZ, *De gratia*, proleg. IV. c. iii. Still a man who is in the state just described, could, on account of his personal sins or those of his ancestors, be really in a state inferior to that of mere nature. Cf. BEL-LAMY, *La vie surnaturelle*, pp. 6-19.

4. The expression, *state of integral nature*, is not clear outside of the theory of Baius. Instead of it we prefer the expression, *the state of privileged nature*.

to the supernatural order, and endowed with preternatural gifts, is called the *state of original justice*. It is so called, because it represents the state of perfect conformity with the will of God, in which the first man was constituted.

4. After his fall man was constituted in what has been called the *state of fallen nature*. Whether this state consisted merely in the privation of original innocence, or carried with it an impoverishment of the state of mere nature, is still a disputed point of theology. Adam's condition was that of *fallen nature, not restored to its former state*. His stay in this state was brief, since he received for himself and for his descendants the hope of forgiveness, and, owing to this hope, he was enabled to prepare for and work out his salvation. From the time that he received the divine promise of restoration, his state was that of a *nature fallen, but restored*. All of Adam's posterity were born in this condition, that is, all are called to strive for a supernatural end with the assistance of divine grace imparted to them from above.

5. The state of man who has attained the full and entire possession of his end is the *status termini*, whilst that of man who is still striving for that goal, is the *status viae*.

ARTICLE II

Does the Natural Order postulate the Supernatural?

The Question Stated. — It might be argued that the descriptions given in the foregoing pages, are more or less *a priori*. But such an inference would be too hastily drawn, for our exposition is but the conclusion reached after ages of bitter controversy, that raged from the time of St. Augustine until the last years of the 16th century¹.

1. The question of the distinction between these two orders was brought

At this later period particularly, the teaching which made for the distinction of the two orders was ably and skillfully attacked by the theologian Baius¹.

The Doctrine of Baius. — Baius maintained that the state of original justice, and consequently man's elevation to a higher order and his preternatural gifts, were absolutely due to human nature. Deprived of these benefits, man was absolutely incapable of well doing. And for this reason, God, by the very fact that He created man, had to endow human nature with these gifts and place him in the state of original innocence, otherwise we would have to admit that God created a being essentially and necessarily evil, an admission which entails a denial of His attributes.

As a consequence, fallen nature, destitute of divine grace, is absolutely incapable of controlling the passions, and hence cannot leave off evil doing. Adam's sin meant the loss of moral liberty and he became a prey to concupiscence. This concupiscence, born of the first sin, is, according to Baius, original sin which has been transmitted to all of us.

out clearly in the Pelagian controversy. But it was given even greater expression in the Semi-Pelagian controversy. After the sixth century, it no longer attracted attention, and it remained of secondary importance until the sixteenth century, when Baius attacked it. He with Jansenius and Quesnel, was condemned by the bull *Unigenitus*. Cf. DENZIGER-BANNWART, 1385, 1388, 1394, 1409.

1. Baius (Michael de Bay) 1513-1589, was a professor in the University of Louvain. He was sent by Philip II, as deputy of this institution to the Council of Trent, and later became its chancellor. He was the first theologian to give utterance to the teaching, which in after years was known as Jansenism. In several of his lesser treatises, especially in *De meritis operum*, *De prima hominis justitia et virtutibus impiorum*, *De libero hominis arbitrio*, he attempted to describe the state of iniquity into which man had sunk after his fall. In the bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*, Pius V, condemned 79 propositions excerpted from his works. Baius accepted the Pope's decree, declared that all the propositions were false, but claimed that in the sense in which they were stated, these propositions were not an embodiment of his doctrine and were not to be found in his writings. At the time he propounded the principles of Jansenism, Baius was thus also inaugurating that method which later the inmates of Port-Royal-des-Champs adopted so strenuously in defence of their theories.

Christ, however, by His death, released man from the bondage of sin, inasmuch as He merited that man be partially and gradually reconstituted in the state of original innocence. Yet the gifts that were Adam's due at his creation, were restored to him after he had fallen, not because of any right that he possessed, but as a gratuitous gift on the part of God, for by his lapse he had forfeited all rights to his primitive condition. Once more placed in the state of grace, man repossessed the power to bridle his passions whose evil influence was diminished in proportion as grace was increased in the soul. Grace and concupiscence were the two opposite poles of man's spiritual life. Grace was submerged at the fall, and concupiscence had free rein. The Redemption brought grace to man, and, as a consequence, concupiscence was checked.

Such in brief is the doctrine of Baius. It contains, as we can easily show, all the elements of Jansenism¹.

There was a variety of causes which actuated Baius in the formation of his system. Perhaps the most important of these, was the too literal interpretation which he gave to the teaching of St. Paul and St. Augustine, both of whom state that without the Holy Ghost i. e. grace, man is a slave to the concupiscence of the flesh (*carnalis homo*), and that it is only with the divine assistance of the Holy Spirit that he can hope to become *homo spiritualis*². Baius enlarged upon this, emphasized it and made it mean to much.

Baius wrote also under the influence of a new philosophy which was just making itself felt in his age and which received its best expression in the writings of Leibnitz³.

1. Since the fall of Adam, Baius claimed, guilty man had no right to grace, and hence it is gratuitous. On the other hand, God could not now grant grace in consideration of man's efforts, since the latter, now under the sway of concupiscence, can only do wrong. Hence God gives His grace to whom He pleases and in the measure He pleases.

2. I *Cor.* III. 1-3. See the meaning of these expressions below, p. 104-108.

3. The fundamental principle of this system is that God owed it to His own being to create the best possible world.

The Condemnation of Baius. — By order of Pope Pius V., the writings of Baius were examined and his system was summarized in 79 propositions. Of this number there are four, namely propositions 21, 26, 78 and 79, which directly concern us here.

The 21st proposition bears directly on the supernatural gifts bestowed on man at his creation. Baius maintained that Adam had *a strict right* to grace, namely to a participation in the divine life¹.

The 26th proposition claims that the integrity of primitive man *was not a state undue to him*, but his *natural condition*². For Baius, integrity was another name for the whole state of original justice, and included both man's elevation to the supernatural order and his preternatural gifts. He refused to admit this distinction, claiming it was an invention of the scholastics.

The 78th proposition deals with the preternatural gift of immunity from death. Baius asserted that it was a privilege *which God owed to Himself to bestow on Adam*³.

The 79th proposition, which affirms that *the state of original innocence was man's right in virtue of his creation*, is a résumé of Baius' whole system⁴.

All of the 79 propositions were condemned by Pius V. in 1567, by what is known as a *condemnation in globo*, as *heretical, erroneous, rash*, etc.⁵.

1. DENZ. 1021 : *Humanae naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium divinae naturae, debita fuit integritate primae conditionis et proinde naturalis dicenda est et non supernaturalis.*

2. DENZ. 1026 : *Integritas primae creationis non fuit indebita humanae naturae exaltatio, sed naturalis ejus conditio.*

3. DENZ. 1078 : *Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium sed naturalis conditio.*

4. DENZ. 1079 : *Falsa est doctorum sententia, primum hominem potuisse a Deo creari et institui sine justitia naturali.*

5. The Church employs two methods in her condemnations. She either takes the various propositions singly and condemns each separately (*singulatim*)

ARTICLE III

Does the Natural preclude the Supernatural Order?

The Question Stated. — It would, indeed, be a great mistake to suppose that, after describing the natural and the supernatural orders, and after showing, by the refutation of the system of Baius, that the latter is not demanded by the former, we had finally and definitely made a sharp distinction between the two orders. So far, we have concerned ourselves mainly with the theoretical and abstract side of this difficult question. But here we intend to go a step farther, and shall attempt to make a practical application of what we have stated theoretically. In other words, we shall endeavor to answer the question, How can the natural order exist side by side with the supernatural order in the human soul?

Put into this form, this question immediately gives rise to two difficulties. 1) *How can man, who belongs to the natural order, be raised to the supernatural order without there being generated in him a conflict of activities?* 2) *Must he not thereby really suffer a loss of some of his moral personality?*

Solution of the First Objection. — In defining the

— as was done in the case of the five propositions of Jansenius condemned by Innocent X. in 1653 — or she condemns them by a sweeping declaration which places all under the ban (*in globo*). This latter course is followed when a council, the pope, or the Holy Office, after having prepared a list of propositions taken from the writings of a suspected author, characterizes them as heretical, erroneous, rash, etc. A condemnation of this sort implies two things. First that every one of the propositions bears one or the other of these characteristics; secondly, that none of these terms is explicitly referred to any one particular proposition. Hence all must be rejected, although all are not censured alike, and those which are *heretical* cannot be distinguished from those that are *erroneous* or *rash*.

natural and supernatural orders, we said that each had an end which man was destined to attain, by the exercise of his natural activity in the case of the former and by employing the supernatural gifts imparted to him in the case of the latter.

A mere glance at their definitions will show that there is no proportion whatever existing between the two. Considered in its end, its means and the laws governing their use, the supernatural cannot be regarded as a development of the natural order. Put into more concrete language, these two orders are out of all proportion, because man, left to his own resources, despite the height to which his nature may be developed, can never realize the faintest degree of the supernatural life.

Incompatible however they are not, and it is not true to say that where they coexist, one acts counter to the other. If man is not divine, he was nevertheless created to God's image and His likeness. Even in the natural order, man as well as God has a tendency towards the true and the good, and we can explain the higher tendencies of his nature, only by the fact that he is the divine image.

This analogy, which exists between man and God, makes it possible for us to receive the very life of God and to receive from Him an aptitude to be made participants in the divine life¹.

Solution of the Second Objection. — The supernatural order is engrafted, as it were, upon the natural, but yet without affecting man's moral personality in the least.

1. The aptitude of nature to receive grace is one of the most difficult questions in theology. To resolve it, we must take human nature in the abstract and study it from a philosophical point of view. Man was created to the image of God, and in pursuing the indefinitely true, the indefinitely good by the efforts of his nature, he is analogous to God. Life in God consists in the infinite possession of infinite truth and infinite good. It is in this analogy alone that the aptitude of human nature to receive grace can be found.

There is one point which must be ever kept in mind and which cannot be insisted on too much, and it is this, that grace does not act in man without the consent of his free will. As the Apocalypse¹ beautifully expresses it, Christ stands at the doors of men's hearts and knocks, and He will enter to establish His kingdom there only in proportion as the soul welcomes Him. Once entered, but always in conjunction with the free will of the soul He possesses, He will develop in it His life of union with His Father, so that gradually the soul will find itself inclining towards the Father, instead of tending towards creatures. Moreover, Christ does that without counteracting the natural activity of the soul, since He finds in it an orientation towards God, but only an analogous one to that which He is establishing here.

Yet in the measure the soul is directed towards God by grace, man finds that he is more detached from creatures and proportionately restrained. But this weaning from created delights is not an impairing of man's moral activity. Besides, and this should never be lost sight of, this condition can be, and is, only brought about by the free consent of man. Hence, by being engrafted on the natural order, the supernatural order does not in any way affect the moral personality of man.

An illustration will best make the matter clearer and at the same time sum up all that we have sought to establish thus far. A small stream, starting out from some hillside, flows on to its receptacle, the sea. Its course is a precarious one, for on every side it meets with one obstacle after another, which almost force it to seek another channel. But if it is swallowed up by a swift torrent rushing to the sea, the streamlet is forced onwards. Nature and grace move in the same fashion, with this difference, however, — for all comparisons fall short in some details — that the stream-

1. III, 20.

let is irresistibly rushed to the sea and is entirely lost in the swiftly moving torrent¹.

1. Writers on mystical theology have made use of this comparison in order to interpret the text of Jn. XIV. 6 : *Ego sum via, et veritas et vita*. The sense of this text is this : Christ is the Life which vivifies men, but at the same time His Life is the Light that illumines them. Consequently, as Light and Life, Christ is the Way by which men are drawn to God the Father. Christ, the Life and the Light which illumines, the Way by which man is drawn to God, is then compared to a river resplendent by the light its waters reflect, which is running to the ocean. The Christian should cast himself in these waters and thus be drawn to the sea, which means that the Christian should imitate Christ by abandoning himself to the lights and inspirations which the Saviour imparts to him.

CHAPTER II

THE STATE OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

The Catholic Church teaches that Adam created in the natural order, was constituted in what is called the state of original justice. In her mind, the divine condescension carries with it a twofold privilege, for not only was Adam raised to the supernatural order, but he was likewise made the recipient of certain gifts of the preternatural order. Each of these aspects of man's original condition we shall study succesively under different headings.

ARTICLE I.

Adam's Elevation to the Supernatural Order.

The Teaching of the Church. — In its fifth session, the Council of Trent defined : *Si quis non confitetur primum hominem sanctitatem... et justitiam in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse* : A. S.¹. This decision was mainly directed against the Protestant doctrine which taught that God had bestowed no special or distinctive favor on Adam, his condition being similar to that of all men who are born into the world.

One expression of this definition requires some comment.

1. DENZ. 788.

According to the original draft of the canon made by the theologians of the Council, Adam was created (*creatus fuerat*) in the supernatural order. But the Fathers of the Council¹ refused to act on their suggestion and substituted in its stead the term *constitutus fuerat* out of deference to the opinion of St. Bonaventure who maintained that God created man in the natural order and afterwards raised him to the supernatural order². By the Council's action, this opinion may be accepted without endangering faith in the least.

The main preoccupation of the Council was to make this one doctrine, *that Adam was elevated to the supernatural order*, an article of faith. It concerned itself little with the time and the extent of the divine act³, leaving these two points to be settled by the discussion of theologians.

As a dogma of faith, however, the basis of this definition must repose in Holy Scripture and in the tradition of the Fathers. Let us see how each bears out the Council's decree.

§ I.

HOLY SCRIPTURE.

The principal argument taken from the O. T. is found in the first chapters of Genesis which, because of the pecu-

1. Many of the Fathers had no difficulty in defining that Adam was *creatus in rectitudine*, or better that he was *constitutus in sanctitate et iustitia*; but they refused to define that Adam was *creatus in iustitia et sanctitate*, Cf. THEINER, *Acta conc. trid.*, I. 231-235; PALLAVICINI, *Histoire du Concile de Trente*, VII, c. ix.

2. St. Bonaventure's opinion was this : *Et ideo gratia non fuit homini con-creata, sed dilata fuit quousque homo per actum et usum rationis quodam modo se disponeret ad illam suscipiendam... Patet igitur quod multiplex ordo hoc exigebat ut homo prius fieret in naturalibus, quam donis gratuitis ornaretur... In III Sent.*, dist. XXIX, a. 2, q. 2, concl.

3. The Fathers of the Council employed the text of Eph. IV, 17-24 in defining the supernatural state in which man was constituted. They did not want to say anything definite on the extent of the grace granted to Adam.

liar literary character it exhibits, must be interpreted with caution. It would be wrong to assign an allegorical interpretation to all the narratives, because such a process would be contrary to the doctrine of inspiration. Likewise it would hardly do to explain all of them literally, for this kind of interpretation would be in direct opposition to the conclusions of a sound scholarly criticism, which on some points must be accepted as certain¹.

It is the task of the exegete to distinguish the text which should be taken literally from that which may be interpreted in an allegorical manner. For the theologian the work is more difficult and complex. His duty it is to determine in the text the teaching which God has willed to impart to mankind through the vehicle of that text, no matter whether it is one that must be interpreted literally or one that bears an allegorical meaning.

The method which we have adopted rests on an indisputable principle. If all the Sacred Books are inspired — and they are — they ought to and must embody a certain unity of doctrine. This doctrine must be identical with the teaching which God by a special providence, preserves and keeps alive in the different religious generations that succeed each other, in order that it may serve as a directive force guiding their moral life². A doctrine, vague

1. The great majority of the Alexandrian Fathers interpreted Genesis allegorically. St. Ambrose tolerated this, but did not adopt it; cf. *De Paradiso*, II; P. L., XIV. 279. Cajetan followed it. Cf. LAGRANGE, *L'innocence et le péché*, Rev. bib., July 1897; BAINVEL, *Nature et surnaturel*, c. vi; LESETRE, *Les récits de l'histoire sainte*, Rev. prat. d'Apol., April 1, 1906.

The Biblical Commission, June 30, 1909, declared that, although some passages may be interpreted allegorically, yet the fundamental facts must be interpreted literally. Cf. LESETRE's comment on this decision in Rev. prat. d'Apol., March 1, April 1, and April 15, 1910.

2. The controversies of the last few years should not blot out the traditional idea that God reveals Himself to us in order to make us act according to His designs. Dogma always bears a moral import. But, on the other hand, it does not follow, as has been affirmed, that the truth of the dogma should be

in the beginning and presented in some of its aspects under an allegorical veil, will, as time unfolds its bearing and gives it greater development, become clearer and clearer, according as the moral exigencies of the different societies call for a greater precision. In the course of its development there even comes a point when it assumes a degree of remarkable precision, which, if not the full expansion of this doctrine, is at least the first of its most striking manifestations. That moment marks an epoch in the history of that doctrine, and if we wish to put it that way, the first step in its development has been reached.

What process, then, must be followed by the theologian who wishes to find in the early books of the Bible, the traces of a doctrine which has acquired a marked degree of development in the later books? Should he investigate those primitive books and seek to discover the first manifestations of the doctrine which he studies, with the help of internal criticism and the knowledge which he has of the historical setting that surrounded the composition of these writings? Doubtless he could and should do so. Everything is not allegorical in the writings he is considering. Certain expressions must be given a literal interpretation; besides, even allegory reflects, in some measure, the divine teaching. But if his knowledge of the historical *milieu* in which the writings were composed, is limited to a few details, he runs a great risk of giving an interpretation, which to say the least, will be arbitrary and superficial.

Rather than fall into such a mistake, the safer course will be to examine the doctrine under discussion at its highest culminating point and then argue back to its earliest traces. The fuller development of the doctrine, as embodied in the later books of the Bible, will be necessarily the very best

measured only by the religious action which it determines. This pragmatism must be abandoned, as the history of the development of doctrine evidently shows.

means of determining the divine teaching in the earlier books. Now, coming back to our particular subject, the doctrine of original justice and the other teaching closely allied to it, that of original sin, we find that in the last books of Israel's history, and even in the books of the N. T., both have reached a certain development in the light of which the different points of the divine teaching in the first chapters of Genesis are brought into clearer relief. It is true that such a method of interpretation is based on faith and the inspiration of the Sacred Books. But it must never be forgotten that *Special Dogmatic Theology* must be studied and treated *from the point of view of faith*. In other words, the theologian who studies the different aspects of dogma, not only *may* but *must* believe. His efforts are of a believer who is seeking the foundation of his faith. Provided he carry into his work a strict intellectual honesty, no historian can object to his method. And if it should happen that he should be charged with employing unfair means of interpretation, he can unhesitatingly and truthfully retort by repeating the old saying : *Medice cura te ipsum*.

By keeping in mind these few remarks, the first part of Genesis loses much of its difficulty. This section cannot be taken as pure allegory, for it embodies also a divine teaching which must be dis-entangled not only by the study of the text itself, but also by the development it has acquired in the later books of the O.T. For the time being, our aim shall be to examine the beginnings of the doctrine of man's original justice.

1. In the first chapter of Genesis, we are told (v. 26) that God created man *to His own image and likeness*, in order that he might have dominion over all other creatures.

Taken in themselves, these words signify that between God and Adam, there existed a special and particular relation of likeness. Yet it would be difficult to assign any particular importance to this doctrine, were it not for the fact

that it occupies a prominent position in the other books of the Bible.

The Book of Ecclesiasticus takes up this idea and comments on this *similitude* of which the first chapter of Genesis makes mention. « God », we read, « created man... after His own image... and gave him power over all things that are upon the earth. » He made him *a co-worker upon earth, like to Himself*. The author then goes on to show in what this resemblance consisted. God clothed man with strength and « put the fear of him upon all flesh ». He filled man with the knowledge of understanding in order that he might discern the good and the evil. Moreover, He gave him instructions that he might comprehend the meaning of the law imposed upon him. He shed light into his heart that he might contemplate the splendors of the divine majesty and « praise the name which hath sanctified » ¹.

But this language, which emphasizes the teaching of Genesis, prepares us for the beautiful expression, employed by St. John in his first Epistle, that man shall be *like to God* because he shall see Him as He is ². Here, surely, St. John is referring to the communication of the light of glory, which is nothing else than the full expansion of the life of grace.

2. But our narratives, under a decidedly allegorical form contain something else in favor of the doctrine we are striving to establish.

The third chapter tells us that when man sinned, *Yahweh-Elohim* condemned him to death, and in order that the

1. *Eccli.* XVII. 1-12. This description might be connected with that of *Isaias* XI. 2, where the prophet enumerates the gifts of the Holy Ghost that will be communicated to the Messias.

2. *1 Jn.* III. 2. See also *2 PET.* I. 3-4. « As all things of his power, which appertain to life and godliness, are given us, through the knowledge of him who hath called us by his own proper glory and virtue. By whom he hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature, flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world. »

sentence might have effect, took means to shut man off from *the tree of life*.

This idea of *the tree of life* is in all likelihood, the very same that later received such great development in Biblical and apocryphal literature. It is *the source of life, the living water* of which the Book of Henoch speaks¹, whereby the just are enabled to live the eternal life of God. It is the *life-giving water* which Dives, of St. Luke's² parable, asked should be given him to cool his tongue, because it would have given him the power to share in the happiness of Lazarus.

But this living water, mentioned in the N. T., does not merely give *immortality according to the flesh*. Over and above this, it affords man *participation in the very life of God by granting him the life of grace*. That which is communicated is *eternal life*, i. e. participation in the divine life, and as a consequence, immortality or definitive exemption from death.

3. Taking the New Testament irrespective of the Old, we find that its language in regard to the constitution of primitive man in the state of grace is rather emphatic.

One of the favorite arguments for our doctrine, is taken from the Epistle to the Ephesians³. St. Paul is exhorting the faithful to become like Christ, *by putting off the old man, « who is corrupted according to the desire of error », in order to put on the new man « who according to God is created in justice and holiness of truth »*. Examined in its context, this text means merely that the Christian must die to sin with Christ, and must be reborn with Him, into

1. HENOCH. XXII. 8-9. Henoch. « At this moment, I asked concerning the other cavities (of Sheol) : Why are they separated one from another ? »

He « (Raphael) replied and said : This is separated for the souls of the just where the source of the luminous water is (Greek text), where, near the source of life is light (Ethiopic text). »

2. LUKE, XVI. 22-24.

3. Eph., IV, 17-24.

a new life. But the metaphor employed here, means more than the actual language, namely, the Apostle's thought is this, *that Adam was corrupted by sin, and that in the beginning he was placed in the state of sanctity and justice.* Considered in this wise, the text retains a certain value.

The principal Scriptural argument is taken from the general teaching of St. Paul. The great fundamental idea in his Epistles, may be summed up as follows : Just as humanity was made subject to iniquity by the sin of one man, so by the redemptive work of one man it was saved. From this language we can infer that between Christ the Saviour and Adam the sinner there is some sort of parity. There can not have been, then, such a very great inequality between the perfection of Christ and that of the first man. The high state of grace in which Christ lived, gives color to the conjecture, that like Him, Adam must have also been constituted in the state of grace. This induction, more than all the textual interpretations, authorizes and at the same time assures the conclusion that the first man was elevated to the supernatural order.

§ II.

TRADITION.

Preliminary Remarks. — The doctrine of the elevation of Adam to the supernatural order is found side by side, in the patristic writings, with that of sin and fall of man. The only reason that urges us to separate the two doctrines is for the sake of clearness.

During the fifth century we find this doctrine clearly expressed, especially in the writings of St. Augustine. This no one denies. On the other hand, it is often said that no traces are found in the literature of the first four centuries.

True, this doctrine was then looked upon as one of secondary importance. All the theological effort and reflection of

the age was directed towards the determination of Christology. Still the doctrine of the supernatural state of the first man, is neither more nor less frequent than that of man's sin and fall.

The Greek Fathers. — In the second century of the Christian era, Christian dogma was in great danger of being confounded with Gnosticism. The principal representatives of this religious philosophy, Basilides, Valentinus and Marcion¹, refused practically to accept the dogmas taught by Christianity, by reserving the right to interpret them in their own fashion. This right they used extensively.

For Valentinus, the origin of evil came about in this way: Wisdom ($\Sigmaοφία$), the female principle of the fifteenth duad, impelled by an ardent desire, sought to know the intimate nature of the masculine principle of the first duad, *Bythus* or the Supreme Being. Balked in her quest and unable to resist the pleadings of her unsatisfied desire, she gave birth to the evil monster Hachamoth, which was expelled from the Pleroma, as the society of the divine eons was called. After many evolutions, it was, by the intervention of the other eons, changed into three distinct, yet related substances — the *material substance* or *hylic* ($\Υλική$) which contained the most evil parts of its nature; the *animal substance* or *psychic* ($\Ψυχική$), which embodied the less evil part of its nature; and the *spiritual* or *pneumatic substance* ($\Πνευματική$), mysteriously generated by the hylic and psychic substances, which was entirely good. These three

1. Basilides and Valentinus, two Syrians by birth, taught their doctrine at Alexandria, in the time of the Emperor Hadrian (117-138). Marcion, a native of Sinope on the Pontus Euxine, came to Rome to teach, in 140. Valentinus appears to be the most noted theoretic teacher in Gnosticism. All their various systems can be traced to the Persian cosmogonies. The combination of Syrian Gnosticism with Alexandrian Neo-Platonism is commonly known by the general name Gnosticism.

substances go to make up the world and the whole human race. As a consequence, mankind is divided into three categories, namely, *the hylic, the psychic, the pneumatic*, according as they have been granted a hylic, psychic or pneumatic substance. The work of the Redemption wrought by the Eon Jesus was neither for the *hylic*, nor for the *pneumatic*, for the former being essentially evil, were irretrievably doomed, and the latter being essentially good, were sure to be saved. Hence it was only for the *psychic* that Christ died. Their life upon earth was one of sorrow and misery, but by following the maxims of Soter (Christ) and practicing asceticism to 'destroy the empire of matter, they were assured of final victory, through the grace and merits gained for them by the Saviour.

Marcion was the first to introduce Gnosticism into Rome and it soon won many adherents. From there it spread rapidly, going so far as the valley of the Rhône. This fact led St. Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, to undertake its refutation. He attacked less the moral and somewhat dull system of Marcion than the doctrine of Valentinus with which he was thoroughly familiar, having doubtless studied it at Alexandria where it had been developed and fostered.

Against Marcion, St. Irenaeus urged that the origin of evil cannot be traced to some disturbance caused in the society of the eons, but must be laid in the fact — a fact which is part of the Church's belief and is attested by Scripture — that Adam lost *his image and likeness* to the Deity, by disobeying His command, and involved all his descendants in his misery¹. He then explains what he means by the expression « to lose the image and likeness of God ».

1. *Haer.* III. XVIII. 1-2. « When He (the Son of God) became incarnate, and was made man, He recapitulated in Himself the long line of human beings, and furnished us, so recapitulated in Him, with salvation; so that what we had lost in Adam — namely, to be according to the image and likeness of God — that we might recover in Christ Jesus (*longam hominum expositionem in seipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem praestans, ut quod per-*

God created man perfect. He formed him with a soul and a body, and then infused His Spirit into him. This infusion made man *the image and likeness* of God¹. Adam lost the divine Spirit by his sin and all his descendants lost it in him. This interpretation may be questioned, as well as that of almost all the Fathers, who generally drew their doctrine more from the traditional faith of which they lived than from Scripture, which is appealed to only accessorially. Whatever its value may be, it nevertheless brings out the thought of St. Irenaeus. He believed that Adam had received an effusion of the Holy Spirit, which, according to the Greek doctrine of which the bishop of Lyons is the Western representative, means grace in its strict definition.

In two of his earlier writings, especially the *Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi*, St. Athanasius describes the state of primitive man after the fashion of St. Irenaeus². In creating man, God made him to His likeness. Man thus formed, was, as it were a shadow of the Word. Adam sinned and lost this likeness and became subject to corruption and death. He remained in this state, until God, pitying his sad condition, resolved to save him. For this purpose, the Word of God took upon Himself our humanity, and regained for us

dideramus in Adam, id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse Dei, hoc in Christo Jesu recipemus. For it was not possible that the man who had been once for all conquered, and who had been destroyed by disobedience (*elusus per inobedientiam*) could reform himself, and obtain the prize of victory. »

1. *Ibid.* V. VI. 1. « But when the Spirit (of God) is blended with the soul which is united to flesh, the man is rendered spiritual and perfect because of the outpouring of the Spirit, he is in the image and the likeness of God ». St. Irenaeus makes a distinction between the image and the likeness of God. The likeness is the effect of the Holy Ghost present in the soul, while the image of God is imprinted on the flesh. « The perfect man consists in the commingling and the union of the soul receiving the spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that fleshy nature which was moulded after the image of God. But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect being, possessing indeed the image of God in his formation, but not receiving the similitude through the Spirit ».

our lost privileges, namely the divine likeness, together with incorruptibility and immortality¹.

Apparently, the teaching of the Cappadocians on this point, differs very little from that of St. Athanasius; yet, the supernatural state of Adam is not so strongly emphasized².

This in brief, is the history of our doctrine, from the second century up to the time of St. Augustine. From his time onward, this doctrine shared the fate of that of original sin. In the sixteenth century it was opposed by the Protestants, and, as we have seen, was made an article of faith, by the Council of Trent.

The Latin Fathers. — Tertullian clearly taught that the sin of Adam is the sole explanation for the existence of evil and sin in the world. He maintained that by Adam's disobedience, all men were condemned to death, became guilty of personal sin, and liable to punishment³. Moreover, this first act of disobedience unchained in man's soul that concupiscence, which, besides drawing men to sin, really makes them sinners, until through Baptism, they are incorporated with Christ⁴. St. Cyprian's teaching is like that of Tertullian⁵. According to their doctrine, man was evidently created in a supernatural state far transcending his natural condition.

1. *Or. de Inc.* 3, 4, 8, 44; *P. G.* XXV.

2. BASIL, *Homilia quod Deus non est auctor malorum*, 6, 7; *P. G.* XXI. 344. GREGORY NAZIANZEN, *Or.* VIII, *P. G.* XXXVI. 632. GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Or. catech.* IV, *P. G.* XLV, 28.

3. *Adv. Marc.* 1, 22 : *Homo damnatur in mortem ob unius arbusculæ delibationem, et exinde proficiunt delicta cum pœnis, et pereunt jam omnes qui paradisi nullam cæspitem norunt.*

4. *De anima*, 40 : *Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur donec in Christo recenseatur, tamdiu immunda quamdiu recenseatur.*

5. *Epist.* LXIV, 5, *Ad Donatum*, 3. *De opere et eleemos.*, 1.

ARTICLE II

Adam received Preternatural Gifts from God.

The Teaching of the Church. — The Council of Trent defined that God constituted Adam in a state of justice and sanctity, in other words in a state of grace. But with it and because of it, he received from God not only the *ordinary concurrence* due to every creature, but also an *extraordinary concurrence* which was not due to his nature.

In what *manner* this was given we do not know. *All that we can affirm is that these gifts were bestowed.*

In what did this consist? According to theologians, in four prerogatives.

1. *Bodily Immortality*¹, which means that man was destined to live indefinitely. This is *de fide* from a definition of the plenary Council of Carthage, held in 418, the acts of which were approved by Pope Zosimus². It was taken up by the Council of Trent which adopted the Pauline formula, that death is the lot of all men, because of a sin in which

1. St. Thomas tells us that God would have left man upon earth for a certain length of time, had he not sinned, and then would have given him the heavenly life. When this time would be over, he would not have tasted death, but his body would have been freed from all material ties, and as it were spiritualized. The change effected in man would have been like that described by St. Paul in regard to those who shall be living at the second advent of Christ. *Unde non poterat virtus ligni vitæ ad hoc se extendere, ut daret corpori virtutem durandi tempore infinito, sed usque ad determinatum tempus... Cum virtus ligni vitæ esset finita, semel sumptum præservabat a corruptione usque ad determinatum tempus : quo finito, vel homo translatus fuisset ad spiritualem vitam, vel indignisset iterum sumere de ligno vitæ. Sum. theol. I, q. xcvi, a. 4.*

2. DENZ., 101 : *Ut quicumque dixerit, Adam, primum hominem, mortalem factum, ita ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moreretur in corpore, hoc est de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, sed necessitate naturæ : A. S.*

they are born, a condition which is due to their descent from Adam the sinner¹.

2. *Freedom from concupiscence.* — Although man was capable of falling into sin, yet owing to the divine concurrence, his moral will was strengthened against all evil, a fact which made the fulfilment of all his duties comparatively easy. Evil could not make impression upon him and had no effect upon his passions. Even slight temptations, which come upon us all rather unexpectedly, were immediately turned away by the strength of his will. His imagination together with all his sensible impressions could produce no inordinate desire in his soul. His will was supreme and inclined always toward the good. By its sheer strength, he could crush the attacks of the most violent temptations.

We do not mean to infer by this that man could not sin. The possibility was there always, as is evidenced by his fall from his high estate. Concupiscence² lay dormant in him, but there was always present the *practical possibility* of his succumbing to its promptings.

The Church has never officially defined this point, but all theologians look upon it as *theologically certain*. It is true that the plenary Council of Carthage (418) declared, employing the language of St. Paul, that concupiscence came into the world when Adam fell³. But the language here is not clear enough to lead to any definite conclusion.

1. DENZ., 788: *Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem, Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim... incurrisse per offensam prævaricationis hujusmodi, iram et indignationem Dei atque ideo mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus...* A. S.

2. Concupiscence as understood in theology is threefold, namely, the concupiscence of the flesh or sensuality, the concupiscence of the eyes or the inordinate desire for riches and worldly goods, and the pride of life, or the inordinate desire for fame and worldly honors.

3. *Ibid.*, 102: *Item placuit ut quicumque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati...* A. S. *Quoniam non aliter intelligendum est quod ait Apostolus: « Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum ».*

3. *Immunity from suffering and pain.* — Experiencing no difficulty in controlling his passions, Adam easily fulfilled all his duties. Without sin, he felt none of the remorse and sorrow that follow in its train nor any of the sufferings which result from painful efforts.

Although there is no explicit definition of the Church on this point, some theologians claim that it has been implicitly defined by the second decree of the fifth session of the Tridentine Council¹. This is denied by others and therefore it is better to regard it merely as a truth *theologically certain*.

4. *An infused knowledge.* — To these favors God added a fourth. He conferred on Adam, His representative on earth, not only an exceptional knowledge of the world and humanity in general, but also knowledge of things divine. For this we really have no Scriptural proofs, although some have been cited in its support. That Adam was endowed with such a knowledge is but a logical inference drawn from his possession of the other preternatural gifts. We may remark, however, that this point has been neither explicitly nor implicitly insisted upon in any definition of the councils.

Before taking up the proofs of the Church's doctrine, let us insist again on the fact that these preternatural gifts were bestowed *conditionally on man's elevation to the supernatural order*. Grace is the *keystone* of the divine work realized in Adam. This is why the loss of grace caused God to withdraw from man His divine extraordinary concurrence. It was gratuitous in the beginning, and man by sinning forfeited the good will of his Maker.

Proofs. A. *Holy Scripture.* — One needs but to read

1. *Ibid.*, 789 : *Si quis... inquinatum illum [Adam] per inobedientiæ peccatum, mortem et pœnas corporis tantum in omne genus humanum transfudisse, non autem et peccatum...* Cf. THEINER, *Acta conc. trident.*, t. I, post sess. IV^{am}, pp. 114-130.

the third chapter of Genesis to be convinced that Adam was endowed with immunity from death. Death is represented as the punishment incurred by the violation of a positive precept, and the whole import of the narrative is that if man had not sinned he would not have tasted death. Corporeal immortality is not described as *a natural prerogative*. On the contrary, left to his own resources, man was bound, in the natural course of affairs, to die, because he was made of dust and it was most natural that in time, he should disintegrate into the same substance.

Therefore immortality is described as a *preternatural gift*, which, had Adam remained faithful, would have been man's portion. It was his, for a time, preserved in his person by a continual communication of marvelous energy, symbolized by the tree of life.

Yet because of the literary character of Genesis, little importance would have been attached to this doctrine, were it not for the fact that in other books of the Bible, it is given a prominent place. The Epistle to the Romans contains by far the strongest argument. There, St. Paul tells us that sin entered into the world by the sin of one man, and by sin death; « and so death passed upon all men », because all have sinned in Adam¹. If then death came of sin, and if Adam was without sin, he must have been *immune* from death.

This conclusion leads to another, namely, that man was *free from concupiscence*. In St. Paul's thought, we all die because we are all sinners, not because we have been guilty of personal sin, but because we are born in concupiscence or the capability of sinning, a heritage that is ours by our connection with Adam. Man's fall, therefore, brought both death and concupiscence into the world.

This teaching is but the development of that found in

1. *Rom. V, 12; I Cor. xv, 22*. This doctrine shall be dilated upon in the second part of our *Studies*.

Ecclesiastes¹ and Ecclesiasticus², where we are told that God made man right, which from the context means that man was gifted with the power to keep his passions in subjection. The basis of the doctrine, however, lies in the Book of Genesis³ which teaches that man was, before his fall, in a state, which after his sin was his no longer, for by his disobedience, he had aroused within himself all the forces of concupiscence.

Further, Genesis⁴ tells us that Adam and Eve were condemned to suffer *physical pain*, especially that which resulted from their daily toil. Can it be concluded from this, that before the fall, man did not have to toil? Not at all, for work is natural to man. Before the fall, graced with the divine favor, they did all things well and easily, whereas after the fall, no longer blessed by God, they toiled anxiously and painfully⁵.

Freedom from physical suffering was only a part of their happiness. Since they lived, with no knowledge of sin, always in communication with God, they enjoyed a happiness of which we cannot form any clear idea.

B. Tradition. — Our doctrine was admitted by St. Augustine and all the Fathers after him. That much is certain. Was it taught in the ages which preceded the illustrious doctor of the Latin Church?

In the Western Church, towards the end of the second century, we find St. Irenaeus teaching in unmistakable language, that when he sinned, Adam lost the image and likeness of God and with it the gift of immortality⁶. He further

1. *Eccles.* VII, 30.

2. *Eccli.*, XVII, 1-10.

3. *Gen.*, II, 25; III, 7-10.

4. *Gen.*, III, 17-19.

5. LAGRANGE, *L'innocence et le péché*, *Rev. Bibl.*, July 1897.

6. *Haer.*, V. XXXIV, 2 : « God shall heal the anguish of His people, and do away with the pain of His stroke (Is. XXX, 25). Now this means that punishment inflicted in the beginning upon disobedient man in Adam, that is death. »

adds that this privilege could be regained only by the Incarnation of the Word. By taking upon Himself our humanity and becoming man, the Son of God has given us the antidote of life, winning back for us the divine likeness, giving us at the same time a pledge of immortality and assuring us a glorious resurrection¹.

St. Justin, who wrote some twenty years before St. Irenaeus, declared that mankind has been under the dominion of death and the deceits of the serpent, since the time of Adam's fall². His disciple, Tatian, is no less positive. Created immortal, he writes, man, by his sin, lost this *privilege* which God had mercifully accorded him³.

St. Athanasius, here as elsewhere, reproduces the doctrine laid down by St. Irenaeus. Death to which all men are subject, is the result of the loss of the divine image in men's

1. *Haer.*, III-XIX, 1 : « Those who assert that He (Christ) was simply a mere man, begotten by Joseph, remaining in the bondage of the old disobedience are in a state of death; having been not as yet joined to the Word of God the Father, nor receiving liberty through the Son, as He does Himself declare : « I, the Son, shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed ». But being ignorant of Him who from the Virgin is Emmanuel, they are deprived of His gift, which is eternal life; and not receiving the incorruptible Word, they remain in mortal flesh, and are debtors to death, not obtaining the antidote of life (*antidotum vitae non accipientes*)... For it was for this end that the Word of God was made man, and He who was the Son of God became the Son of man, that man, having been taken into the Word, and receiving the adoption, might become the son of God. For by no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality, unless first incorruptibility and immortality had become also that which we are, so that the corruptible might be swallowed up by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality, that we might receive the adoption of sons » ?

2. *Dial.* 88. « Christ did not go to the river because He stood in need of baptism... even as He submitted to be born and to be crucified, not because He needed such things, but because of the human race, which from Adam had fallen under the power of death and the guile of the serpent ».

3. *Or. adv. Graec.*, 11. « We were not created to die, but we die by our own fault. Our free-will has destroyed us; we who were free have become slaves; we have been sold through sin. Nothing evil has been created by God; we ourselves have manifested wickedness, but we who have manifested it, are able again to reject it ».

souls. Adam lost it for himself by his sin and involved us in his misfortune. But the Word, by becoming incarnate has regained it and thus we are assured that our bodies shall rise gloriously from the dead¹.

In the third century, Tertullian maintained the same doctrine. His main pre-occupation was to fix *the origin of concupiscence*. In his *De Anima*, he clearly asserts that concupiscence came into the world, as the result of Adam's violation of the divine command. Before the fall it did not exist². St. Cyprian adopted Tertullian's views, which later served as the basis of St. Augustine's teaching.

Such is the dogma of man's primitive condition. *Raised to a supernatural sphere, endowed consequently with many advantages, not transcending the natural order, but wholly gratuitous on the part of God, man lived in a state wherein his will was in perfect accord with the divine Will. He was as God wished him to be, he was just.*

1. *Or. de Inc.*, 44, P. G. xxv.

2. *De animâ*, 40-41; P. L., II, 719 : *Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donec in Christo recenseatur, peccatrix autem, quia immunda, nec recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate... Malum igitur animæ... ex originis vitio antecedit naturale, quodam modo.*

SECOND DIVISION

ORIGINAL SIN

By failing to observe the command which God had placed upon him, Adam fell into sin. He deliberately set himself against God and chose a creature in His stead. Put into theological language, this denotes the aspect of original sin, as a sinful personal act. Viewed as such, it is *personal* to Adam¹.

Man, in setting his will against the divine will, broke off both his preternatural and supernatural connections with the Deity, a breaking which entailed *the loss of grace* and hence *also the forfeiture of the preternatural privileges* which were bestowed on him in virtue of that grace, *together with the added misfortune of a possible impoverishment of his natural gifts*, which became disabled to some extent, in their exercise. Man remained in this sad condition until that time when it pleased God to re-impart to him, by anticipation, some of the supernatural gifts, which later would be merited by Christ.

This state is *original sin* looked upon as *habitual*, a form in which it is not peculiarly personal to Adam, but in which it is, and rightly should be, the portion of *every*

1. This expression « original sin » has been employed in a twofold sense by the Fathers of the Church. In their terminology, it means either the first sin committed, or the sin in which all men, by the fact that they are the descendants of Adam the transgressor, are born.

man, who by the mere fact of his birth, shares in Adam's humanity. An exception has been made in this sinful heritage, in favor of Christ and His Virgin Mother Mary.

With these brief preliminary remarks in mind, we may conveniently divide this second section of our *Studies* into six chapters. Thus :

Chapter I. — *The Sin and Fall of Adam.*

Chapter II. — *The Transmission of Adam's Sin to His Posterity.*

Chapter III. — *The Effects of Original Sin on Adam's Posterity.*

Chapter IV. — *The Nature of Original Sin.*

Chapter V. — *How could God permit Original Sin?*

Chapter VI. — *The Protestant and Rationalistic Idea of Original Sin.*

CHAPTER I

THE SIN AND FALL OF ADAM

As we remarked above, Adam by his disobedience of the command which God had imposed on him, sinned grievously. By this sin, he lost grace, and with it was deprived of the preternatural gifts¹, the *raison d'être* of which was precisely that grace. At the same time, he awoke to the realization that only his natural gifts were left to him and perhaps his very nature had been weakened². These various assertions, with the exception of the last point, which has been the subject of considerable controversy, have been *formally defined* by the Council of Trent³.

Let us trace this dogma in Holy Scripture and in Patristic tradition. We shall consider in turn these two sources,

1. When we say that Adam, by losing grace, was consequently deprived of the preternatural gifts which were joined to it, we mean only this, that Adam was deprived of that preternatural concurrence, by which God was pleased to elevate his nature to a higher sphere. Adam must have still retained, in some measure at least, the habits which he had acquired in virtue of this concurrence.

2. ABBÉ DE BROGLIE, *Conf. sur la vie surnaturelle*, vol. II. 4^e conf.

3. DENZ., 788 : *Si quis non confitetur primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei, in paradiso, fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat, amisisse, incurrisseque per offensam prævaricationis huiusmodi, iram et indignationem Dei atque ideo mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus, et cum morte captivitatem sub ejus potestate, qui mortis deinde habuit imperium, hoc est diaboli, totumque Adam, per illam prævaricationis offensam, secundum corpus et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse : A. S.*

and then as a sort of corollary, for the sake of completeness, we shall discuss *the doctrine of St. Thomas on the nature of Adam's sin.*

Holy Scripture. — From the account given in the first two chapters of Genesis, we glean that a certain commandment had been imposed on our first parents, and we may rightly argue from the fact that the violation of this precept carried with it a serious punishment, that its obligation was also grave.

We are further told that this precept was disregarded by our first parents, who by their disobedience, were thus guilty of a serious sin.

In the wake of their fall, there immediately followed the loss of God's grace; they became subject to death, the evil cravings of concupiscence and to all of life's miseries. They attained to the realization of evil in both its moral and physical aspects until death, the gravest of their misfortunes, should claim them.

This, in brief survey, seems to be the substance of the teaching embodied in the first two chapters of the Bible.

But an examination of the Genesis data, in the light of the development of this same doctrine, contained in the other books of the Bible, converts them from a state of mere supposition into that of actual certainty.

Though strange, it is nevertheless indisputable, that the doctrine of Adam's sin and fall, has left very few traces in the books of the Old Testament. And this is the more remarkable, when we remember that Adam's transgression and particularly the loss of his state of original justice, are two strong arguments, which, it may well seem, could and should have been resorted to, both in the solution of the question of the origin of evil and for supplying motives to the soul crying to God for mercy.

Appeal is sometimes made to the Book of Job, where we read that he who is born of woman shall not be without

spot¹. But if this text be given a careful study in its doctrinal setting, it is difficult to find in it an allusion to Adam's sin and fall. As a matter of fact, the Book of Job is essentially an empiric work, a book based on experiences, in this sense, that it places the cause of sin in antecedent facts which it supposes to be known to everybody. There is not the least effort to go back to the first cause of evil.

Does the *locus classicus* of the Psalmist make the matter any clearer? At first sight, his *Miserere*² appears to possess an undeniable significance. « I was conceived in iniquities », he wails, « and in sins did my mother conceive me ». But if we examine the verse in question closely, and study it in the light of the laws of parallelism, we shall find that what it affirms is the fact that a tendency to evil is inborn to the heart of every man. No reference, whatever is made to a hereditary stain, whose origin dates from the sin of Adam.

We can find no direct allusion to the dogma of original sin and man's fall, in any of the Old Testament books, until we come to those which were composed in the two centuries which preceded the coming of Christ³.

The Book of Ecclesiasticus tells us explicitly that woman

1. Job, xv, 14. « What is man that he should be without spot, he that is born of a woman that he should appear just? » The gloss which is sometimes appended to XIV, 4, « How could a clean come from an unclean? Not one », has not the meaning often given it.

2. Ps. L. 7.

3. Whoever views the books of the O. T. as purely historical works, must indeed feel some surprise that a dogma of such importance as the fall of Adam, has left so few traces in the literature of the Old Dispensation. He cannot at all understand how, as it were in one bound, we go from Genesis to Ecclesiasticus and to Wisdom. The believer in inspiration can find a ready explanation for these abrupt transitions. If we would understand the written word, we must never lose sight of the fact that its authorship is divine, which means that God Himself presided over the composition of every one of the Sacred Writings. If He, now and then, permitted a doctrine to remain unmentioned for a certain time, it was only with the purpose of making it reappear later in a newer and stronger relief.

was the cause of sin, and that by her fault we all die¹. A view somewhat similar to this, is found in the Book of Wisdom. After declaring that God created man to His own likeness, the author goes on to say that death came into the world by the envy of the devil².

Since they are a faithful portrayal of Jewish thought as it prevailed in the last two centuries before Christ, the Apocryphal books have a special importance for the doctrine we are examining. Their testimony on this point affords us some interesting data. According to the Book of Enoch, God created man in order that he might live for ever. Seduced by the evil angels, he became a prey to all sorts of iniquity. Consequently God cursed him and condemned him to death³. This book is at least a witness to the fact that the first man received exceptional favors from God. These favors were lost because he and his immediate descendants persisted in multiplying iniquity.

The Fourth Book of Esdras embodies a teaching which throughout is more complete and more orthodox. In the dialogue which he holds with the angel sent by the Lord to him, Esdras remarks that it would have been much better not to have created the earth for Adam (*melius erat non dare terram Adam*) or to force him not to sin (*coercere eum ut non peccaret*). Then suddenly, as the enormity of human misery flashes upon him, he apostrophizes Adam, crying out, « O thou Adam, what hast thou done? For though it was thou that sinned, *the evil is not fallen on thee alone, but upon all of us that come of thee* »⁴.

1. *Eccli.* XXV, 33.

2. *Wisd.* II, 23-24.

3. *HENOCH*, VI-XI.

4. *IV ESDRAS*, VII, 46-48. The whole passage reads : *Et respondi et dixi : Hic est sermo meus primus et novissimus, quoniam melius erat non dare terram Adam, vel cum eam dedisset coercere eum ut non peccaret. Quid enim prodest hominibus in præsenti vivere in tristitia, et mortuos sperare*

When we come to the New Testament, we find that St. Paul is the only writer to bring out the doctrine of sin and man's depravity into clear relief¹. By his disobedience, Adam, the representative of the human race², fell into a state of sin, and was condemned to death. All his descendants shared the same state of evil and all are subject to the same punishment. But by His obedience unto the death of the cross, Christ, the new Adam, has regained the lost righteousness. In order to participate in this justice, we must be united to Christ by Baptism. As, by our generation which links us to Adam's humanity, we have been made sinners, so by Baptism, which affords us a participation in the life of Christ³, we are reformed unto justification. It is for this reason that the reception of this sacrament is called a regeneration or a re-birth.

For the present, it will be sufficient for our purpose to keep in mind these explicit utterances of the Apostle, which are so many affirmations of the sin and fall of Adam.

Tradition. — All the Fathers of the Western as well of the Eastern Church, have, from the time of St. Irenaeus onward, borne witness to the sin and moral decay of Adam. All of them teach that Adam had committed sin. But, as we shall see in the following chapter, some of them contented themselves with this mere statement and did not explain the evil and sinfulness of mankind in general, as a

punitionem? O tu quid fecisti, Adam? Si enim tu peccasti non est factus solius tuus casus, sed noster qui ex te advenimus.

1. I Cor. XV, 21-23; Rom. V, 12-21.

2. Adam is the representative of the human race by a special disposition on the part of God, and only in virtue of this disposition. See a further development of this thought, below, p. 86-89.

3. By birth we possess the natural life that had been given Adam, and hence we possess a humanity like his. In like manner, the sacrament of Baptism grants us the fullness of the supernatural life which was conferred on the human nature of Christ, and conforms us, by its sacramental character, to Christ the Saviour.

direct consequence of the sin of the father of the human race. And even amongst those who trace man's sinful condition to Adam's fall from grace, we find some who did not regard this condition as a sin.

For our purpose, it will be sufficient to cite the testimony of St. Ambrose on this point. We choose his evidence for two reasons. First, because he glories in the fact that he has derived his teaching from the writings of the Greek Fathers; and secondly, because he was the teacher of St. Augustine who has been justly entitled *the Doctor of the Dogma of Original Sin*.

In his *De Paradiso*, he gives a literal interpretation of the second and third chapters of Genesis¹. After this, he attempts to determine the character of the command that God imposed on our first parents. By gathering together all the objections raised against his position and explaining them all satisfactorily, he indicates the manner in which Eve, and, after her, Adam, committed their sin of disobedience².

The Doctrine of St. Thomas on the Nature of Adam's Sin. — If not one of the texts of either the Old or the New Testament affords any indications that would aid in the determination of the exact nature of the command given by God to Adam, *a fortiori*, there are none of any value in fixing the character of the first sin, for the simple reason, that every transgression is specified by the precept violated.

Yet the texts which have been cited, teach us two things, namely that Adam was perfect in the sight of God at his creation, and that despite the signal marks of favor that were granted him, he committed a serious fault which discredited both him and all his descendants. The importance of these two facts has been recognized by inductive theology, which

1. *De Paradiso*, V. P. L. XIV, 285-287.

2. *Ibid.* VI.

for centuries has made them the basis of its endeavors to determine the nature of the sin of Adam.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on this point is interesting and sheds much light on the matter. He puts the question, whether Adam's fall was not primarily a sin of pride.

As we have seen before, Adam's moral perfection lay in the fact that, by the sheer strength of his moral will, he, very easily, but not necessarily, controlled all his passions, both those which craved sensible delight, and those which sought the goods and honors of the world. These passions, acting as they did under the control of the moral will, were exercised in a normal manner. Thus, there was then no concupiscence in Adam, since concupiscence implies not only disorder, but also the habitual disorder of passion. Adam's moral will *certainly* swayed his passions, but *not necessarily* so. For there always remained the *possibility* and a *practical possibility* of the passions revolting against the moral will, or to put it in other words, there was always present the practical possibility of transitory rebellion of concupiscence.

In the course of time, this practical possibility became an actuality. The disorder which befell the first man, St. Thomas tells us, did not consist first, in the revolt of the passions which seek sensible pleasure, for this was precluded by the very state of righteousness in which he had been placed in the beginning. What it did consist in, was a revolt of the passions which crave honors. Man's moral will yielded to the abnormal craving for a *good of the intellectual order*, which God had forbidden should be his. This abnormal yearning was, in its last analysis, simply a feeling of pride. Adam in sinning, yielded to an unholy feeling of pride, and it is in this that his fault *primarily* consisted¹.

1. *Sum. theol.* II^a II^æ, q. clixiii, a. 1. *Sic autem homo erat in statu innocentie institutus, ut nulla esset rebellio carnis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani, ex hoc quod appetierit aliquod*

Next, St. Thomas seeks to determine the character of the intellectual good unduly sought by Adam.

First he lays down this principle: Man does not desire what he already possesses. Hence the object which occasioned the intellectual disorder in Adam, was none of the many perfections that were already his. What he desired, was *not to possess the power to discern between good and evil*, as some theologians maintain, for God had given him this faculty. The narrative of the temptation reveals that much. Adam knew, speculatively at least, what was good and what was evil. What he did desire unduly was *the power to determine for himself what was good to do, or what was evil to do*, a power which belongs to the eternal mind of God alone. Consequently, what Adam wished was to possess *the power of acting as he pleased*, in fact *absolute independence* from God, or, as St. Thomas puts it, *sibi inniti voluit*¹.

This declaration of absolute independence implied the obstinate refusal to recognize in God, the Sovereign Lord and the Supreme Legislator, and led in its last analysis to *a refusal of adoration*. The cause of this lay in man's

sensibile bonum, in quod carnis concupiscentia tendit praeter ordinem rationis. Relinquitur igitur quod prima inordinatio appetitus humani fuit ex hoc quod aliquod bonum spirituale inordinate appetiit. Non autem inordinate appetirisset, appetendo id secundum divinam mensuram ex divina regula praestitutam. Unde relinquitur quod primum peccatum hominis fuit in hoc quod appetiit quoddam spirituale bonum supra suam mensuram, quod pertinet ad superbiam.

1. Ibid., a. 2. *Sed primus homo peccavit principaliter appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad scientiam boni et mali... ut scilicet per virtutem propriae naturae determinaret sibi quid esset bonum, et quid malum ad agendum, vel etiam ut per seipsum praecognosceret quid sibi boni vel mali esset futurum; et secundario peccavit appetendo similitudinem Dei quantum ad propriam potestatem operandi, ut scilicet virtute propriae naturae operaretur ad beatitudinem consequendam... Verumtamen... Deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet... sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine.* Therefore, the first man sinned because he desired to be like unto God. He did not want to be equal to Him in all things (*similitudo omnimodae aequiparantiae*) for only a madman would desire this, but he did desire a *similitudo imitationis*, that is to say, his own autonomy.

unwillingness to give to God *the love which He demanded*, not only because of His infinite bounty, but also because of the benefits which He showered upon man, a mark of His desire that man should give Him love in return. Man's criminal desire placed him in a state which was in direct contradiction to the very reason of his existence, for God had created him, and placed him in the state of grace for the sole purpose of having him live with Him in the sweet bonds of friendship.

Such, according to St. Thomas, was the first malice in the sin of Adam. Love of his own independence led him to the commission of other sins. He allowed himself to be seduced by Eve, believed the words of the devil which Eve recounted to him, desired to possess the knowledge of good and evil, and ate the forbidden fruit which was handed to him. Thus did it happen, that *the movements of the concupiscence of honors* were followed by *the unlawful desires of the concupiscence of the flesh*, and Adam became entangled in all the misfortunes and ills recorded in the third chapter of the Book of Genesis¹.

1. *Summa*, II^a II^{ae}, q. clxiii, a. 1 ad 1^{um}, 2^{um}, 3^{um}, 4^{um}.

CHAPTER II.

THE TRANSMISSION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY.

Adam's transgression placed him in a condition which God had never intended should be his. In a word, from his state of innocence he had lapsed into a state of sin. But his sin was of such a character that it did not remain personal to him. It descended to his posterity. Our main purpose here, in this second chapter, is to show that every man, who through generation shares in Adam's humanity, is, at his entrance into this world, stained with Adam's sin¹.

For the sake of clearness, we shall divide the question into two articles. First, we shall discuss *the fact* of the transmission of Adam's sin, and then we shall examine *the manner* in which this transmission is effected.

ARTICLE I.

The Fact of the Transmission of Original Sin.

The Teaching of the Church. — Every man, by the very fact of his descent from Adam, is born in a *state of sin*. This sin, common to all of Adam's posterity, must, then, be classed, *not* as an *actual sin*, but as a *habitual sin*.

The question at once arises, What meaning should

1. Cf. ABBÉ DE BROGLIE, *Conférences sur la vie surnaturelle*, II. 55° conf.

be attached to the term 'habitual sin', and what is the habitual sin into which all men are born?

When one man offends another, he continues in that offence and is in a state of antagonism to the offended party, until he makes an act of sincere regret, accepted by the person injured, because, until this is done, he is still swayed by the feelings that prompted his action, and consequently is disposed to repeat the offence.

Now, if there is such a thing as a habitual state of antagonism, arising from an offence committed, in the natural relations of man with man, with much greater reason ought we to expect such a state in the supernatural relations existing between God and man. Whoever lives according to the principles of Christian morality, *fulfils all the duties of his state*, not by his own powers only, but *under the direction of the divine light and with the aid of the divine assistance*. He is like a wood-cutter working in a deep valley, where he can receive light and air only from above. Should he happen to fall into serious sin, he would lose the heavenly light and the divine assistance which support him, and at the same time would fall into a state of viciousness. In this condition, he is confronted with the absolute impossibility of doing anything so far as the supernatural order is concerned, and can do very little even in the natural order. He is really in opposition to the divine Will, a state most offensive to God, and in that state he must remain, until he has shown signs of repentance, and thereby obtained that grace be restored to him. This is what we mean by the state of habitual sin.

From these brief remarks, it is easy to form some idea of the habitual sin in which all men are born, for it is just such a state as has been described. It means *the loss of grace and the preternatural gifts* that are ancillary to it, and, perhaps entails a weakening of the natural faculties. Man, by the very fact of his loss, is rendered *totally incapable* of performing any supernatural act, and is placed in a posi-

tion where with *the greatest difficulty*, he can accomplish all that is naturally good.

Such is original sin, *considered in all its complex phases*. In further pages we shall consider the very essence of original sin proper. That is to say, we shall, by an examination of the characteristic features of this state of privation in which we are born, seek to fix that element, which scholastic theologians have termed *ratio formalis peccati originalis*, that makes us all in reality sinners.

The doctrine of the transmission of original sin must be accepted as an article of faith, since it has been defined in no uncertain language, by the Council of Trent.¹ What remains for us is to examine how far it is taught by *Holy Scripture* and *Tradition*.

§ 1.

HOLY SCRIPTURE.

The Old Testament. — There is no mention at all, in the chapters II and III of the Book of Genesis, of the fact that all men are born sinners because of Adam's transgression. Shortly after the narrative of the fall, Genesis details the first murder committed by Cain². Can we argue a relation between the disobedience of the father and the criminal outburst of the son? Such a relation is possible, yet there is nothing in the text which would justify such a position. Besides, the personal responsibility of the crime

1. DENZ., 789 : *Si quis Adæ pravocationem sibi soli et non ejus propagini asserit nocuisse, et acceptam a Deo sanctitatem et justitiam, quam perdidit, sibi soli, et non nobis etiam eum perdisse; aut inquinatum illum per inobedientiam peccatum, mortem et penas corporis tantum in omne genus humanum transfudisse, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animæ : A. S. : cum contradicat Apostolo dicenti : Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.*

2. Gen., IV, 9.

is clearly revealed in the words addressed by God to Cain, "If thou do well, shall not thy countenance be lifted up?"¹.

Yet the very contrary is asserted in the first commandment of the Decalogue, where it is explicitly said that God will visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and the fourth generation². According to this text, then, children are punished for the crimes of their immediate ancestors, but within certain prescribed limits. This is apparently contradicted by Ezechiel (XVIII, 4), when he insists on the personal responsibility of sin. "The soul that sinneth", he declares, "the same shall die". However there is no contradiction here. Ezechiel's purpose was to counteract the feelings of discouragement that had taken possession of the Jewish exiles. Fully persuaded that their punishment was due to the misdeeds of their fathers, they despaired of the future and resigned themselves to the chastisement, without, however, taking any steps to reform their own lives. The very same teaching is found also in the prophecy of Jeremias³.

The transmission of Adam's sin to the whole human race is strongly insinuated in Ecclesiasticus⁴, where it is said: "From woman came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die." Here at least is a strong resemblance to the teaching of St. Paul, which we shall presently discuss. We are all sinners, writes the Apostle, since we all must die; our sinful state is due to the sin of the first man. The very same doctrine is found, though in less forceful language, in the Book of Wisdom⁵, where it is said that death entered into the world because of the envy of the devil.

Here too, must be added the testimony of the Fourth

1. *Gen.*, IV, 7. [The Vulgate reading is, "If thou do well, shalt thou not receive?" The reading adopted above seems to enjoy the best authority. Tr.]

2. *Ex.*, XX, 5.

3. XXXI, 29.

4. XXV, 33.

5. II. 23-24.

Book of Esdras, which, as we have already observed, is clear and explicit in affirming the transmission of original sin¹.

The New Testament. — In the New Testament, the doctrine of the transmission of original sin is clearly taught by St. Paul. « In times past », he writes to the Ephesians, « you were dead in your offences and sins; in which also we all conversed living according to the desires of the flesh, and were by nature children of wrath » (τέκνα φύσεως ὀργῆς, *natura filii irae*)². The question that arises is this, Are they children of wrath, among whom the Apostle reckons himself with all men, because of their many personal offences, springing from a violent inclination to evil and their own natural viciousness, or are they sinners because they received a sinful heritage from their ancestors and therefore sinners necessarily, made so by a kind of law in virtue of which their nature, by the very fact of its descent from the head of the race, was born into sin? The second interpretation is more obvious. This presumption is almost strengthened into certainty, by paralleling this thought with the ideas contained in the Epistle to the Romans XI. 21-24. Here St. Paul compares the Israelites to *the branches of the cultivated olive-tree*, τῶν κατὰ φύσιν κλάδων³. By this simile, he brings out the fact that man *by his birth* is an object of malediction, just as the Israelite, by birth a part of Abraham's posterity, is on that account worthy of incorporation with Christ, and possesses a special right to share in the kingdom of God. The analogy which is at once apparent in these two forms of expression, makes it clear that St. Paul's meaning is that man is an object of the divine wrath, by his very birth and nature. It has been claimed that St. Paul's thought has been pressed too far here. This we could admit, were it not for the fact that

1. IV. 46-48.

2. Eph., II. 3.

3. The cultivated olive tree is a symbol of Christ.

the doctrine set forth is the general teaching of the Apostle on this point.

Nowhere in his writings is St. Paul more explicit than in *Romans* V. 12-21. His argument is briefly this : Death is the portion of all men, because all have sinned in Adam ($\epsilon\pi' \omega\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \hbar\mu\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\epsilon\nu$, *eo quod omnes peccaverunt*, and not *in quo omnes peccaverunt*, as the Vulgate puts it).

In proving this general proposition, he takes for granted that *death is reckoned as the consequence of the violation of a positive law*. From this he concludes that as death reigned from Adam to Moses, all who lived in that period were subject to death, because they had violated a positive law. This could not have been the Mosaic law, for it had not as yet been promulgated. Yet they died and hence *somehow* they were guilty of a breach of a positive law. But of what law? The very law that Adam himself had transgressed, for in the eyes of God all men formed *a moral unit with Adam*, and in him all were guilty of sin (v. 12-14).

In verse 18, the Apostle follows the same line of thought and draws the conclusion, « Whereas by the disobedience of Adam, all men were constituted sinners, so by the justice of Christ all have been justified ». Thus, he connects the dogma of the transmission of Adam's sin with the dogma of the Redemption, by the antithesis which he draws between Adam the sinner and Christ the Saviour.

§ II.

THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS.

Preliminary Remarks. — Before the end of the second century we do not find any mention of the doctrine of the transmission of Adam's guilt in the writings of the Fathers. *But from this time down to the end of the fourth century*, it occupies a position of ever increasing prominence in the works of both the *Greek* and the *Latin Fathers*. *In the time*

of *St. Augustine*, it became the storm center in the famous Pelagian controversy. But, after *St. Augustine's* time, its prominence was overshadowed by the development given to other dogmas. It assumed again a capital importance at the *time of the Council of Trent*. The development of the dogma, as thus briefly outlined, will mark for us the order to be followed in its treatment.

The Greek Fathers. — Towards the end of the second century, the Gnostics, as we have already said, explained the origin of evil by tracing it back to a sin committed in the world of eons.

In his treatise against heresies, *St. Irenaeus* points out the insufficiency of this explanation, and assigns another cause for the origin of evil. He argues that as all mankind had, by *Adam's* sin, fallen into moral depravity, so all mankind, represented by the human nature of the Incarnate Word, was sanctified in Him¹.

The Saint's argument is but the reproduction of *St. Paul's* thought, with some exaggeration at least in the expression. He identifies Christ's body with the whole human race, and declares that the Son of God, in assuming human flesh, has, as it were, made it divine. Christ's action is in direct contradiction to the conduct of *Adam*, who by his fall, vitiated the whole human race, with which he was identified. These words of the Bishop of Lyons, might lead us to believe that all men *personally co-operated* in the sin of *Adam*. The teaching of *St. Paul* is less realistic and more significant. According to the Apostle, *Adam*, as representative of the whole human race, sinned by his non-compliance with the will of God, and as a consequence cast himself into a state of sin. All his descendants, by the very fact that they came from him, were born

1. *Adv. Haer.* III, XVIII, 1-2; see also V, XVI, 3, where we read, « In the first *Adam*, we offended God, when he did not perform his commandment; in the second *Adam*, however, we are reconciled, being made obedient even unto death ».

into this same sinful state. The exaggeration of St. Irenæus serves to set forth more strongly his view of the transmission of an hereditary stain.

We next come to Origen. Did he, in so many words, teach the doctrine that Adam's sin was transmitted to the whole human race? After a brief and summary view of his system, we would be inclined to answer this question in the affirmative. In his commentary on Leviticus, he asserts that every soul born in the flesh is stained with the blemish of sin. No one is exempt from this universal law, not even the child of a day. This is why the Old Law prescribed, in the case of all the newly-born, the sacrifice of two turtle doves, one of which was destined as an offering for sin. This also gives the reason why the Church administers Baptism to infants, for the purpose of cleansing them from sin¹. Here Origen supplies the elements, in more or less formal language, of the orthodox theory of the existence of original sin. His whole line of argument leads to the belief that he himself admitted the view that Adam's sin was transmitted to his posterity. Yet despite his evident clearness here, passages taken from other of his works, tend to confirm the opposite impression.

This stain of the soul of which he speaks so fully in his Commentary on Leviticus, he discusses in several of his other treatises, where he assigns it a peculiar origin. He admitted the pre-existence of souls, and claimed that they were created *ab æterno*, and in the beginning were

1. In *Levit.*, VIII, 3; P. G. XII. 496. Origen appeals to the text of Job, xiv, 4-5, (in LXX) and says :

..... *Quæcumque anima in carne nascitur, iniquitalis et peccati sorde polluitur : et propterea dictum esse illud..... quia « nemo mundus a sorde, nec si unius diei sit vita ejus. » Addi etiam illud potest, ut requiratur quid causæ sit, cum baptisma Ecclesiæ pro remissione peccatorum detur, secundum Ecclesiæ observantiam etiam parvulis baptismum dari : cum utique, si nihil esset in parvulis, quod ad remissionem deberet et indulgentiam pertinere, gratia baptismi superflua videretur.* The Greek text has perished.

united to ethereal or subtile bodies. Created free and equal, they were by one personal sin, made to forfeit their high estate, and were cast into bodies of flesh and in these they must work out their punishment in expiation for their fall (καταβολή). All the evil, therefore, that is ours, had its origin in a fault which each of us was guilty of during our existence in another sphere. There is no need to ask whether this καταβολή is original sin in our meaning, for in Origen's thought, there is no connection with it and the actual sin of Adam.

This theory, which was nothing but the Platonic explanation of sin, bears so little resemblance to the traditional conception, that from the very moment it was launched, it became the source of great scandal. Immediately after Origen's death (254), St. Methodius strenuously fought it.

He attacked the idea of the pre-existence of souls and their final re-establishment to the spiritual condition from which they fell. In counter argument, he explicitly states that because of Adam's sin, all men are born sinners¹. Following in his wake, St. Athanasius teaches that the sin of Adam is transmitted to all his descendants².

Under these various attacks, the disciples and admirers of the great Alexandrian doctor sought to modify the teaching of their master. They claimed that the pre-existence which Origen ascribed to men's souls before the καταβολή, was really the primitive state of Adam. After the fall, his soul which before was united to an ethereal body, was clothed with a body of flesh and made subject to all sorts of miseries. All men, they say, are born in this way, because of the sin of the father of the human race. Thus born into a state of sin, they are in reality guilty. The

1. Cf. EPIPHANIUS, *Haer.* LXIV, 60; *P. G.* XLI. 1172.

2. *Contra Arianos*, Or. I, 51; *P. G.* XXVI, 117: « Through Adam the sinner, sin passed to all men (εις πάντας ανθρώπους ἔφθασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία); so, after Christ became man and vanquished the serpent, his power expanded to all mankind ».

dogma of the transmission of a hereditary stain could not have been expressed in clearer language than this. And the very fact that this doctrine was drawn up by the Origenists themselves, as a modification of Origen's system, gives it greater importance. The Cappadocians, and in particular, St. Gregory Nazianzen¹, expressed themselves in similar language. This is also the theory of Didymus the Blind, the leader of the Alexandrian school in the fourth century. In a treatise directed against the Manicheans, he affirms that all men are born sinners, because of the guilt contracted by Adam².

If, however, the disciples of Origen, are clear in teaching the dogma of the transmission of Adam's sin, the same cannot be said of St. John Chrysostom. The Holy Doctor advocated a doctrine, which in appearance at least, must ever sound strange to us, a doctrine which was the source of all sorts of embarrassment to St. Augustine and after him to Bossuet.

This teaching is embodied in a statement contained in a fragment of one of his homilies, found in the writings of St. Augustine, which reads : « Therefore, do we baptize little ones, although they have no sins, that they may gain entrance into the kingdom of Christ ». The bishop of Hippo affords an easy explanation of the difficulty, by claiming that Chrysostom's meaning was that the souls of the infants were not sullied by the guilt of actual sins³, and in this explanation, he has been followed by Bossuet⁴.

Although true as far it goes, this solution of the difficulty is by no means complete. For, as a matter of fact,

1. Or. xxii, 13; P. G. XXXV, 1145 : « I, who have fallen entirely and am condemned because of the sin of the first man and the ruse of the demon, am not saved entirely ». In this particular place, the Saint is refuting the Apollinarist theory which led to a negation of the Incarnation and an efficacious Redemption of the Word incarnate. See also Or. xxxiii, 9 : « ...πάντες δὲ οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἀδὰμ μετασχόντες, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄψεως παραλογισθέντες, καὶ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ θανατωθέντες... »

2. *Contra Manichaeos*, viii; P. G. XXXIX, 1096.

3. *Contra Julianum*, i, 22; P. L. XLIV. 655-656.

4. *Défense de la Tradition*, x, chap. I, IV.

this fragment is not the only place where Chrysostom employs language which is at variance with the doctrine of the transmission of original sin. In his tenth homily on the Epistle to the Romans, when interpreting the words ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, he explicitly states that we are all sinners because of Adam's sin, but only in the sense that we have all been condemned to misery and death¹. This interpretation is most astonishing, in view of the fact that Chrysostom of all the Fathers, is perhaps the one most anxious to interpret the Scriptures literally. This being so, no better opportunity than this same passage of *Romans* could have been given him, to allude, at least, to the dogma of the transmission of sin.

Can his language be explained merely by the fact that the Fathers of the fourth century attached very little importance to this doctrine? In part, it can. For the doctrine of a hereditary stain had assumed a secondary rôle in the domain of dogmatic speculation, a position which it occupied until the Pelagian controversies made their appearance. But this can only partly explain Chrysostom's language. There is another and a deeper reason for it, and it is this : All the Greek Fathers of the fourth century, it seems, were not accustomed to look upon original sin in the light of a sin in its strict definition. In their philosophy, sin must be something essentially personal. With this impression, it can be easily seen how they could declare a soul, which bore no guilt other than that of original sin, innocent of all sin.

1. In *Rom. hom.* x, 1, 3; *P. G.* LX. 474, 475, 477 : « What do the words ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον mean? They mean that by the fall of Adam, even those who did not eat the forbidden fruit have become mortal... How then is Adam a type of Christ? Just as Adam has been the cause of death for all his posterity, who did not even taste the forbidden fruit, so Christ has procured justice for his own, who have not practiced justice... The text, « for as by the disobedience of one man, many have been made sinners », raises a serious difficulty. What does the Apostle mean by sinners (τὸ ἁμαρτωλοί)? It appears that the best translation is, those condemned to the pains of death (ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τὸ [ἁμαρτωλοί] ὑπεύθυνοι κολάσει καὶ καταδικασμένοι θανάτῳ) ».

To sum up, then, all the Greek Fathers, who lived in the period extending from the end of the second century to the time of St. Augustine, taught the dogma of the transmission of Adam's sin. St. Irenaeus, whose authority must be given considerable weight, is most explicit. Too much stress, however, should not be placed on the testimony of Origen, who appears to trace the beginning of sin to an individual fall. Almost as soon as this theory made its appearance, it was attacked by St. Methodius. St. Athanasius followed him and gave us an exposition of this doctrine in language which can leave no room for doubt. The Origenists reformed the doctrines of their master and gave them an orthodox interpretation. Even the somewhat vague language of St. John Chrysostom finds an easy explanation in the philosophy of his time.

The Latin Fathers. — Like St. Irenaeus, Tertullian sought to defend the orthodox faith against Gnosticism. Let us make it clear in the very beginning that in the polemic he waged against them, the renowned African scholar had a very definite purpose in view. And this purpose was to determine *the cause of concupiscence* rather than *to solve the question of the origin of evil*.

His teaching may be briefly summed up as follows. Every man bears within himself an innate bias toward evil which consists in the disordered movements of the flesh. This is nothing else than *the concupiscence of the flesh* or *original sin*. What, then, is the cause of this concupiscence or sin? Its cause lies in the *fact of original corruption* (*De anima*¹) for all humanity is tainted because of its descent from him (*De testimonio animæ*²).

1. 40-41 ; II, P. L. 719.

2. *De testimonio animæ*, 3; P. L., I, 613 : *Satanam... pronuntias quem nos dicimus malitiæ angelum..... per quem homo a primordio circumventus, ut præceptum Dei excederet, et propterea in mortem datus, exinde*

This language is clear enough to lead any one to the belief that Tertullian admitted the transmission of original sin. Yet in his treatise on Baptism, he expresses himself in a way which makes for the very opposite position. Here¹, he argues for delay in the reception of baptism, until the age of reason, because before that period they are in a state of ignorance, and *have no need for the remission of sins*. At first sight, this makes it appear that Tertullian did not believe in the existence of original sin. But on deeper examination, we find that such is not the case. All that Tertullian teaches here, is that the ordinary object of the sacrament of baptism is the remission of personal sins. He is not alone in this view, for it was a favorite thesis of the Western Fathers down to the fifth century. Yet St. Cyprian had given expression to the very opposite doctrine, for in his letter to Fidus, he explicitly teaches that the effect of baptism is the remission of original sin².

Like Tertullian and St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose regards the concupiscence into which we are all born because of the sin of our first parents, as a blot, or an original blemish (*iniquitas calcanei*) and as a hereditary sin (*hereditaria peccata*)³. In other passages, his teaching is drawn on even stricter lines, in language which was soon to be adopted by

totum genus de suo semine infectum, suæ etiam damnationis traducem fecit.

1. *De Baptismo*, 18 : *Veniant ergo, dum adolescunt, dum discunt, dum quo veniant docentur : fiant christiani, cum Christum nosse potuerint. Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum ?*

2. *Epist. LXIV*, 5 : *Porro autem si etiam gravissimis delictoribus et in Deum multum ante peccantibus, cum postea crediderint, remissa peccatorum datur et a baptismo atque gratia nemo prohibetur, quanto magis prohiberi non debet infans qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus, contagium mortis antiquæ prima natiuitate contraxit, qui ad remissam peccatorum accipiendam hoc ipso facilius accedit quod illi remittuntur non propria sed alia peccata.*

3. In *Psal. LVIII*, 9-10; *P. L. XIV*, 1159. — *De mysteriis*, c, VI, 32; *P. L. XVI*, 398.

St. Augustine. « In Adam have I sinned », he writes, « and in him have I been made subject to iniquity¹ ».

The Dogma of the transmission of Original sin in the Age of Saint Augustine. — The dogmatic controversy which was waged at the beginning of the fifth century by St. Augustine, on the one side, against Pelagius and his followers, on the other, bears many features in common with the disputes of St. Athanasius and Arius, and those of St. Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius. In all three, dogma was attacked by men whose learning was unquestioned, and in all three the defenders of the doctrines involved, were the three great doctors *par excellence* of orthodoxy. In St. Augustine's time, the controversy did not center around the intimate nature of Christ, but was concerned with the inmost essence of grace, or, to put it otherwise, the life which Christ imparts to souls. But before we examine *the method employed by St. Augustine in his refutation of Pelagianism*, it will be well to have a brief but complete idea of what the Pelagian system stood for.

The Pelagian doctrine.—The attacks of Arianism against the Trinity had scarcely been refuted, when the Church was again called upon to defend two other fundamental dogmas, namely grace and the Incarnation. Gnosticicism had attempted to define the origin of evil and had been combated by the assertions of the early Fathers that sin in its source must be traced to the fall of Adam. Incidentally, if not explicitly, all the teachers of the Church maintained that because of sin, inherited from the father of the human race, man is alienated from God and inclined toward evil.

1. *De excessu fratris sui Satyri*, l. II, 6; P. L., XVI, 1317 : *Lapsus sum in Adam, de paradiso, ejectus in Adam, mortuus in Adam; quomodo revocet, nisi me in Adam invenerit, ut in illo culpæ obnoxium, morti debitum, ita in Christo justificatum.*

The question then arose, What can man in his unregenerate state, left entirely to his own resources, do for the attainment of his supernatural end? Pelagius, the English monk, emphasized the capabilities of human nature, and by his teaching, once more threw the Church in the throes of heresy. At the root of his system lay an exaggerated idea of man's moral freedom. He claimed that all men were born into this world with wills perfectly free. Unobstructed in its exercise, this free will became a power for good, despite the evil inclinations of concupiscence. Grace, in the meaning that the Church gave it¹, had no place in the divine plan, for man was endowed at his creation with a moral faculty which carried with it a natural capacity for moral excellence.

So far did he push this principle, that he branded the doctrine that we must pray for the divine assistance in all human affairs, a pernicious doctrine, because it robbed man of his self-sufficiency and allowed no room for the development of his natural gifts.

Realizing that the beneficial effects of the Redemption and the doctrine of original sin, as maintained by the Church, were at variance with his system, he set about to explain them away. He dared not deny the fact of Redemption, but he did insist that up to his time, Christ's work had been wholly misunderstood. Christ is our Saviour, not in the sense that He gained for us something which we had lost, but in the sense that He gave us an edifying example of how our lives should be lived.

He also admitted the existence of original sin, but claimed it had been made to mean too much. It is absurd

1. Pelagius admitted the existence of grace, but in the sense of purely natural gifts. For him it meant the sufficiency of purely natural means to the attainment of a supernatural end determined by God. This is why, in some of his writings, we find him asserting that God's grace is necessary at all times, though he is careful never to commit himself to any expression which might be twisted into meaning an interior or spiritual force.

to maintain the idea that Adam's sin has descended to his posterity. By yielding to his passion, Adam was guilty of personal sin. " Evil against which all mankind are obliged to struggle, owes its origin to the force of *example*, and the words of the Apostle, 'in Adam all have sinned', are to be understood as meaning only that all are more or less under the influence of Adam's example, and imitate him in committing sin; whereas they might just as well, if they had a mind to make good use of their natural faculties and endowments, avoid committing sin altogether, for, like Adam, they are born *free from sin and without virtue*¹. »

Such, in brief, are the main ideas embodied in the Pelagian system. They assume both a moral and a dogmatical aspect, but they are pre-eminently moral. It is true that Pelagius denied the dogmas of the Redemption and the transmission of original sin, but it must always be remembered that he was led to this denial by the great emphasis which he placed on man's moral capabilities.

To give an adequate explanation of the system of Pelagius, recognition must be granted to a variety of causes which contributed to its formation. Its success and wide diffusion must be traced more to the spirit of the times in which its author lived than to any marked personal characteristics either of Pelagius or his followers. The spirit of heresy was rife and any doctrine antagonistic to the traditional belief needed but the planting; the soil was all prepared for quick and rapid growth.

The power of human nature was all sufficient for the work of salvation and the British monk was shocked at any teaching which belittled this power and made grace the effective cause of all good. His own blameless life, the outcome of his close observance of the religious cloister of which he was an inmate, helped more than anything else to mould his views. His age was the age of monks and monas-

1. ALZOC, *Universal Church History*, I. p. 574, 575.

teries. The old monastic discipline of the East was making itself felt in the Western Church where it was received enthusiastically and adopted by many. At its basis lay all sorts of mortifications, the practice of which assured its followers of their souls' salvation. Pelagius, taking his own case as a criterion, over-estimated the discipline of the cloister and was led to believe that it sufficed without the co-operating influence of any divine aid, which men called « grace ». Exalting the monastic life, as he did, it is no wonder that his system made rapid strides in an age when monasticism was all supreme.

About 400 A. D., Pelagius repaired to Rome to teach his doctrines. There he fell in with a certain Syrian priest, Rufinus¹ by name, who like himself was also a monk. The two became fast friends. This Rufinus was a disciple of Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia in Cilicia. Only a few fragments of his works have come down to us, but we have enough « to make it certain that Theodore was a Nestorian before Nestorius ». He taught that Christ is but a man joined to the Logos in a moral union. The Logos dwelt in Him as in a temple and raised Him to divine dignity. This meant a denial of the Incarnation, and led to a denial of the Redemption and original sin. In this, his system coincided with the ideas of Pelagius who had belittled the redemptive work of Christ and rejected the dogma of original sin. This then, was the second great cause for the rapid spread of Pelagianism.

Pelagius and Rufinus now made the acquaintance of Celestius, a devotee of the monastic life, a distinguished lawyer and a member of one of the first families of Rome. From this time on, Pelagianism became a definite system. Its doctrines now had a certain coherency and it was supplied with men able to defend it.

1. TILLEMONT, XIII. p. 569. This Rufinus must not be confused with Rufinus of Aquileia the erstwhile friend, and later the bitter enemy of St. Jerome, who translated the *Periarchon* of Origen into Latin.

Refutation of the Pelagian System. — Pelagius and Celestius lost no time in propagating their system in Rome and throughout Italy. Many Italian bishops embraced the new doctrine, among whom there was no more zealous defender than Julian, bishop of Eclanum in Apulia. From Italy it made its ways into Carthage and the churches of Northern Africa. Here, it met the first obstacle to its progress in the person of St. Augustine, who consecrated the evening of his life (413 — 430 A. D.) to its refutation.

When the bishop of Hippo first raised his voice against the Pelagian error, the Pelagians retorted that he was in no position to defend the dogma of the transmission of original sin, since he had denied it in his earlier writings¹. St. Augustine speedily justified himself. He argued in reply to this charge that, even though prior to the year 413 he had made startling assertions in regard to the state of original righteousness, even though he had said Adam possessed an ethereal body before his fall², even though he had been led by St. Ambrose to adopt this and other doctrines of the Greeks, and even though he had given different explanations of the man-

1. The principal works of Augustine against the Pelagians, are as follows :

De spiritu et littera ad Marcellinum, 413.

De natura et gratia ad Timasium et Jacobum, contra Pelagium, 415.

De gestis Pelagii ad Aurelium episcopum, 417.

De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, l. II, 418.

De nuptiis et concupiscentia, ad Valerium comitem, l. II, 419.

Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum, ad Bonifacium, l. IV, 420.

Contra Julianum, l. VI, 421.

De gratia et libero arbitrio, ad Valentinum et cum illo monachos, 426.

De correptione et gratia ad eundem Valentinum et cum illo monachos hadrumeticos, 427.

De prædestinatione sanctorum liber ad Prosperum et Hilarium primus, 427.

De dono perseverantiæ liber ad Prosperum et Hilarium secundus, 428.

Contra secundam Juliani responsionem opus imperfectum, l. VI, 429.

The two writings of 427 and 428 are directed against the Semi-Pelagians of the south of Gaul.

2. *De Genesi contra Manichæos*, II. 32; P. L. XXXIV. 213; written about 388.

ner in which original sin is transmitted¹, still he had always maintained that Adam's sin had in some way mysteriously affected his posterity.

After a little skirmishing on both sides, St. Augustine came out boldly and took the offensive. In a series of writings he set out to prove that because of Adam's sin, all men are born sinners. His arguments in defence of his position are taken from *Scripture, the liturgies, the doctrine of the Greek Fathers of the first three centuries, and the acts of the provincial councils* which received, through him, the papal approbation.

1. *His arguments from Scripture.* — In his *Expositiones in Epistolas Pauli*, written towards the close of the year 410, Pelagius interpreted the phrase *in quo omnes peccaverunt* of Rom. V. 12, in a novel way. He claimed that the *in quo* has the meaning of *quia* and not *in eo in quo*. Men die not, he said, because Adam sinned, but because like him, they commit actual sin, *in quo omnes peccaverunt* « *propter imitationem dictum* ».

St. Augustine answered him in his *De peccatorum meritis* (III. 14; P. L. XLIV. 194)² maintaining the relative sense of the phrase *in quo*³, making it mean *in Adamo*. His

1. Cf. *De libero arbitrio*, III, 59; P. L. XXXII, 1299. This was written about the year 394 and here our Saint claims that traducianism or creationism can be maintained with equal authority. Cf. also *De Genesi ad litteram*, X. 39, P. L. XXXIV. 426, composed about the year 410. Here Augustine pronounces in favor of traducianism. This latter theory he maintained, though half-heartedly, until the end of his life.

2. *In quo omnes peccaverunt... siquidem in Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt quando in ejus natura, illa insita vi quameos gignere poterat, adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt.*

3. This interpretation prevailed until the seventeenth century, when it was attacked by Richard Simon in his *Hist. crit. des commentateurs du N. T.* c. 20. But when St. Augustine explained the text in this wise, he had no idea of drawing the doctrine of the transmission of original sin from the text. He believed it because it was part of the Church's teaching, and he pleaded this text as a sort of justification for his belief. This is the attitude of all the Fathers. They were

whole work is a grand interpretation of Pauline thought, and he concludes from his study that all men are born sinners because our first father sinned.

2. *His arguments from the liturgies.* — These are set forth in his *De Nuptiis*. He sees in the ritual observed in baptizing children an argument in favor of the dogma of original sin. « It is right and just », he asserts, » that the devil should be exorcised in the case of infants. They renounce the devil, not by their own lips, but by the lips of those who stand sponsors for them (*per corda et ora gestantium*).... What then, is the power which makes them slaves of the devil, if it be not sin?... And yet they are guilty of no mortal sin. Original sin must be the cause of this diabolical power which endures until they have been regenerated »¹.

3. *His arguments from the teaching of the Fathers of the first three centuries.* — The preceding argument was directed against Julian of Eclanum who was unable to answer it. Yet he persisted in making himself the real heir of the thought of the Fathers, in other words, he posed as the representative of the faith of the Church. Moreover, he did not cease to reproach St. Augustine for having taught the transmission of original sin, less, he maintained, to declare the traditional faith than to make the error of the Manichaeans triumph, of which at one time, he was a pronounced advocate².

primarily the witnesses of the faith of their times. If they cited Scripture, it was often not as proof of their teaching, but as an edifying confirmation of it.

1. I, 22; P. L. XLIV, 427. This text is from a doctrinal point of view, of great importance. It contains St. Augustine's teaching on original sin, on the baptism of children, and on the active functions of the god-parents in the ceremony. To gain a good idea of Augustine's idea of original sin, compare this text with another found in *De peccatorum meritis*, III, 14, P. L. XLIV. 194 : *Nec sic dicuntur ista aliena peccata, tanquam omnino ad parvulos non pertineant...; sed dicuntur aliena quia nondum ipsi agebant vitas proprias, sed quidquid erat in futura propagine, vita unius hominis continebat.*

2. St. Augustine, belonged to the Manichaeans from his nineteenth until his twenty-eighth year. Then he followed the sermons of St. Ambrose at Milan.

This unjust charge went right to the heart of the holy bishop. How can Julian, he writes, reproach me in this wise? Manichaeism teaches that human nature is essentially evil, because it consists of a soul united to a body which is an evil principle. Now, this is not what I said. I maintain that when man came from the hand of God, he was innocent and holy; sin came into the world by the fall of Adam ¹.

Two years later he published the great work *Contra Julianum libri VI*, in which he answers all the charges made against him by Julian. In the first book, Augustine shows the whole difference which exists between the doctrine he is asserting in the name of faith and Manichaeism. Then, in order to show that his teaching is that of Christian tradition, he gathered in the second book all the texts favorable to the transmission of Adam's fault, which are found in the writings of St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Hilary, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Ambrose. He concludes his work with this admirable peroration: *His igitur eloquiis et tanta auctoritate sanctorum, profecto aut sanaberis, Dei misericordia donante, quod quantum tibi optem, videt qui faciat; aut si, quod abominor, in eadem quæ tibi videtur sapientia, et est magna stultitia, perduraveris, non tu iudices quæsiturus es, ubi causam tuam purges, sed ubi tot sanctos doctores egregios atque memorabiles catholicæ veritatis accuses, Irenæum, Cyprianum, Reticium, Olympium, Hilarium, Gregorium, Basilium, Ambrosium, Joannem, Innocentium, Hieronymum, ceterosque socios ac participes*

He adhered to Christian Neo-Platonism, and after five years he was baptized on Easter in 387. He was then 33 years old.

1. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, II, 50; P. L. XLIV, 465-466: *...hoc enim manichæi asserere voluerunt et non creaturam Dei factam de nihilo, sed ipsam naturam Dei malis omnibus implere conati sunt. [Hoc falsum est]. Non enim ortum est malum nisi in bono, nec tamen summo et immutabili, quod est natura Dei, sed facta de nihilo per sapientiam Dei. Est itaque per quod homo divino operi vindicetur, quia non esset homo, nisi divino opere crearetur; malum autem non esset in parvulis, nisi voluntate primi hominis peccaretur, et origine vitata peccatum originale traheretur.*

*eorum, insuper et universam Christi Ecclesiam, cui divinæ familiæ dominica cibaria fideliter ministrantes, ingenti in Domino gloria claruerunt*¹. This is the first proof taken from tradition, properly speaking, which can be cited in the history of theology. St. Augustine appeals to the witnesses of the faith of the Church, as to the Church itself, vivified by the union with Christ, the witness and guardian of truth.

Julian fell back on the authority of St. John Chrysostom, who, he asserted, employed a language which is equivalent to the Pelagian negation of original sin. St. Augustine easily showed that such an idea was far from Chrysostom's mind². Hence, not only does he affirm, but he proves that man inherited the sin of Adam in all its consequences. One feature of this whole controversy is, that from the beginning to the end, St. Augustine based all his arguments on traditional belief. He had been charged with philosophical speculation and philosophical jugglery, but he vehemently denied the accusation.

4. *His arguments from the authority of provincial councils.* At the very beginning of the Pelagian controversy, St. Augustine called a provincial council, which met at Milevis in 416. The doctrines of both Pelagius and Celestius were condemned and the dogma of the transmission of original sin was defined. The acts of this council were forwarded to Pope Innocent I. who unhesitatingly confirmed them. The letters bearing the papal approbation were joyfully welcomed by Augustine, as is evidenced by his glad declaration addressed to the people : " Two councils have already sent their decisions in this cause to the Apostolic See. The desired rescripts have now been returned, the affair is ended. Would that there were also an end of error »³.

1. II. 37; P. L. XLIV. 701-702.

2. *Contra Julianum*, I. 22, P. L. XLIV. 655-656. Cf. above, pp. 63-64.

3. *Sermo CXXXI*, 10; P. L., XXXVIII, 734 : *Quod ergo dictum est de Ju-*

But the controversy was by no means ended. The Pelagians appealed to Rome and asked for vindication. Zosimus, who had succeeded Innocent I. in the papal chair, completely deceived by the specious pretensions of both Celestius and Pelagius, took their side. In a letter to the African bishops, he chided them for their haste in condemning the accused as unorthodox. He did not, however, repudiate the letter of his predecessor, which confirmed the acts of the council of Milevis. For one whole year Augustine waited but could gain no further news from Rome. The action of Zosimus was so great a disappointment to him, that, it has been said, he was thinking of resigning his see¹. He took new courage, however, and in 418 convened a council of 200 bishops at Carthage, where in clear, precise and unmistakable language the dogma of the transmission of original sin was again defined. It was a bold stroke and one fraught with dire consequences. What if Zosimus refused to recognize Pelagius and Celestius as heretics?² Would not the way be paved to one of the bitterest schisms in the Latin Church? But fortunately Zosimus did not hold fast to his first decision. Even before the bishops of Africa departed for their sees, they learned that the Pope, now fully aware that Celestius had cunningly deceived him, had called a council at Rome, and officially condemned Pelagianism. Later the decrees of the Carthaginian Council were sent to

dæis, hoc omnino in istis [pelagianis] videmus. Zelum Dei habent... Fratres mei, compatimini mecum. Ubi tales inveneritis, occulare nolite, non sit in vobis perversa misericordia... Redarguite contradicentes et resistentes ad nos perducite. Jam enim de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad Sedem Apostolicam: inde etiam rescripta venerunt. Causa finita est: utinam aliquando finiat error! Ergo ut advertant monemus, ut instruantur docemus, ut mutantur oremus.

1. TILLEMONT, *Mémoires*, XIII, 727-728.

2. The conversion of Zosimus to the views of Augustine has always been a matter of comment. It is said that the bishop of Hippo, through his kinsman Valerus, interested the Emperor Honorius in his behalf. But it is absolutely false to say that the Emperor brought pressure to bear upon the Pope.

Zosimus and he unreservedly and unhesitatingly subscribed to all of them¹. His indorsement carried with it the final official condemnation of the Pelagian errors². Its influence was scarcely felt afterwards, except in a moderated form, known as Semi-Pelagianism.

From the year 418, therefore, the doctrine of original sin became a part of the dogmatic teaching of the Church. The common belief was that man was heir to a sinful heritage, but no one, as yet, had definitely settled just what this heritage consisted of. Augustine, like Tertullian, identified it with concupiscence. Baptism, he claims, not only wipes out all actual sin, but also remits original sin together with concupiscence. We must not mistake this language, for the holy doctor has explained the sense in which he employed it. Baptism does not blot out concupiscence, for this tendency to evil remains after the reception of the sacrament, but, says St. Augustine, it has lost its character of guilt (*reatus culpæ*)³. Again, he saw but one explanation of the manner in which original sin is handed down, and that, he claims, is traducianism. Neither of his theories on these two points was adopted by theologians.

1. DENZ., 102 : *Ut quicumque parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro expietur, unde sit consequens ut in eis forma baptismatis « in remissionem peccatorum » non vera sed falsa intellegatur* : A. S.

2. Pelagius disappears from history in 418. A doubtful tradition asserted by Marius Mercator, claims that he took refuge in the Orient where he was condemned by a council which met at Antioch. As for Celestius, he remained in Africa until the year 424. Then he went to Rome, where he attempted, though unsuccessfully, to gain the good will of Pope Celestine. He then hid himself in the East. Julian of Eclanum kept up the fight for a number of years. Finally he went to Cilicia to Theodore of Mopsuestia, and then to Constantinople, to Nestorius. The latter received him cordially, but required that he admit that because of the sin of Adam we are all born sinners. The Council of Ephesus in 431 which condemned the Christology of Nestorius, formulated also two canons against the teaching of Pelagius and Celestius.

3. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, I, 27-29; XLIV, 429-430.

The Dogma of the Transmission of Original Sin at the Time of the Council of Trent. — So effectively had this dogma been vindicated by Augustine, that none after him dared call it into question. The dogma of original sin, rather than the transmission of it, was the subject that engrossed the Fathers and theologians of succeeding ages. All their efforts were aimed at a better understanding of the state in which our first parents lived both before and after the fall. This is why, we find attempts made, here and there, to fix the character of the sin committed or to determine the manner in which it was transmitted. The fact of the transmission was admitted by all¹.

The first break in this great silence was made by the so-called reformers of the sixteenth century. Luther and Calvin took over the Augustinian doctrine and made it mean that human nature was now essentially evil. Hence, they asserted, man's will is hopelessly under the dominion of concupiscence, so much so that it is impossible to perform any action that is not sinful. Some theologians among whom was Pighius revived the old Pelagian idea. Zwingli adopted a midway position. He denied that Adam's sin was transmitted to his posterity, although it was the cause of all the misery into which we are born.

It was chiefly against Pighius and Zwingli that the Council of Trent officially defined the dogma of the transmission of original sin.

The Historical Development of the Dogma. — As a conclusion to our *Studies* here, it will be well to sum up the stadia by which the dogma of the transmission of original sin was developed.

1. It is true that in the twelfth century, Abelard denied that our degenerate state can be called a real sin. It had the character of *reatus pænæ*, but not *reatus culpæ*. This was because he claimed in his philosophy that sin must be a personal act.

If we take up the definition of the Council of Trent and compare it with another made by the Plenary Council of Carthage, held in the year 418, we shall find very little difference. The dogma is enunciated there in the same clearness, with the same precision and almost with the same rigor as in the Tridentine Council.

From the time of St. Paul, it has been a practical and living belief in the Church. For a time it became absorbed, as it were, in the belief in the Man-God around which the efforts of the Church were centered. The onsets of Irenaeus and Tertullian against Valentinus and Marcion served to bring it once more to the fore. The Origenistic interpretation which was applied to it by the Cappadocians, gave it greater vitality, and Pelagianism was the occasional cause of its final definition.

Can we explain the manner in which the question was settled? Like many of the definitions of the Church, this, too, is the outcome of bitter controversy. Many controversies start from principles which are diametrically opposed to each other. An example will best illustrate what we mean. Let us suppose two philosophers discussing some thesis, the one an Aristotelian, and the other a follower of Kant. They cannot come to an agreement, because the principles they start from have little in common. Yet the discussion has one great effect. Both disputants will analyze their ideas and expose them in the best possible manner. The result is that both systems are reinforced by mutual opposition.

This is just what occurred in the development of the belief in original sin. Or, to put it in theological and, therefore, in more abstract language, this is what occurred in the development of both the *representative element*, necessarily contained in the belief in original sin, and the formula in which this belief is expressed, both elements constituting what we call the dogma of original sin.

But let us return to our illustration. In the course of

the analysis of their thought and its development, ideas and concepts truly contained in each of the disputants' system but unperceived before, will now be brought forth by the mental effort resulting from the discussion. As the argument progresses, each disputant becomes more and more explicitly and fully conscious of the system he is defending.

This is what happened with the dogma of original sin¹. In his controversy with Pelagius, and especially with Julian of Eclanum, St. Augustine evolved aspects of the question, which up to this time had been veiled in obscurity. Thus, he was led to declare, notwithstanding the Calvinistic and the Jansenistic interpretation, that original sin or concupiscence did not totally vitiate human nature, and that original sin or concupiscence is only an *accident* of human nature which was *created good* and *remained good*, because it was always *in possession of free will*. The cause of this *accident* was the sin of our first parents. Further, his discussion made him affirm that the transmission of original sin cannot, in any manner whatsoever, be traced to any divine act. Rather than accept that opinion which savored too much of Manichaeism, he preferred to adopt the theory of traducianism. Therefore, it was owing chiefly to his efforts that not only the dogma of original sin was clothed in a precise terminology, but it was also given a *new development*, inasmuch as new aspects of the question hitherto undreamed of were brought into relief and given the Western Church for the first time.

In conclusion, let us remark, that throughout the process of development, this dogma has retained a *perfect homo-*

1. We do not mean to make this the only method according to which a dogma may develop. We recognize that there are other laws which mark the development of the various dogmas of our faith. This is the way the dogma of original sin has developed. In the case of the other dogmas we are discussing we shall assign a part of our work in studying the lines of their development, so as to be able at the end to attempt a classification of dogmas, according to the laws of their development.

geneity, despite influences which from a human point of view, should have tended to deviate it from its line of progress. The Gnosticism of Valentinus and Marcion, together with Origenism and the twofold influence of Manichaeism and Pelagianism, all contributed indirectly to make the dogma what it is. Its growth was perfected, *imperceptibly and unknown to the men* who, surrounded with strifes on all sides, knew not, at times, whither to turn for the truth, as happened in the days of the Plenary Council of Carthage. This being the case, must there not have been at work, a cause which rose far superior to all the contingent causes? That cause can be no other than Our Lord Jesus Christ, living in and through the Church, to instruct His spouse in truth and keep her from all error. Thus the history of the development of dogma, brings out Christ's influence ever co-operating with His followers in the fulfilment of the work, intellectual and moral, which He entrusted to them.

ARTICLE II

The Manner in which Original Sin was transmitted.

The Question Stated. — The determination of the *manner* in which original sin is transmitted, depends entirely on what view is taken of original sin. St. Augustine, who made it consist in concupiscence, thought he could not explain the transmission otherwise than by *traducianism*. St. Thomas, who looked upon the privation of original justice as the main element of the hereditary stain, explained it by a kind of *right of representation* of the whole human race conferred on Adam.

These are the two principal solutions given in explanation of the manner of the transmission of original sin¹.

1. Although many in the past have followed the opinion of St. Augustine, yet

St. Augustine's Solution. — Manichaeism, a heresy which originated toward the end of the third century, was closely allied to Gnosticism, which it attempted to supplant in religious and philosophical thought, when the death-knell of the latter system had been sounded. Unlike the Gnostic theorists, the adherents of this system did not trace the origin of the world to a series of intermediary eons. Manes, to whom the heresy owes its origin, maintained that at the head of the universe, there were two eternal Beings, God the Good Principle, and Darkness the Evil Principle. This latter is sometimes referred to as matter, and at others, as the prince of this world, or Satan. Opposed to it, is the Good Principle, the source of light, and the two are constantly at war with each other. Taking a strange fancy to the Light, matter seeks to be united with it. The Principle of Light repulses this attempt, and in the conflict that

the Church, as the centuries rolled on, more and more plainly disclaimed it. Leo IX. and Benedict XII. declared against it. Rosmini brought it once more to life, but not just as its author had proposed it. Human generation, he claims, is the same as that of animals, and hence the effect ought to be the same. Its object is the production of a sensitive soul, which in man becomes also an intellectual soul. This intellectual soul is produced in man, by a divine illumination, which is a reflection of the splendor of the majesty of God, a sort of participation in the divine life itself, which Rosmini calls the ideal being. *La generazione dell' anima umana si può concepire per gradi progressivi dall' imperfetto all' perfetto, e perciò prima ci sia il principio sensitivo, il quale giunto alla sua perfezione colla perfezione dell' organismo, riceve l' intuizione dell' essere e così si renda intelligente e razionale.* Cf. *Teosofia*, I, 646. This was condemned by the Holy Office in a decree dated Dec. 14, 1887, in the three following propositions :

Propos. XX : *Non repugnat ut anima humana generatione multiplicetur : ita ut concipiatur eam ab imperfecto nempe a gradu sensitivo, ad perfectum, nempe ad gradum intellectivum, procedere.*

Propos. XXI : *Cum sensitivo principio intuibile fit esse, hoc solo tactu, hac sui unione, principium illud antea solum sentiens, nunc simul intelligens, ad nobilitiorem statum evehitur, naturam mutat, ac fit intelligens, subsistens atque immortale.*

Propos. XXII : *Non est cogitatu impossibile divina potentia fieri posse, ut a corpore animato dividatur anima intellectiva, et ipsum adhuc maneat animale : maneret nempe in ipso, tamquam basis puri animalis, principium animale, quod antea in eo erat veluti appendix.* DENZ., 1910-1912.

ensues, the powers of matter succeed in gaining possession of particles of light. The Luminary Principle changes from the defensive to the offensive. To secure the particles of light lost, and in order to counteract the powers of Darkness, the Good Principle forms the first man from His own substance. This, in brief, is the explanation given by the Manichaeans for the origin of physical, as well as moral evil, whose existence is attested by our inner consciousness¹.

In this very same period, the Neo-Platonists of the school of Alexandria also taught that there were two principles at play in man, his soul, and the material which enveloped it. Both those principles are essentially good, for both were created by God the Eternal Good. Man's sin in the beginning marred the order appointed by God. Before the fall, man's soul was enclosed in an ethereal body, i. e. was surrounded by matter which was, as it were spiritualized. After the fall, the soul and the ethereal body were, limited and constrained in their activities. Instead of spiritualized matter, the soul was now imprisoned in a body gross and earthly. It was dominated by the basest inclinations, especially by the concupiscence of the flesh. This body, together with all the tendencies of the lower nature, have been transmitted by Adam to all his posterity.

Five years before his baptism, St. Augustine renounced the Manichaean system in order to embrace the Neo-Platonic doctrine. The maxims of this religious philosophy clung to him throughout his life, although his study of the Pauline Epistles and the writings of the Fathers of the African Church, particularly those of Tertullian and St. Cyprian, contributed in a large measure to modify and perfect them. This fact affords a ready explanation of his attitude in con-

1. TIT. BOST. *Contra manich.*, I. 60. Titus, bishop of Bostra, the metropolis of Arabia, wrote in 360. His fame is due to the four books which he wrote against the Manichaeans. Cf. TILLEMONT, *Mémoires*, VII. 382 ff.; DOM CEILLIER *Hist. des aut. sacrés et ecclés.*, VI, 43 ff.

sidering concupiscence in the non-baptized, not only as a *degenerate state* which sometimes was designated as sin though improperly so, but also a disposition with a pronounced *sinful character, reatus culpae*.

In explaining the manner in which original sin was transmitted, St. Augustine felt that, in order to give an adequate solution, he was bound to depart from the opinions that were then prevalent on this subject, and formulated a theory which was more in harmony with his own personal convictions.

According to the Neo-Platonists, concupiscence being an infirmity special to our terrestrial bodies, could be transmitted by generation. As soon as the act of generation had taken place; God, according to those who maintained the pre-existence of souls in an ethereal body, sent this soul to take up its abode in that terrestrial body thus formed. On the other hand, those who believed that God created the soul at the same time the body was formed, or creationists, as they are called, claimed that God fashioned a soul to His image and likeness and then placed it in the material body generated by the parents.

Despite the great pressure brought to bear on him by St. Jerome, St. Augustine could not bring himself to subscribe to the creationist doctrine. Writing to the learned recluse of Bethlehem, he asks how it is possible for God to create a soul which He knows will be contaminated by sin, from the sole fact of its union with the body. Would not this be insulting the divine sanctity? And further, would not the acceptance of this theory immediately invite the charge of Manichaeism, since these heretics unqualifiedly ascribed the creation of evil to God Himself¹? In all pro-

1. Epist. CLXVI, 10; P. L. XXXIII, 275: *Doce ergo, quæso, quod doceam, doce quod teneam, et dic mihi si animæ singillatim singulis hodieque nascentibus fiunt, ubi in parvulis peccent, ut indigeant in Sacramento Christi remissione peccati. peccantes in Adam ex quo caro est propagata peccati:*

bability, it was just this fear of affording the Manichaeans an occasion for criticism, which made it impossible for the holy doctor to adopt the opinion of St. Jerome.

Hence it was that he simply preferred to admit traducianism. He claimed that at the time of the generative act, the substance of both parents is united and transformed. This new substance is then animated by a spiritual soul, which emanates from the souls of the father and the mother, just as one light is produced from another, *ut eas animas ex illa una anima Adam credas propagando traduci*¹. St. Augustine always felt that this view never gave an adequate explanation of the problem at stake and this is why he ever showed little enthusiasm in its defence. He readily conceded that a critical examination of this theory would at once bring the difficulty of explaining how the child's soul can emanate from the souls of the parents, without possessing a part of the souls of the parents².

Despite the care exercised in the formulation of this

aut si non peccant, qua iustitia Creatoris ita peccato obligantur alieno, cum exinde propagatis membris mortalibus inseruntur, ut eas, nisi per Ecclesiam subventum fuerit, damnatio consequatur, cum in earum potestate non sit, ut eis possit gratia baptismi subveniri. Tot igitur animarum millia, quæ in mortibus parvulorum sine indulgentia christiani sacramenti de corporibus exeunt, qua æquitate damnantur, si novæ creatæ, nullo modo præcedente peccato, sed voluntate Creatoris singulæ singulis nascentibus adhæserunt, quibus eas animandis ille creavit et dedit; qui utique noverunt quod unaquæque earum nulla sua culpa sine baptismo Christi de corpore fuerat exitura? Quoniam igitur neque de Deo possumus dicere quod vel cogat animas fieri peccatrices, vel puniat innocentes; neque negare fas nobis sit, eas quas sine Christi sacramento de corporibus exierint, etiam parvulorum nonnisi in damnationem trahi; obsecro te, quomodo hæc opinio defenditur, qua creduntur animæ non ex illa una primi hominis fieri omnes, sed sicut illa una uni, ita singulis singulæ.

1. Epist. CXC, 14, P. L. XXXIII, 861. In this writing Augustine declares that his opinion must not be confounded with the generationism of Tertullian. The latter, he says, went so far as to state that the human soul is the result of the generative substances in man as well as in animals. *Quo diversius quid dici potest? Neque hos Tertullianum somniasse mirandum est, qui etiam ipsum Creatorem Deum non nisi corpus opinatur.*

2. *Ibid.*, 15.

theory, St. Augustine and his position were bitterly attacked by Julian of Eclanum. If generation, the latter argued, is the means of transmitting original sin, then the best method to limit and eradicate sin, is to prohibit matrimony. To this attack, St. Augustine replied in his treatise *De nuptiis*, wherein he declared that the generative act must be classed as good, although it is always accompanied by the excitement of concupiscence¹.

But the great argument which from time immemorial has been urged against traducianism, is fatal to its acceptance. If the parents' souls are spiritual, they must be simple; if simple, they are indivisible. If indivisible, how can they be divided and partially transmitted? Hence as a system, the spiritualistic philosophy was forced to reject the Augustinian explanation.

And yet, if original sin in its strict definition, is made to mean the same as concupiscence, it becomes quite difficult to explain its propagation in any other way.

St. Thomas' Solution. — St. Anselm was the first scholar explicitly to teach that the nature of original sin consisted in the loss of original justice. But whether all or only a part of man's original righteousness was lost, St. Thomas does not state.

Unwilling to place himself in opposition to the teaching of St. Augustine, and yet feeling himself constrained to do so on this point at least, St. Thomas reluctantly adopted the view of St. Anselm. Like him, he made original sin consist mainly in man's forfeiture of his original state of justice. But more of this later on.

In order to explain the manner of the transmission of original sin, St. Thomas proposed the theory of *the right of representation*. The first man, he writes, was as it

1. *De Nuptiis*, II, 25; *P. L.*, XLIV, 560.

were the agent of all his descendants, *quoddam principium totius humanæ naturæ*¹. Should he persevere in the state to which God had raised him, all mankind like him, would be born into original justice. But should he sin, his fall would be imparted to all men. All of his descendants would share his responsibility, just as the citizens of any state are answerable for the conduct of their ambassador. Hence they would be born deprived of all preternatural and supernatural favor.

This explanation had already been propounded by St. Paul, for in various passages we find that he insists again and again on the fact that Adam is *the representative* of the human race. His ideas, however, did not carry with them the systematic construction, which St. Thomas gave them. They are less rigorous and naturally less technical than those of the Angelic Doctor.

The Pauline teaching did win some of the Fathers of the Church, for we find St. Irenæus writing that Adam represented the whole human race, because we, as it were, were summed up in his personality.

Before leaving this subject, we must say a word about two opinions, which, although too exaggerated and too strict, have been and are quite apt to make their way into sermons, especially by incautious and impulsive preachers.

Some time before the opening of the Council of Trent,

1. *Quæst. disput. de malo*, q. IV, a. 1 : *Est autem considerandum, quod primo homini in sua institutione datum fuerat divinitus quoddam supernaturale donum, scilicet originalis justitiæ, per quam ratio subdebatur Deo, et inferiores vires rationi, et corpus animæ. Hoc autem donum non fuerat datum primo homini ut singulari personæ tantum, sed ut cuidam principio totius humanæ naturæ, ut scilicet ab eo per originem derivaretur in posteros. Hoc autem donum acceptum primus homo per liberum arbitrium peccans amisit eo tenore quo sibi datum fuerat, scilicet pro se et pro tota sua posteritate. Defectus ergo hujus doni totam ejus posteritatem consequitur et sic iste defectus eo modo traducitur in posteros quomodo traducitur humana natura : quæ quidem traducitur non quidem secundum se totam sed secundum aliquam sui partem, scilicet secundum carnem, cui Deus animam infundit.*

Catharinus, a Dominican, in his famous book *De casu hominis et peccato originali*, bitterly and scathingly attacked all the various theories that had been proposed in explanation of the transmission of original sin. St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Thomas, all came under the fire of his criticism. He claimed that all had erred in making original sin consist in the mere loss of a preternatural and supernatural gift. This loss is not sufficient to make us sinners. At best it is the punishment for sin committed, and not the sin itself. Sin is a free act and hence original sin like any other sin, must consist also in an act. Once we arrive at the act committed, we know what the sin is. What was the act that produced the first sin? The answer is easy, for it is nothing else than Adam's *prevarication*, i. e. *his eating of the forbidden fruit*. This is the act which is *our sin*, and this is the sin which is on us, because in the eyes of God, we have, in some manner, acted with our common forefather¹.

Hence according to this author, all men are born sinners, because, in the divine mind, they are considered to have sinned with Adam and because they really did act with him, *moraliter loquendo*.

This view of the case, however, demands some qualification. When the inhabitants of a country instruct an agent to act in their name, they share, though indirectly, in the conduct of that agent. They are, it is said, the *moral cause* of the acts of their delegate. But Adam could not act as an *agent for humanity*, because humanity was non-existent. *God alone could delegate him*. Hence mankind could not share in the conduct of their representative, except by the will of God.

Jansenius revived the doctrine of St. Augustine, and

1. *Op. cit.* disp. V, p. 183 : *Sed nullus actus noster proprius talis fingi potest nec alius... nisi illa primi patris nostri prima prævaricatio actualis, id est illa vetiti fructus comestio... Haec ergo sola dicenda est peccatum nostrum quod et in nobis aliquam certe habet rationem culpæ, quia aliquo modo in patre eramus coram oculis Dei.*

grossly exaggerating it, he declared that mankind had actually taken part in the sin of Adam, because as he claimed, Adam, not only was a moral, but also a physical (*physice seu seminaliter*) summary of the human race.

In conclusion, let us call attention to the two points which we have established.

1. Adam, by a special disposition on the part of God, was in a unique manner, made the representative of all mankind.

2. Adam sinned as mankind's head, and as he was reduced to a fallen and degenerate state, so all his descendants are born in the same state.

CHAPTER III

THE EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN ON ADAM'S POSTERITY

No better description of the disastrous consequences of man's defiance of God, can be found than the figurative interpretation given the parable of the Good Samaritan, by the Venerable Bede¹ in his *Commentary on the the Gospel of St. Luke*. According to him, the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, is none other than Adam and the whole human race. Jerusalem is but a figure of the heavenly city, whilst Jericho is the city of sin and misery. Adam, and with him the whole human race, by sinning, left Jerusalem, the abode of peace, and set out for Jericho, the city of wickedness.

En route, he was attacked by robbers, — the devil and his evil angels. They fell upon him, despoiled (*despoliaverunt*) him of his goods and robbed him of his original innocence which had been given to him by God (*gloria videlicet immortalitatis et innocentiae veste privarunt*). Not satisfied with this, they covered him with wounds which impaired his natural faculties for all times, and departing left him in this state (*naturae humanae integritatem violando, seminarium quoddam — ut ita dicam — augendae mortis, fessis indidere*

1. St. Bede surnamed the Venerable (674-735) was the most distinguished scholar of the English Church in the eighth century. His commentaries on both the Old and New Testament are very curious, and bear the marks of the writer's wonderful erudition. His complete works may be found in Migne, P. L. XC-XCII.

visceribus)¹. In a word, man was made a slave of sin.

Summing up this commentary of the Venerable Bede, the theologians of the Middle Ages asserted that the devil and his angels left Adam, and with him and in him, the whole human race, *spoliatus et vulneratus, spoliatus scilicet in donis gratuitis, vulneratus autem in naturalibus*.

This formula had a great success, from the time of the sixteenth century onward, especially in those circles where the teachings of Luther, Calvin, Baius and Jansenius held sway. Because of Adam's sin, they said, human nature was not only despoiled of the supernatural and preternatural favors, but was further wounded or weakened in the natural gifts. It had lost the moral power necessary and sufficient to fight against concupiscence.

The opponents of this teaching could not help accepting the received formula, but they interpreted it in a different manner. Because of Adam's sin, they said, human nature was *spoliata in gratuitis scilicet gratia stricte dicta*; moreover, it was *vulnerata in naturalibus, scilicet orbata donis præternaturalibus*. This second opinion which has come more and more into prominence, since the end of the eighteenth century, is that which is accepted by the majority of theologians of our times.

The Practical Importance of this Question. — From this, it is quite easy to understand the *practical import* of the question with which we are occupied. According as one chooses *one or the other of these two solutions*, he has to give

1. In *Lucæ Evangelium Expositio*, III, P. L. XCII. 468-469. Yet in speaking of the injury done to man's nature, Bede is not too radical. He declares that sinful man still retains the natural power to love and to know God. *Semivivum* (hominem reliquerunt (diabolus et angeli mali) quia beatitudinem vitæ immortalitatis exuere, sed non sensum rationis abolere valuerunt. Ex qua enim parte sapere et cognoscere Deum potest, vivus est homo. Ex qua vero peccatis contabescit et miseria deficit, mortuus idem, lethiferoque est vulnere fœdatus.

a special aspect and color to the defense of the dogma of original sin.

Put into a few words, the whole question naturally resolves itself to this : Are all of Adam's descendants, because of his fall, born not only deprived of original justice, but also weakened in their natural gifts¹?

We, all of us, live in a world of misery and woe. Shall we explain this pitiable state by the claim that man deviated from the divine plan in his creation, and suffered an impoverishment of his nature as a consequence of his conduct? This claim has been made and its defendants assert that the world's sorrow and suffering is the experimental proof for the existence of an original sin.

But on the other hand, it is asserted by some that, despite the miseries of man, his natural faculties were left unimpaired. God, in creating man owes to Himself to endow him with these qualifications which would best enable him to realize the end of his being. More than this He is not bound to, and hence man's present condition is not a proof for an original lapse, drawn from experience.

The solution chosen will evidently command the apologetical view-point assumed in defending the dogma of original sin².

Critical Exposition of the First Solution. — The first of the two solutions mentioned above can be understood in a twofold manner. Some of its adherents have taken it absolutely, others have mitigated it.

1. Natural gifts are those qualities with which God must clothe every man in virtue of his creation, always supposing, however, that mankind has acted in accordance with the divine plan. They are the faculties which man needs to work out the end of his being, and include all the virtues and habits which spring from the exercise of these faculties.

2. What we have in mind here is only the question of the weakening of the will. As for the darkening of the intellect, this we shall see further in note, p. 161.

The Jansenists and Pascal¹ have clung to the absolute interpretation. They argue that man is thoroughly vicious, claiming that his moral freedom is entirely under the domination of concupiscence. They furthermore claim that, left to his own resources, that is, unaided by grace, he can do nothing but sin. On the other hand, as God could not have planned a being so misshapen, man himself must have by some failure on his part, been the cause of his woeful condition. This argues, then, the existence of a sin committed in the very beginning of things, by the head of the human race.

This interpretation we cannot accept. The Church denies that man's nature has been corrupted by original sin in the manner the Jansenists assert. Even if Adam's sin did affect the nature of his descendants, its consequences in no way entailed the total subjection of man's free will to the power of concupiscence².

1. « It is nevertheless, an astounding fact that the mystery that transcends our reason more than any other, the transmission of original sin, is the one thing without which we could have no knowledge of ourselves! For there is nothing more shocking to our intellect than the assertion that the sin of Adam has corrupted those far removed from him and therefore incapable of co-operating in his fall. This transmission appears to us not only impossible, but it is highly unjust, for is it not contrary to all the rules of our own puny ideas of justice, to condemn an infant to the eternal torments of hell, for a sin in which it had so little share, a sin committed some six thousand years before it sprang into being? Certainly there is nothing that does more violence to our right way of thinking than this teaching, and yet without it, incomprehensible as it is, we would be incomprehensible to ourselves. The stress of our condition furnishes the twists and turns in this valley of tears, so much so that man is more inconceivable without this mystery than this mystery is inconceivable to man ». Cf. sect. VIII, 434, p. 532, *ed. Brunsvigg*. See also same section, 436, 429, 441, 479, 481.

With the theologians of Port Royal, Pascal admitted that man's moral will is entirely dominated either by concupiscence or the love of the creature, or by grace, i. e. by faith working through charity, or in a word by the love of God. If man is in such a state of misery, it is because there was a sin committed in the beginning. Pascal's extreme severity in his judgment of fallen man is far from the exaggérations of Jansenius and Arnauld.

2. The Council of Trent condemned those who asserted that original sin wiped out man's free will. *Si quis liberum hominis arbitrium, post Adæ peccatum, amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, aut rem esse de solo titulo,*

Pascal and the others went too far. His conclusions were too rigid. Yet his position, unaccepted as it is by many, did not force the complete abandonment of the view that by Adam's fall man's faculties were impaired. Unlike the Jansenists, the defenders of this position do not assert that concupiscence reigns supreme and they emphatically deny that human nature is essentially corrupt. What they do claim is that man's liberty is so weakened in its exercise that surely man is not in a normal state. We are born in a state inferior to that of pure nature. Such a state of affairs could be made possible only by original sin.

This interpretation does not run counter to the doctrine of the Church, but it could easily be tainted with exaggeration.

First of all, care should be taken not to exaggerate the miserable condition of mankind. Thus one would not be justified in saying that concupiscence has so far dominated the soul as to habitually hamper it in the exercise of its freedom. Such an exaggeration might enhance the oratorical effect, it could not escape the charge of being Jansenistic in tone.

Furthermore, in accepting this view of the effects of original sin, it is well to bear in mind the following observations. The assertion that man's nature has been impoverished proves that at the beginning of things the first man was a sinner, but it does not prove at all that the descendants of this first sinner are likewise under the bondage of sin. To argue in this wise would be to argue in a circle. Looking at the world's woes as I come in contact with them, I can say, both from internal and external experience, that I myself am a being whose nature has been impaired. No one can contest this assertion. On the other hand, I believe in

imo titulum sine re, figmentum denique a Satana invecum in Ecclesia : A. S. DENZ., 845. A few years later, Baius was condemned for teaching that the works of infidels are sins, and the good works of the philosophers, vices. DENZ., 1025.

a God infinitely wise, who cannot be the author of a being thus situated. The reason must lie in the transgression committed by mankind's representative. That Adam sinned, is all that I can affirm. There is nothing which will permit me to conclude that I too am a sinner. To make for this conclusion, I should have made it clear at the beginning of my discussion, that not only am I reduced in my natural faculties, but also that by nature I am a sinner. Now, my own experience which supplied the premises of my conclusion, tells me nothing of original sin. If it did, then all my ratiocination would have been useless, for, by the mere analysis of my inner and outer experience, I would have already possessed the knowledge of what I was attempting to arrive at, namely, the transmission of original sin.

As a last remark, let it be noted that it is unfair to ascribe to St. Augustine this line of argument. Some authors have accused him of this; but they must have overlooked the fact that in many of his writings the holy Doctor affirms that man is really endowed with moral freedom, and has the power to act counter to his evil inclinations¹. When he speaks of the degenerate state of man, he almost always has in mind the extraordinary privileges that Adam forfeited by his sin². If he does affirm that human

1. In his *De libero arbitrio*, composed about 394, St. Augustine declares that the fact that the soul is naturally ignorant, or naturally weak, is not a guilt. *Non enim quod naturaliter nescit et naturaliter non potest, hoc animæ deputatur in reatum*, l. III. 61; *P. L.* XXXII. 1302. The Saint's idea never changed. He maintained it in 415 when he wrote his *De perfectione justitiæ hominis*; see c. iv. and vi., *P. L.* XLIV. 295-298. Towards the end of his life, in his *Imperfectum opus*, he writes that man (here he uses the term in its general meaning) sinned because he freely willed it and that to will it not, was in his power as well. *Et ita homo creatus est ut et nolle posset et velle, et quodlibet horum haberet in potestate*, l. V. c. xl: *P. L.* XLV. 1477. This is why St. Augustine could assert that there was nothing in common in his teaching and that of the Manichæans. See *De nuptiis* and *Contra Julianum*.

2. See especially the passage, *Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum, ad Bonifacium*, l. 4, 5; *P. L.* XLIV. 552, where the Saint's thought admits of no argument. *Dicunt, inquit [Julianus], illi manichæi, quibus modo non communicamus, id est toti isti cum quibus dissentimus, quia primi hominis*

nature, by its own resources, can do nothing but sin, he does not mean that human nature, unaided by any other power, can do nothing that is not inspired by the sinful dictates of concupiscence. What he does mean, is that human nature, left to itself, cannot perform a meritorious act.

Hence Pascal's solution can be still maintained, if softened down and if the three observations which we have just laid down, be taken into account¹.

Thus modified, it may deserve criticism, but cannot be condemned. It is still a sound method of apologetics. The misery that prevails on all sides is really appalling, and the question must ever force itself upon us whether God could have created or would still create man in a state wherein he is so much under the sway of concupiscence, if at the beginning of things some grave fall had not called down upon humanity a universal curse.

This consideration will always make a deep impression on all men who themselves have experienced sufferings and sorrow, and who have heard the plaintive cries of their brothers. To those who have succeeded in all their undertakings, and are consequently wrapped up in their own thoughts and are imbued with a spirit of optimism, this consideration will not appeal. It may scandalize them, for they will naturally question the actual experience of a curse whose origin is veiled in the dim past.

Critical Exposition of the Second Solution. — Those who

peccato, id est, Adæ, liberum arbitrium perierit, et nemo jam potestatem habeat bene vivendi, sed omnes in peccatum carnis suæ necessitate cogantur. Manichæos appellat catholicos... Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa quæ in paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate justitiam. Propter quod natura humana, divina indiget gratia... See De natura et gratia, 56; ib. 274.

1. This is the view held by NEWMAN, *Apologia*, ch. V, p. 241-243, and strongly defended by P. FORDE, *Original sin and human nature*, in *Irish Theol. Quarterly*, April 1910.

hold this second opinion maintain that man suffered no enfeebling of his natural gifts, since he possesses the moral freedom to combat the base animal tendencies that make themselves felt in him. They do not mean to claim that this freedom is all-powerful; far from it. They are aware that the Church teaches, that morally speaking, we cannot, without the help of divine grace, observe the whole natural law for a considerable period of time, nor can we overcome very serious temptations. Still this liberty is both necessary and sufficient whereby man can, when seeking to acquire a physical and moral education conformable to his individual nature, rise to a greater perfection, by utilizing only his natural forces and employing the natural means that have been given him for this end.

It is quite evident that such a conception of human nature does not take into account the experience which served as the basis for the first opinion. What then is the main argument for this second solution? It is based on the authority of Holy Scripture, on tradition and the councils. Its advocates affirm the fact of Adam's sin and its transmission to all men, proving this latter by reasons taken from history. Nevertheless, they should not fail to first present a picture of the moral and physical evil in human nature.

Their method of argumentation is this : They first describe the miseries that are in store for every man who comes into this world. This must be done with utmost care. We are all conscious that there is within us, an ideal of truth and justice, in the realization of which we are balked by an obstacle ever at work. We may well ask, in what does this obstacle consist? We know only too well. It is the sum total of our innate lower tendencies that we share in common with animal nature. In those who have succumbed to it, it is stronger than in those who by their repeated and painful efforts to overcome it, have gradually risen superior to their disordered passions.

How does it happen that we experience such difficulty

in attaining what we know is the aim of our life? In other words, what is the origin of this great obstacle which we experience so painfully within us?

Evolutionists find an easy answer to these hard questions. They claim that man's lower nature marks the traces of his ancestors who were entirely ruled by their animal appetites. In the course of ages, these have decreased and will continue to grow less and less, in proportion as man strives to reach a higher and more perfect civilization. From a scientific point of view, this answer is merely hypothetical and will scarcely satisfy any one who is sincerely concerned with the problems of the human soul. In any case, this hypothesis is in direct contradiction to the Catholic faith.

The Church teaches that according to the divine plan, man was to experience no great difficulty in doing good and remaining steadfast to duty. On the contrary, he was to do all things with the greatest ease. Thus God in the beginning placed man in what is called the state of original innocence. He gave him preternatural gifts. Especially, He endowed his free will with such a strength that he could rule all his passions with ease. In giving man all these advantages, God desired that he should be a creature superior to all others, a sort of king of creation, with whom He could commune as a friend with a friend. This privileged state was to be the portion of all men, had the head of mankind persevered in keeping the divine commandment imposed upon him.

But Adam fell away from grace and committed the most abominable of sins. Unmindful of the fact that he owed all his gifts to God, he rejected Him when He offered Himself to him in an outburst of His infinite love. The divine justice demanded that God should withdraw all favors, and as a consequence man was left to his own natural forces. And this is the state into which all his descendants were to be born.

Thus reduced to a state of pure nature, man found

himself placed in a position where he was in direct opposition to the will of God, namely, in a state of sin. For, in creating man, God's purpose was to raise him to a highly supernatural state of perfection. Hence left to his own natural resources man now experiences the greatest difficulty in doing good and persevering in it.

This solution presented under this form possesses a value that no one dare gainsay¹. It gives a satisfactory explanation of the existence of moral and physical evil in the world. Although it cannot be termed a theory founded on experience and philosophy, it nevertheless rests on Scripture, tradition and the councils. And this is why it is the most commonly received opinion in theology².

It can be safely followed, without the least hesitation,

1. We might illustrate the matter by an example. Take the case of a child whose parents have loaded him down with favors. Not only do they give all their affection, but his very raising demanded a thousand sacrifices. They gave him a moral and physical education as far as in their power lay. Coming to the age of fifteen or sixteen, this child fails in his duties towards his parents. What then is their course of action? They take from him their favors and oblige him to earn his livelihood in the sweat of his brow. And this is just the reason why God treats mankind so severely. Perhaps the child of our story will, under the influence of better feelings, return to his duties and crave pardon from his parents. And they in turn, in their mercy and kindness, will receive him and begin again to give him some of the favors that were his in the beginning. In like manner God acts with each sinner : *Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam*.

2. THOM. AQ., *Quæst. disput. de malo*, q. v, a. 2, starts from the following principle : *Quod ergo detrimentum aliquod patitur aliqua persona in his quæ sunt supra naturam, potest contingere vel ex vicio naturæ, vel ex vicio personæ ; quod autem detrimentum patitur in his quæ sunt naturæ, hoc non videtur posse contingere nisi propter vitium proprium personæ. Ut autem ex præmissis patet, peccatum originale est peccatum personæ...*

This principle is applied in *Summa*, 1^a II^a, q. Ixxxv, a. 1 : *R. d. quod bonum naturæ humanæ potest tripliciter dici. Primo ipsa principia naturæ ex quibus ipsa natura constituitur et proprietates ex his causæ, sicut potentie animæ et alia hujusmodi. Secundo quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad virtutem... ipsa autem inclinatio ad virtutem est quoddam bonum naturæ. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturæ, donum originalis justitiæ, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti humanæ naturæ.*

Primum igitur bonum naturæ nec tollitur, nec diminuitur per pecca-

in the apologetical exposition of the dogma of original sin. It will recommend itself readily to those who by nature and by education are fond of an idealism, which, if we do not indorse, neither can we blame.

Side by side with these, there are many who are pessimistic by nature, and their number is daily increasing. This is one of the peculiarities of our age, that on every hand we are brought in contact with the most striking contrasts.

We may find both points of view in the same individual. It is easy to conceive of one and the same man, who being struck at one time by the misfortune he sees in his

tum. Tertium vero bonum naturæ totaliter est ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturæ scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem diminuitur per peccatum.

This *diminutio naturalis inclinationis ad virtutem* is not the *vulneratio naturalis* of the Jansenists. For St. Thomas the effect of Adam's sin on his posterity consists solely in this that all of them are born without original innocence.

This doctrine has been maintained especially by Suarez. Cf. *De necessitate gratiæ*, l. I, c. III, IV, XXIII, XXIV; also Bellarmine, *De gratia primi hominis*, c. v. Looked upon as it was by Jansenists as a renewal of the doctrines of Pelagianism, this doctrine has been given a very important place in the studies of the theologians of late years. Palmieri has summed up the matter best of all. See *De Deo creante et elevante*, thesis LXXVIII: *Itaque Adamus peccans amisit quidem nobis bona illa, quæ ipsi ut capiti naturæ, collata fuerunt propaganda in posteros, quæ sunt bona gratuita; at bona naturalia non amisit. Hinc capacitas Dei ut finis naturalis non est amissa, propter ejus peccatum, a posteris. Ipse quidem actu peccans quandoquidem et contra legem naturalem peccavit, aversus est quoque a fine naturali; at peccatum ejus non imputatur nobis nisi quatenus caput nostrum in ordine morali propagandorum donorum supernaturalium, constitutus erat; ideoque aversio a fine naturali fuit ejus propria, nec transit ad posteros. Ergo homo in statu naturæ lapsæ idem est ontologice quoad bona naturalia, ac homo qui in statu naturæ puræ fuisset: differentia tamen est quod defectus bonorum supernaturalium, qui, in pura natura, fuisset pura carentia, sit in natura lapsa privatio; ac propterea culpa sit in natura lapsa et sit ea servitus diaboli, quæ non essent in pura natura primum creata.* Same doctrine in HÜRTER, *De Deo creatore*, n. 395. — CH. PESCH, *De Deo creante et elevante*, n. 284. — A. TANQUERÉY, *De Deo creante et elevante*, n. 920. — MONSABRÉ, *Exposition du Dogme*, 1877, conf. 28°.

own life and in the lives of others, is firmly convinced that the first solution is the only adequate one, while at other times, seeing the upright lives of men with no distinctive religious influence, he is persuaded that the second solution contains the best possible answer. For, indeed both opinions can be held with an equal amount of certitude.

A third solution. — From what we have just said, we can safely maintain either of the foregoing theories. We may argue that human nature, although not fundamentally corrupted as the Jansenists assert, is nevertheless inferior to pure nature. Or, we may claim that the faculties of fallen man are as potent as if he were in a state of pure nature, and deny that there was any weakening of man's natural gifts, because of Adam's sin.

But may there not be a midway position? The partisans of the second explanation affirm that fallen man possesses faculties with as great capabilities as man in a state of pure nature. This we may subscribe to, readily. We further grant that God could have created man just as he is in his present condition. Yet, we must admit that man, even though his faculties have not been impaired, is morally incapable of persevering for any length of time in the observance of the natural law, nor can he withstand violent temptations. This must be granted, for it is part of the Church's teaching¹.

But if God had created Adam in a state of pure nature, viz. in a state like the state in which we are born, then Adam would have found it morally impossible to fulfil the natural law. This, we fully realize, sounds rather strange and is offensive to religious ears. This is why Suarez adds that if God had created man in his natural state, He would have given him preternatural gifts which would help him to

1. DENZ. 90. This teaching will be further considered in our discussion of the Pelagian system. See p. 154-161.

observe the whole natural law without much difficulty¹.

This remark of the learned theologian is the basis upon which a third and intermediary explanation has been built.

On account of Adam's sin we are born in a state which excludes preternatural and supernatural gifts, a condition which is altogether normal, for our faculties are as strong as they would have been in the state of mere nature. But they are working now at a disadvantage. The extraordinary assistance which God would have given in the state of *natura pura* is lacking and, as a consequence, man attains his natural end with the greatest difficulty. He becomes involved more and more in error and sin, in those very conflicts in which man in a state of mere nature could gain easy victories.

Hence in the state of mere nature, man could have easily attained his natural end; after the fall, there remains the possibility, but only with the greatest difficulty. Fallen man soon recognizes by sad experience, that he is insufficiently armed for the strife. He may hear voices calling him to higher and greater things, but he lacks the wings to soar to these heights².

Moreover, this fully realized impotence towards his natural end begets in the heart of fallen man, a feeling that his lot is insupportable and intolerable. Consequently, all enthusiasm in pursuing the end of his being is dampened, for weariness and grief mark his steps; the consciousness of duty only partly fulfilled can hardly be a source of joy, because there is always present the realization that much is still to be done; daily his views become higher and higher and his power of action is correspondingly held in restraint. There is as much difference between man in a state of pure nature and man in the fallen condition, as there is between one who has lost a great fortune and one who has never

1. *De necessitate gratiae*, l. I. c. xxiv, 20, quoted below p. 159, note 1.

2. This is the solution advocated by Abbé de Broglie in his *Conférences sur la vie surnaturelle*, II. Conf. 6, 7. Read too the preface by Bishop Perraud.

tasted the comforts of wealth. Both must labor for their daily bread in the sweat of their brows, but the former is a saddened dreamer, where the latter finds complete satisfaction.

This solution, like the other two, possesses its own apologetical value. It makes human misery a cogent argument for the existence of a primitive fall. Willingly or unwillingly we are forced to acknowledge the force of this argument. The solution, as it stands, does no violence to our intellect, for it affirms that if fallen man is almost incapable of fulfilling the duties of his natural state, it is not because his moral personality has been weakened, but because the assistance of a preternatural help has been denied him ¹.

1. Fallen man in obeying the dictates of his conscience soon receives this preternatural aid, which is given in virtue of the merits of our Lord. It happens most frequently, however, that God bestows a supernatural grace immediately. This latter does not modify the intrinsic difficulty of the acts of virtue as the preternatural help would have done.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

After having examined original sin under its different aspects, we are now ready to answer the question, In what does original sin precisely consist?

Viewed in all its complexity, we can certainly answer, that it consists in *the loss of all original innocence*. Since, however, this loss really makes us all sinners, what we want to know is, *Which one of the elements of the state of original righteousness* is it whose forfeiture has placed us in a state of sin?

The Nature of Original Sin according to St. Paul. — In the teaching of St. Paul, there was a close connection between original sin and our actual sins, and hence we find his doctrine of original sin intimately bound up with his ideas on sin in general.

The Pauline teaching on sin can be summed up in the three following propositions :

1. Man, at the present time, is dominated by an evil influence, which Paul sometimes calls sin, and other times concupiscence ¹.

1. In order to understand the sense of this expression, we must have some idea of the anthropology of St. Paul. According to him :

1° All men bear in themselves an objective power of personal sin, δύνανται.

2° This power permeates the flesh because of the sin of Adam. From that

2. This influence inspires all our actual sins.

3. It came into the world as the result of Adam's transgression of a positive law. As the head of the human race, he acted in the name of all men and drew down his guilt upon them¹.

Man then is doubly a sinner. He commits personal and

time onward, the flesh is under the dominion of the law of sin. We have a sinful flesh, *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*. This explains why the Apostle identifies flesh with sin in so many passages. See in particular Gal. V. 17.

3^d Since the flesh is ruled by the law of sin, it vitiates all the powers that come under its influence. Hence there is within us *ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός*, Gal. V. 17; *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός*, Rom. VIII. 6; *θέλημα τῆς σαρκός*, Eph. II. 3; and even *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός*, Col. II. 18.

4th To better understand these expressions we must note that like the writers of the O. T., St. Paul distinguishes in the soul of the just man, two principles at play. *σὰρξ* the flesh, and *πνεῦμα* the Spirit of God. These two are in opposition to each other. Frequently the Apostle is content to mention these two principles, and point out the enmity of the flesh against the spirit. Yet, in many other passages the psychology of St. Paul is more complex. First he distinguishes the flesh, *σὰρξ*, and then the principle which animates the flesh, i. e. the vegetative and sensitive life, *ψυχὴ*. *Νοῦς* is the power to discern the good, *φρόνημα* and to desire the good, *θέλημα*. The sum total of these powers makes up a determinate body which he calls *σῶμα*. The centre of all these activities is the heart, *καρδίᾳ*.

If man, as a consequence of his sin, is abandoned by the spirit of God, the flesh is laid open to three tendencies toward evil, the pleasures of the flesh, *ἐπιθυμία σαρκός*, the perversion of the will, and the perversion of the intellect. This is why there is in sinful man, *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός*, i. e. *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός* and *θέλημα τῆς σαρκός*. It is to these three inclinations that the Apostle gives the name of sin, *ἁμαρτία*.

The most powerful of these tendencies is the desire for the pleasures of the flesh, lust, sensuality, which we commonly refer to as concupiscence, *ἐπιθυμία σαρκός*. This is why this expression is often employed to designate all evil propensity in its triple form. Cf. Rom. V. 12; VI. 12; VII. 7-8; — Gal. V. 16-21; Col. III. 5. Cf. Stevens, *The Theology of the N. T.* p. 14, *The Theology St. Paul*, ch. II, *Flesh and spirit*.

1. Hence those are wrong who claim that St. Paul identified original sin with concupiscence. Certainly he saw original sin in the workings of concupiscence, but he made it the effect of Adam's fall. St. Paul made original sin consist in *concupiscence implanted in us because of Adam's violation of a positive precept*. There is no great difference between this and the conception that original sin consists in concupiscence as related to the deprivation of original innocence.

actual sin, and is moreover ruled by an evil influence, emanating from Adam's sin, which is concupiscence. As St. Paul puts it in the Epistle to the Ephesians (II. 3), we are *natura filii irae*. Original sin consists in that sin of nature.

Whosoever is not dead, with Christ, to that sin by baptism, is *carnal* (*carnalis homo*), in opposition to the *spiritual man* who lives in the state of grace and is totally subject to the spirit of Christ (I Cor. III, 1-3). Those not regenerated by baptism are deprived of grace and are subject to concupiscence. They are deprived of original righteousness.

Such is the Pauline doctrine of original sin. Drawing, as he does, a close relation between original sin and all the other sins, it becomes immediately clear, how Christ, in freeing us from original sin, also gained for us the remission of our actual sins.

The Nature of Original Sin according to St. Augustine.—In order to grasp the doctrine of St. Augustine in regard to the nature of original sin, we must first consider his teaching on concupiscence.

According to this holy Doctor, concupiscence is not merely passion. It is something more; it is inordinate passion, seeking the fulfilment of its cravings in a manner that man's moral conscience reproves and free will must prevent. Besides, it has become a power for sinning, a power capable of holding the moral will in check. It is essentially evil, and therefore human nature which is infected with it, has become vitiated. This does not mean, as Luther, Calvin, Baius and Jansenius later maintained, that human nature is incapable of resisting concupiscence, nor that it is irresistibly drawn towards evil. Despite the fact that concupiscence has corrupted it, man's nature still preserves the *moral freedom*, and hence possesses the power to act against the sinful tendencies of the flesh. However, unaided by grace, man's moral liberty is scarce-

ly a match for concupiscence, and hence *practically* is capable of accomplishing little that is good¹.

Adam, after his fall, was made subject to concupiscence, although its sinful tendencies were ably and effectually counterbalanced by the exercise of his moral freedom; we all share in his condition. It is in this, that St. Augustine sees the *formal essence* of original sin².

In formulating this doctrine, St. Augustine had no intention of asserting that original sin was nothing more than concupiscence. With him, as with us, original sin consists in the entire loss of original innocence. But that this loss is a sin, is due to the fact that it implies *the appearance of concupiscence*. — Besides, St. Augustine in using the term, concupiscence, almost always has reference to the concupiscence of the flesh.

At first sight, it might seem that there is little difference between the Pauline and the Augustinian doctrine on this

1. Cf. *De libero arbitrio*, l. III, 64; *P. L.*, XXXII, 1302. — *De perfectione justitie hominis*. c. IV et VI; *P. L.*, XLIV, 295-298. — *Imperfectum opus*, l. V, c. XL; *P. L.*, XLV, 1477. — *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, l. II, 50; *P. L.*, XLIV, 465-466. — *Contra Julianum*, l. II, 37; *P. L.*, XLIV, 701-702. — *Ad Bonifac.*, l. I, 4 and 5; *P. L.*, XLIV, 552. — *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 5, 7, 21-22; *P. L.*, XLIV. For the interpretation of these texts, see J. MARTIN, *Saint Augustin*, l. II, ch. IV, *Dieu et l'homme*, Paris, 1901.

2. Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, l. I, 27; *P. L.*, XLIV, 429 : *Ex hac carnis concupiscentia quæ licet in regeneratis jam non deputetur in peccatum, tamen natura non accidit nisi de peccato : ex hac, inquam, concupiscentia carnis... quæcumque nascitur proles originali est obligata peccato.*

A little further on, he continues, 29 : *In eis ergo qui regenerantur in Christo, cum remissionem accipiunt prorsus omnium peccatorum, utique necesse est ut reatus etiam hujus licet adhuc manentis concupiscentiæ remittatur, ut in peccatum, sicut dixi, non imputetur. Nam sicut eorum peccatorum quæ manere non possunt, quoniam cum sunt prætereunt, reatus tamen manet, et nisi remittatur, in æternum manebit : sic illius, quando remittitur, reatus aufertur. Hoc est enim, non habere peccatum, reum non esse peccati.*

Hence according to St. Augustine, every man who shares in the humanity of Adam, is by that very fact made subject to concupiscence. This is a fault and at the same time a punishment, bearing the double character of *realis culpæ* and *reatus poenæ*. He who receives baptism loses the former, but still retains the latter.

point. Resemblances, there are no doubt, but side by side with them, there are also important differences.

Both place the essence of original sin in concupiscence. St. Paul considers concupiscence as the consequence of the violation of a positive precept. Then too, by concupiscence, he understands not only the lust of the flesh, but also the sinful thoughts and desires of our fallen nature. St. Augustine, on the contrary, nowhere explicitly teaches that the relation between concupiscence and the sin of Adam belongs to the essence of original sin. Moreover, for him, concupiscence nearly always means the lust of the flesh, or what we call the concupiscence of the flesh or sensuality.

Further, St. Paul never shows explicitly how concupiscence does not destroy man's moral liberty, although he does hint at it in several passages¹. He contents himself in opposing concupiscence to grace, the flesh to the spirit, and in showing how grace can gain the mastery over concupiscence². St. Augustine, however, stung by the charge of Manichaeism made by Julian of Eclanum, declared that man's moral freedom, although it accomplishes little when left to itself, can, even by its own resources, subdue the evil tendencies of human nature.

The Nature of Original Sin from the Time of St. Anselm.
— Whatever defects it may possess, the Augustinian view has always found defenders among theologians of all schools and of all times.

In the sixteenth century, Calvin brought it once more to the fore and by the exaggerated interpretation that he gave it, claimed that original sin had completely corrupted

1. Cf. *Rom.* i. 18-32 where he reproaches the Romans for their failure to act in accordance with the natural lights imparted to them.

2. *Gal.*, v, 17 : *Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; hæc enim sibi invicem adversantur, ut non quæcumque vultis, illa faciat.*

human nature, and the sin itself consisted in this corruption. After him, other theologians took up the Augustinian view and made it mean many things. According to some, mankind's hereditary stain consisted in the transmission of a substantial form; according to others, in the transmission of an accidental form, called by Jansenius *cupiditas vitiosa*, *amor creaturæ* or *prava delectatio*, and by Gregory of Riez, *qualitas morbida*, vague expressions all, employed to designate either concupiscence or one of its special aspects.

All this theorizing had gone on, despite the fact that as early as the twelfth century, St. Anselm had dealt the Augustinian theory a fatal blow. For St. Augustine, original sin meant principally concupiscence. He affirmed that baptism took away the sinful character of concupiscence, though concupiscence itself remained. Therefore, if a man regenerated by baptism persevered in sin, it was not because concupiscence was a part of him, but because he had succumbed to its allurements¹.

In his celebrated treatise on the *virginal Conception*, St. Anselm discussed the Augustinian view at length and showed its untenableness. If original sin consists in concupiscence, he argued, baptism which remits the one ought likewise to wipe out the other. But such is not actually the case². In what then must original sin be made to consist? In the privation of original innocence, St. Anselm replies. In whole or in part? In the privation of the preternatural gift which he designates as moral rectitude, i. e. in the impairment of the perfect moral freedom bestowed on Adam³.

1. See note p. 107, note 2.

2. *De conceptu virginali*, 4; *P. L.*, CLVIII, 437 : *Si peccata essent [ipsi appetitus quos Apostolus carnem vocat], auferrentur in baptismo, cum omne peccatum, abstergitur: quod nequaquam fieri palam est.*

The same objection had been made to Augustine by Julian, and he answered him by citing the texts which we have indicated. This answer evidently was not satisfactory for St. Anselm.

3. *Ibid.*, 3 : *Sciendum est quod quia justitia non potest esse nisi in vo-*

Later the Augustinian position was attacked by Abelard. His criticism was much more radical than that of the Archbishop of Canterbury. He boldly declared that as the loss of moral rectitude in man was not voluntary, it could not be justly called sin. Abelard was answered by Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard, who maintained that original sin in Adam's posterity, was really a sin, although not actual, but habitual¹.

The Council of Sens in 1140, declared that all men, because of their descent from Adam, are born in a state of sin. This definition received the confirmation of Pope Innocent II.

The consequence of this reaction was once more to revive the Augustinian view. What is original sin? is one of the questions put by the author of the *Summa Sententiarum*². « It is », he answers, « the gate of sin, namely, concupiscence (*fomes peccati scilicet concupiscentia*) which is also called the law of the members or the languor of our nature (*lex membrorum sive languor naturae sive tyrannus qui est in membris nostris...*). After the reception of baptism, concupiscence loses its sinful character, whereas it is no longer imputed. Before baptism, it is both a punishment and a sin, after the reception of the sacrament, it is merely a punishment for sin ».

Nevertheless, towards 1230, Alexander of Hales adopted the opinion of St. Anselm. Albert the Great taught it and its acceptance by St. Thomas, even though with qualifications, gave it the sanction of « a theological consecration ». Orig-

luntate, si iustitia est relictudo voluntatis, propter se servata : quare nec iniustitia.

1. DENZ., 376. Abelard never denied that the descendants of Adam were in a fallen state. He maintained that this state should not be considered a sin, but only as the punishment for sin.

2. Peter the Lombard according to some; Hugh of St. Victor, according to others; according to others still, Otho, a disciple of Hugh of St. Victor, according to Denifle, like Peter the Lombard.

nal sin, Aquinas writes, consists formally in the privation of that state of original righteousness wherein the will of Adam was in entire submission to the will of God¹. But he hastens to add immediately that it consists materially in concupiscence. Hence, St. Thomas can be neither called an Augustinian nor an Anselmian, for he is both. What was the reason of this attitude, may we ask? Was it because he did not wish to get away from the Augustinian view, or to reject the opinion of Albert the Great, that he proposed a sort of eclectic teaching? It was rather, it seems, because St. Thomas made use of psychological considerations which none of his predecessors had recourse to. As a matter of fact, there exists between man's moral liberty, on the one hand, and concupiscence on the other, a very close relation. They subsist in inverse ratio, one to the other. A diminution of man's moral liberty must mean an increase of the power of concupiscence, and *vice versa*. One must increase, before the other can decrease. Consequently, St. Thomas was justified in making concupiscence the material element of original sin, and the diminution of moral liberty, i. e. the impoverishment of the high moral rectitude conferred on Adam, the formal element.

It goes without saying that this doctrine can be safely taught to-day. Besides it differs from the teaching of St. Paul and St. Augustine but by a deeper psychological analysis.

It must not, however, be confounded with the doctrine laid down by modern theologians, such as Palmieri, for

1. *Quæ quidem subjectio primo et principaliter erat per voluntatem, cujus est movere omnes alias partes in finem... Unde ex aversione voluntatis a Deo consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animæ viribus. Sic ergo privatio originalis justitiæ, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animæ præcipue in hoc attenditur quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile: quæ quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis justitiæ (I^a II^æ, q. LXXXII).*

See also *In II Sent.*, dist. XXX. q. I, a. 3.

example. St. Thomas makes original sin formally consist in the total privation of original righteousness, considered as a state of perfect conformity with the will of God. At the present time, theologians make original sin formally consist in the privation of grace purely supernatural.

The manner in which the present-day teaching grew and was formulated, is as follows :

At the time of the Council of Trent, the Spanish Dominican, Soto, criticized both the teaching of St. Anselm and St. Thomas, employing the method adopted by St. Anselm in his examination of the Augustinian doctrine. If original sin consists in the privation of moral rectitude, why does not baptism, which wipes out original sin, at the same time restore this moral rectitude? Is it not lawful to argue that original sin must essentially consist in the privation of that which the reception of baptism restores to us? This criticism was easy enough, for, after all, St. Anselm had simply assigned as the essence of original sin, instead of a physico-psychic phenomenon, a purely psychological one.

The same reply that St. Augustine made to Julian of Eclanum, or the one made by the author of the *Summa Sententiarum*, might be made to the objection of Soto. It might be argued against this, that after the reception of baptism, the moral inferiority of man's soul is due to the fact that although he is no longer *reus culpae*, he is still *reus poenae*. But this answer gives no more satisfaction than that of St. Augustine, or the author of the *Summa Sententiarum*.

Soto's idea is that original sin should formally consist in the *privation of grace*, that is to say, of that supernatural life which we lost because of Adam's sin, and which is truly regained by baptism¹.

1. *De natura et gratia*, l. 5, p. 16 : ... *Justitia originalis nihil aliud fuerit quam gratia, majoris, hac parte, dignitatis quam gratia nostra, nempe quæ non modo hominem faceret gratum Deo, sed sensualitatem compesceret.*

One feature of this doctrine that must commend itself to every one, is its simplicity. Bellarmine¹ and Suarez² gave it their warm approval. And although scathingly attacked by the Jansenists who exaggerated the Augustinian view, it has been restored by the theologians of the nineteenth century, especially by Palmieri³, Mazzella, Hürter, Pesch, and Tanquerey.

It is not a dogma of faith and still remains a mere theological opinion. But there seems to be no reason to reject it.

1. *De amissione gratiæ et statu peccati*, l, V, c. 19 : *Si omnino privationem doni a Deo infusi [gratiæ stricte dictæ], a ratione formali peccati originalis excludat, repugnabit concilio tridentino.*

2. *De vitiis et peccatis*, dist. IX, sectio 2, 18 : *Peccatum originale... privat justitia seu quod idem est charitate et gratia, quatenus hominem convertunt ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, scilicet Deum.*

3. This author explains the term *privatio* as employed by Bellarmine and Suarez. We are not born simply in a state of *carentia*, but in a state of real *privatio*. Cf. *De Deo creante et elevante*, thes. 78.

CHAPTER V

HOW COULD GOD PERMIT ORIGINAL SIN?

This question is intimately connected with the question of the effects of original sin which has been treated in the third chapter. Its answer really marks the main point in the defence of the dogma of original sin.

From time immemorial, it has been urged again and again, that God could not, because of His very being, permit the commission of the first sin. If we look round about us, we shall find that man, no matter from what view-point he be regarded, whether in his physical constitution, or his intellectual activity, or his moral powers, is the most miserable of creatures. Such being the case, it is absurd to state that God, the infinitely wise and the infinitely good, created him in this condition. If God did not bring him so low, what was the cause that contributed to his misery? Himself and only himself. Created in a higher estate, the father of mankind fell from grace and his fall brought himself and all his posterity under the same divine curse.

But the objection becomes more embarrassing. How could an infinitely wise and merciful God, be so cruel as to make the sin and misery of Adam felt in the lives of all men of all times and all places? Again, if divine justice demanded that Adam's sin should be so severely punished, why did God permit him to commit it?

Such in brief is the objection. It is by no means new,

and it is one that must present itself at some time to all who believe and seek to justify their faith¹.

There are two ways of answering this difficulty, according as one admits or denies that man was impaired in his natural gifts.

How is one led to affirm or to deny that wound? It depends in great measure on one's surroundings and one's personal experience in life. Hence, either view deserves respect.

If, then, any one is persuaded that man is placed in a state where his natural faculties have been in some way impaired, if he believes that it would be simply impossible for God to create man in this condition, unless there was a fall in the beginning, the misery which he sees in the world round about him, and the consciousness of his own ills and woes, must make him argue the existence of a primitive fall. And thus it is, that the demands of the religious conscience form an argument for dogmatic conclusions.

But there immediately arise two objections, both of which are difficult to answer satisfactorily. On the one hand, punishment is always in proportion to the guilt, and on the other, according to our principles of morality, guilt always carries with it a personal character. Therefore, how can man suffer such a penalty as the impoverishment of his natural qualifications and his moral personality, because of the fault of another, his first ancestor?²

The best answer to this difficulty is that of Pascal. « Man is more incomprehensible without this mystery, than this mystery is incomprehensible to man ».

On the other hand, if one should deny that man has suffered any loss in his natural abilities, admitting at the

1. Cf. LACORDAIRE, *Conférences de Notre-Dame*, conf. 65°.

2. « For there is nothing that taxes our reason more than the assertion that the sin of Adam has made those guilty, who far distant from that source, seem to be unable to share therein ». PASCAL, *Pensées*, VII, 134, p. 532.

same time that God could create man in this condition, even though there were no sin in the beginning, the objection loses much of its force, and it becomes much easier to justify our dogma.

In our discussion, we shall draw a distinction between the general problem of evil and the dogma of original sin.

Our first step shall be an attempt at a solution of the problem of moral evil.

After a description of the disorders to which man is subject, it must be shown that there should be no exaggeration, and that everything can be explained naturally. It is sure that human misery is great, yet man retains his moral freedom. If he knows how to use it, he can elevate himself more and more in the life of perfection. Some limit, however, must be placed on this moral force, for one who is left to his natural resources cannot persevere very long in the observation of the whole natural law, nor can he overcome violent temptations, unaided by a special divine assistance¹. This perfection is partly transmitted by heredity and perfected by education. We can easily conceive of men endowed with such natural goodness, and we have met some who by merely adhering to the use of their natural gifts, have arrived at a high degree of natural morality.

It is indisputable that some men are born with enfeebled natures, and when they arrive at the age when passion makes itself felt, they find it very difficult to overcome their inclinations to evil. But such a case is not the usual thing with the great majority of men. Very often its existence is explained by a vicious habit acquired or transmitted to children by their parents.

Besides, such exceptions are in the nature of things to be expected, if God desired that man should freely attain his end, and in this wise promote His glory. Likewise, victory

1. See p. 154-161.

in war always and inevitably entails the loss of some lives. The commander does not desire the death of his soldiers, but what he does want is the victory for his army. But since every one must grant that success cannot be obtained without trial, it is inevitable, morally speaking, that some few should succumb.

The moral evil which exists in the world is, then, not so great as some would have us believe, and can be explained by reason alone. Consequently, there is nothing which would justify us in saying that because man suffers, he is therefore enfeebled in his natural abilities. God could have created him in this condition, even though Adam did not fall.

Nevertheless, all this is but arguing on a pure possibility. As a matter of fact, the Church in interpreting revelation, obliges us to believe that the actual state of man, a state which might have been normal, is a fallen state. In reality, this would not be man's fate, had he not been born fallen and sinner because of Adam's fall. Thus the philosophical explanation of the problem of evil must be completed by the dogma of original sin.

All the plausible objections against this mystery, readily disappear when we keep before our minds the following propositions which embody a summary of the whole Catholic doctrine on original sin.

1. Because of Adam's sin, we are born deprived only of those privileges to which we had no right.

2. This state of degeneracy really constitutes us sinners.

3. We are sinners because we were born deprived of grace.

4. In this state of privation, we are as a matter of fact in opposition to God's designs in our behalf.

CHAPTER VI

THE IDEA OF LIBERAL PROTESTANTS ON ORIGINAL SIN

As we have seen in the preceding pages, the Catholic teaching in regard to original sin is clear and unmistakable.

The Church emphatically declares that sin came into the world when Adam fell away from grace, and this sin is transmitted to all his descendants. This dogma developed in the Church, as the counterpart of the dogma of the Redemption.

The Rationalistic thought of the day looks upon the Redemption as absurd. Denying that humanity has been justified by the death of Christ, it was little wonder that it should deny that this same humanity had been stained by the fall of Adam. Many Protestants agree with the Rationalists on this point, though they refuse to reject the truthfulness of the Biblical record. They are therefore, constrained to accept the position that humanity is saved by its *imitation of Christ*, just as it sinned by *imitating Adam*.

The Protestant Idea of the Origin of Sin. — The starting point of the liberal Protestant theory on this point, is a fact of conscience. From the time that man is capable of reflection, he is conscious of a power within him which draws him away from good and inclines him to acts for which he is re-proved by his moral conscience.

This power is inborn in all men; it is a *fact universal*

and innate. It would not be an exaggeration to say it is *universal because it is innate.* Hence it is as it were, *a part of human nature.*

Although this power is natural, conscience *forbids* that we should follow its dictates. If we voluntarily commit the acts to which it solicits us, we *suffer* and are filled with *remorse*; we confess ourselves *sinner*s and *responsible* for our deeds and *liable* to punishment. And this is proof that this evil influence did not belong to our being in the beginning, that it formed no part of our essence. Otherwise, to satisfy the cravings of a natural instinct would be just and normal. It is therefore *natural* to us, and yet it is but an *accident* of our nature.

This is what the moral or religious conscience of both the individual and society at large, bears witness to. Now we have to seek the origin of this inclination.

The Church teaches that this inclination to evil is the consequence of Adam's sin. The first man was created in a higher state. The devil tempted him and led him to commit sin. This sin carried with it a state of degeneracy in which all of us are born.

But Protestants object, if Adam enjoyed a high estate, how could he sin?

By his fall, the nature of Adam, according to ecclesiastical writers, was vitiated, and that of all his posterity was corrupted.

Protestants look upon this as a rather serious assertion.

They claim that it is equivalent to saying that Adam's fall entailed the transformation of human nature by making it a principle of evil. On the other hand, as this transformation would be due to the agency of the devil, acting in opposition to God, it represents the victory of the evil principle over the good principle, all of which is Manichaeism under a new form.

Pursuing their argument, they pertinently demand the documents on which the Church bases her teaching. The

only ones are the second and third chapters of Genesis; but they are of no value unless they be interpreted symbolically¹.

After having rejected the Catholic doctrine, they attempt to explain the origin of sin. Their explanation is briefly this: The history of the first man is like our own. Like us, he soon found that two principles were at work in his soul, the one good, the other bad. The whole story of Genesis shows nothing else but that Adam had become conscious of this twofold activity.

Why then is such importance attached to a fact which occurs again and again in the life of every man? The first man must not be regarded in the light of an individual, but as humanity slowly emerging from the animal state in order to rise to a higher degree of perfection. The second and third chapters of Genesis narrate the first impression made on the heart of man, when he was evolving from a lower into a higher state.

We should add that evolution is not the sole basis of the Protestant position. Over and above this, it rests on what has been termed deterministic pantheism. The substance of man which passed from animality to spirituality, is the divine or universal substance, which goes on perfecting itself indefinitely. The power of sin born in each man is one of the necessary phases in the development of this universal substance; it is at the same time *natural* and *accidental*².

1. This is the criticism made by Schleiermacher. Bovon reproduced it in his *Dogmatique chrétienne*, I, pp. 350-361.

2. This theological synthesis was presented by A. Sabatier, a follower of Schleiermacher, in his *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion*. His efforts won a staunch advocate in Ch. Secrétan. Like Schleiermacher, Secrétan believes in the absolute religious value of the individual, but he rejects all exterior authority. See his *La philosophie de la liberté*, 4th and 5th lectures. See also Bovon, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-361; also Pillon, *La philosophie de Ch. Secrétan*. To the theories of Schleiermacher and Secrétan, Sabatier added the evolution theories of Darwin. All of these authors are nothing more than the perpetuators of the ideas of Kant, for all have endeavored to make religion rest on the imperative dictates of the moral conscience.

Criticism. — It is scarcely within our plan to enter into any lengthy detailed criticism of the pantheistic and evolutionary elements of this hypothesis. Suffice it to say that the pantheistic conception on which the theory rests is wholly gratuitous, and it is no less arbitrary to assign the full explanation of man's origin and his moral elevation to the general law of evolution.

We shall content ourselves with an examination of the objections brought against the traditional doctrine.

1. If we contend that Gen. II. and III. do not lend themselves to the Protestant interpretation, it is because we firmly believe in the inspiration of the Biblical narrative. Inspiration demands that these chapters be taken into account and assigned some value. Their figurative dress does cover some truth, and that truth the theologian must investigate with the help and in the light of its further development in the later canonical books.

2. Adherence to our dogma cannot merit the charge of Manichaeism, because we look upon concupiscence as an accident of human nature. As a matter of fact, the manifestation of concupiscence in our being is merely correlative to the suppression of preternatural gifts. Moreover, we affirm that concupiscence can be held in check by our moral liberty, and hence we really possess the power of doing good, which power can be made more perfect by the acquisition of natural virtues.

3. Doubtless the difficulty in explaining the sin of Adam is made the greater by the fact that he was elevated to a preternatural and supernatural state. Yet his conduct can be made comprehensible, if we do not exaggerate the moral excellence which the Bible and prudent theological inductions claim was his.

Temptation must have affected man's spiritual nature in some way, else he could never have sinned. The point in his moral excellence which it could attack was his liberty. Moral freedom calls for trials. Hence, even before the fall,

even without that strong influence for evil. man must have had desires to seek intellectual and sensible good, in a manner which were reprov'd by his conscience and condemned by his will. Even in his high estate, Adam could be tempted, could sin, Protestants notwithstanding. Speaking of these latter, Bovon affirms that their objections proceed from a « complete misunderstanding of the nature of moral liberty »¹.

4. Upon what grounds does the liberal Protestant position, then, rest? On experience. But we emphatically affirm this « warfare of the flesh against the spirit » over which they make such an ado, we claim that it has nowhere been the object of deeper study than in Catholic theology. Still we refuse to make this the only argument for our position. Man's enfeebled nature can be proof that man sinned in the beginning, but it cannot prove that all his descendants are in the bondage of sin.

1. *Dogm. chrét.* vol. I, p. 422.

THIRD DIVISION

GRACE.

Etymologically, the word « grace » is employed in the Sacred Books in four different meanings. 1) It is used to express the *special quality* of a person which occasions love or pleasure; this is the sense of the greeting of the angel appearing to Mary, « Hail, full of grace!¹ » 2) It denotes *the love* from which springs a kindly action or gift; this is the meaning of the angel's words, also spoken to Mary, « Thou hast found grace with God »². 3) Again, it means *the benefit* granted in virtue of love; an example of this meaning is found in the Epistle to the Ephesians where St. Paul is discussing the grace procured by Christ for mankind³. 4) Finally, it has reference to *the gratitude felt or acknowledged* for a gift received; this is the meaning of I Cor. X. 30, where the Apostle speaks of thankfulness and calls it *grace*.

The third meaning is the one which shall concern us in our present treatise. Put into fuller language, grace, as we understand it here, is *a gift bestowed on man by God because of the love* which He bears toward him. It is not only a gift made in love or with love, *cum amore*, but it is a divine

1. Lk. I. 28.

2. Lk. I. 30.

3. I. 6.

gift made solely because of love, *ex amore*, which means a gift wholly gratuitous, to which man has no right, and does not correspond to any demands of his being¹.

In our *Studies*, grace always means a *gratuitous gift*, and very often it carries with it the character of a *supernatural gift*².

In order to make our meaning more precise, we shall attempt a *description of the life of grace*, and then show *how it is developed within us*.

Description of the Life of Grace. — Concretely put, grace is God viewed in His own life, i. e. in the Trinity, in the measure *in which He gives Himself* to His creature. In a special manner, it denotes the Son of God who became incarnate in order to redeem us. In a more special manner, it denotes the Holy Ghost, who has been revealed to us as the term of the divine life, consequently as He, through whom the Son who is generated by the Father, sanctifies us.

The Holy Ghost accomplishes this work of sanctification by taking up His abode in men's souls, together with the Father and the Son, and by creating in them dispositions similar to those which animated the soul of Christ. The soul of the just man truly lives as Christ, and since these dispositions are created and developed by the same Spirit which animated the holy soul of Christ, he lives the very same life that Christ lived, he lives in Christ, that is to say, by Christ, as Holy Scripture puts it.

1. A mother nourishes her child *with love*, but also *because she is in duty bound to do so*. God gives us grace *with love* and *solely because of love*.

2. Sometimes God grants *certain preternatural favors* which are designated under the name of *grace*.

Certain *extraordinary favors* given to the Apostles and to the saints for the accomplishment of certain missions, such as the gift of tongues and the gift of miracles, are called *gratiae gratis datae*, in opposition to grace given for man's personal sanctification, *gratia gratum hominem faciens*.

The term *exterior grace* is given to all those circumstances in which an individual is placed, which serve as the occasion of grace.

This is grace considered concretely. It becomes apparent immediately that as such, grace really embodies a double gift. First of all, there is God Himself, namely, *the Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father through the Son*. Next, there is the *work* which the Holy Ghost creates and develops in our souls, in order to conform them to the holy human soul of Christ. The first gift is an *uncreated gift*, since it is the very Divinity itself; the second is a *created gift*, since it is the effect of the divine action in the human soul. Thus taking grace in the abstract, it consists of an *uncreated gift* and a *created gift*. But in reality the created gift is nothing more than the effect produced by the uncreated gift. Therefore, concretely, grace is God transforming the heart of man, God adapting the heart of man to the exigencies of His divinity, in order to take up His abode in him and to live with him in the close bonds of friendship.

The Manner in which the Life of Grace is developed in us. — The analysis we have just made, gives us some insight into the nature of grace, and now we shall seek to get a glimpse of the manner in which grace is developed in us.

An example will bring out better our meaning. Let us take the case of a man who is confiding the education of his son to a man of learning, desiring that he should be brought up in accordance with the traditions of his family. Naturally, the teacher will take the child with all his defects, and will strive to make him what he really ought to be. For this purpose, he will study the emotions that he has to play upon to inspire him with a love for the virtues of his parents. Love soon begets action; action in turn, by repetition, becomes habit, and habit produces the desired result, that is, an exact counterpart of his father. In our example, Christ is the father; the child is every Christian; the teacher represents the Spirit of Christ, namely, the Holy Ghost. Christ sends the Spirit to us, in order to produce in us dispositions similar

to those that inspired His own life, and thus to produce a more or less faithful portrait of Himself.

The first action of the Holy Ghost consists in external action. He produces in us a slight desire to imitate Christ. If we respond to this first prompting of the Spirit of God, and if we make the acts of faith, hope, charity and contrition to which He urges us, He will take possession of our souls, in the real meaning of the term, that is to say, He will personally come and dwell within us. Nay more, He permeates us and transforms us more and more into a likeness of Christ, always, however, taking into account our own personal morality. For this end, He reproduces in us the dispositions which exist or existed in the soul of Christ, and by His inner action on the soul, He puts into play those dispositions, which by exercise become more and more developed.

Now, *the Holy Spirit permanently present in our soul conjointly with the Father and the Son, and producing in us dispositions similar to those that exist or existed in the soul of Christ*, is what we call *habitual or sanctifying or justifying grace*. *The transitory intervention of the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son, exercised upon the soul, either from without in order to prepare the soul for His reception, or from within in order to co-operate with all the supernatural works which He urges and in order to develop the new life which He established there*, is what we call *actual grace*. In the measure that we correspond to grace, *the more meritorious our acts become*.

This gives us our division into three chapters :

Chapter I. — *Actual Grace*.

Chapter II. — *Habitual Grace*.

Chapter III. — *Merit*.

CHAPTER I.

ACTUAL GRACE.

As we just remarked, the transitory action of the Holy Spirit whereby He prepares the soul for His reception, and then assists in the production of all supernatural works, is what we mean by actual grace.

Actual grace differs from habitual grace in this that the former is *an assistance, an aid* given to the soul by the Holy Ghost for the production of a specified action, whilst the latter is *a habitual disposition* of the soul created and preserved in us by the Spirit of God. Every action is transitory, and hence actual grace is necessarily something *transient*. On the other hand, habitual grace, like every habit of the soul, is something essentially *permanent*.

Let us take the case of an adult who is not a Christian, but who nevertheless acts according to his conscience and who does what he thinks his duty. Theology teaches us that the Holy Spirit will help this man in the fulfilment of his duty and will help him in his battles against violent temptations. Ordinarily this intervention consists in a direct action either upon the heart or the soul. This divine help is a gift pure and simple, granted solely in love, a gratuitous gift. Although divinely given, nevertheless this actual grace would merely aid its recipient in the attainment of his natural end, and hence is only preternatural.

Yet if this man should co-operate with the first aid given to him, God will not delay long in elevating him to the supernatural order. Some time, perhaps in good or evil circum-

stances, perhaps by a Scripture text, perhaps by hearing for the first time the exposition of some Catholic dogma, the Spirit of Christ will excite in his heart the first and faintest beginning of a truly supernatural faith, which is called *pius credulitatis affectus*. This is followed by an *illuminatio intellectus*, by which the mysteries of faith lose much of their unacceptable character. This marks the first appearance of a truly supernatural actual grace in the heart and the mind. This grace is called *gratia excitans* because it is, as it were, the first desire to enter into the supernatural order. It is also called *gratia praeveniens*, because it precedes the action of the will in its acceptance. Further, it is called *operans* and not *cooperans*, because it is produced by God in the heart without the co-operation of the will, *Domino operante sine nobis cooperantibus*. It is, therefore, a supernatural act, entirely indeliberate¹.

1. The different manifestations of actual grace are well described by St. Francis de Sales in his *Treatise on the Love of God*, b. II, c. XII : « I will not here speak, my dear Theotimus, of those miraculous graces which have almost in an instant transformed wolves into shepherds, rocks into waters, persecutors into preachers. I leave on one side those all-powerful vocations, and holily violent attractions by which God has brought some elect souls from the extremity of vice to the extremity of grace, working as it were in them a certain moral and spiritual transubstantiation : as it happened to the great Apostle, who of Saul, vessel of persecution, became suddenly Paul, *vessel of election* (Acts IX. 15)... But what are then the ordinary cords whereby the divine providence is accustomed to draw our hearts to his love? Such truly as he himself marks, describing the means which he used to draw the people of Israel out of Egypt, and out of the desert, unto the land of promise. *I will draw them*, says he by Osee, *with the cords of Adam, with the bands of love* (XI. 4), and of friendship. Doubtless, Theotimus, we are not drawn to God by iron chains, as bulls and wild oxen, but by enticements, sweet attractions, and holy inspirations, which, in a word, are the *cords of Adam*, and of humanity, that is, proportionate and adapted to the human heart, to which liberty is natural. The *band* of the human will is delight and pleasure. We show nuts to a child, says St. Augustine, and he is drawn by his love, he is drawn by the cords, not of the body, but of the heart. Mark then how the Eternal Father draws us : while teaching he delights us, not imposing upon us any necessity; he casts into our hearts delectations and spiritual pleasures as sacred baits, by which he sweetly draws us to take and taste the sweetness of his doctrine.

« In this way then, dearest Theotimus, our free-will is in no way forced or

If the free will corresponds to this enticement, the Spirit of God again intervenes and co-operates with it. This new grace is called *gratia adjuvans* or *gratia cooperans*, because God acts by His grace and man co-operates with it freely.

This co-operating grace can be more or less vehement. As a matter of fact, this grace gives the will the power necessary and sufficient for action, without, however, making the free will act. This is called *sufficient grace*. Again, it may be of such vehemence as to make the will act freely, or it may accompany the will in its action, and then it is called *efficacious grace*¹.

necessitated by grace, but notwithstanding the all-powerful force of God's merciful hand, which touches, surrounds and ties the soul with such a number of inspirations, invitations and attractions, this human will remains perfectly free, enfranchised and exempt from every sort of constraint and necessity. Grace is so gracious, and so graciously seizes our hearts to draw them, that she noways offends the liberty of our will; she touches powerfully but yet so delicately the springs of our spirit that our free will suffers no violence from it. Grace has power, not to force but to entice the heart; she has a holy violence not to violate our liberty, but to make it full of love. She acts strongly, yet so sweetly that our will is not overwhelmed by so powerful an action; she presses us but does not oppress our liberty: so that under the very action of her power, we can consent to or resist her movements as we list. But what is as admirable as it is veritable, is that when our will follows the attraction, and consents to the divine movement, she follows as freely as she resists freely when she does resist, although the consent to grace depends much more on grace than on the will, while the resistance to grace depends on the will only. So sweet is God's hand in the handling of our hearts! So dexterous is it in communicating unto us its strength without depriving us of liberty, and in imparting unto us the motion of its power without hindering that of our will! He adjusts his power to his sweetness in such sort, that as in what regards good his might sweetly gives us power, so his sweetness mightily maintains the freedom of the will. *If thou didst know the gift of God*, said our Saviour to the Samaritan woman, *and who he is that saith to thee, give me to drink; thou perhaps wouldst have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water* (Jn. IV. 10). Note, I pray you, Theotimus, our Saviour's manner of speaking of his attractions. *If thou didst know*, he means, *the gift of God*, thou wouldst without doubt be moved and attracted to ask the water of eternal life, and *perhaps* thou wouldst ask it. As though he said: Thou wouldst have power and wouldst be provoked to ask, yet in no wise be forced or constrained; but only *perhaps* thou wouldst have asked, for thy liberty would remain to ask it or not to ask it. »

1. The action which we are considering here is not merely the definite deter-

Let us note in concluding our remarks, that these different actual graces are but so many phases of the progressive action of the Holy Ghost, who conjointly with the Father and the Son, comes to take up His abode in the soul¹. Hence our tendency abstractly to differentiate these various aspects of actual grace should be restrained. Just as soon as the soul evinces its willingness, Christ acts upon it through His Spirit. In proportion as it shows its earnestness, does He act upon it until He is definitively received.

Again, this supernatural action, represents not only the intervention of the Spirit of Christ when He wishes to abide in the soul, but also the intervention of the same Holy Ghost, when He no longer works from without, but from within the soul.

Having described actual grace, let us say a word on the controversies that have risen on this point. First of all we have the *Pelagian controversy* which bore on

mination of the will, but takes into account the long considerations that precede its final decision. Both the sufficient and the efficacious graces, are given for the beginning as well as the completion of the act.

1. These different aspects of the progressive action of the Holy Ghost are analyzed by St. Francis de Sales, *op. cit.* b. II, c. xiii : « The wind that raises the apodes blows first upon their feathers, as the part most light and most susceptible of its agitation, by which it gives the beginning of motion to their wings, extending and displaying them in such sort that they give a hold by which to seize the bird and waft it into the air. And if they, thus raised, do contribute the motion of their wings to that of the wind, the same wind that took them will still aid them still more and more to fly with ease. Even so, my dear Theotimus, when the inspiration, as a sacred gale, comes to blow us forward into the air of holy love, it first takes our will, and by the sentiment of some heavenly delectation it moves it, extending and unfolding the natural inclination which the will has to good, so that this same inclination serves as a hold by which to seize our spirit. And all this, as I have said, is done in us without us, for it is the divine favor that prevents us in this sort. But if our will thus holily prevented, perceiving the wings of her inclination moved, displayed, extended, stirred, and agitated, by this heavenly wind, contributes, be it ever so little, its consent. — Ah! how happy it is, Theotimus. The same favorable inspiration which has seized us, mingling its action with our consent, animating our feeble motions with its vigor, and vivifying our weak co-operation by the power of its operation, will aid, conduct, and accompany us, from love to love, even unto the act of most holy faith requisite for our conversion ».

the necessity of grace. Exaggeration of the Augustinian theories led to the *Calvinistic* and the *predestinarian* controversies. The first concerned *the power of human nature alone*, while the second bore on *the extent of the saving will of God*. The examination of these different questions prepares us for the study of *the controversy* of the Thomists and the Molinists in regard to the manner in which actual grace acts *with free will*. Finally, we must mention *the Jansenistic controversy* which concerned itself with *the nature of sufficient and efficacious grace* ¹.

ARTICLE I.

The Necessity of Grace, or the Pelagian Controversy.

The Question Stated. — Pelagius maintained that human nature is not only capable of attaining a high natural perfection, but also that it could by its own resources raise itself to the « so-called » supernatural order, in which it could persevere till the end of life, and could perform all the acts which were necessary for salvation.

St. Augustine and after him all the doctors and theologians of the Church have vigorously opposed this teaching.

The Church's teaching on this point may be summed up in the two following propositions :

1. Apparently these controversies array themselves in a logical sequence. The *Pelagian controversy* begins the series and gives the direction of the others. The affirmation of the necessity of actual grace led men to believe that human nature is radically powerless, and thus we had the *Calvinistic controversy*. Hence, as God could or would not give grace as He listed, salvation depended on God's arbitrary decision and thus Predestinarianism was launched. This last theory is found in *extreme Augustinianism*, *Calvinism*, *extreme Thomism* and *Jansenism*.

Such being the case, it seems preferable to treat *en bloc* the various stages of this great theological question, even though some repetition must result.

1. *A truly supernatural grace is necessary for the performance of all acts conducive to salvation.*

2. *Human nature, by its own resources, cannot observe the whole natural law for any great length of time, nor can it overcome violent temptations.*

SECTION I.

A TRULY SUPERNATURAL GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL ACTS CONDUCTIVE TO SALVATION.

The Object of this Section. — An actual grace, strictly supernatural is necessary for the performance of *any salutary act*; it is requisite also for *the beginning of faith*. Further, actual grace is necessary for *the just man in order that he may persevere in the grace he has already received*, and it is equally necessary to *avoid all venial sins*.

§ I.

A SUPERNATURAL ACTUAL GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY SALUTARY ACTION.

The Teaching of the Church. — When we use the term « salutary action », we mean any action which tends to establish, keep up and preserve the soul in that divine life, which is the beginning of that happiness with God and the enjoyment of the beatific vision which will be realized in the world beyond. Salvation or heaven means this possession of God.

Here, we are concerned more especially with the salutary acts which are anterior to the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul, or justification. These are the acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition after which the divine Spirit takes possession of the soul and justifies it.

But, once the soul is justified by the Holy Ghost who

creates in it the divine life, it is in a better position to accomplish salutary acts. Now, in order to perform these works, the soul must also be aided by actual grace. In other words, the Holy Spirit who produces the divine life in the soul, further intervenes to put this divine life into action.

It is *de fide*, from a definition of the Council of Trent, that a supernatural grace is necessary for the performance of the salutary acts which precede justification¹; the other position, namely that actual grace is necessary for the acts posterior to justification, is a *common teaching* of theologians². The Church has merely defined that actual grace is necessary for the just man in order that he may persevere in the state of grace as will be seen later.

Her doctrine is clear. Can we trace it to *Scripture* and *Patristic tradition*?

Scripture. — 1. According to the doctrine of the Synoptic Gospels, whosoever would enter the kingdom of heaven, must follow Christ, which means that he must imitate His virtues and live in the most intimate union with Him³.

2. The Gospel of St. John gives this doctrine greater

1. Sess. VI, can. 1 : *Si quis dixerit, hominem suis operibus, quæ vel per humanæ naturæ [vires] vel per legis doctrinam fiant, absque divina per Jesum Christum gratia posse justificari coram Deo : A. S.*

Can. 2 : *Si quis dixerit, ad hoc solum divinam gratiam per Jesum Christum dari, ut facilius homo juste vivere ac vitam æternam promereri possit, quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia utrumque, sed ægre tamen et difficulter, possit : A. S.*

Can. 3 : *Si quis dixerit, sine præveniente Spiritus Sancti inspiratione atque ejus adjutorio hominem credere, sperare, diligere, aut pænitere posse, sicut oportet, ut ei justificationis gratia conferatur : A. S. DENZ., 811-813.*

2. The intervention of the Holy Ghost appears to be a necessary consequence drawn both from the nature of grace and the general economy of the supernatural life. If grace consists in the Holy Ghost creating and preserving in the soul a new life, then it seems right that the same Spirit should make this life act and develop. The contrary can be asserted only if sanctifying grace is considered as something abstract, apart from the Holy Ghost who is its vital principle and its preserver.

3. Mt. X, 32-42; XVI, 24-28; XIX, 21.

consistency. The Word, the Life and Light, vivifying and enlightening, from the very beginning, every man entering into the world, became man, and communicated to the humanity with which He was united, the plenitude of His life and His light, in order to impart this very same to all men¹. Hence, Christ is called the source of living water (IV, 13-14), the bread of life (VI, 32 ff.). Whosoever will not drink of this water nor taste of this bread will not have the life of Christ in him. Christ is the vine, of which the faithful are the branches, and just as a branch broken off soon withers and dies, so the soul that is separated from Christ no longer shares in His life².

In comparing the Jewish theocracy to a sheepfold, and the Messianic mission to the gate of that sheepfold, it has been well said that Jesus, in laying the foundations of His kingdom, did not act as the Pharisees. The latter sought to establish their domination over Israel, by climbing over the walls of the enclosure like thieves and robbers. Jesus enters by the natural gate, because He has been truly invested with the Messianic dignity. He, then, is the True Shepherd who leads His sheep to good pasture, that is, the gifts of salvation and the life and light that He imparts to His faithful adherents (Jn. X. 1-16).

Salvation, therefore, is impossible without the communication of Christ's life to the soul. This life is *light or representation*, i. e. *faith* and *action*, hence, *hope and charity*. Consequently there can be no act meritorious of heaven, unless Christ's life be the source of this action.

3. The teaching given by St. John in allegorical form is more explicitly brought out by St. Paul in his Epistles. According to him, every salutary act is due to the intervention of the Spirit of Christ, and hence we can neither will nor do anything for our sanctification without the di-

1. JN. I, 1-18.

2. JN. XV, 1-7.

vine assistance. (Phil. II, 13). We cannot even pray as we ought. (Rom. VIII, 26). All the good that was in him, and all the wonderful results of his missionary activity he assigns to God's grace¹, which is nothing else than the Spirit of Christ or the Spirit of God animating the soul of the faithful Christian².

In this last passage, it is remarkable that St. Paul speaks of the Spirit of Christ just as the ancient Jews spoke of the Spirit of God. According to them, all the higher life, all sanctification, and all special gifts are the work of the Spirit of God. In the same manner, St. Paul attributes all exceptional favors to the Spirit of Christ, whom he also calls the Spirit of God. Hence, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, grace must be considered as the effect of the action of the Spirit of Christ, who is the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son³.

1. I Cor. XV, 10; 2 Cor. II, 5.

2. Rom. VIII, 9-11.

3. St. Paul could consider grace as the effect of the intervention of the Spirit of Christ, without feeling the need of distinguishing the uncreated and the created gift in it. According to the theology of the O. T. which the Apostle supposes, the higher works of the soul are always attributed to the intervention of the Spirit of God. Gradually a distinction was made between the action of the Spirit of God and the effect of this action. Our theology distinguishes the Person of the Holy Ghost, *gratia increata*, and the work that He produces in us, *gratia creata*. Moreover, when we refer to the Christian life or spirit, we mean the work of the Holy Ghost in us, viz. a certain way of thinking, speaking, acting like Christ.

It must be remarked that the Apostle in his Epistles, far from favoring the interpretation of Pelagius, seems rather to be nearer to that of Calvin and Jansenius according to whom all the good that is in men is the work of grace. This is due to the fact that he drew his doctrine from the O. T. where all higher good is referred to the Spirit of God. Like the other sacred writers, he is above all concerned with the description of the moral life that man experiences daily. Consequently we must not interpret his words too literally, as Protestants and Jansenists do when they make him say that human nature, by itself, is incapable of doing any good.

Finally, let us remark that St. Paul attributes all salutary acts to the Spirit of Christ, both those which precede justification and those that follow it. But this does not mean that the Apostle teaches explicitly that a new grace is needed for every salutary act, as is sometimes claimed by some authors.

Tradition. — The New Testament doctrine had ever been taught in the Church, almost in the same terminology, for the need of adding more precision was not felt. Every faithful soul was looked upon as being under the direct influence of the Holy Spirit of Christ who aided in all his actions.

At the beginning of the fifth century, Pelagius attacked this teaching and proclaimed the absolute power of human nature. At least, grace is an assistance without which the free will of man can do very well. Therefore, the doctrine of grace is dangerous, for it is calculated to destroy all man's initiative¹.

St. Augustine refuted Pelagianism, almost in all his writings posterior to 410, but dealing it its heaviest blows in his *De natura et gratia* and *De gratia et libero arbitrio*.

In the former writing, he shows that nature, by itself, can do nothing conducive to salvation². Then he refutes the contention of Pelagius that man can, by his own efforts, during his life time keep from falling into sin³. If such were the case, of what use was the Redemption of Christ? The whole tenor of his efforts here, is to show that man, without grace, can do nothing in the way of salvation. Throughout, however, there might even be a slight tendency to claim that human nature, by its sole power, can do no good⁴.

But in the latter writing, St. Augustine shows that this was not his thought at all. The dominant idea here is this : Just as free will is given to us to do good in the natural order, so grace is given to us to do good in the order of salvation. Both parts of this thesis, he proves by a series of texts taken from the Scriptures⁵.

1. PETAVIUS, *De pelagianorum et semipelagianorum dogmatum historia*, c. ii-v.

2. 4, P. L. XLIV, 249.

3. *Ib.* 13.

4. *Ib.* 56.

5. *Ib.* 7, P. L. XLIV, 886.

As can be easily seen, St. Augustine simply develops the doctrine of St. Paul, namely, that man is surrounded on all sides by the grace of salvation, but if he fails to profit by it, he can do nothing at all for his salvation.

While the Saint was waging war on Pelagius in his writings, he was also engaged in calling together several councils. The principal of these was the one held at Carthage in 418, the acts of which were eventually approved by Pope Zosimus. The Fathers gathered there condemned those who maintained that grace is only given to help the will to fulfil more easily that which it could accomplish naturally¹. This definition considered in its historical setting, is really a condemnation of the Pelagian system.

The second council of Orange, held in 529, was directed more against Semi-Pelagianism than Pelagianism. It repeated this same definition, in clearer words, declaring that man, by the mere efforts of his nature, can perform no salutary work².

Both these definitions were taken up by the Council of Trent; we quoted them, p. 133.

Scholastic Theology. — The teaching of St. Augustine was followed by all the Fathers of the Latin Church, and it was this same teaching that the Schoolmen systematized. They were fond of comparing nature and grace to two lives developed on parallel lines, without it ever being possible to nature to become the life of grace or to merit it in any manner whatsoever. The life of nature is developed

1. DENZ., 105 : *Item placuit ut quicumque dixerit ideo nobis gratiam justificationis dari, ut quod facere per liberum jubemur arbitrium, facilius possimus implere per gratiam, tanquam et si gratia non daretur, non quidem facile sed tamen possimus etiam sine illa implere divina mandata : A. S...*

2. Ibid., 180 : *Si quis per naturæ vigorem, bonum aliquod, quod ad salutem pertinet vitæ æternæ, cogitare, ut expedit, aut eligere, sive salutari, id est evangelicæ prædicationi consentire posse confirmat, absque illuminatione et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti... hæretico fallitur spiritu...*

so as to give to man an indefinitely perfectible knowledge of all things and a morality more and more perfect. The other leads us to the beatific vision. But these two lives must not and cannot be confounded any more than two perfectly straight lines can ever come in contact¹.

§ II

SUPERNATURAL ACTUAL GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR THE BEGINNING OF FAITH.

The Question Stated. — The question treated in this first section being general contains within it several particular propositions one of which is the present thesis. The commencement of faith in the heart of man is something of a salutary act. If we were giving a strictly logical treatment of our doctrine, this proposition would have found place as corollary of the preceding paragraph. Although logical, this arrangement would not correspond so well to the happenings of history, for after having established that every salutary act is the effect of grace, the Fathers of the Church were confronted with the task of proving that the beginning of faith had to be the effect of an actual grace truly supernatural. For many who accepted the general proposition, made exception first of all for the beginning of faith in the soul². They were thus led to advocate a kind of mitigated Pelagianism, which has been called later on Semi-Pelagianism. Fully to understand the errors of this teaching, we must first examine its

1. Cf. ST. THOMAS, *Summa*, I^a II^{ae}, q. cxii, a. I, : *Respondeo dicendum quod nulla res potest agere ultra suam speciem quia semper oportet quod causa potior sit effectui, donum autem gratiæ excedit omnem facultatem naturæ creatæ, cum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divini naturæ quæ excedit omnem aliam naturam.*

2. After having admitted the general thesis, and being no longer allied to Pelagianism, the Semi-Pelagians took back part by part what they had given up. Thus they denied the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith, and the necessity of a special grace for a just man's perseverance in his justified state.

origin, then the attacks made upon it by the Fathers of the Church, and finally its condemnation by the Councils.

The Origin of Semi-Pelagianism. — Pelagius and his followers declared that human nature was powerful enough, of itself, to perform all the works necessary for salvation, and consequently, that salvation could be gained by purely natural means. The Pelagian system did not survive the powerful refutation made of it by St. Augustine who argued, that as far as the work of salvation was concerned, human nature could do nothing at all.

Pelagius had made an absolute statement, and in his reply, St. Augustine employed an absolute statement, too absolute, perhaps, for in some of his writings, especially *De natura et gratia* '56), he seems to restrict the power of human nature so as to make it powerless to perform any natural good.

This refutation soon produced a reaction. Men began to assert that at least the beginning of salvation was due solely to the efforts of human nature alone. Had they taught that the beginning of salvation consists in those naturally good actions, within human forces, after which grace is always given by God, they would have remained within the limits of orthodoxy. But they went further, asserting that unaided human nature could effect the first orientation in the order of salvation, that order which ends in heaven or the beatific vision.

This doctrine was at first very vague. Greater precision was forthcoming. The work of salvation begins in the soul as soon as faith is implanted there, and this implanting was made the work of unaided human nature. As every other act, faith brings into play both the will and the intellect, and therefore its first appearance was made to consist in a *pious credulitatis affectus* and in an *illuminatio intellectus*. In other words, the defenders of this new doctrine, claimed that the work which we characterize as the effect of *gratia*

præveniens is the result achieved by human nature alone.

The reasons upon which this contention was based are as follows : If the beginning of salvation, and therefore, the beginning of faith were impossible to human nature, then the first grace given to man is merely gratuitous and God can give it to whom He pleases. On the other hand, those to whom God does not grant it, cannot be saved. Some would be destined for salvation from their very birth, while others could never be saved, or, what amounts to the same thing, God would predestine some to heaven, and others to hell and damnation. This is untenable, they said, because it is repugnant to the divine justice.

The whole difficulty immediately disappears, they added, if we grant that the first step in the way of salvation is not a gratuitous act of God, but the result of the working of the human will. Then God foreseeing the step taken by the will decrees that grace be granted to effect the final attainment of salvation, namely heaven. This statement is the fundamental idea in the whole Semi-Pelagian system.

This doctrine was openly taught in Africa in the fifth century, by the disciples of Pelagius, who felt that their master's teaching had gone too far. On the other hand, it won advocates from the disciples of St. Augustine who also felt that their master had exceeded on the other side. The real hot-bed of Semi-Pelagianism was in southern Gaul. The Scythian monk, John Cassian, after a sojourn in the Orient, came to Marseilles and there founded a monastery which soon became the centre of a strong theological movement. The most distinguished of its adherents were St. Vincent of Lerins, Faustus of Riez, Gennadius and Arnobius the Younger. Nearly all of them became the defenders of the new theology¹.

The Fathers of the Church oppose this System. — In

1. Cf. PETAVIUS, *De pelagianorum et semipelagianorum dogmatum historia*, c. vii-ix; TILLEMONT, *Mémoires*, XIII, a. 343.

his earlier writings, St. Augustine had given little attention to clarifying the doctrine of the beginning of salvation. He had thought, as he declared in later years, that the human will could by itself effect the beginning of faith¹.

But later on he interpreted the text of St. Paul, *Quid habes quod non accepisti?* in its strict sense, and showed that every step towards salvation is the effect of supernatural grace. The objection of the Semi-Pelagians in regard to the gratuitous character of predestination affected him not at all.

At the beginning of the fifth century Semi-Pelagianism was opposed by St. Prosper of Aquitania and Hilary of Sicily². Both reasserted the teaching of St. Augustine. It was to them that St. Augustine addressed his *De prædestinatione* and *De dono perseverantiæ*, to which St. Vincent of Lerins replied in his famous *Commonitorium*³.

1. *De prædestinatione*, 8 ; P. L., XLIV, 966 : *Quid autem habes quod non accepisti..... Ecce quare dixi superius, hoc apostolico præcipue testimonio etiam me ipsum fuisse convictum. Cum de hac re aliter saperem, quam mihi Deus in hac questione solvenda, cum ad episcopum Simplicianum, sicut dixi, scriberem, revelavit. Hoc igitur Apostoli testimonium, ubi ad reprimendam hominis inflationem dicit : « Quid enim habes quod non accepisti? » non sinit quemquam fidelium dicere : habeo fidem quam non accepi. Reprimatur omnino his apostolicis verbis tota hujus responsionis elatio. Sed ne hoc quidem potest dici : quamvis non habeam perfectam fidem, habeo tamen ejus initium, quo in Christum primitus credidi.*

The *De prædestinatione* was composed in 427, but the two books to Bishop Simplician were written in 397. Our Saint probably refers to the time when he wrote the second question of the first book. It is in this passage, that he declares that the first good will, the beginning of faith, is in us by the grace of God. Cf. *De diversis questionibus ad Simplicianum libri duo*, I. q. ii, 12 ; P. L., XL, 117. However, he did not likely make a definitive profession of this doctrine until the year 413 or in that period when he was bent on crushing Pelagianism. The *De spiritu et littera* (413) contains some half positive statements which have been twisted into a Semi-Pelagian meaning. See 58 ; P. L., LXIV, 238.

2. This Hilary is the same that wrote letter 88 to St. Augustine (about 414).

3. The full title is, *Commonitorium pro catholicæ fidei antiquitate et universalitate adversus profanas omnium hæreticorum novitates*. He appeals to tradition against new doctrines which illustrious doctors might introduce

At the death of St. Augustine (430) they went to Rome and persuaded Pope Celestine I. to address a monitory letter to the bishops of Gaul, in which the Augustinian teaching was recommended, and that of the innovators, viz. the Semi-Pelagians, severely criticized¹.

But Semi-Pelagianism was such a subtle doctrine that it was able to escape all disapprobation and to cast discredit upon any condemnation directed against it.

In the second half of the fifth century, the great opponent of Semi-Pelagianism, was Pope Leo the Great. In the sixth century, Cæsarius of Arles, wrote against Semi-Pelagianism his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, a work inspired by the teaching of St. Augustine.

As the Semi-Pelagians were becoming more and more powerful, Cæsarius complained to Pope Felix IV. The latter sent 25 propositions taken from the writings of St. Augustine and asked that they be examined in council.

The Conciliar Condemnation of the System. — A council was convened at Orange in 529, over which Cæsarius of Arles presided². It took up these 25 propositions and made each one a dogmatic decree.

The third decree declared that grace is not given to us because we ask for it, for it is that impulse which makes us ask it³.

into the Church. He gives the criterion by which dogma can be recognized. Orthodoxy demands antiquity (*vetustas*), universality (*universalitas*) and a general acceptation (*consensio*) which means that in order to be orthodox a doctrine must be believed in all places, at all times, and by everybody (*quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus creditum est*). The second part of the book, which doubtless was an application of this principle in regard to what he considered Augustinian novelties has disappeared entirely.

1. TILLEMONT, *Mémoires*, XIII, a. 344.

2. *Concilium arausicanum*, II.

3. Can. 3. : *Si quis ad invocationem humanam gratiam Dei dicit posse conferri, non autem ipsam gratiam facere ut invocetur a nobis, contradicit Isaïæ prophetæ vel Apostolo item dicenti : Inventus sum a non quaerentibus me; palam apparui his qui me non interrogabant* (Rom., x, 20).

The fourth decree defines that God does not wait for us to desire to be purified from sin, it is He who generates the desire in us, by the Holy Ghost¹.

The fifth decree declares that the beginning of faith, *initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum*, is the work of grace and not of nature².

The sixth decree affirms that it is not right to claim that God shows mercy to us, because we would think, believe, desire, study, etc., by our own natural powers; for it is grace which makes us believe, desire and study. Grace is not content in strengthening humility and obedience in the heart of man, but it makes it humble and obedient³.

To satisfy all the objections which might be brought against their position, the Fathers of the council claimed that as a matter of fact God granted the grace of the beginning of salvation viz. the beginning of faith to every man of good will⁴.

1. Can. 4 : *Si quis, ut a peccato purgemur, voluntatem nostram Deum exspectare contendit, non autem ut etiam purgari velimus, per Sancti Spiritus infusionem et operationem in nobis fieri confitetur, resistit ipsi Spiritui Sancto per Salomonem dicenti : Præparatur voluntas a Domino et Apostolo salubriter prædicanti : Deus est, qui operatur in nobis et velle et perficere pro bona voluntate.*

2. Can. 5 : *Si quis sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum, quo in eum credimus, qui justificat impium, et ad regenerationem sacri baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiæ donum, id est per inspirationem Spiritus Sancti corrigentem voluntatem nostram ab infidelitate ad fidem, ab impietate ad pietatem, sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, apostolicis dogmatibus adversarius approbatur...*

3. Can. 6 : *Si quis sine gratia Dei credentibus, volentibus, desiderantibus, conantibus, laborantibus, vigilantibus, studentibus, petentibus, quærentibus, pulsantibus nobis misericordiam dicit conferri divinitus, non autem ut credamus, velimus, vel hæc omnia, sicut oportet, agere valeamus, per infusionem et inspirationem Sancti Spiritus in nobis fieri confitetur, et aut humilitati, aut obedientiæ humanæ subjungit gratiæ adjutorium, nec, ut obedientes et humiles simus, ipsius gratiæ donum esse consentit, resistit Apostolo dicenti : « Quid habes quod non accepisti », et « Gratia Dei sum id quod sum ».* DENZ. 176-179.

4. This is implied in the condemnation of a certain teaching of predestina-

Hence, according to the definitions of this council, the entire work of salvation from the first beginning of faith in the heart, must be attributed to the work of grace¹.

The definition of the Council of Orange has been resumed in terms just as precise by the Fathers of Trent. The third decree of the sixth session declares that without the *gratia præveniens*, i. e. without some feeling being produced by God's help in the heart and some light given to the intellect, no one can believe, no one can hope, nor love, nor repent².

It is then a point of doctrine that the beginning of faith is not produced by human nature alone, but a truly supernatural grace is required.

§ III

ACTUAL GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR A JUST MAN TO PERSEVERE
IN THE GRACE HE HAS RECEIVED.

The Question Stated. — In general, perseverance implies multiplied and continued acts. As continuity is simply impossible in the case of an intelligent being, unless there is a definite purpose in view towards which all thoughts and sentiments converge, perseverance demands also that all thoughts and sentiments should tend towards a determinate end. These are the constituent elements in perseverance.

When man is in the state of grace, the divine life has been imparted to his soul by the Holy Ghost. Here He dwells, developing the divine life daily until, if persevering in it, man reaches the full expansion of the supernatural life. This development demands repeated and multiplied acts tending

tion according to which God positively predestined to damnation all those whom He has not positively predestined to heaven. Cf. DENZ., 200.

1. HEFELE, *Histoire des Conciles*, II, part. 2, liv. XIII, p. 1085-1110.

2. DENZ., 813 : *Si quis dixerit, sine præveniente Spiritus Sancti inspiratione atque ejus adjutorio hominem credere, sperare, diligere aut pœnitere posse, sicut oportet, ut ei justificationis gratia conferatur* : A. S.

to salvation performed by the help of the Holy Ghost who dwells in us¹.

The Church teaches explicitly that *actual grace is necessary for the perseverance of the just in the life of grace*.

The very fact that God imparts the life of grace to man argues that He will accord His assistance in the development of this new life. Therefore we may conclude that the just man can persevere in a certain way in the state of grace.

But, with such graces in our hearts are we always perfectly armed against the difficulties of life? Will not at times a special grace distinct from ordinary grace be needed to enable us to overcome an exceptional difficulty or fulfil a particularly hard obligation?

There can be no doubt that, from time to time, man does find himself placed in such a situation, especially at the hour of death. This is why we maintain that *in order to persevere in the state of grace for any length of time, and more so to persevere in it unto the end of life, especially at the hour of death, the just man does need a special actual grace*².

1. The Holy Ghost living in us, keeps in our soul the thought of Christ, placing Him before us as our model, in all His acts of humility, patience, condescension, kindness, meekness, and other virtues that were inspired by His love for His heavenly Father and His fellow-men. At the same time we are urged to put these sentiments into our actual lives by fervent imitation. Christ is made the ideal, the soul is ever directed towards it, and in this wise is fulfilled the indispensable condition of perseverance. Following in His footsteps, the life of grace aiding in the easy fulfilment of all duties, and the soul ever protected by the Spirit of God and urged to greater and repeated action : this is what we mean by perseverance.

2. Whether this grace is supernatural or only a preternatural assistance, is scarcely of importance; either view is permissible.

The *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Oct. 1908, claims that the grace of perseverance does not differ from ordinary actual grace, and that the Council of Trent called it a *special* assistance because the Fathers wished to distinguish it from the natural divine concurrence and especially from habitual grace. This can hardly be reconciled with the history of the Semi-Pelagian controversy and with the decision of the Council of Orange, which was reproduced by the Council of Trent. A view similar to ours has been proposed by BILLOT in his *De gratia Christi*, q. XIX, c. v, 2. *Etenim primo. semel supposita sententia ista [juxta quam perseverantiæ auxilium non distinguitur a summa*

The controversy here is less on the necessity of grace for a *temporary* perseverance, than on the necessity of this same grace for perseverance *until the end of life*.

As regards the grace for temporary perseverance we will content ourselves with citing the declaration of the Council of Orange. The Fathers of this Council claimed that God's assistance must be incessantly implored, otherwise the just man cannot remain in grace for a long time. *Adjutorium Dei etiam renatis ac sanctis semper est implorandum ut... in bono possint opere perdurare*¹. The Council of Trent adopted this view of the case, but gave it a more explicit declaration².

We shall now consider the necessity of a special actual grace for final perseverance, and for this purpose we shall first of all take up *the teaching of St. Augustine*, then we shall see *the interpretation given his teaching by the Fathers of southern Gaul*, and finally we shall state *the definitions of the Councils in regard to this doctrine*.

St. Augustine's Teaching. — In his *De correptione et gratia*, St. Augustine endeavors to show that perseverance in the life of grace, especially final perseverance demands a special and new grace. His method of argument is this. He takes the case of a just man who has relapsed and fallen into sin. This man may claim : « It is not my fault that I did not

corum quæ pro actibus singulis postulantur], nihil plus diceretur per assertam necessitatem gratiæ ad unumquemque actum in particulari. Sicut non plus dicis cum asseris ad viginti panes requiri viginti solidos, quam cum asseris ad unum quemque ex illis viginti requiri solidum unum. Et tamen si ad ecclesiastica decreta te referas, videbis quod necessitas adjutorii in ordine ad perseverandum proponitur ut veritas distincta ab ea qua generaliter statuitur gratiam Dei pro omni opere salutari qua tali postulari; et eatenus quidem distincta, quatenus aliquid superaddit quoad rem, et non quoad solam verborum formam vel loquendi modum.

1. DENZ., 183.

2. DENZ., 832 : *Si quis dixerit justificatum vel sine speciali auxilio Dei in accepta justitia perseverare posse vel cum eo non posse* : A. S.

persevere; it is God's fault, because He did not give me grace; therefore, He should not punish me ». This is a false position, declares St. Augustine. No one can persevere in grace without receiving a new grace, yet he who does not persevere has no right to complain. As God is not bound to give man the grace of justification, neither is He bound to assist him in preserving that grace until death¹. The only right that sinful man has, is the right to be eternally damned².

1. *De correptione et gratia*, 11; P. L., XLIV : *Quæ cum ita sint, corripimus tamen eos, justeq̃ue corripimus, qui cum bene viverent non in eo perseverarunt. Ex bona quippe in malam vitam sua voluntate mutati sunt, et ideo correptione, et si nihil eis correptio profuerit, sed in vita perditâ usque ad mortem perseveraverint, etiâ divina in æternum damnatione sunt digni. Nec se excusabunt dicentes, sicut modo dicunt, quare corripimur, ita tunc quare damnamur, quandoquidem ut ex bono reverteremur ad malum, perseverantiam non accepimus qua permaneremus in bono? Nullo modo hac excusatione a justâ damnatione se liberabunt. Si enim, sicut veritas loquitur, nemo liberatur a damnatione quæ facta est per Adam, nisi per fidem Jesu Christi, et tamen ab hac damnatione non se liberabunt qui poterunt dicere, non se audisse Evangelium Christi, cum fides ex auditu sit, quanto minus se liberabunt qui dicturi sunt : perseverantiam non accepimus? Justior enim videtur excusatio dicentium, non accepimus audientiam, quam dicentium, non accepimus perseverantiam : quoniam potest dici, homo, in eo quod audieras et tenueras, in eo perseverares si velles; nullo modo autem dici potest, id quod non audieras, crederes si velles... 19 : Cur igitur hoc tam magnum beneficium aliis dat, aliis non dat Deus, apud quem non est iniquitas, nec acceptio personarum, et in cujus potestate est quamdiu quisque in hac vita maneat, quæ tentatio dicta est super terram? Sicut ergo coguntur fateri, donum Dei esse ut finiat homo vitam istam, antequam ex bono mutetur in malum, cur autem aliis donetur, aliis non donetur, ignorant; ita donum Dei esse in bono perseverantiam secundum Scripturas, de quibus testimonia multa jam posui, fateantur nobiscum; et cur aliis detur, aliis non detur, sine murmure adversus Deum dignentur ignorare nobiscum.*

2. *De natura et gratia*, 5; P. L., XLIV, 250 : *Universa igitur massa perna debet, et si omnibus debitum damnationis supplicium redderetur, non injuste procul dubio redderetur. Qui ergo inde per gratiam liberantur, non vasa meritum suorum sed vasa misericordiæ nominantur. Cujus misericordiæ, nisi illius qui Christum Jesum misit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere, quos præcivit et prædestinavit et vocavit et justificavit et glorificavit? Quis igitur usque adeo dementissime insanial, ut non agat inefabiles gratias misericordiæ quos voluit liberantis, qui recte nullo modo posset culpâre justitiâ universos omnino damnantis.*

God gives the grace of final perseverance only to those who are predestined¹.

This teaching of the bishop of Hippo must be well understood, otherwise we might make him responsible for exaggerations of which he is altogether innocent.

Taking as an example, two adult Christians equally pious and both corresponding to the grace of God. It can well happen that the one will persevere till death and the other will not. Why? Because the one has received the grace of final perseverance and the other has not. How do we explain this fact? It is a mystery, says St. Augustine, for God owes us nothing, and if He does give us this grace, and rewards us with eternal life, it is entirely due to His own boundless mercy.

Yet in his *De dono perseverantiæ* the holy doctor apparently feels that his teaching is entirely too severe. His celebrated sentence, a sentence which the Semi-Pelagians took into account in no wise, *Hoc ergo Dei donum [perseverantiæ usque in finem] suppliciter emereri potest*², shows how far he endeavored to modify his earlier views. Prayer can win the grace of final perseverance, especially the devout recitation of the Lord's prayer³.

By comparing these two lines of thought we can get some idea of St. Augustine's position. The just man cannot persevere in grace until the end of his life without a special help from God. This help God grants to all those who during life have corresponded to the graces which He has bestowed on them⁴.

1. *De prædestinatione*, 16; XLIV, 972 : *Fides igitur et inchoata et perfecta donum Dei est : et hoc donum quibusdam dari, quibusdam non dari, omnino non dubitet, qui non vult manifestissimis sacris Litteris repugnare.*

Hence just as the beginning of salvation, or the beginning of faith, is absolutely a gratuitous gift on the part of God, so is the grace of final perseverance.

2. VI, 10, P. L., XLV, 999.

3. *Op. cit.*, II. 4-9.

4. This at least seems to be the meaning of the passage, *De correptione et*

The Interpretation of the Fathers of Southern Gaul. — The Semi-Pelagians claimed that the teaching of St. Augustine was too rigid and tended to discourage the devout Christian. If the just man could not persevere in grace until death, unless he received a special grace from God, who might or might not give it, as He pleased, what must be the anguish of those who did not receive it? They then asserted that the just man could persevere without any special divine assistance.

The Fathers of Southern Gaul took up the Augustinian teaching, and endeavored to make it better understood.

They affirmed that a special divine grace was necessary for final perseverance. But they also affirmed that, as God did not delay in giving the gift of faith to those who acted as well as they could in the natural order, so in the supernatural order He never failed to give the grace of final perseverance to those who have faithfully corresponded with the grace received; for God will never abandon those who have given themselves to Him.

This was the teaching of Cæsarius of Arles. His work, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* is lost, but it is very probable that the epilogue which follows the twenty-five propositions taught by the Council of Orange is taken from his work¹.

The Definitions of the Councils. — The Fathers of the Council of Orange declared that the saints themselves should pray unceasingly for the grace of final perseverance².

gratia, XII, 34. Primo itaque homini, qui in eo bono quo factus fuerat rectus, acceperat posse non peccare, posse non mori, posse ipsum bonum non deserere, datum est adjutorium perseverantiae, non quo fieret ut perseveraret, sed sine quo per liberum arbitrium perseverare non posset. Nunc vero, sanctis in regnum Dei per gratiam Dei prædestinatis non tale adjutorium perseverantiae datur, sed tale ut eis perseverantia ipsa donetur; non solum ut sine isto dono perseverantes esse non possint, verum etiam ut per hoc donum nonnisi perseverantes sint.

1. DENZ., 199, 200.

2. DENZ., 183: *Adjutorium Dei etiam renatis ac sanctis semper est implorandum ut ad finem bonum pervenire, vel in bono possint opere perdurare.*

Then, in the epilogue, which in form is like a symbol of faith, wherein it declares anew quoting Phil. I, 6, that God gives the grace of persevering in the grace received even to the day of the Lord¹, it adds : « We believe, that the baptized, after receiving the grace of Baptism, can and should, in accord with the help and the co-operation of Christ, accomplish all that is necessary for salvation, if they have the will to faithfully labor for this end »².

The first part of these definitions, which insists on the necessity of a special grace for final perseverance, represents the doctrine of St. Augustine. The second part recognizes the good features of the Semi-Pelagian system.

The Council of Trent treats of the grace of final perseverance in chapter XIII and in canon 16 of the sixth session. It teaches that in order to persevere until death in the state of grace a gratuitous grace is necessary. This grace cannot be merited by faithfully corresponding with grace; but it is always granted to those who pray God for it³. Hence

1. DENZ., 199 : *...gratiam... credimus largitate conferri secundum illud... : « Vobis datum est pro Christo non solum ut in eum credatis sed etiam ut pro illo patiamini » ; et illud : « Deus, qui cepit in vobis bonum opus, perficiet usque in diem Domini nostri Jesu Christi. »*

2. Ibid., 200 : *Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus, quod, accepta per baptismum gratia, omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quæ ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere.*

3. Ibid., 806 : *Similiter de perseverantiæ munere de quo scriptum est : « Qui perseveraverit usque in finem, salvus erit », quod quidem aliunde haberi non potest, nisi ab eo qui « potens est eum qui stat, statuere, ut perseveranter stet, et eum qui cadit, restituere » : nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta certitudine polliceatur, tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere omnes debent. Deus enim, nisi ipsi illius gratiæ defuerint, sicut cepit opus bonum, ita perficiet, « operans velle et perficere ». Verumtamen qui « se existimant stare, videant ne cadant, et cum timore ac tremore salutem suam operentur » in laboribus, in vigillis, in eleemosynis, in orationibus et oblationibus, in jeuniis et castitate. Formidare enim debent scientes, quod in spem gloriæ et nondum in gloriam renati sunt, de pugna, quæ superest cum carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo, in qua victores esse non possunt, nisi cum Dei gratia Apostolo obtemperent dicenti : « Debitores*

no one, unless he be favored with a private revelation, can be certain, with an absolute certainty, that he has received the grace of final perseverance¹.

God gives the grace of final perseverance to all who are faithful to correspond with the grace received, and no one is damned except through his own fault. Yet, as we do not and cannot merit this grace, we must unceasingly ask God for it in our prayers.

We say in the language of scholastic theology, the grace of final perseverance cannot be merited *de condigno*, but only *de congruo*².

According to the teaching of the saints, we find that God is infinitely liberal in bestowing this grace on man. Not only the just receive it, but sinners also, who have not become hardened in their guilt, at the point of death. By the divine illuminations and aspirations produced in their hearts, God reveals to men His infinite mercy and at the same time the ugliness of their sin. He comes to all, asking, Do you want Me? or, do you want Me not? If the soul chooses the latter, it is eternally damned. But if, on the other hand, it is sorry for its sins, God pardons it, and permits it to expiate its crimes in purgatory, after which heaven will be its portion.

This doctrine is intimated particularly in the writings of St. Francis de Sales³, and St. Catherine of Genoa⁴; moreover, it is in perfect accord with the general economy of grace. Again, this teaching does away with all the objections that are ordinarily urged against the dogma of the

sumus non carni, ut secundum carnem vivamus : si enim secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini : si autem spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis».

1. DENZ., 826 : *Si quis magnum illud usque in finem perseverantix donum se certo habiturum absoluta et infallibili certitudine dixerit, nisi hoc ex speciali revelatione didicerit* : A. S.

2. Cf. GONET, *Clyp. thom.* vol. V. disp. II. a. 9.

3. Cf. J. P. CAMUS, *The Spirit of saint Francis de Sales*, part III, c. 13.

4. *Traité du Purgatoire*, c. civ.

eternal pains of hell, for it can be easily understood why God, after exhausting all resources of His boundless mercy, withdraws Himself from the soul entirely and for ever¹.

Since the grace of final perseverance which is not due to man in strict right, is granted by God out of pure mercy to all who faithfully correspond with grace, we must therefore beg for it in our prayers².

§ IV

ACTUAL GRACE IS NECESSARY FOR THE JUST MAN TO AVOID VENIAL SIN THROUGHOUT LIFE.

The Question Stated. — This question finds place rather in ascetic theology than in an elementary treatise on grace. In a few words it amounts to this, Can a man in the state of grace, by his own good works, merit in strict right, *de condigno*, new graces, and thus persevere during his life, so perfectly that he will avoid all venial sin³?

The Doctrine of the Fathers of Southern Gaul. — Pelagius had answered this question with a decided yes. St. Augustine took up the Scriptures and proved how erroneous this position really was. He culled many passages wherein it is explicitly stated that the just man cannot live without faults. And this is why, he says, the saints did penance for their sins, why they prayed, and why they especially begged of God, *Dimitte nobis debita nostra*.

In the following centuries, the Augustinian doctrine was brought out into clearer relief. Thus it was taught that the just man could avoid all venial sins for a certain time, and

1. Cf. LACORDAIRE, conf. 72, *La sanction du gouvernement divin*.

2. This grace is generally known as *the grace of a happy death*. The saints were wont to make that prayer and beseech others to do the same.

3. It is an open question whether this grace, like the grace of perseverance, is supernatural or preternatural.

even that he could escape all deliberate venial sins throughout his life. But to avoid all venial sins all the time required a special grace from God, which no one could gain by his own merits. In His great mercy, God has bestowed it on certain saints, as for example, the Blessed Virgin.

The Plenary Council of Carthage had summarily taught this doctrine ¹, which later was explicitly defined by the Fathers of the Council of Trent².

Conclusions. — The first part of the Pelagian controversy, on *the necessity of grace for the performance of acts in the order of salvation*, leads us to the following conclusions :

1. The Church teaches against Pelagius that an actual grace, really supernatural, is necessary for the performance of *any salutary act*.

2. Against Pelagius and his disciples who granted this general thesis, but modified it into their own meaning, she further teaches :

(a) That a truly supernatural actual grace is necessary for the *beginning of faith*.

(b) That actual grace is necessary for *perseverance in the life of grace*, and especially for *final perseverance*.

(c) That actual grace is necessary for the just man *to avoid venial sin during his life-time*.

1. DENZ., 107.

2. Sess. VI, can. 23 : *Si quis hominem semel justificatum dixerit amplius peccare non posse, neque gratiam amittere, atque ideo eum, qui labitur et peccat, nunquam vere fuisse justificatum; aut contra posse in tota vita peccata omnia, etiam venialia, vitare, nisi ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine tenet Ecclesia : A. S. Cf. DENZ., 833.*

SECTION II

HUMAN NATURE, BY ITS OWN RESOURCES, CANNOT OBSERVE THE WHOLE NATURAL LAW FOR ANY GREAT LENGTH OF TIME, NOR CAN IT OVERCOME VIOLENT TEMPTATIONS.

The Object of this Section. — An actual grace, truly supernatural, is necessary for the performance of all works of salvation, namely, for the attaining of man's supernatural end.

But, is man, considered in his human nature, endowed with all power? In other words, viewing man from the standpoint of his natural end, can we say that by his nature alone, he can easily attain it?

We must make this question, which is peculiarly a delicate one, clear from the beginning.

The natural end of man is that which is dictated and demanded by his nature. The direction of his nature to this end is called the natural law.

At best the natural law is but an abstract idea, if considered independently of the precepts which it contains, precepts, some of which are primary, others secondary, because they are the determination of the former, in object, end or circumstances.

Now the question arises, Can man by his own intellectual and moral power observe the whole natural law, that is, fulfil all the precepts of the natural law and thus fulfil his natural duty?

Pelagius and all those who deny the existence of the supernatural order, answer in the affirmative. The Church does not disregard the power of human nature, but she has seen fit to surround it with certain limitations. Hence it is, that she clearly teaches that man, by his own natural resources, cannot, without a special help from God, persevere for a long time in the keeping of the whole

natural law, and especially, that he cannot overcome grave temptations.

Let us first establish *the Catholic thesis*, and then we shall study what is *the weakness of human nature which requires a special help from God*.

§ I

THE CATHOLIC THESIS.

Teaching of the Church. — The meaning of the thesis is sufficiently explained by what we have said, and it merely remains for us to prove how far this teaching is binding our belief.

The powerlessness of human nature, left to itself, has never been defined by any council. The only claim that it may have as a doctrine, lies in the dogmatic letter, written by Pope Celestine I. against the Semi-Pelagians of southern Gaul, at the solicitation of Hilary and Prosper, some time after the death of St. Augustine¹.

This letter explicitly declares that human nature alone cannot resist the concupiscence of the flesh, without grace given daily². Thus, this is a direct confirmation of our thesis.

This letter, though dogmatic throughout, is not a *de fide* definition. Yet the doctrine here expressed, ought to be

1. See above, p. 141-142.

2. DENZ., 132. *Neminem etiam baptismatis gratia renovatum idoneum esse ad superandas diaboli insidias et ad vincendas carnis concupiscentias, nisi per quotidianum adjutorium Dei, perseverantiam bonæ conversationis acceperit. Quod ejusdem antistitis [Innocentius I, in loc. cit., ad conc. Milev.] in eisdem paginis doctrina confirmat, dicens : « Nam quamvis hominem redemisset a præteritis ille peccatis, tamen sciens iterum posse peccare, ad reparationem sibi, quemadmodum posset illum et post ista corrigere, multa servavit, quotidiana præstans illi remedia quibus nisi freti confisque nitamur, nullatenus humanos vincere poterimus errores. Necesse est enim, ut quo auxiliante vincimus, eo iterum non adjuvante vincamur. »*

regarded as an expression of the ordinary *magisterium* of the Church, and it is therefore, *a certain doctrine*, which no one can reject. From the time of the writing of this letter this teaching has always been maintained in the Church¹.

The Proof from Scripture. — The main argument drawn from this source is taken from St. Paul, especially his Epistle to the Romans, where he gives a long development to the idea that man cannot hope for victory over the flesh without the grace of God². But here the main idea of the Apostle, is to exhort the faithful not to abandon the Spirit of God, because it is the best means of overcoming concupiscence. St. Paul never dreamt of explaining the powerlessness of human nature in any other way. Hence we cannot say that our doctrine is contained explicitly in Sacred Scripture, although the Epistle to the Romans gives a general indication of it.

What else could we expect from the Bible? If it is true, as the Church teaches, that God grants man grace for his actions, the doctrine of the weakness of human nature in regard to the observance of the natural law can only be substantiated by the refutation of the contrary opinion which lays too much stress on the power of human nature. This is not the purpose of Scripture.

The Proof from Tradition. — To St. Augustine we owe the clear expression of this teaching, for it was he that answered the Pelagian assertion that human nature can observe the natural law for a long period of time.

This refutation is to be found in several treatises. In his *De natura et gratia*, he claims that there is within man a power that forces man to sin, a power due to the fall of

1. Cf. DE BROGLIE, *Conférences*, II. 6.

2. Rom. VII. 14-24.

Adam, which cannot be successfully met by the human will alone¹.

Later, he replied to an *argumentum ad hominem* brought against him by Pelagius. The latter argued that in his *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine claimed that a man who succumbed to an invincible inclination, did not sin. But then, adds Pelagius, there is no such thing as sin, for every time man gives in to his inclinations, he does so because he cannot help himself.

St. Augustine freely acknowledges that he had employed this language, but he asks his objector to view the context in which it appears. There he claims that a man who is overcome by a violent inclination does not sin in that, but he does sin in not asking the help of grace whereby he might have saved himself from this fall².

To sum up, St. Augustine explicitly teaches that there are certain natural precepts which human nature cannot fulfil by itself, but which it must nevertheless observe, with

1. *De natura et gratia*, 56; *P. L.*, XLIV, 274 : *Sicut ergo istæ similitudines falsæ sunt, ita et illud propter quod eas voluit adhibere. Sequitur enim et dicit : « Simili ergo modo de non peccandi possibilitate intelligendum est, quod non peccare nostrum sit, posse vero non peccare non nostrum. »* (In other words we are not impeccable by nature; but if we wish, we can avoid sin). *Si de integra et sana hominis natura loqueretur, quam modo non habemus, nec sic recte diceret, quod non peccare nostrum tantummodo sit, quamvis peccare nostrum esset : nam et tunc esset adjutorium Dei et tanquam lumen sanis oculis quo adjuti vident, se præberet volentibus ; quia vero de hac vita disputat, ubi corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem, miror quo corde, etiam sine adjutorio medicinx Salvatoris nostri, nostrum putet esse non peccare, posse vero non peccare naturæ esse contendat, quam sic apparet esse vitiatam, ut hoc majoris vitii sit non videre.*

2. *Ib.* 80 : *Agnosco, verba mea sunt ; sed etiam ipse dignetur agnoscere superius cuncta quæ dicta sunt. De gratia quippe Dei agitur, quæ nobis per Mediatorem medicina opitulatur, non de impossibilitate justitiæ. Potest ergo ei causæ, quæcumque illa est, resisti : potest plane, nam in hoc adjutorium postulamus, dicentes, ne nos inferas in tentationem : quod adjutorium non posceremus, si resisti nullo modo posse crederemus. Potest peccatum caveri, sed opitulante illo, qui non potest falli.*

the help of grace, under the pain of falling into sin. This means that, by its own power, human nature cannot persevere for any great length of time, in the observance of the whole natural law. This is a teaching which St. Augustine was more inclined to exaggerate than to attenuate.

§ II.

IN WHAT DOES THIS POWERLESSNESS OF HUMAN NATURE CONSIST, AND WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE SPECIAL DIVINE ASSISTANCE THAT IT DEMANDS?

The Powerlessness of Human Nature. — This incapability is twofold, the one moral and the other physical.

Physical incapability is an absolute inability, and hence it is that human nature is absolutely unable to perform any salutary act whatsoever, without the help of a grace which is altogether supernatural.

Moral incapability is but a relative inability. The difficulty here is great, wit could, but ill not be overcome.

Nowhere is it said that the powerlessness to keep the natural law for a long time, by our own efforts, is physical inability. If such were the case, it would be extremely difficult to deny that human nature, because of Adam's fall, was impaired in its natural prerogatives¹.

On the contrary, the Church maintains against the opinions of Calvin and Jansenius, as we shall see further, that human nature alone is capable of attaining a high degree of natural moral perfection. Modern psychology which has given careful study to the passions, affords us sufficient reason for this statement.

1. It is hardly possible to admit that God could create man in a condition in which it is *physically impossible* to fulfil all his moral duties.

The brutality of the passions depends on a multiplicity of causes, as the memory, the imagination, feeling, and physiological causes. All these causes can be disciplined by education. Sometimes they can be toned down in their violence; sometimes they can be turned toward good or directed toward evil; in each individual it can be made the basis of a high natural honesty.

But every one knows that this desirable result can be obtained only after a thorough and intelligent education, which must begin in infancy, and the fruits of which may not be definitely obtained before the second generation. It must be admitted that the complex character of this education, and the application it exacts, forms a difficulty of such a nature that we can and must say that man is morally unable to persevere for a long time in the observance of the whole natural law, and especially that he is unable to overcome grave temptations, without a special divine assistance.

But difficult as this work may be, it nevertheless remains feasible to man, and this is enough to affirm that man has not suffered any natural impoverishment, at least as a result of the fall of the head of mankind.

The Nature of the Special Help granted by God. — As this help must be a means which directs man to the attainment of his natural end, and perfects him in this order, it cannot be a supernatural help nor a supernatural grace. Only those graces are, as a matter of fact, supernatural, which are of the same nature as the beatific vision. The assistance to which we refer here consists in giving light to the intellect, affections to the will, which perfect human nature in its order, but which God does not owe to man. Hence it belongs to the preternatural gifts; it is a grace, but a preternatural grace¹.

1. SUAREZ, *De necessitate gratiæ*, l. I, c. XXIV, 20 : *Dico ergo hanc gratiam consistere in aliqua interna motione Dei aliquo modo supernaturali, qua*

To sum up then, man, by his natural abilities, is unable to keep the natural law for any length of time, nor can he withstand violent temptations. This inability is a moral

juvat imbecillitatem nostram, ut tali tentationi valeamus resistere.... Est ergo hæc motio.... vel illuminatio intellectus, qua melius et fortius repræsentatur objectum quam per communem cursum causarum possit, vel motus aliquis voluntatis, quo Deus facit suavem illam resistantiam, vel terret ab illo malo... Dixi autem motionem dari debere aliquo modo supernaturalem, quia ad effectum de quo tractamus, non semper est necesse ut sit supernaturalis in entitate sua, quia effectus non est adeo excellens. Sufficit ergo ut modo supernaturali conferatur; consistit autem ille modus in hoc quod talis ac tanta consideratio, vel affectio, aut inordinatio, in tali occasione ac puncto, fieri non posset per communem cursum naturalium causarum, vel per humanam industriam ejus, qui tentationem patitur, comparari. Et ideo illa motio habet veram rationem gratiæ, præsertim si detur in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, sicut nunc datur.

Thus, declares Suarez, this concurrence which is morally necessary for the accomplishment of all natural duty is not necessarily supernatural in the strict sense, *supernaturale quoad rem seu in entitate sua*, i. e. supernatural as a part of that life of which the connatural term is the beatific vision. It is supernatural in the sense of a natural being being perfected according to a mode which transcends the activity of nature alone, and which consequently demands an extraordinary concurrence on the part of God, *supernaturale quoad modum, præternaturale*; or in the sense that it is question of an extraordinary natural favor granted with a view to make salvation easier, as is always the case in the state of fallen nature; or in the sense that it is question of a natural advantage given to the merits of a salutary work. (This last meaning is given by Suarez, *in loc. cit. infr.*).

Supposing that God created man in the state of pure nature, then He would have even then given him a special concurrence, which supplied the deficiency of his nature and helped him to observe the whole natural law :

Cur ergo Deus, ut auctor naturæ, non præberet homini indigenti hoc altius providentiæ genus, præbendo illi adjutorium prout expedire censeret? Unde illud adjutorium non esset tam propria gratia, sicut nunc est simile auxilium datum homini lapso. Nam hoc auxilium, prout nunc datur fidelibus, etiam peccatoribus, ordinarie est supernaturale, vel saltem per media supernaturalia obtinetur, nimirum fidem et orationem ex illa, ut dictum est. In statu autem puræ naturæ, tale auxilium solum daretur per inspirationes, cogitationes affectionesque honestas liberaliori modo immissas, utique ultra communem cursum externarum causarum. Ibid., c. xxviii, 10.

Instead of intrinsically perfecting human nature in strengthening the moral will and in lessening the violence of passion, God may increase supernatural grace in the soul; and then the difficulty of accomplishing one's duty remains the same, but God comes and helps the soul to overcome this difficulty by holding before its view heaven and the glory beyond. The Christian will suffer

inability, relative and not absolute, which God counter-balances by His special concurrence whereby man is perfected in his own order. This concurrence is not supernatural, but preternatural¹.

ARTICLE II

The Power of Human Nature, or The Calvinistic Controversy.

The Question Stated. — Pelagius claimed that human

more perhaps than any other from the hardships of this life, but he always possesses the assurance and the assistance to overcome them.

1. We have considered the weakness of human nature as embodied in the Augustinian doctrine, from the viewpoint of the moral will. Our conclusion was that man was unable to fulfil all the precepts of the natural law. This state is not a whit inferior to the state of pure nature. With Suarez, we have admitted that if God decided to create man in this state, He would have given him certain preternatural gifts which would help him to accomplish the whole natural law easily.

But what about the intellect of man? Can it, in its fallen state, accomplish as much as it could in the state of pure nature?

The answer is the same as we gave in regard to the will. Adam's fall carried with it the loss of all his preternatural gifts and impaired the intellect itself in no way.

The loss of his preternatural gifts, rendered the human intellect incapable of gaining easily the certain knowledge of his principle and his end, unless a revelation be granted to him. If God had not given a revelation, says St. Thomas (*Summa contra Gentiles*, I. c. iv.) few men could have ever gained a knowledge of God. Some would fail because their intellects could not grasp this truth, others, because of the hardships and necessities of life, and others still, because of sloth. This knowledge after all is only gained gradually, and then only after long study. Many men are in a state of doubt on this most essential point, because of the sophisms and errors with which they are surrounded.

The human intellect now in its fallen state is not weaker than it would have been in the state of pure nature. Revelation would have been then morally necessary, because the human mind could not have grasped easily truths that were essential for it. Hence, we have now the same moral inability.

God created man, not in the state of pure nature, but He always destined him for the supernatural order. And fallen man as long as he remains unreconciled to God, is in a state in which God never intended that he should be. On this question, see JUNGMAHN, *De gratia* pars I. c. i, a. 5; DE BROGLIE, *Conférences*, conf. 7; DIDOT, *Logique surnaturelle subjective*, th. LXVIII-LXXVI.

nature is all-powerful, consequently grace is useless. Against him, following the teaching of St. Augustine, we have established the relative helplessness of nature and the necessity of grace.

In direct antithesis to the Pelagian doctrine, Calvin and Baius declared that human nature is radically so weak, that it can accomplish no good unless assisted by the grace of God. Like the Pelagian system, this view sins by excess; by exaggerating the consequences of the fall, it goes to the other extreme.

To refute it, we must show the power of human nature and determine what our nature can do without grace. In order to do this, we must prove that *not all the acts of sinners are sins*, that *not all works of infidels are sins*, and that, because *man by his nature alone, is capable of accomplishing some moral good*.

As can be easily seen, the third proposition gives the reason for the other two, and the three together form one great thesis, the Catholic position radically opposed to the Calvinistic view.

§ I.

NOT ALL THE ACTS OF SINNERS ARE SINS.

The Teaching of the Church. — By the term *sinner* we mean here one who has not as yet been baptized, and who is still therefore in the state of original sin. Calvin claimed that all the acts of man thus unregenerated were sins.

He argues that original sin consists in concupiscence, and as long as concupiscence has not lost by Baptism its sinful character, all its manifestations are necessarily so many sins.

Every act of an unbaptized person must be regarded as a manifestation of concupiscence, for his moral will is entirely under the sway of concupiscence¹. This is a brief summary

1. *Institution de la religion chrétienne*, II. c. ii, 16-17. Here he says

of the doctrine which Calvin developed with a logic as vigorous as ever found in the greatest doctors of the Thomistic school.

The Council of Trent explicitly condemned his teaching in the following definition : « If any one says that all the works performed before justification, no matter for what motive they are performed (i. e. purely natural actions and not merely the actions performed with the aid of grace) are sins... let him be anathema¹ ». It is therefore defined that a non-justified sinner can perform some natural actions which are good.

The Proof from Scripture. — The New Testament affords us examples where Christ took into account the works of Gentiles who were sinners in the sense given by Calvin. For instance, it was the trust and confidence of the centurion, and the faith of the Chanaanitish woman that He rewarded, because they were good². In the Epistle to the Romans, St. Paul reproaches the Gentiles, because they did not follow the natural dictates of their conscience³.

These texts are generally interpreted in the light of the above definition of the Council of Trent. Christ, it is argued, could hardly have recompensed acts that were sinful, nor would St. Paul have reproached the Gentiles for not acting in accordance with their conscience, if all these actions were sins, and hence the conclusion follows that not all the acts of sinners are sins.

This conclusion must not be pressed too far. It is clear

explicitly that an unjustified man is the slave of concupiscence, and there is no moral free will in him. All his acts are infected with concupiscence, i. e. sins.

1. DENZ., 817 : *Si quis dixerit, opera omnia quæ ante justificationem fiunt, quacumque ratione facta sint, vere esse peccata, vel odium Dei mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis nititur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto eum gravius peccare* : A. S.

2. Mt. VIII. 5-13; XV, 22-28.

3. Rom. I. 18-23.

that not all the acts of sinners are sins, if among them there are some who are doing good, and there certainly must have been some of these, else Christ would have never rewarded them. Thus Sacred Scripture is in contradiction to the thesis of Calvin¹.

But we must go a little further for a satisfactory proof.

The third decree of the Council of Orange obliges us to believe that grace is not only given in answer to prayer, but also in order to enable us to pray for it. Could not the acts of the Gentiles, mentioned in the New Testament be good because performed with the help of grace? An affirmative answer can, in all fairness, be given to this question. To assert that the acts here recorded were good, even though not performed by the help of God's grace, is strictly orthodox, but not explicitly stated in the Bible.

The Proof from Tradition. — Calvin claimed that he drew his doctrine from the teaching of St. Augustine, and as we already remarked, he had some reason for his claim.

It is true that St. Augustine identified original sin with concupiscence and claimed that the regenerative virtue of Baptism lay in the fact that it takes away the sinful character of concupiscence². At first sight, it seems that St. Augustine was guilty of the Calvinistic heresy.

But there is no more unfair conclusion than this. To substantiate it, it will have first to be proved that St. Augustine admitted two principles which lay at the very root of Calvin's system namely, that all the acts of the unbaptized are the result of concupiscence, and that the will of the unbaptized is irresistibly drawn by concupiscence. It would be difficult

1. RICHARD SIMON, *Critique des Commentateurs du N.T., Commentaires de Calvin*, 50.

2. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, l. I, 27-29; P. L., XLIV, 429-430 : ... *dimitti concupiscentiam carnis in baptismo, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non imputetur.*

to prove that St. Augustine did not admit the first proposition, but he certainly did not advocate the second. Against Julian of Eclanum who had accused him of Manichaeism, he ceaselessly protests that he does not accept such fatalism. Furthermore, he wrote his *De gratia et libero arbitrio* where he proved that free will does exist despite concupiscence¹. Calvin, therefore is wrong in claiming to have St. Augustine with him, because he has failed to take into account one of the most important elements of the great doctor's teaching.

§ II.

NOT ALL THE WORKS OF INFIDELS ARE SINS.

The Teaching of the Church. — This is by no means a new doctrine; its main object is to refute the position of Baius, who took over the opinion of Calvin and gave it a different form.

Baius does not speak of all the unbaptized or sinners, but only of those who because of their utter unworthiness have made themselves incapable of receiving the grace of faith. These he called infidels².

1. *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 5-7 : Quando autem dicit homo, non possum facere quod præcipitur, quoniam concupiscentia mea vincor, jam quidem de ignorantia non habet excusationem, nec Deum causatur in corde suo, sed malum suum in se cognoscit et dolet, cui tamen dicit Apostolus, noli vinci a malo, sed vince in bono malum (Rom., xii, 21). Et utique cui dicitur, noli vinci, arbitrium voluntatis ejus sine dubio convenitur. Velle enim et nolle propriæ voluntatis est... 21 : Non enim quia dixit « Deus est enim qui operatur in vobis et velle et operari, pro bona voluntate », ideo liberum arbitrium abstulisse putandum est. Quod si ita esset, non superius dixisset, cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini. Quando enim jubetur ut operentur, liberum convenitur arbitrium... 22 : Itaque, debetis quidem per liberum arbitrium non facere mala et facere bona. P. L., XLIV.

2. *De prima hominis justitia et virtutibus impiorum*, l. II, c. iv : ... ideo præsentī instituto satis fore putamus (quantum Deus adjuverit) ostendere virtutes eas quæ ab Aristotele describuntur, id est virtutum officia quæ non ob aliud sed propter semetipsa expetuntur, non recte a peccato vindicari,

He maintained that all the actions of infidels were sins, because no action can be good unless it is performed under the influence of a grace of faith perfected by charity, *ex fide per dilectionem operante*. Hence, all the works which added lustre to the names of the great men of pagan antiquity, are sins. By the word *sin*, he understands vicious acts in which there is not a particle of natural goodness; acts which spring up from the threefold concupiscence, and consequently from egoism¹.

By asserting this doctrine, Baius showed that he was perfectly consistent. If, as he affirms, the elevation of human nature to the supernatural order is absolutely necessary for it to be good, then everything that nature does by itself, must be considered as some thing essentially vitiated. Left to its own resources, human nature cannot but obey the brutal promptings of concupiscence. Like Calvin, Baius claimed that his doctrine was founded on Scripture and tradition, especially on the writings of St. Augustine.

This doctrine is embodied in the 25th proposition of the 79 that were condemned *in globo*². Of course, this condemnation has not the value of a conciliar definition. Its worth lies in this, that the contradictory doctrine is con-

virtutesque non esse, sed virtutum simulationes et vitia virtutes imitantia... Homo ad hoc conditus est, et hoc debet ut Deum ex omnibus suis viribus diligat et illi soli serviat; sed qui secundum virtutem vivit, quod debet facit, et ad quod conditus est: igitur qui Deo non servit etiam virtutum officia non ob aliud, sed propter semetipsa expetit, is non secundum virtutem vivit, sed simulat duntaxat, fornicans a Deo suo et per honestatis officia quæ soli debuerunt Creatori famulari, in cogitationibus et inanibus desideriis evanescit... c. v: ... Et ideo quidquid non sit ex fide per dilectionem operante, sed per cupiditatem aut timorem, ipso non recto fine, peccatum est... c. viii: ... Nempe ut et falsas impiorum virtutes e medio tolleret et illud simul in animis fidelium confirmaret quod alibi sæpius inculcat ac repetit [Augustinus], liberum arbitrium sibi derelictum non nisi ad peccandum valere et tanto citius propinquare iniquitati, quanto acrius intenditur actioni.

1. Michaelis Baii apologia, prop. XXXI: *Omne quod agit peccator, vel servus peccati, peccatum est.*

2. DENZ., 1025: *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata et philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia.*

firmed by a theological note. Therefore, we must hold, in opposition to Baius, that not all the acts of infidels are sins, or better, that infidels are, by their own natural ability, capable of performing human acts that are morally good¹.

The Proof from Scripture. — In all probability the actions of the centurion and the Chanaanitish woman were inspired by a supernatural faith, and therefore the Scriptural texts which refer to them are worthless as a proof against Baius.

The first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, where St. Paul reproaches the Gentiles for not having acted in accordance with their conscience, cannot form a decisive argument. Baius maintains, because later, in chapter XIV. 23, the Apostle clearly says that any work not wrought in faith is sinful. Moreover, in Heb. XI. 6, we find the explicit statement that without faith it is impossible to please God.

But these two texts on which Baius depends so much in his *De prima hominis justitia* (II. v) and in his answer to the propositions condemned², certainly have not the meaning which he gives them.

Taken in its context, Rom. XIV means this : to act against a practical conviction, i. e. against conscience, is sinful.

Heb. XI. 6 refers indeed to faith, but it means simply that an act performed without faith is not conducive to salvation, which we all readily grant.

The doctrine of Baius is then founded on a false interpretation of Scripture. Still it must be admitted that the Bible favors our opinion only in a general way.

1. The various points of the doctrine of Baius have been rehearsed by Jansenius in his work, *Augustinus*, II, *De statu naturae lapsae*, IV. c. I-XIII, pp. 221-252. Therefore, the doctrine of Jansenius shares in the condemnation of Baius. A more special study of Jansenism is to be found in the fifth article of the present chapter.

2. *Michaelis Baii apologia*, prop. XXV : *Omnia opera infidelium sunt peccata*.

The Proof from Tradition. — Manifestly Baius has misunderstood Scripture. Has he likewise misinterpreted St. Augustine? In order to justify his position and show how wrongly he had been condemned, he gathered together a great number of texts taken from the writings of St. Augustine. He appealed to *De civitate Dei*, book XIX, where the holy doctor endeavored to show the vanity of the acts of the wise men of old. Baius' great argument was taken from *Contra Julianum*, IV. III,¹ where St. Augustine discusses the text *Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est*. Is Baius right?

The book of St. Augustine can be thus briefly summed up: all works not performed in faith are sinful, says St. Paul. Julian objects however that there are many good works which are accomplished without faith. *Alienos a fide abundare virtutibus, in quibus sine adjutorio gratiae, solum est naturae bonum, licet superstitionibus mancipatum, qui solis libertatis ingenitae viribus, et misericordes crebro, et modesti, et casti inveniuntur et sobrii*. After expressing his admiration for the naive optimism of his objector, St. Augustine threshes out thoroughly the difficulty. He takes it that there is no true virtue except in the just man. Even the disciples of Plato and Pythagoras possessed no true virtue. For, if true virtue can be acquired without the grace of Christ, of what use is the blood of Christ? Then all the works of infidels are sins in as much as they are not performed under the influence of faith.

Baius claims that the thought of St. Augustine here is unmistakable. There is no gainsaying that when St. Augustine declares that the virtues of the pagan philosophers are not true virtues, he does not only proclaim them sterile and useless for heaven, *quia steriles sunt et ad regnum coelorum consequendum inutiles*, but he deems them to be moreover sins worthy of punishment, *vitia sunt et peccata digna supplicio*², because not being habits informed by the

1. P. L. XLIV. 743-756.

2. *De prima hominis justitia et virtutibus impiorum*, II. v.

virtue of faith, nor by charity; they are nothing but the manifestations of our egoism or our selfish tendencies.

But despite the arguments of Baius to the contrary, this interpretation goes beyond the thought of St. Augustine. The bishop of Hippo does say that the works of infidels are sins, in the sense that they are performed without grace, i. e. without that perfection which should accompany them. As regards their natural moral goodness, St. Augustine does not seem to touch that point¹.

§ III.

HUMAN NATURE, WITHOUT ACTUAL GRACE, IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING SOME MORAL GOOD.

The Teaching of the Church. — If all the acts of sinners and infidels are not sins, then it follows that human nature can accomplish some moral good. Yet we have seen fit to make this important doctrine the subject of a special study. Besides, while the dogma is indirectly established by the condemnations of the preceding systems, its direct proof will furnish an indirect justification of these condemnations.

Two ideas must be made clear and kept in mind, namely, the idea of moral good and the idea of moral liberty.

Good in general is the object and goal of the various forms of our activity. Thus, the good of sight is the object of this form of sense activity, and it consists in the sensation of color or relief. The good of the moral inclinations is the object of this other form of activity. That of love, for example, consists in the possession of the object loved. The good of the intelligence is the object of this form of activity, and it consists in the knowledge of reality. The good of the will con-

1. THOMASSIN, Cinquième Mémoire sur la grâce, ch. xxv-xxviii. — D. PALMIERI, *De gratia divina actuali*, thes. XXI.

sists in the proper application of the senses, the inclinations, the intelligence, all to their own respective good.

Now, there is moral goodness when the will directs the various forms of our activity toward their own object, according to the moral law or duty.

If one or the other of the forms of our activity pursues its object with excess, even though that might be physically good, it is a moral evil, a moral disorder, for then it would be a good which the will must not allow¹.

Moral good then means the conformity of the will with the natural law according to right reason².

What is moral liberty? The power to do moral good. This definition needs some explanation.

Moral liberty is the power to do moral good, and moral goodness means the conformity of the will with duty. Now, to effect this conformity, man must possess the power to oppose all that stands in the way of this conformity. Over and above this, he must possess the power to apply his faculties to the proper pursuit of their object and the power to determine himself to act or not to act. Moral liberty then consists in a triple power, the power of reaction, the power of application, and the power of determination or non-determination³.

Have we such a moral liberty? Can we, without actual grace, accomplish some moral good?

Philosophy says, yes. Theology gives the same answer. Baius says, no; and his position was condemned⁴.

1. Cf. ANSELM, *De conceptu virginali*, 4; P. L., LVIII, 437: *Nec ipsi appetitus quos Apostolus carnem vocal... justi vel injusti sunt per se considerati. Non enim hominem justum faciunt vel injustum, sentientem, sed injustum, tantum voluntate, cum non debet, consentientem... Nam si sentientem sine consensu, injustum facerent, sequeretur damnatio. Quare non eis sentire, sed eis consentire peccatum est.*

2. This is well brought out by ABBÉ DE BROGLIE, *Conférences sur la vie surnaturelle*, II, conf. 7. See also J. BÉLLAMY, *La vie surnaturelle*, pp. 8-9.

3. Cf. CARDINAL MERCIER, *Psychologie*, pt. 3, c. i, a. 1, sect. 2, ii. *La liberté de mal faire, imperfection du libre arbitre.*

4. DENZ., 1097: *Liberum arbitrium, sine gratiæ Dei adiutorio, non nisi ad*

The Origin of this Teaching. — From the fact that Scripture teaches — only in a general way, it is true, — that not all the acts of sinners and infidels are sins, it can be inferred that human nature is capable, without the assistance of grace, of accomplishing some moral good.

St. Augustine brought out this teaching in clearer light. We have already seen how Baius, in misinterpreting the text *Contra Julianum*, IV, III, attributed to the holy Doctor a doctrine absolutely false. Human nature or the moral will, according to this interpretation, can do nothing but sin, unless it has the help of the grace of faith and charity; for it is fatally drawn by concupiscence. But this is a misinterpretation. What St. Augustine seems to say is, that human nature unassisted by grace can only sin, by which term he means, can only perform actions void of supernatural merit. If this were not the meaning of the passage, then St. Augustine would have been inconsistent. In his *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (426), five years after he wrote his work against Julian, he held that free will was given to man in order that he might perform naturally good actions¹. No less explicitly did he maintain the same teaching in his *Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum, ad Bonifacium*, written one year prior to his attack on Julian, that is, in 420².

peccandum valet. The contradictory proposition is *de fide* as defined by the Council of Trent against the errors of Calvin: *Si quis liberum hominis arbitrium post Adæ peccatum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, aut rem esse de solo titulo, immo titulum sine re, figmentum denique a Satana inreductum in Ecclesiam*: A. S. — *Si quis dixerit, non esse in potestate hominis vias suas malas facere, sed mala opera ita, ut bona, Deum operari, non permissive solum, sed etiam proprie et per se, adeo ut sit proprium ejus opus non minus proditio Judæ, quam vocatio Pauli*: A. S. Cf. Sess. VI, can. 5 and 6; DENZ., 815 and 816.

1. 5-7, 21, 22; P. L. XLIV.

2. *Contra duas epistolas pelagianorum, ad Bonifacium*, l. I, 4-5; P. L., XLIV, 552: *Quis autem nostrum dicat quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere. Libertas quidem periit per peccatum sed illa quæ in Paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate justitiam. Propter quod natura humana divina indiget gratia.*

Besides, if the doctrine of St. Augustine was anything like Baius claims it is, we could reply by saying that the Saint was carried too far in his assertions by the heat of controversy. According to the commonly received opinion, an act is morally good, when it conforms to the natural law manifested by right reason; on the other hand, human nature, by itself, is capable of performing such acts¹.

One important reservation in regard to this whole question must not be lost sight of, namely, that such acts are only naturally good, and are therefore of no value as regards the gaining of the heavenly kingdom.

Conclusions. — The teaching of the Church in regard to the Calvinistic controversy, may be summed up in the following propositions :

1. Not all the works of sinners (the unbaptized) are sins.
2. Not all the works of infidels are sins.
3. Without the assistance of actual grace, human nature is capable of performing some moral good, which means that it must be an act conformable to the moral law manifested by right reason.

The first of these three propositions is a reply to the teaching of Calvin. The second is an answer to Calvin and Baius. The whole question is then really concerned with the Calvinistic view, for Baius' opinion is but the logical development of it².

As we have seen, the work of the Church in this controversy, is far from being that which is sometimes attributed

1. Cf. D. PALMIERI, *De gratiâ divina actuali*, thes. XXI: *Libertas ergo amissa non est libertas indifferentiæ ad bonum et malum morale simpliciter, quæ opponitur necessitati, sed est libertas filiorum Dei seu potestas bene et salubriter agendi quæ opponitur servituti peccati. Homines enim per prævaricationem servi effecti peccati et diaboli, libertatem filiorum amiserunt, nec possunt operari opera meritoria salutis nisi a Filio liberentur.*

2. The great difference comes from the fact that Baius rejects the Protestant justification through a forensic imputation of the merits of Christ.

to her by bigoted writers on educational questions. She recognizes the rights of human nature and the integrity of moral liberty, and she has never ceased to defend them against those Protestants and Jansenists who have sought to diminish either, so as to make human nature radically corrupt.

ARTICLE III

Does God will all men to be saved? or the Predestinarian controversy.

The Question Stated. — Although human nature, by its own power, can perform some morally good actions, yet it cannot persevere in the keeping of the natural law for a long time, nor can it overcome grave temptations, unless aided by a preternatural grace. Furthermore, it can do nothing in the order of salvation, without a truly supernatural grace. These conclusions we have proved in the two preceding articles.

Having determined what human nature can and what it cannot do, our next step shall be the consideration of God's treatment of His creature.

If it be true that God never fails to give to every adult acting according to his conscience, a preternatural assistance, that He grants to all who respond to His first advances, a truly supernatural actual grace, and that He grants to all who correspond to this grace, other actual graces whereby they may gradually acquire the life of justification, then it can be safely said that He bestows salvation on all who will it. Does He do this much? This we shall answer in the following pages.

The problem of the saving will of God is one of the hardest in dogmatic theology. Hence for the sake of convenience, we have divided the subject into two sections, in the first of

which we shall consider the theoretical side of the problem, and attempt to answer the question, *Does God will all men to be saved?* In the second we shall take up the practical consequences of the problem, and shall examine *the manner in which God bestows His grace.*

SECTION I

DOES GOD WILL ALL MEN TO BE SAVED?

The Teaching of the Church. — As early as 529 the Council of Orange protested against the doctrine of those who exaggerating the teaching of St. Augustine, were not satisfied with affirming a sort of restricted predestination, but even taught the positive predestination of some to hell and damnation¹.

The theory of restricted predestination was renewed by Calvin and by Baius. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it became the central point of the Jansenistic theology.

On four different occasions, and in as many constitutions, the Popes have condemned the following proposition of Jansenius, taken from his *Augustinus*, as heretical. « It is Semi-Pelagian to claim that Christ died for absolutely all men »².

1. DENZ., 200 : *Aliquos vero ad malum, divina potestate prædestinatos esse, non solum non credimus, sed etiam si sunt qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus.*

Predestination to sin and damnation seems to be somewhat a consequence of the non-predestination to good and heaven. But it is not a necessary consequence. There is a degree of difference in not assigning a man to heaven, and positively assigning him to hell and its torment. This difference lies in what is called *negative predestination* or *permissive decree*. Hence the definition of the Council of Orange does not necessarily carry with it a condemnation of restricted predestination.

2. DENZ., 1096, prop. v : *Semipelagianum est dicere Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse.*

Declarata et damnata uti falsa, temeraria, scandalosa, et, intellecta eo

The contradictory proposition, which declares that it is not Semi-Pelagian [but Catholic] to claim that Christ died for absolutely all men, is *de fide*.

Taking into account the condemnation of Arnauld which we shall consider later, it follows :

1. That God wills the salvation of all faithful, of all those who, having embraced the true faith, still continue to correspond to the grace received. This is *de fide*.

2. That God further wills the salvation of all men. Jews as well as pagans, in this sense, that all adults who follow the dictates of their conscience, will soon receive graces sufficient for salvation ; and that in the case of children dying before baptism, God had prepared graces for them ; they cannot receive them because of natural disorders, physiological or otherwise, which bring about their death ; God does not will the disorders, but He allows them in view of the general end of creation.

This doctrine, referring to the adults, is *fidei proxima* ; it is the common teaching of theologians, as regards children dying before baptism. Let us trace this teaching to Scripture and Patristic tradition, then we will study its developments in scholastic theology.

§ I

THE PROOF FROM SCRIPTURE.

The Old Testament. — As we read further into the history of Israel, we find that the kingdom of God or sal-

sensu, ut Christus pro salute duntaxat predestinatorum mortuus sit, impia, blasphema, contumeliosa, divinae pietati derogans, et haeretica.

The five propositions of Jansenius were condemned by Innocent X., May 31, 1653, in the constitution, *Cum occasione* ; by Alexander VIII, Oct. 16, 1656, in the constitution, *Ad Sanctam B. Petri Sedem* ; by the same Pope, Feb. 15, 1664, in the constitution, *Regiminis apostolici* ; by Innocent XI, July 16, 1705, in the constitution, *Vineam Domini*.

vation, which in the earlier books is represented as the exclusive or almost exclusive portion of the new people of God¹, is, in the later books, more and more pictured as being open also to all nations. God's judgment against the pagans will not bring about their complete destruction, for many shall survive the visitation of His anger and will be permitted to share in the kingdom announced². Yet we cannot help but notice that in the prophetic writings which portray the universality of salvation in the clearest terms, the people of Israel is made the recipient of many great privileges. The new kingdom belongs to the people of God, and Jerusalem must remain the religious centre of mankind³.

The best and clearest expression of the universality of salvation, is embodied in the second part of the Book of Isaiah. The Servant of God will announce salvation to all men. He shall make known the true religion which will consist in the practice of the law and the observance of justice (XLII. 1-4). He shall be the light of nations and shall carry His saving work even to the ends of the world (XLII. 6; XLIX. 6). All pagans who have come to a knowledge of the name of the God of Israel, shall be commissioned by Him to establish His rule in all countries and in far off isles (LXVI. 19).

The New Testament. — The general doctrine of the Gospels is that all men are called to share in the kingdom of God⁴. According to Christ's teaching, grace is given to all who place no obstacle in its path by their evil dispositions.

There are some texts which seem to contradict this general

1. *Deut.* VII, 6-26; *Amos*, IX, 11-15; *Is.* XI, 14-15; *MICH.* IX, 5.

2. *Is.* II. 2-4; XIX. 21-25; XXV. 2-8; *JER.* XXXIII. 9; *EZECH.* XXXVI. 23-26; XXXVII. 28.

3. *Is.* II. 2-3; XVIII. 7.

4. *Mt.* VIII. 5-13; *Lk.* XIV. 15-24.

teaching. Thus, in the Gospel of St. Matthew, we read, « No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him » (XI. 27). But this text is restrictive in appearance and not in reality. No one can know the Father unless the Son makes revelation of Him, which means that no one can be saved unless he receives grace from on high.

Further on in the same Gospel, XV. 24-28, our Lord declares to the Chanaanitish woman that He was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. Nevertheless He grants her request, and cures her daughter. Again, at the end of the parable of the wedding feast, Christ makes the mysterious utterance, « Many are called, but few are chosen » (XXII. 14). But neither of these passages has the meaning that is sometimes given them. Our Saviour is merely teaching what the prophets had taught before Him, and what St. Paul declared after Him. All men are called to salvation, for the kingdom of God is offered to all; still, before all else, to the children of Abraham, for it is their natural heritage. All are called by the right of their birth, although few are in reality able to receive it¹.

St. Paul also has several passages which seem to restrict salvation. Thus in the Epistle to the Romans, the Apostle speaks of God *justifying those whom He called, calling those whom He predestinated, and predestinating those whom He foreknew*². Yet despite these instances, it must be admitted the general teaching of St. Paul is that God wishes to justify all men. This he declares explicitly in his first Epistle to Timothy, when he says : « God will have all men to be saved » (II. 4).

Furthermore, all the texts which prove the universality of Redemption are so many arguments for the universality

1. In interpreting the text, « Many are called, but few are chosen », the context in which the parable appears, must be never separated from it.

2. VIII. 28-30.

ty of salvation, for the two doctrines are one and the same. According to St. Paul, Christ shed His blood in order to gain remission of sins for all men. « Therefore as by the offence of one, *unto all men* to condemnation: so also by the justice of one, *unto all men* to justification of life. For as *by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners*, so also *by the obedience of one, many shall be made just*. Now the law entered in, that sin might abound. And where sin abounded, grace did more abound. That as sin hath reigned to death, so also grace might reign by justice unto life everlasting, through Jesus Christ our Lord¹ ».

§ II

THE PROOF FROM TRADITION.

The doctrine of the universality of salvation bears a different aspect in *the Eastern Church*, from that generally given it by *the Fathers of the West*, and hence, to understand the patristic teaching on this point, both must be considered separately.

The Oriental Church. — Up to the middle of the second century, this doctrine had been accepted on all sides and was denied by no one. All repeated the ideas laid down in the New Testament, namely that *God gives His grace to all men of good will*, without, however, adding anything to it, in the way of development or explanation.

About the middle of the second century, the disciples of the Gnostic Valentinus propounded a doctrine which limited the application of the merits of Christ's redemptive work. This they were led to do, by the philosophy of their system. They distinguished three distinct categories in mankind, the hylic, the pneumatic, and the psychic. Christ could die only for the psychic, for they were the only ones who were ca-

1. Rom. V. 18-21.

pable of receiving salvation and the only ones who stood in need of it.

Whatever intrinsic value this teaching may have, its extrinsic value is greater, for it was the cause of greater light being shed on our dogma. Origen rose against this new system and directed all his efforts to its refutation. He claimed that God had decreed the salvation of all men, and at the same time, He decreed to grant to every man the means of salvation. *This double divine decree, he called predestination or election.* This is the oldest, the simplest and the most exact definition we have of predestination.

All men are predestined or elect, which does not mean that all men shall be saved, because God always respects man's free will. If they are among the elect, it is because He foresees that they will freely meet all His advances. Predestination is then based on the *prevision* or the *prescience* of the voluntary correspondence of all men to the favors of God¹.

From whence did Origen get the idea that the divine prescience extends to all men? From St. Paul or from his own philosophy? He had made the pre-existence of souls, a theory of Plato, the basis of his anthropology. All souls were created *ab æterno*, and existed in a superior world, enveloped in ethereal bodies. They all sinned, and were, as a consequence, imprisoned in terrestrial bodies. They all shall one day regain their lost privilege and once more dwell in their spiritual bodies².

1. *Libellus de Orat.*, 6, P. G. XI, 436-437 : « It is necessary that God should know all that is from all eternity : just as it is necessary that He should decree according to the exigencies of our free will, all that which He has decreed in accordance with our power of action... It is not that the prescience of God is the cause of all that we should do with our free will (... οὐχὶ τῆς προγνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ αἰτίας γινομένης τοῖς ἐσομένοις πᾶσι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἡμῶν ἐνεργηθησομένοις). If by hypothesis, God would not know the future, yet we could act and desire ». From this text it is clear why the Molinists can claim Origen's authority in their behalf.

2. *Periarchon*, I, VII, 3-4; III, I, 20, V, 4.

This then was the philosophical principle on which Origen founded his doctrine on the prescience of God. His thought is this : all souls should return to their primitive state of glory and felicity ; God knows this disposition by His infinite prescience, and, *in consequence of this prescience, He predestines all men to salvation.*

Two elements in the Origenistic system, must be carefully distinguished, namely, the philosophical and the theological. The philosophical part, a borrowing from the system of Plato, disappeared in the ages that followed, whilst the theological element represents the first scholarly expression of the dogma of predestination.

Up to the end of the fourth century, the doctrine of Origen was the most widely accepted, although some modifications had been made to it.

At that time, St. John Chrysostom, began to agitate anew the question of the universality of salvation. In his exposition he brought out the doctrine with remarkable clearness, without, however, resorting to the philosophical principles of Origen, which shows, that, although our dogma was generally admitted at that time, that admission did not carry with it belief in the pre-existence of souls. Chrysostom, although he held Origen in the highest esteem, rejected this theory entirely.

A rather peculiar meaning was ascribed, then, to the words of John, VI, 44, « No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him ». At Constantinople, this interpretation threw the whole Church in despair. Many concluded that it was hardly worth while to be concerned about our salvation, since the whole affair was in the hands of God anyhow. This led St. John Chrysostom to develop his doctrine. God, indeed, desires the salvation of all men, but He wil. force no one against his will. Why then are not all saved, if God wills it? Because all do not conform their will to the will of God, who on His part will force none of us. Therefore, although God wills our salvation, if

we do not walk with Him, we shall remain in death¹.

In his homily on the Epistle to the Ephesians, he makes his teaching more precise. God wishes all men to be saved, by His will *anterior to His prescience* of what men will do. This is the *voluntas antecedens*. Its cause is in God, it proceeds from the love which He has for man, and in fact is this very love. But there is also in God *another will called the consequent will*, because it is *posterior to the prescience* which God has of the manner in which men will correspond to His favors. By this second will, God wills that all sinners should perish. Its cause lies in the prescience or the prevision of man's unfaithfulness, and depends on man's abuse of divine grace².

The whole Eastern Church adopted the teaching of St. Chrysostom. Towards the middle of the eighth century, St. John Damascene incorporated it in his system and stated it with utmost accuracy³. Aside from its simplicity, this doctrine has two features which especially recommend it. On the one hand, it insists that God desires the salvation of all men, and on the other, it shows that man can be damned through his own fault, without in the least affecting the divine will.

The Western Church. — In the fourth century, the Fathers of the Western Church taught a doctrine similar to that advocated by the Fathers of the East.

St. Ambrose took up the dogma, and gave it an explanation which is as exact as it is beautiful. He likens Christ to a brilliant sun who communicates His divine life to all who place themselves in His rays. He also compares Him to a beneficent dew, which covers the whole world and to which it suffices merely to expose oneself in order to be saved⁴.

1. *In quaedam loca* N. T. hom. XI, 6; P. G. LI, 143.

2. *In epist. ad Ephes.*, hom. I, 2; P. G. LXII, 13.

3. *De fide orthod.*, II, xxix; P. G. XCIV, 968-969.

4. *In Psal. CXVIII*, Sermo VIII, 57; P. L., XV, 1318 : *Quomodo misericor-*

This is the teaching of Chrysostom, given under a less philosophical form.

Until he was entangled in his controversies with the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians, St. Augustine held St. Ambrose's view. Like him, he subordinated *predestination* to the divine prescience of the free will's co-operation with grace¹.

But from this time on, he argued otherwise. Commenting on the words, *Quid habes quod non accepisti*, he claims that it is illogical to affirm that God predestines to salvation those who He *foresees* shall correspond with grace².

diæ Domini plena est terra, nisi per passionem Domini nostri Jesu Christi, quam futuram prævidens, quasi promissam Propheta concelebrat? Prophetis enim ea quæ ventura sunt prævidentibus moris est, ut quasi jam decursa memorentur quæ posterioris ætatis sunt. Plena est ergo terra misericordia Domini; quia omnibus est data remissio peccatorum. Super omnes sol oriri jubetur. Et hic quidem sol quotidie super omnes oritur. Mysticus autem sol ille justitiæ omnibus ortus est, omnibus venit, omnibus passus est, et omnibus resurrexit: ideo autem passus est, ut tolleret peccatum mundi. Si quis autem non credit in Christum, generali beneficio ipse se fraudat, ut si quis clausis fenestris radios solis excludat, non ideo sol non ortus est omnibus, quia calore ejus se ipse fraudavit; sed quod solis est, prærogativam suam servat; quod imprudentis est, communis a se gratiam lucis excludit. Super omnes pluvia est, et hoc divinæ misericordiæ deputatur; quia pluit super justos et injustos. Aut certe sic interpretandum, quod misericordiæ divinæ plena sit terra « quia Domini est terra et plenitudo ejus... » (Ps. XXIII, 1). Etenim per Ecclesiam in omnes gentes diffusa est misericordia Domini, in omnes gentes diffusa est fides.

1. *De spiritu et littera*, 58 (written 413): *Liberum arbitrium naturaliter attributum a creatore animæ rationali, illa media vis est, quæ vel intendi ad fidem, vel inclinari ad infidelitatem potest: et ideo nec istam voluntatem qua credit Deo, dici potest homo habere quam non acceperit; quandoquidem vocante Deo surgit de libero, quod naturaliter cum crearetur accepit. Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, et in agnitionem veritatis venire; non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium quo vel bene vel male utentes justissime judicentur. P. L. XLIV, 238.*

In his homily on Ps. XCV, 5, 15 (405): *Sanguis Christi pretium est. Tanti quid valet? Quid nisi totus orbis? Quid nisi omnes gentes?... pro toto dedit quantum dedit... Totum judicare habet quia pro toto pretium dedit. P. L., XXXVII, 1231, 1236.*

2. From the year 413, St. Augustine explicitly taught that the first good will of man is not possible without the grace of God. He also claimed that

God *predestines* those to whom He *has decreed* to grant salvation and the means of attaining eternal life, and not those who He *foresees in His prescience* shall correspond with His grace. *Predestination* is not based on *prescience*, on the contrary *prescience* is founded on *predestination*. God knows those that shall be saved because He has decreed their salvation.

Then arose the Semi-Pelagian controversy. Augustine was opposed, because his doctrine tended to throw Christians into despair. Some made it mean, that those who were not predestined to salvation, were predestined to sin and damnation. In its stead they proposed another opinion. According to them, God predestines to salvation those who He foresees in His infinite prescience, shall, of their own accord, produce the beginning of faith in their souls.

Semi-Pelagianism was in turn attacked by the Fathers of southern Gaul. It was condemned by the second Council of Orange, which declared that man cannot, without grace, attain to the beginning of faith, and cannot persevere in it until the end of life without a special grace¹.

Still these Semi-Pelagian objections were not altogether groundless; hence the Council of Orange declared, in the epilogue after canon 25, that God predestines no one to damnation², but on the contrary, that He predestines all men to salvation, for He never fails to give grace to those who act in accordance with the dictates of their conscience, and always grants the grace of final perseverance to the just who have been faithful to the graces they have received³.

the will could not continue in this disposition without further grace from God. The just, however, can by their prayers gain the grace of final perseverance.

1. DENZ., 176-179, 183.

2. DENZ., 200.

3. DENZ., 200 : *Hoc etiam secundum fidem catholicam credimus quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quæ ad salutem animæ pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere.*

§ III

THE TEACHING OF SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

Albert the Great. — The controversy on predestination tore the Church of Gaul widely asunder, especially in the ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Bishops and monks arrayed themselves on different sides. Some were ultra-Augustinians, while others held fast to the Semi-Pelagian system. This dispute shed little light on the dogma itself, and so we pass it by with a mere mention.

In the thirteenth century, Albert the Great took up the doctrine of St. John Chrysostom, and its development by St. John Damascene. God wills the salvation of all men, with an *antecedent will*, which by no means precludes a *consequent will*, whereby He wills some men to be damned because of their sins¹.

St. Thomas. — The Angelic Doctor adopted the views of Albert the Great and gave them a greater precision. He admitted the *antecedent will* in God, and claimed that this is what the Apostle had in mind when he wrote : *Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri*. He likewise admitted the existence of a *consequent will*, whereby God could and did will the damnation of some because of their sins. He warns us not to carry this distinction too far. The antecedent will can be identified with God's infinite love, by which He wishes to all men all possible good. Yet, even with that love, He can and must, in His infinite justice, will (*voluntate consequenti*) the damnation of sinners².

1. In *I Sent.*, dist. XL. 8, ad 1^{um} : *Ergo dicendum quod secundum Damascenum hoc intelligitur de voluntate antecedente et non consequente. Dicitur autem voluntas antecedens quæ non habet relationem nec ponit effectum ad nostram causam, hoc est ad nostra merita : ... voluntas autem consequens est quæ ex nostra causa, secundum quam prævidendo malitiam, quosdam reprobat, et quosdam eligit, ut bene gratia utantur.*

2. *Sum. theol.*, I^a, q. xix, a. 6 : *Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud*

Although attacked in endless ways, the Thomistic teaching has carried the day, and is now the opinion which is commonly admitted. Put into the theological language of our times, it means that God, in His infinite love wills all men to be saved, and at the same time He prepares for them sufficient actual graces for their salvation. The only obstacle to the fulfilment of that will is the wrong use man can make of his moral liberty ¹.

verbum Apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit accommodata distributio secundum hunc sensum : Deus vult salvos fieri omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus sit quem non velit salvum fieri...; secundo potest intelligi ut fiat distributio pro generibus singulorum et non pro singulis generum, secundum hunc sensum : Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos fieri... non tamen omnes de singulis statibus; tertio secundum Damascenum intelligitur de voluntate antecedente non de voluntate consequente. Quæ quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius voluntatis divinæ, in qua nihil est prius, vel posterius, sed ex parte volitorum.

Ad cujus intellectum considerandum est, quod unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo. Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen prout cum aliquo adjuncto consideratur, quæ est consequens consideratio ejus, a contrario se habet ; sicut hominem vivere est bonum et hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem; sed si addatur circa aliquem hominem quod sit homicida, vel vivens in periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi et malum est eum vivere : unde potest dici quod iudex justus antecedenter vult omnem hominem vivere, sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari, sed consequenter vult quosdam damnari secundum exigentiam suæ justitiæ. Neque tamen id quod antecedenter volumus simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid ; quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in se ipsis sunt ; in se ipsis autem sunt in particulari. Unde simpliciter volumus aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde potest dici, quod iudex justus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi, sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet in quantum est homo. Unde magis potest dici velleitas quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit, licet illud quod antecedenter vult, non fiat.

1. Cf. PALMIERI, *De gratia divina actuali*, thes. XXXIX; BILLOT, *De Deo uno et trino*, I. thes. XXX, XXXV; PESCH, *De gratia*, prop. XX.

SECTION II.

THE MANNER IN WHICH GOD GRANTS HIS GRACE.

Infants dying without Baptism. — Naturally, an infant is physically incapable of a moral act, and hence is incapable of receiving grace. Without Baptism it cannot enter heaven. How is God willing to give him grace if He has made it impossible for that child to receive it?

Despite the difficulty which the question entails, theologians generally affirm that infants who die before the reception of Baptism, are in reality included in the decree — even the consequent decree — whereby God wills all men to be saved.

God prepared for them a sufficient amount of actual graces, which would have brought them to justification, had they been faithful to them. If they were placed in a position where it was impossible for them to receive grace, it was in virtue of a *permissive decree consequent to the prevision of the natural, physiological and other disorders*, — the cause of the child's death — which God *permits* for the greater good of the world.

Granting that the world was created to develop and achieve an end always perfectible, it is inevitable that some catastrophes should occur. Children dying before the reception of Baptism, are the victims of these coincidences.

The Church has defined nothing on this point. The *common* teaching is that these children, since they have not been initiated into the life of grace in this world, cannot participate in the glory of heaven. Their only sin is original sin, and their punishment is the loss of that to which they were not entitled.

They do attain their natural end, and do enjoy a certain happiness in *Limbo*.

Infidels. — An infidel is an adult who has not yet attained to the beginning of faith. If such a man acts in accordance with his conscience, God, according to the teaching of the Church, will grant him *grace to believe* (*gratia excitans*). Should he correspond to this grace, God will grant him others (*gratia adjuvans aut cooperans, aliunde sufficiens saltem remote*).

This doctrine is *proxima fidei*, for the contradictory proposition was condemned in 1690 by Alexander VIII. This was directed against Arnauld who taught that pagans have no share in the grace of Christ, and consequently have no sufficient grace¹.

Unjustified Sinners. — Here it is question of an adult who has the beginning of faith and who has at some time corresponded with the grace of God. He has not gone further, he has not made the acts of faith, hope, charity and contrition that are required for justification.

The doctrine of the Church is that such a man will be given sufficient actual grace to set him on the path of justification (*gratia remote sufficiens*).

What is the nature of this grace?

As we have said, actual grace called sufficient, is a grace which is both necessary and sufficient for the performance of a truly supernatural act. Now either this grace *gives full power of action*; it is *plena et expedita potentia agendi*; then it is called *gratia proxime sufficiens*. Or it *does not give full power for action* because of intrinsic or extrinsic causes, which must first be removed for its action; and then it is called *gratia remote sufficiens*.

To make our meaning clearer, we shall give an example. A man is about to commit a sin. If in this crisis,

1. DENZ., 1295 : *Pagani, Judæi, hæretici alique hujus generis nullum omnino accipiunt a Jesu Christo influxum : adeoque hinc recte inferes, in illis esse voluntatem nudam et inermem sine omni gratia sufficienti.*

he strives to abide by his duty, God will grant him sufficient grace which, however, is still imperfect, because he is hindered from co-operating with it by interior or exterior obstacles. This grace will show him the hideousness of sin and the beauty of virtue, and at the same time inspire him with a hatred for the one and love for the other. If it is held in check by the obstacles we have alluded to, it is *remotely sufficient*; if that man corresponds to it, God will give him all that he needs to conquer, i. e. a grace called *proximately sufficient*.

God does give every sinner not yet justified but who showed his good will a grace which is *remotely sufficient*. This doctrine is *proxima fidei*, because of the condemnation of Arnauld who maintained the opposite ¹.

Relapsed Sinners. — Here we are dealing with those who have received the grace of justification, but who have fallen into a grave sin. How does God act with them?

If it is question of ordinary sinners, the answer to this is not hard. God does not delay in giving them grace to change their hearts and help them to repentance.

This doctrine is certain, and, we might say, *proxima fidei*, for the fourth Lateran Council declares that the *lapsi* can once more gain grace by real penance². Every one knows that this penance cannot be performed unless by a grace coming from God.

The answer is less certain in regard to sinners who have become hardened and have lost the virtue of faith. The *common* teaching is that God gives such sinners interior lights whereby they may be converted from their sins. God never abandons a soul that shows the least signs of obeying His voice.

1. See above, p. 187.

2. DENZ., 430 : *Et si post susceptionem baptismi quisquam prolapsus fuerit in peccatum, per veram potest semper pœnitentiam reparari. Non solum autem virgines et continentes, verum etiam conjugati, per rectam fidem et operationem bonam placentes Deo, ad æternam merentur beatitudinem pervenire.*

The Just. — Here we refer to the just man who has presently to observe a certain precept, or who is violently assaulted by temptation.

The Church teaches that God always gives to such a man *grace remotely sufficient*. God always comes to the help of faithful souls in time of danger. In its sixth session, the Council of Trent condemned the doctrine of Luther and Calvin, who taught that there were certain precepts that the just man could not perform ¹. Hence it must be considered *a doctrine of faith*.

Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam. — The conclusion of this third section can be summed up in an axiom of dogmatic theology : *Facienti quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam*.

This does not mean that the accomplishment of natural good *demand*s the first grace or that it *merits* this grace, for this would smack of Semi-Pelagianism, and is contrary to the common teaching of theologians ².

Neither does this formula mean that God grants the first grace after the first effort on man's part. It merely signifies that, *in fact*, God does not fail to grant the first grace to an adult who acts in accordance with his natural lights, which means, that not only does *he avoid doing what appears to him as evil*, but *he positively does that which is good*.

If this first grace is accepted and acted upon, God gives other graces until this man is justified. Then with the help of the Lord, he increases in grace until he obtains the grace of final perseverance.

1. DENZ., 828 : *Si quis dixerit Dei præcepta homini etiam justificato et sub gratia constituto esse ad observandum impossibilia* : A. S.

2. The Semi-Pelagians taught that nature *demand*s the beginning of faith, not in the sense that our free will, by its own good desires, *demand*s or *merits* the beginning of faith, but in the sense that by its own resources, it can effect the beginning of faith, *intendi ad fidem ex seipso*. Hence the expressions referred to above are not Semi-Pelagian in their strict meaning, at least they differ from the historical Semi-Pelagianism.

This is the theoretical side of the question. Coming down to facts, we can rightly question whether this process really takes place. There are two elements in human life that must not be lost sight of, elements which must be ascertained before we can dare give a positive answer, namely, the full knowledge of each man's responsibility, — a knotted question of moral theology — and the relations of the individual with God at the moment of death — a truly mysterious problem. But we can certainly affirm that outside of those who have received Baptism and thus have been admitted to the body of the Church, there are a multitude of souls, in whom the grace of God is working efficaciously, and who, although not members of the body of the Church, must be reckoned as members of the soul of the Church.

ARTICLE IV.

The Controversy between Thomists and Molinists.

How does actual grace act with the human will?

In this article, we shall study first *the problem involved*, then *the solutions given by the Thomists and the Molinists*, and thirdly, *the criticism of these two positions*.

The Problem. — The controversy on grace and free will arose in the sixteenth century and was bitterly waged down to the succeeding century, when gradually it ceased to be discussed. In reality it is but a continuation of the controversy on predestination. Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, was on one side of the dispute and he was opposed by all the followers of the Thomistic school.

At the basis of the Molinistic idea there lay the Greek thought which Albert the Great had once more brought into the limelight. The Thomists adhered rather to the theology of St. Augustine.

The Molinists maintained that by an *antecedent will*, God wills the salvation of all men, and by this same will He destines for *all men* graces, more or less sufficient. But at the same time, He *foresees* that *some*, by their *good dispositions*, shall make Him, as it were, act *simultaneously* with their *free will* in order to render in their souls sufficient grace efficacious. He *foresees* that there are *others* who will not possess these good dispositions. And then, as a *consequence* of this prevision, He predestines the former for salvation, and permits the damnation of the latter.

This consequent predestination is the only predestination in the strict sense of the term, for antecedent predestination is such only in a wide sense. The former is restricted predestination, the latter is universal. The former is efficacious, the latter is sufficient, but not efficacious. But the inefficiency of the antecedent predestination is imputable to man altogether, since his evil dispositions are the cause of this inefficiency.

On the other hand, the Thomists claim that God wills the salvation of all men by an *antecedent will* and by this same will, He prepares an amount of grace sufficient for *every* man's salvation. Up to this point both sides agree. But here the agreement ends.

The Thomists deny that man's good dispositions alone can *actualize* the sufficient grace. For this result something more is needed. God must first give to man's free will a *pre-motion* which completes and perfects the sufficient grace. Under the influence of this supernatural impulse, the will and the now supplemented sufficient grace produce the supernatural action. This impulse is called *gratia efficax*, and those who correspond to the sufficient grace are those to whom God has decreed to give the efficacious grace.

Hence, it is not *in consequence of the prevision of man's correspondence with sufficient grace* that God predestines men to salvation, but on the contrary, He predestines them in *consequence of His decree to grant them efficacious grace*. On

the other hand, God decrees to grant man grace in the measure demanded and His mercy and His justice, or to put it more clearly, in the measure of the demands of His glory, by the manifestation of His mercy and His justice towards sinful man.

To sum up, both the Molinists and the Thomists teach a sufficient predestination for all men, but maintain that an efficacious predestination is not the portion of all. The difference between the two systems is, that, according to the Molinists, the inefficiency of predestination is due to the evil dispositions of our free will, whilst, according to the Thomists, it is due to God who, from all eternity, decreed to give us efficacious grace, but only in the measure that His glory demands.

They must therefore differ as to *the mode of action of actual grace upon free will*. This is the problem. How does grace act on our free will?

The Two Solutions. — *The Molinists' Answer.* — God gives to every well disposed free will sufficient grace. If He foresees that the will, possessing this sufficient grace, *would be disposed to act in accordance with it*, He decrees that He shall act *simultaneously* with it, so that it may perform a salutary act. Hence, the act is entirely that of God and entirely that of man. But the decree of the divine intervention is *conditioned* by the prescience of the *disposition* of the will to follow sufficient grace.

The Thomists' Answer. — God gives every well disposed free will sufficient grace. Moreover, He has decreed, from all eternity, according to the demands of His glory, to give efficacious grace to some and to refuse it to others.

This efficacious grace consists in a *transitory supernatural influence, which completes sufficient grace in the free will, in order to make it infallibly perform a supernatural action*.

Let us add that in both the Molinistic and Thomistic system this efficacious grace, is, in reality, but a step forward in the development of sufficient grace.

Criticism. — The defenders of these two theories are hurling objections at each other.

The Thomists claim that the Molinists make the will and knowledge of God depend on the acts of His creature, and hence limit the knowledge and will of God, and admit a certain indetermination in God.

No fully satisfactory answer is given to this objection by the Molinists.

It is a principle of philosophy, argue the Thomists, that no faculty can determine itself to action, unless by the intervention of a principle which is superior to it. How then can the will, with sufficient grace merely, begin or not begin to act? To give such a power to the will seems to be Semi-Pelagian. The will cannot *dispose itself or begin* to decide to correspond with the grace, but for the action of God Who gives for that purpose an efficacious grace.

The Molinists reply to this that they cannot understand the Thomists. What do they mean by God influencing our free will supernaturally, so as to make it *infallibly* perform *freely* a supernatural act?

This language is meaningless, and if not so, it certainly involves a contradiction. for it means that God *necessarily* makes the will perform a *free* act.

Besides, they admit the philosophical principle brought against them, viz. : no faculty can determine itself to action unless a superior principle intervenes, except in the case of free will. For, if it is denied that the will has the power to determine itself to action, then it is impossible to claim that there is anything like free will.

We need not dwell on that controversy. Thomism has weighty arguments for its defence and so has Molinism. We may belong to either party so long as we do not lose

sight of man's free will, even under the action of grace, and do not become imbued with the Semi-Pelagian error.

Our personal opinion is that it is better to be neither one nor the other, and to leave the problem unsolved. How does actual grace act with the human will?

In dogma, as in every other science, there are problems, so difficult, that the more we study them, the more unhesitatingly we give up for ever the hope of finding a solution.

ARTICLE V.

The Jansenistic Controversy. The nature of sufficient and efficacious grace.

The Question Stated. — As we saw in the first chapter, actual grace is a supernatural help given to man to assist him in the performance of a supernatural act. Concretely, it is the Spirit of our Lord, or the Holy Ghost aiding man in the exercise of his intellectual and voluntary activity.

This grace exists under different forms even as the Holy Ghost acts on the soul in different ways. God gives to every man performing a morally good action *gratia excitans*, then as he co-operates with it, God grants him *gratia adjuvans*, *partially* or *completely sufficient*, or *efficacious*.

What is the nature of sufficient and efficacious grace? This question is the object of the Jansenistic controversy.

The Molinists claim that the soul, by its *good will* to act with the *gratia sufficiens*, decides, so to speak, God to act *simultaneously* with the soul so as to make the *sufficient* grace *efficacious*.

The Thomists argue against this that the will of itself cannot induce God to act simultaneously with it. The *actuation* of sufficient grace is not left to the *spontaneity* of

our free will. If not for God's *supernatural premotion*, the soul never could and would produce the act.

If such is the case, the Molinists reply, he who does not correspond to sufficient grace is not guilty, for certainly it is not man's fault, if he does not receive the divine impulse or *efficacious premotion* which alone can make him act.

The Thomists claim, that it is his fault, for in giving man sufficient grace, God holds in reserve His impulse or *efficacious premotion* which He always grants to those who place no obstacle in the way.

This, the Molinists claim, is joining hands with them; for grace, even if the Thomists call it a *premotio efficax*, is really conditioned by man's *dispositions*.

But the Thomists will not agree to this, for they claim that although grace alone can render sufficient grace efficacious, still they who receive sufficient grace are certainly guilty, if this grace never becomes efficacious.

The Jansenists took up the arguments of the Molinists and, like them, sought to deride the Thomists, begging God not to give them sufficient grace. *A gratia sufficienti libera nos, Domine*. They consider the Thomists to be inconsistent in admitting a grace merely sufficient. *All grace is necessarily efficacious* is one of the tenets of Jansenism. Blessed they who receive it, unfortunate those who do not, for salvation is limited to the elect alone.

The Jansenists explain efficacious grace in a manner altogether different from that of the Molinists or the Thomists.

According to Jansenius, the moral will is a passive faculty which always leans on the side where the weight is the stronger. Thus it can be influenced by two contrary delectations. The one is evil, that which proceeds from concupiscence, i. e. the longing for honors, riches, pleasures, in one word, egoism. The other is good, for it emanates from God the first principle and the last end. But nature alone is powerless to elevate itself to such a motive of action and

to be influenced by it. Hence, the fact of being influenced by God considered as the first principle and the last end cannot take place except by grace, *ex fide per dilectionem operante*.

This is the state of the will in fallen man. If grace is not given to him, concupiscence will fatally conquer. If God grants him grace, man will act irresistibly. In the state of fallen nature, it is impossible to resist God's grace¹.

1. This doctrine is *de facto* found in his *Augustinus*, t. II, *De statu naturæ lapsæ*, l. III, ch. II : *Sententia igitur Augustini, quam tantopere pelagiani detestati sunt, non alia quam ista est; quod arbitrium voluntatis post lapsum primi hominis, antequam divina gratia visitetur, hoc est, antequam christianam suscipiat fidem unde incipit gratia, sub cupiditatibus terrenis ita arcte captivum possideatur, ut libertas illa voluntatis velut ferreis vinculis astricta nullo modo possit surgere, ut bonum velit aut faciat: sed ut tantummodo captivo motu versetur in malo. Qua de causa liberum arbitrium toto illo tempore non tam esse liberum quam servum, hoc est liberum esse justitiæ, peccati autem servum, sublata funditus indifferentia proxima ad bonum et malum. Thus, on the one hand, unless grace comes in, fallen man's will is irresistibly drawn by concupiscence. Still, Jansenius, claiming to follow St. Augustine, calls such a will *liberum arbitrium*. He is anxious to preserve this traditional name. On the other hand, when grace comes in, free will is irresistibly drawn to God. *Nunc [in statu naturæ lapsæ] quamvis opus bonum non sine voluntate nostra fiat..., quod tamen reipsa fiat, non voluntati adscribendum esse sed gratiæ, utpote quæ nunc [in statu naturæ lapsæ], non olim [in statu justitiæ originalis], voluntati dominatur; non determinationem ad operandum, quemadmodum olim a voluntate præstolando, sed voluntati suaviter potentissimeque tribuendo. Nunc enim infirmam voluntatem gratia ad influendum operandumque rapit, tunc a forti et vegeta voluntate rapiebatur: quia tunc nullo concupiscentiali languore deorsum pressa, flectebat se, velut plena sui domina, quoquo versum videbatur: nunc vero amisso illo indifferenti ad utrumlibet flexu, et in alterius partis dilectionem incurvata, propter inhærentem visceribus suis terrenum amorem, quem funditus sibi ipsi extirpare non potest, ad singulos dilectionis cælestis impetus erigi debet. Cf. t. III, l. II, ch. xxvi.**

At the end of the same book, c. xxvii, Jansenius writes that there is no such thing as merely sufficient grace, for grace is always efficacious :

Quamobrem quicumque animadvertit omnia quæ de adiutorio gratiæ medicinalis ex Augustino diximus, de gratia quadam potentissima, quam efficacem recentiores suo sensu vocant esse intelligenda; consequenter hoc etiam animadvertere debet, non aliam Christi gratiam medicinalem in scriptis ejus requiri [scilicet gratiam sufficientem].

This teaching is summed up in the second of the five propositions condemned by the Church¹.

According to Quesnel († 1719), an Oratorian and disciple of Jansenius, actual grace is the working of the absolute and necessarily efficacious will of God. This is the twenty-first of the 101 propositions condemned by Clement XI. in his Bull *Unigenitus*².

According to Arnauld, actual grace acts without the co-operation of man and it is useless for the human will to oppose it. This was condemned by Alexander VIII, as a renewal of Jansenism³.

It is then true that God can give a grace which is merely sufficient, that is a grace which suffices for a supernatural act, whether that act is realized or not.

This is *de fide*, all contradictory propositions being heretical. If sufficient grace is not efficacious, it is due to man's own fault, a doctrine which is regarded as *certain* by the Church.

Still it must be admitted that this second proposition is better explained by the Molinists than by the Thomists.

The Practical Consequences of the different Conceptions of Actual Grace. — Jansenism was not only *a theory*, it was for a long time *a rule of life*.

1. DENZ., 1093, propos. II : *Interiori gratiæ, in statu naturæ lapsæ, nunquam resistitur.*

This teaching is embodied in the heresy of Calvin which was condemned by the Council of Trent, sess. vi. can. 4.

DENZ., 814 : *Si quis dixerit liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam justificationis gratiam se disponat ac præparet, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed veluti inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere : A. S.*

2. DENZ., 1371, propos. XXI : *Gratia Jesu Christi est gratia fortis, potens, suprema, invincibilis, upote quæ est operatio voluntatis omnipotentis, sequela et imitatio operationis Dei incarnantis et resuscitantis Filium suum.*

3. *Ibid.*, 1296, propos. VI ; *Gratia sufficiens statui nostro non tam utilis quam perniciosa est, sic, ut proinde merito possimus petere : A gratia sufficienti libera nos, Domine.*

Although they affirmed that human nature was essentially corrupt, the Jansenists maintained that their system was launched with a view to aid man to escape his sad fate. Had they been logical, their moral code would not have been so complicated. Abandoned to itself, human nature can but follow the bent of its egoism. But on the other hand, if grace intervenes, human nature will be drawn irresistibly to God and will be more and more absorbed in Him, because grace is necessarily efficacious. Human nature must be either *all good* or *all bad*. To be wholly good, God must give his grace, and hence goodness or badness depends solely on the arbitrary will of God. Practically the life of the Christian should be *passive*.

But the Jansenists were not consistent with themselves. They claimed that human nature was essentially evil, and could not but follow the bent of its own egoism. Hence, they demanded it should submit to a rigorous code of rules to set it aright and turn it to its true end.

On this one-sided conception of corrupted nature, the Jansenists based the education of the children confided to their care¹.

Children, who despite their baptismal regeneration are still feeble, and who tend « by their natural bent » towards corruption, must be taken away from the world which robs them of their innocence, or from crowded colleges where they learn or teach others all sorts of vices. They must be under a guidance which will keep from them all bad example, repressing their instincts and preserving them in ignorance of evil.

Hence, in the schools of Port Royal, each professor was limited to a very small number of pupils in order to watch over them the better. Everything that led to a

1. SAINTE-BEUVE, *Port-Royal*, t. III, l. IV, ch. I et II. — GAILLARDIN, *Histoire du règne de Louis XIV*, t. II, ch. x, § 2. — E. PARADIS, *La Pédagogie janséniste comparée à la Pédagogie catholique*, Lyon, 1910.

knowledge of evil had to be rejected. The pupil was forbidden to read or hear anything which tended to awake his sleeping passions. The professor's sole duty was to train each one to virtue, and hence he was above all things, an educator.

Outside of the class-room, the pupil must be always occupied so as not to permit his soul to engage in vain thoughts which result in awakening evil longings. No amusements were allowed, for they tend to arouse outbursts of our vitiated nature. All these things should be replaced by work and especially by severe and long religious practices.

It is evident that one's self-love was to be no motive for their work or for reform in life. Reputation, self-interest, the pleasure which results from well doing, were never taken into account. All acts inspired by such motives were looked upon as sins. On the contrary, the courage of the pupil was roused by the thought of death, of sin, of God's judgment, and of the eternal pains of hell.

Duty should rule all, and austere duty at that. Natural emulation, which comes from the desire of praise, or the thought to please, all such thoughts must be looked upon as the suggestions of the evil one.

The defects of such an education are apparent. Making little of friendly rivalry, rejecting the principal stimulant of activity, a training like this cannot produce the best results. The pupil who is not urged on by natural considerations, which, of course, ought to be made more and more disinterested and supernatural, will never amount to anything. If emulation can foster vanity, the absence of emulation produces in most cases slothful habits. Pascal in speaking of the students of those schools, says : « The children of Port Royal who are lacking in all incentive of rivalry or honor, soon fall into a state of nonchalance »¹.

1. *Pensées*, II. 151, éd. Brunschvigg.

Why did the educators of Port Royal frown on natural rivalry? Because this feeling proceeds from a principle which is *essentially evil*, and can *never be supernaturalized*. Emulation *inspired by pure egoism* is surely condemned by natural morality. But if this emulation is enhanced by *disinterestedness*, it is *naturally good, worthy of praise*, and *can be easily supernaturalized*. From the same principle, the teachers imposed on their pupils a *merely external constraint* exacting from them in everything only a *passive obedience*.

In discipline such as this, there is great danger. First of all, the principle on which it rests, is false. Moreover it is deadly to all incentive in a youth. Lacking all *earnest spontaneity*, he will never aim at perfection. The day on which the exterior constraint by which he is kept on the right path, has lost its hold on his soul, the pupil remains inert as a broken down machine, or becomes the victim of his evil instincts. True education consists in the development of all the intellectual and moral faculties which God has placed in the soul of a child. He must be submitted therefore to a very definite and firm discipline, but in such a way that he be prepared to be able to do without it.

Had the Jansenists kept their schools, they might have been forced, even at the sacrifice of logic, to adopt natural means to educate their pupils. As we know, the Puritans of Scotland, England and America were forced to modify their systems gradually. The only remnant of Jansenism that remains is a life of austerity, and the contempt of all that fosters luxury and immorality, and even that remnant is gradually disappearing.

Conclusions. — We are now bringing to a close our *Studies* on actual grace, and we deem it advisable to take a bird's eye view of the method followed in the development of this dogma.

The Pelagian controversy was the occasion of the

Church's declaration of the dogma of actual grace. Pelagius claimed that human nature was all powerful and could work out its own salvation without any assistance from on high. In opposition, St. Augustine maintained that human nature could do absolutely nothing in the order of salvation.

This position naturally led men to attempt to define the starting point of God's grace in its influence upon the soul. And thus we can say that, from this time on, the dogma of actual grace became a *dogma distinct* from the general teaching on grace.

But how undeveloped yet! It took all the controversies that raged from the fifth to the eighteenth centuries to bring it up to the degree of precision which it now possesses.

Further, we can safely entitle St. Augustine the doctor of grace, without fear of contradiction. Still, we must realize well his providential rôle in the formation of this dogma. He gave the lie to Pelagianism and refuted it by categorical arguments. Nature can do nothing in the way of salvation, without a supernatural grace; and still we must be concerned with the supernatural order. This, the affirmation of a supernatural order and its compulsory character, is the truly admirable doctrinal work of St. Augustine.

Now, it is not surprising that in the heat of his refutation of Pelagius, he may have exaggerated the doctrine of predestination. What is unchangeable in Christianity is Jesus Christ vivifying the Church by His Holy Spirit, and by this Church *preserving, directing, developing dogmatic thought* in a *wonderful continuity*, over the course of ages and in all civilized countries. This marvellous fact, which no conscientious historian can deny, is the *sign* of the Saviour's *presence* in the midst of His disciples and of His *influence* on their intelligence and their hearts.

In the accomplishment of this intellectual and moral regeneration, Christ makes use of the most illustrious scholars. Their doctrine has the guarantee of truth and immutability

only in as much as it is the doctrine of the Church and consequently of the Holy Ghost. Now, as in the beginning, the Apostles preach the glad tidings, Christ working with them, in them and through them, confirming by miracles, especially by the miracles of conversion, the truth of their doctrine. *Et Dominus quidem Jesus, postquam locutus est eis, assumptus est in cœlum et sedet a dextris Dei. Illi autem profecti, prædicaverunt ubique, Domino cooperante et sermonem confirmante, sequentibus signis*¹.

1. MARK XVI, 19-20.

CHAPTER II.

HABITUAL GRACE.

The first action of the Holy Ghost upon the soul of men of good will consists in producing in it a slight desire to imitate Christ. If it responds to this first supernatural prompting of the Spirit, the soul receives new helps which enable it to make acts of faith, hope, charity and contrition. If the soul continues to correspond to divine grace, He will take possession of that soul, in the real meaning of the term, that is to say, He will personally come and dwell within it, together with the Father and the Son, in order to reproduce and develop in it the dispositions of love and self-denial which existed in the soul of Christ.

Now, the Holy Spirit *permanently* present in our soul, conjointly with the Father and the Son, and producing in us dispositions similar to those which existed in the soul of Christ, is what we call *habitual* or *sanctifying* or *justifying* *grace*.

It is called *habitual*, because it is *permanent* in the soul, in contradistinction to actual grace which is *transitory*. It is called *sanctifying*, because it makes us *holy*, separated from the world and united to God. It is called *justifying*, because it makes man *conformable to the will of God*, or in other words, *just*. Now the will of God is that man should live with his Creator as a son and a friend.

We prefer the name *justifying* *grace*, or *justification* as being more in accordance with history, although, out of

deference to tradition, we have headed our chapter by the old name, habitual grace.

This chapter has two great divisions, *justification* the cause of sanctifying grace, and *justifying grace*.

ARTICLE I

Justification.

General Definition. — Justification is the wonderful transformation of the soul from the state of sin to the state of justice, *Translatio a statu peccati in statum justitiæ*¹.

We can begin to understand this transformation only after an examination of the causes that are at work. For this, we shall but comment on the doctrine of the Council of Trent.

All supernatural acts which take place in the world are directed toward the glory of God, procure *the glorification of Christ the Redeemer*, and tend to the *eternal life of man*, which consists in the possession of the Holy Trinity, by contemplation and by love. Hence the *end* or the *final cause* of justification is *the eternal life of man, the glorification of Christ the Redeemer and the glory of God*².

Love and love only is the motive for God granting man the justice he has lost by sin. Hence the *efficient cause* of justification is the *merciful bounty of God*³.

1. DENZ., 796 : *Quibus verbis justificationis impii descriptio insinuat, ut sit translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Adæ, in statum gratiæ et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secundum Adam Jesum Christum Salvatorem nostrum; quæ quidem translatio post Evangelium promulgatum sine lavacro regenerationis, aut ejus voto, fieri non potest, sicut scriptum est : Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei.*

2. DENZ., 799 : *Hujus justificationis causæ sunt, finalis quidem gloria Dei et Christi, ac vita æterna.*

3. *Ib.* *Efficiens vero misericors Deus qui gratuito abluit et sanctificat, signans et ungens Spiritu promissionis Sancto.*

For this great privilege, God demands something from man, namely *full reparation*, which was obtained through the bloody death of Christ, the Incarnate Word. Hence justification is the *price* of the blood of Christ, the *merit* of His passion. This is why the *meritorious cause* of our justification is none other than *Jesus Christ Himself* ¹.

In order that we might receive this justification, Christ instituted the sacrament of Baptism as *an ordinary means*. Because of this fact, this sacrament is called the *instrumental cause* of justification ².

Finally, what makes us just or the *term* of the justifying process consists in a *real perfecting* of the soul, and not in the imputation of the holiness or justice of Christ, as Protestants maintain. This real perfection or justifying grace is nothing else than the *presence of the Holy Ghost* in the soul and *the communication of the supernatural life* which He creates there and which He wishes to develop more and more, until it reaches its final development in glory. This new state of justification follows right upon the disappearance of the state of sin, a disappearance which is not only forensic and fictitious as Protestants assert, but real, so much so that the justified soul has passed from *a state of sin to a state of justice*. Scholastic theology, in conformity with the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, calls this state of justice, the *formal cause* of justification ³.

1. *Ib.* Meritoria autem, dilectissimus Unigenitus suus, Dominus noster Jesus Christus, qui cum essemus inimici, propter nimiam charitatem qua dilexit nos, sua sanctissima passione in ligno crucis nobis justificationem meruit et pro nobis Deo Patri satisfecit.

2. DENZ., 799 : Instrumentalis item sacramentum baptismi, quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua nulli unquam contigit justificatio.

3. *Ibid.* : Demum unica formalis causa est justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua videlicet ab eo donati, renovamur spiritu mentis nostræ et non modo reputamur, sed vere et justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout vult, et secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et cooperationem.

One remark more, and we are done with our general definition. In an adult, justification is always the result of a more or less long preparation, always made with the help of actual grace. Hence before we take up the discussion of *the nature of justification*, we shall consider *the dispositions requisite* for justification. And in the third place we shall examine some of the characteristics of justification.

§ I.

THE REQUISITE DISPOSITIONS FOR JUSTIFICATION.

The Question Stated. — God justifies no man unless he cooperates with the divine action. *Spiritus Sanctus*, declares the Council of Trent, (*justitiam*) *partitur singulis prout vult et secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et cooperationem*.

It could not be otherwise. For just as in the Old Law, the blood of the sinner could not be purified unless united to the clean blood of the victim with which it was, morally speaking, sprinkled before the face of God, so in the New Law, the blood of sinners cannot be purified unless it is morally united to the most pure blood of Christ and, with it, sprinkled before the face of God.

Hence, the price or the merit of the blood of Christ, viz., justification gained once for all in a general way, is necessarily suspended in its application to the individual until such a time, when by an effective cooperation, the latter offers his life in sacrifice with Christ's passion, or, to put it in Gospel language, until he begins to bear his cross after Christ.

Every adult should prepare himself for the reception of justifying grace. This can only be done by cooperation with actual grace which must be responded to with greater and greater ease, so as to enable the Spirit of God to effect

interior conversion in the soul, and thus make himself worthy of obtaining sanctifying grace.

Although permanent by nature, this grace can be kept alive in the soul only by continued effort. For this development the natural faculties must play their part. Grace increases in proportion as the recipient does all that lies in his power. There is no standstill in the Christian life. **Not to go ahead is to go back.**

After all, this is a most consoling doctrine, for it means that each man has it in his power to make the work of the Redeemer effective in his soul. This readily explains why penance is one of the essential virtues of Christianity, and it gives a satisfactory answer to those who assert that our doctrine of grace opposes all progress, since our cardinal principle is that grace can develop only in proportion to human effort.

What dispositions are required in the sinner working with the help of actual grace, before he can receive sanctifying grace?

Theology teaches us that *justification presupposes faith*, and faith cannot exist without a determined object. The subject *must believe explicitly in certain revealed truths, and implicitly in all revelation.* But this is not all. Justification also presupposes *certain supernatural dispositions which are principally penance, hope and the beginning of the love of God*, as the Council of Trent has it, *Fides quae per charitatem operatur.* Consequently, we cannot indorse the Protestant theory of justification, for we cannot admit that *justifying faith is nothing but a clinging of the mind to the mercy of God, manifested in Jesus Christ our Saviour.*

I

Justification presupposes the true Faith.

The nature of faith, according to the doctrine of the Church.
— What is faith? To form an adequate idea of the nature

of faith, we must first mark its distinction from knowledge.

Knowledge or science is the mind's acceptance of a truth which is based on absolute evidence, whereas belief is the mind's acceptance of a truth on another's authority. The difference between the two lies in the motive which actuates the mind in subscribing to the truth of the judgment. But can faith be firm and unwavering, if actuated by the motive of authority? Certainly, if we can be sure that the authority is real. Yet the evidence can never be absolute, if it be question of human authority. Hence, a new factor must be reckoned with, namely the dispositions of the one who believes. Human faith then requires three distinct motives, namely *the fitness of the proposition, the authority of the one proposing the truth, and the subjective dispositions of the believer.*

Can we argue the same for divine faith? No, for divine faith deals with truths that are not evident, presented to man by God and based on His authority. His authority is absolute, the credibility of the revealed truth therefore becomes absolute, and as a consequence our acceptance of the truth ought to be firm and steadfast. This appears to be sufficient and many have claimed that it is. But they are wrong. Granting all that they say, how can it be evident that a truth has emanated from God? We need for that certain subjective dispositions mostly of a supernatural character. Like human faith, divine faith also embodies three elements, namely, *the fitness of the proposition revealed, the authority of God revealing, and the subjective dispositions, mainly supernatural, of the believer.*

This is the faith that we claim is one of the dispositions required for justification. By this we do not mean the virtue of faith¹, but rather the act of faith. Without it, justifica-

1. Faith as a virtue is defined : *Virtus supernaturalis qua inclinamur ad firmiter assentiendum veritatibus divinis, non ex intrinseca evidentia veritatis, sed ex motivo auctoritatis Dei revelantis.*

The material object of this faith is *veritates revelatae.*

tion, is absolutely impossible, a doctrine which was clearly enunciated by the Council of Trent¹.

Let us try to trace this doctrine of the Church to its foundations in Scripture, Patristic Tradition and Scholastic Theology.

The Proof from Scripture. — That faith in God is necessary for salvation is clearly taught in the O. T. The object of this faith is the existence of God, the certainty of His word, and the fidelity in fulfilling His promises².

The teaching of the Synoptics is that faith is one of the necessary dispositions before entering the kingdom of heaven. The object of this faith is the same as that of the O. T. But it bears an important addition to this effect, that what God had announced by His prophets was really fulfilled in Jesus Christ³.

This is also the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel. In order to possess eternal life, belief in Jesus Christ as the Messiah and Son of God is absolutely necessary⁴.

St. Paul teaches the same doctrine in nearly all his Epistles⁵. In the Epistle to the Hebrews we are told that « he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek after him⁶ ».

In neither of the Testaments do we find any distinction

The formal object *quod* is *veritates revelatae ut obscurae ideoque transcendentes aliquo modo*.

The formal object *quo objective* is *auctoritas Dei revelantis*.

The formal object *quo subjective* is *lumen fidei scilicet fides supernaturalis*.

1. DENZ., 798 : *Disponuntur autem ad ipsam justitiam, dum excitat divina gratia et adjuti, fidem ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quæ divinitus revelata et promissa sunt...*

2. Num. XXIII. 19; Ps. XIV. 1, LIII. 1; Is. VII. 9, LXV. 16.

3. Mk. I. 15; XVI. 16; Lk. XVIII. 8; XXIV. 25-28.

4. Jn. XI. 25-27.

5. Rom. III. 22-25; IX. 30-33. Eph. III. 8-12.

6. XI. 6.

drawn between the act of faith and the virtue of faith. We merely find the statement that faith wins God's favor for us, and that without faith it is impossible to please Him.

The Proof from Tradition. — The doctrine of the Scriptures was indorsed by the Fathers of the Church. There can be no justification without faith, writes St. Clement of Rome, for if Abraham was blessed, it was because he had fulfilled justice and truth in faith¹. St. Ignatius tells us that in order to possess the life of Christ and thus be made *χριστοφόρος* or *θεοφόρος*, faith and love are necessary². The teaching of St. Irenaeus is no less explicit. By His death on the cross Christ has vanquished the demon, reconciled us with God, restored us to the image of God, and merited for us eternal life and the dignity of becoming the sons of God. But to share in this life, the soul must believe in Jesus Christ, for it was only by this faith, that the patriarchs and the just men of the O. T. were saved³.

1. *Ad Cor.* XXXII. 3, 4. « All these (the holy ones of the O. T.) were highly honored, and made great, not for their own sake, or for their own works, or for the righteousness they wrought, but through the operation of the divine will. And we, too, being called by His will in Christ Jesus (*διὰ θελήματος αὐτοῦ ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ κληθέντες*), are not justified by ourselves, nor by our wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have wrought in holiness of heart, but by that faith, through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men (*ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς πίστεως, δι' τῆς πάντας τοὺς ἀπ' αἰῶνος ὁ παντοκράτωρ θεὸς ἐδικαίωσεν*). XXXI. 2 : « For what reason was our father Abraham blessed? Was it not because he wrought righteousness and truth through faith? » The second text explains the first. Justification demands faith, but a lively and active faith. All our works, unless inspired by faith, are useless for justification.

2. *Ad Ephes.* XIV. 1. « None of these things is hid from you, if ye perfectly possess that faith and love towards Jesus Christ, which are the beginning and the end of life. For the beginning is faith, and the end is love (*ἀρχὴ μὲν πίστις τέλος δὲ ἀγάπη*). Now these two, being inseparably connected together, are of God, while all other things which are requisite for a holy life follow after them. No man truly making a profession of faith sinneth; nor does he that possesses love hate any more (*οὐδεὶς πιστὶν ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἁμαρτάνει, οὐδὲ ἀγάπην κεκτημένος μισεῖ*) ». To interpret this text in the sense of Luther and Calvin would be a mistake. What the Saint means to say is that faith and love must be found in all actions; else they count little for salvation.

3. *Haer.* IV. vi, 5. « And for this purpose did the Father reveal the Son,

Tradition clearly teaches that justification presupposes the possession of faith. By this faith, as we shall see later, the Fathers do not mean a simple adhesion of the mind, or a faith purely speculative, but a faith accompanied by an interior disposition of penance and charity, which is manifested in the observance of God's law.

Scholastic Theology. — Theologians later on made a distinction between the act of faith and faith as a virtue. This was in all probability due to the fact that they considered the life of grace on parallel lines with man's natural life. The soul is a substance which acts by means of its faculties. If the life of grace is analogous to the natural life, there can be no supernatural faculties without the existence of a supernatural substance, which is grace. Hence the faith required for justification is not the faculty or virtue of faith, but only actual faith¹.

How far these distinctions may or may not hold, the Church has merely taught the traditional conception of faith as a requisite for justification.

II

Man must believe explicitly in certain revealed Truths and implicitly in all Revelation.

Some revealed Truths must be believed explicitly. — We have seen that faith is necessary for justification. But what must be believed?

that through His instrumentality He might be manifested to all, and might receive those righteous ones who believe in Him unto incorruption and everlasting enjoyment. Now, to believe in Him is to do His will (*credere autem ei est facere ejus voluntatem*). But He shall righteously shut out into darkness which they have chosen for themselves, those who do not believe, and who do consequently avoid His light. »

1. Suarez proposes this difficulty in regard to justifying faith : *Hæc quæstio, de actuali fide movetur, nam in habituali locum non habet, cum realis justificatione semper sit necessaria; et ideo de solis etiam adultis quæstio tractatur De Fide, disp. XII, sect. II.*

Before receiving Baptism, an adult must believe in all the truths contained in the Creed.

Faith in the Creed is necessary *by necessity of precept*, which means that if one should receive Baptism without this faith, he would be guilty of a serious sin. It is not necessary *by necessity of means*, that is, if this faith is lacking, the sacrament is not invalidated¹.

What truth must be believed in *by necessity of means*?

In the Old Law justification demanded faith, *by necessity of means*, in the existence of God and in the certainty of His word. Consequently, the Israelites had to believe in God's fidelity to His promises of rewarding the just and punishing the wicked, and also in His promise of raising a king who was to establish the kingdom of heaven upon earth. This was required *by necessity of means*.

In the New Law, over and above this, we are bound to believe in Christ, the incarnate God, Son of the Father and Principle of the Holy Ghost, the author of our sanctity, as witnessing the fulfilment of the divine promises made to those of the Old Dispensation. Hence, in the New Law, belief in the existence of God, in God as a rewarder, in the Incarnation and the Trinity, is absolutely necessary for salvation.

All theologians agree thus far, but now they begin to disagree. As all means can be necessary either absolutely or relatively, so truths may have to be believed *by necess-*

1. Here is the very precise language used by theology to express the Catholic doctrine on this point : *illud est necessarium necessitate mediæ, quod est necessarium quatenus medium, cujusque proinde ommissio etiam inculpabilis obstat salutis. Illud est necessarium necessitate præcepti, quod est necessarium tantum quia præcipitur, cujusque proinde ommissio inculpabilis non obstat salutis.*

Hence the necessity of means is twofold. It is said to be *in re, si actus præscriptus ita sit necessarius ut per alium actum suppleri non possit*. It is said also to be *in re vel in voto, si adstante involuntario impedimento, actus præscriptus suppleri possit per alium actum, sed cum voto (scilicet cum desiderio voluntatis) eliciendi actum præscriptum, cessante impedimento.*

ity of absolute means or by *necessity of relative means*. Under the first heading, we have all those means which cannot be replaced by any other, as for instance, contrition in order to obtain pardon for the sins committed after Baptism. Under the second, we have the means that can be replaced by another, as for instance, the absolution of the priest which can be replaced by an act of perfect contrition. In this case, however, contrition must be accompanied by a desire of absolution. Hence the relative means contains *in voto* the absolute means.

Now, in order to be justified, what truths must be believed by *necessity of absolute means*?

To answer this question, we must first make a distinction between a country in which the Gospel has not been preached and one where the glad tidings have been announced.

In the case of the former, all theologians maintain that faith in God as Creator and Rewarder will suffice. This belief contains the faith in Christ the Redeemer *in voto*.

In regard to the latter, theologians are divided, the Thomists against the followers of Suarez.

The Thomists demand belief in *the existence of God, Creator and Rewarder, in the Incarnation and in the Trinity*. This faith must be *explicit*, although with the ordinary faithful it need not be so profound¹.

But this opinion has not been generally accepted. In certain cases, argues Suarez, such as that of an individual

1. St. Thomas discusses this teaching at length in *Quæst. disp. de veritate* q. XIV, a. 11. He claims that to believe in the Church is to implicitly believe all that she teaches.

He claims that divine Providence will see to it that an infidel acting in accordance with his conscience shall have an opportunity of believing the truths necessary for salvation.

Certissime est tenendum quod ei Deus vel per internam inspirationem revelaret ea quæ sunt ad credendum necessaria, vel aliquem fidei prædicatorem ad eum dirigeret, sicut misit Petrum ad Cornelium.

belonging to a family of infidels and who would be at the point of death, faith in God the Creator and Rewarder is sufficient for salvation. It is enough, if he *explicitly* believes that there is a God who rewards the good and punishes the wicked, and that He is a good God, before whom he will have to appear to render an account of his life. This faith really contains an implicit belief or a belief *in voto* in Christ the Redeemer¹.

1. SUAREZ, *De fide*, disp. XII, sect. iv, 11 : Dico ergo primo non esse tam necessariam, hoc tempore, fidem explicitam Christi, ut sine illa in re ipsa oblenta, nullus possit justificari..... Probo autem illam [assertionem] hoc modo, quia potest nunc aliquis pro aliquo tempore habere veram, supernaturalem et explicitam fidem Dei sine fide explicita Christi, imo cum ignorantia invincibili ejus; ergo potest cum illo fide sola justificari. Antecedens probatur primo in illo casu de puero educato in sylvis, aut inter infideles, præsertim non errantes in cognitione veri Dei; nam si ille cum perveniat ad usum rationis faciat quod in se est, illuminabitur; et cum non habuerit prædicationem Christi poterit obtinere fidem Dei sine fide explicita Christi, sicut illam acciperet in simili casu ante Christi adventum. Respondent [adversarii hujus sententia] eum, qui nunc facit quod in se est, in quocumque eventu accipere illuminationem statim per quam possit explicite in Christum credere, quia vel hoc est privilegium hujus legis, vel certe est consequenter necessarium, juxta institutionem ejus. Sed hoc imprimis non dicitur cum sufficienti fundamento, quia est nimis miraculosum et extraordinarium, neque potest ostendi ubi Deus tantam gratiam promiserit, neque etiam necessitas sufficienter ostenditur, ut dixi: est enim in hoc puncto considerandum, in eo statu et occasione, multo facilius esse hominem illum elevari ad cognitionem et fidem unius Dei Salvatoris, quam illuminari circa mysterium Trinitatis et Incarnationis. Item est alia differentia notabilis, quod fides Dei est per se, et quasi ex natura rei ab intrinseco necessaria ad justificationem, quia sine illa non potest homo converti in Deum sicut oportet, ut justificetur; fides autem explicita Christi, si necessaria est, solum id habet ex ordinatione Dei et positivo jure divino, et ideo multo certius est, facientem quod in se est per aliquale auxilium gratia, vel non ponentem impedimentum, illuminari a Deo quoad supernaturalem cognitionem ipsius Dei, quam circa explicitam cognitionem Christi; nam in eis quæ solum sunt necessaria ex institutione divina et positivo jure, non solet Deus, etiam in casu necessitatis, adhibere extraordinariam providentiam ut impleantur, et in re ipsa applicantur; sed desiderium aut votum eorum solet sufficere, ut patet in confessione et baptismo. Denique, licet concedamus Deum in eo casu illuminare hominem, etiam in articulis humanitatis, nihilominus non potest cum probabilitate affirmari simul et in uno momento illuminari hominem de omnibus his mysteriis, quia hoc excedit hominis capacitatem. Unde fieri non posset nisi ad cognoscendum modo angelico elevaretur, quod certe admittendum non est, quia non est verisi-

This solution of the question involves some mighty important and practical consequences both in the case of administering Baptism to a dying infidel, and in giving absolution to a dying sinner who is not gifted with much understanding.

If faith is necessary for salvation *by necessity of means*, for justification, then, there is a grave obligation incumbent upon the minister of the sacrament, to instruct those whose salvation he must procure. *He must do his best*¹, to bring those souls to believe not only in God as Creator and Rewarder, but also the two mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. But if, despite his efforts, he sees that there is only time to get a confession of faith in regard to the existence of a good God, then he must baptize or absolve conditionally: and mindful of the opinion of Suarez, he will feel very little practical doubt as to the validity of the Sacrament.

From a speculative point of view also, the teaching of Suarez possesses an advantage. It shows that the faith demanded of the Israelites for justification is the very same as that demanded, under the New Covenant, of those who are

mile Deum, in hac lege et in hoc tempore, viam salutis coarctasse ad tam miraculosum providentiæ modum. Oportet ergo ut per successionem temporis illa cognitio fiat. Debet autem necessario incipere a cognitione Dei, quæ est fundamentum aliarum; ergo pro aliquo tempore erit talis homo illuminatus de Deo, et non de Christo; et ita pro eodem tempore habere poterit fidem Dei, ut nondum fidem explicitam Christi, quod probandum proposueramus.

1. When it is question of salvation, we all have to be *tutorists*. Hence the priest should never fail to instruct the dying in regard to the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The Holy Office made this obligatory upon missionaries by a decree dated Jan. 25, 1703. *Missionarium teneri adulto etiam moribundo [infideli, priusquam illi baptismum conferat] qui incapax omnino non sit, explicare mysteria fidei quæ sunt necessaria necessitate fidei, ut sunt præcipue mysteria Trinitatis et Incarnationis.* Coll. P. F. p. 549. In 1679, Innocent XI. condemned the following proposition advanced by the laxists: DENZ. 1214 : *Absolutionis capax est homo, quantumvis labore ignorantia mysteriorum fidei, et etiamsi per negligentiam, etiam culpabilem, nesciat mysterium sanctissimæ Trinitatis et Incarnationis Domini nostri Jesu Christi.*

placed in an impossibility of arriving at a better understanding of dogmatic truths. Time, therefore, has not changed the essentials for justification.

Therefore, in the New Law, justification demands a belief, by *necessity* of means, in *the existence of God the Creator and Rewarder*, in the *Incarnation* and in the *Trinity*.

This belief is necessary by a *necessity of relative means*.

For the belief necessary by *necessity of absolute means* requires faith only in *God the Creator and Rewarder*, which must be *explicit*, and contains *implicitly* the belief in Christ the Redeemer.

All Revelation must be believed implicitly. — The formal object of faith, or the reason why we believe, is the authority of God who has revealed His truths to us. If we accept that authority we accept all revealed truths for the same divine authority is back of all of them. To deny any one dogmatic truth is to open the way to practical infidelity. Therefore, there can be no faith, unless it is accompanied by the disposition to believe all that God has revealed, which means, without believing implicitly in all revealed truth¹.

III

Justification presupposes besides, certain supernatural dispositions which are principally Penance, Hope and the Beginning of the Love of God.

The Teaching of the Church. — Faith necessarily leads to action. As we have seen, we have to believe in the fact

1. Cf. BILLUART, *De fide*, dissert. IV, art. II, dico 5°. *Objectum formale fidei sive habitualis sive actualis est prima veritas in dicendo ut manifestata per Ecclesiam. Atqui qui negat pertinaciter unum articulum fidei, non credit alios quos tenet, propter primam veritatem ut manifestatam per Ecclesiam, alioquin et hunc quem negat crederet, cum sit etiam, sicut alii, revelatus a prima veritate et propositus ut talis ab Ecclesia; sed hunc rejicit et illos tenet ex propria electione. Unde S. Augustinus (lib. XVII contra Faust., c. III), alloquens manichæos : Qui, inquit, in Evangelio quod vultis creditis, quod vultis non creditis, vobis potius quam Evangelio creditis.*

that the Son of God became man and died in order to save man, viz. to merit for men the grace to reproduce in their life, the example of His own perfect life. Now this belief is practical, it impels to action. How can any one really believe that the Son of God died to expiate his sins, without being filled with a lively *contrition*, which must necessarily lead to acts of penance? How can we believe in the Redemption, without *hope* in the merits gained for us, and *love* for Him who gained them?

Faith without action is dormant or dead. It cannot be real faith, as can be easily shown from psychology.

Hence, to be justified, we must not only believe, but hope, repent, and love. The way that leads to salvation is faith joined with charity. Faith is the beginning of the justified life, hope is its development, and the beginning of love is the starting point of its full expansion.

This doctrine was defined by the Council of Trent against Luther and Calvin, and in general against all the reformers of the sixteenth century¹.

We can easily trace its beginnings to Scripture and Patristic Tradition.

The Proof from Scripture. — Lutherans and Calvinists

1. DENZ., 819 : *Si quis dixerit, sola fide impium justificari ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requiri quod ad justificationis gratiam consequendam coope- retur et nulla ex parte necesse esse, eum sua voluntatis motu præparari atque disponi : A. S.*

Ch. VI of the same session is more explicit : *Disponuntur autem ad ipsam justitiam, dum ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse, quæ divinitus revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo justificari impium per gratiam ejus, per redemptionem, quæ est in Christo Jesu, et dum peccatores se esse intelligentes a divinx justitiæ timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se conver- tendo, in spem eriguntur, fidentes, Deum sibi propter Christum propitium fore, illumque tanquam omnis justitiæ fontem diligere incipiunt, ac propte- rea moventur adversus peccata per odium aliquod et detestationem, hoc est, per eam pœnitentiam, quam ante baptismum agi oportet. Cf. DENZ., 798; ibid., 800.*

who claim that faith alone is sufficient for justification, base their views on a great number of texts taken from the N. T.

Their favorite argument is drawn from the Epistle to the Romans, where St. Paul teaches that man is justified by faith without works¹. But how wrongly they have interpreted this passage can be seen, when we study it in its context.

The burden of the Apostle's argument, here, is that the works demanded by the O. T. are no longer sufficient for justification, for faith in Jesus Christ is necessary. Then he concludes by saying that this faith is sufficient without works. But, as can be seen, he is speaking of the works prescribed by the Old Law. In the New Covenant, the Law is no longer of any avail. The faith he recommends is a complete faith, a faith that will make us seek to crucify ourselves with Christ and pin our hopes to where are the true joys, Heaven, and live our lives in the love of Christ.

In other passages, St. Paul explains what he means by faith in Christ. « If I have all faith so as to move mountains and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing », he writes in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (XIII. 2). Faith is nothing unless accompanied by charity. In Gal. V. 6, he contends that faith without charity availeth nothing. This faith *working through charity* which he demands for justification is really the beginning of the *Christian life* in the soul.

This doctrine receives even a greater development in the Epistle of St. James where we are told that faith without works is *dead* (II. 14-26). This teaching accentuates the necessity of good works for justification, and admits of no equivocation.

The Tradition of the Fathers. — The same doctrine was taught by all the Fathers. In fact there is not one dissenting voice in tradition. When the Fathers speak of conditions of justification, they always have in mind a faith

1. Rom. III. 28.

manifested by penance and by the fulfilment of God's law ¹.

IV

A Critical Exposition of the Protestant Theory of Justifying Faith.

The Protestant Theory. — First let us consider the causes which led to the launching of the Protestant views.

Leaving a brilliant career, Luther entered the Augustinian convent of Erfurt in 1505. This act was influenced by his desire to gain peace of heart and live a life of austere sanctity, and to secure his eternal salvation.

In the beginning of his monastic life, all went well. But it was not long before he perceived that, despite the many mortifications that he submitted to, there was no visible sign of betterment in his life. This caused his soul to be filled with dejection, sadness and even despair. This alternative soon made itself felt in his life. Either God had predestined him to damnation and hence all his works of penance were useless, or good works are not the means that God requires for salvation ².

In order to escape the terror of such thoughts, he plunged himself into deep study. He took up the works of the German mystics of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and under their influence the conviction grew on him that salvation was acquired *not by good works but by faith alone*. A reading of the Epistles of St. Paul and St. Augustine confirmed his views. *Faith justifies without works*, became the keystone of his theology, and the watchword of all the reformers of the sixteenth century.

Of that doctrine, as developed in all the systems of the reformers, but especially of Luther and Calvin, we shall speak presently.

1. See the argument drawn from tradition in proof of the doctrine of justifying faith, p. 210.

2. Cf. F. KUHN, *Luther, Encyc. des sc. rel.* VIII.

God gives the *grace of illumination* to *all men* who are inclined to it, according to Luther, only to *the elect*, according to Calvin. This grace is a kind of interior light which the Holy Ghost communicates to the soul, revealing the hideousness of sin and the great mercy of God.

According to Luther, this grace excites in the soul a *feeling of penance* and *justifying faith*. According to Calvin, it first excites *justifying faith*, and this faith produces the *feeling of penance*. Calvin's modification was due to the fact that he was loth to admit that faith was conditioned by penance or any other good works.

This is the subjective aspect of justifying faith according to the two great reformers. What about the objective aspect? It is faith in this truth, that God has manifested His mercy toward men by sending His only Son, Jesus Christ. By His life of suffering and humiliation, and His ignominious death on the cross, He has expiated the sins of mankind. In other words, it is sufficient to believe that God pardons us through Christ.

Criticism. — This doctrine was condemned by the Council of Trent¹. Justifying faith must be accompanied by penance, hope and charity. It must be a faith working through charity, otherwise it is dead, *fidem sine operibus mortuam et otiosam esse*².

Therefore, to be justifying, faith must be accompanied by hope, penance and charity, in a word, by the works which it immediately inspires.

It is true that some Protestants have maintained that the justifying faith of Luther implied works³. If this is so, it is hardly worth while to continue this criticism, for his

1. DENZ. 822 : *Si quis dixerit fidem justificantem, nihil aliud esse quam fiduciam divinæ misericordiæ, peccata remittentis propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam solam esse quâ justificamur* : A. S.

2. DENZ., 798, 800, 819.

3. See MOEHLER, *Symbolism*, p. 201.

system is then in agreement with the Catholic doctrine. But unfortunately such is not the case. Luther explicitly teaches that justifying faith consists in a purely mental assent to the truths contained in the Scriptures, and in particular to those which deal with the person and the work of the Redeemer. He made this faith purely speculative and exclusive of charity one of the principal articles of his dogmatic system, admitting that faith can give rise to charity, but claiming that charity avails nothing for salvation¹. This conclusion was the result of his own sad experience of not being able to gain peace of mind, and correct his own shortcomings by good works. Hence to attribute to Luther the doctrine of a justifying faith which implied good works, is to misunderstand the main idea of his teaching and at the same time to fail to grasp the causes which led to its formulation.

All the early symbols of the Reformation contained a clear expression of this one doctrine. « It is faith alone that justifies and not charity » is one of the sentences of the *Augsburg Confession*². The *Book of Concord* is even more explicit³. It is neither contrition, nor love, nor any other, but faith alone which confers upon us the grace of God, the virtue, merits of the Saviour and the remission of sins³.

Therefore, according to Luther, justifying faith is not belief associated with hope, penance or love. It is purely an adhesion of the mind to revealed truths, and especially to those which concern the redemptive work of Christ. It is a lifeless idea, a light which gives no warmth to the heart, a purely speculative disposition, *fides mortua et otiosa*⁴.

1. Cf. *Luthers Werke*, I, p. 476.

2. *Apol. Conf. Aug.* IV, *De justificatione*, § 26, p. 76 : *Sola fide in Christum, non per dilectionem, non propter dilectionem aut opera consequimur remissionem peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem.*

3. *Solida Declar.*, III. *De fide justific.*, § 23, p. 639 : *Neque contritio, neque dilectio, neque ulla virtus, sed sola fides est illud instrumentum quo gratiam Dei, meritum Christi et remissionem peccatorum apprehendere et accipere possumus.*

4. Cf. MOEHLER, *Symbolism*, p. 211-212.

As can be easily seen, this teaching has nothing in common with the doctrine laid down by Scripture and the Fathers on this point. It owes its origin to the imagination of Luther. He wanted something to fit his religious needs. This offered the best remedy, and he adopted it and drew many into the same error¹.

If faith alone justifies, is not the way immediately paved for a life of debauchery? According to the Protestant idea, a man can sin as much as he wills, and provided he have faith, he is justified. *Pecca fortiter, crede fortius* was the advice of Melancthon.

Luther evidently foresaw the consequences of his teaching, for he made it clear that faith can be lost by incredulity and by a habitually vicious life, which he claimed was equivalent to unbelief. Furthermore, he asserted that they who permitted themselves to become involved in a life of iniquity, never had the faith. But all these restrictions were not made until long after the declaration of the all-sufficiency of faith, and then only when he saw what his theory led to².

§ II

NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION.

The Question Stated. — Justification is a real transformation from a life of sin to a life of justice.

In her controversies with Protestants, the Church was led to give an utmost precision to her teaching on this point, and hence it is well, in order to have a clearer idea of what she teaches, to start with a critical exposition of what Protestants taught.

1. The old Lutheran conception on this point has been modified by Protestants who nowadays do not exclude the good works.

2. Cf. DÖLLINGER on the Reformation, III.

I.

A Critical Exposition of the Protestant Theory on the Nature of Justification.

The Protestant Theory. — Faith is the only condition of justification, according to Luther and Calvin. Hence, the moment that man believes that he has been pardoned by God through Christ, he is *justified* by God. He is justified, i. e. he is *declared just* by God, according to the exact meaning of the word *justificari*, *justum aliquem statuere*, δικαιῶν. This means that he is declared *united to Christ*, dead to all sin, and reborn into a new life. Justification, then, according to the old Protestant idea, consists in a simple declaration of God, in an act altogether exterior to the sinner justified, *actus forensis*, *actio extra hominem*, *actio in Deo*.

Furthermore, this declaration does not produce a real change in the soul. The sinner remains exactly the same after justification as before. He still retains the same old moral stains, and suffers no intrinsic transformation by the infusion of a new life. The sinner is covered by Christ. Christ is like a wonderful prism illuminated by a dazzling heavenly light. Those who believe in Christ, although they are and will be until the end of their lives, essentially corrupt in their nature, will be nevertheless lighted up by the rays that emanate from the luminous prism. God sees them only through this light and in this light. They are reckoned and thought to be just, by the justice of Christ¹.

1. Cf. Luther's commentary on Galatians, I. 195; and Calvin, *Inst. chrét.* III. XI. 2.

This is the doctrine defined in the *Book of Concord* :

Per fidem propter obedientiam Christi, justi pronuntiantur et reputantur, etiamsi ratione corruptæ naturæ suæ adhuc sint, manentque peccatores, dum mortale hoc corpus circumferunt. Solida declaratio, III. De fide justif., § 15, p. 657. Human nature remains what it was i. e. wicked and corrupt. The Christian is not master of his heart, because all his desires are vitiated, says Melancthon, *Loc. theol.*, p. 18.

Although justification does not wipe out sin intrinsically, nor causes any appearance of a new life in the heart of the sinner, still it gives man assurance that none of his past faults will be held against him in the sight of God. This assurance is the source of peace and consolation, and as such is of inestimable worth to the soul of man.

Criticism. — We must confess that this doctrine is peculiarly strange, and we can scarcely conceive how it found acceptance, still less could we understand how it was defended and lived by men who were adepts in theology, unless we call to mind the state of soul of its first advocates. Luther complained that he could not subdue his natural cravings, no matter how strenuously he performed good works. Therefore, he concluded, my nature, must be radically corrupted by original sin, the slave of concupiscence, incapable of purifying itself from its hereditary stain. Therefore, good works must be useless for salvation.

Luther, however, and some others claimed that good works, though useless for salvation, had some worth inasmuch as they aided the soul in testifying its gratitude to God.

Nicholas of Armsdorf and others maintained, on the other hand, that good works made salvation more difficult. It can be easily seen to what excesses such a doctrine as this would lead to.

Luther and his disciples claimed that this doctrine was based on Scripture. If, however, there are certain texts of the Old and the New Testament which seem to make justification consist in the application of an exterior justice, if the literal meaning of the word *justificari*, δικαιωθῆναι, amounts to this, still it must be granted that the general teaching of the Sacred Writings is that all justification consists in an interior renovation of the heart and the utter annihilation of sin. This is the transformation which David desired and pleaded for in his prayer : *Averte faciem tuam a peccatis meis : et*

*omnes iniquitates meas dele. Cor mundum crea in me Deus : et spiritum rectum innova in visceribus meis*¹.

The rite of expiation of the Old Law is often appealed to in defence of the Protestant position, because there it appears that the sinner is merely covered by the purity of the legal victim. Christ was the victim for us and was offered in expiation for the sins of the world. Hence the remission of sin consists in the application or imputation of the sanctity of Christ, the only Victim of the sole sacrifice of the New Covenant.

Now, this interpretation is entirely false. According to the rite of the Levitical sacrifice², the sinner is pardoned because he has identified himself with the victim, and because, in his heart, he has annihilated himself before God. On the other hand, the effect of sacrifice was to renew the soul of the sinner, to give him a new spirit, and as a consequence to blot out sin³. Hence the theory of a merely imputative justification of the old Protestants has not a single solid foundation in Scripture. Its only basis and explanation is the psychological phenomenon of its founders, who imagined it to calm the fears of their religious conscience.

It is not surprising that this doctrine should be contradicted by the Protestants themselves. In 1524, Osiander, one of the most distinguished theologians of the Reformation, taught that God could not be infinite truth, if He looked upon a man as just who in fact did not possess essential

1. Ps. L. 11-12.

2. In the old sacrifices for sin, the victim took the place of the sinner, and in accepting it, God accepted the sinner, gave him grace and pardoned his fault.

3. It is quite precarious to base a whole doctrinal system on a merely literal exegesis.

Every one suspected that the expression « to cover » had not the theological meaning assigned it by Calvin. The proof of this is now easy to make from the knowledge of the Assyrian equivalent for the Hebrew word כָּפַר, to cover. It really means to wipe away. See F. MARTIN, *Textes religieux assyriens et babyloniens*, Paris, 1903.

justice. Our justice, he adds, consists in the presence of Christ in us, a presence which does not necessarily wipe out some remnants of the old man in us. Yet it is but a drop of dirty water in comparison to an ocean of purity.

German Protestantism rose in arms against this return to the old theory of a *justitia infusa*. But after the first burst of indignation, the pietists as they are called, gradually brought the thesis of Osiander once more into light. They made a sharp distinction between *justification*, and *sanctification*, claiming that the former is merely an external act by which God, in His mercy and justice, imputes the justice or sanctity of Christ to every sinner that believes. But once he is justified, the sinner is bound to live the life of Christ and abandon himself entirely to his Spirit. Then, and then only, is he on the threshold of sanctification.

Moreover, that faith which leads to justification, is not merely the mind's adhesion to some truth, but a vivifying force which contains good works *in potentia*, just as a seed encloses the plant.

Much, if not all the credit for this change in the doctrine of the Protestants, is probably due to the efforts of Kant. God, he says, regards us as just, when we possess His faith, that is, when we remain steadfast to the moral principles of Christ. We become saints, if we live our lives modelled on the moral ideal of which Jesus Christ is the noblest expression. Kant also made a clear distinction between justification and sanctification.

Schleiermacher maintained that justification was not a divine act, but a phenomenon of conscience or the manifestation of a new state of things in our souls. The curse of God hung over us, as long as we felt that sin ruled us entirely. United to Christ by faith, we feel that, meditating upon His example and abandoning ourselves to His Spirit, we possess the strength to dominate our evil nature. From this time on, we are really converted, we are justified and placed on the road to sanctification.

Between this doctrine as enunciated by Kant and Schleiermacher and the Catholic position there are some striking resemblances. This is why it has won many staunch defenders in the ranks of Protestantism, and this also explains why it has met so many bitter opponents.

At the present time, Protestants still maintain the distinction between justification and sanctification. Justification is always the act by which God declares a believer in Christ just. Sanctification is the participation in the justice and sanctity of Christ. But does this sanctification remain a simple imputation of the sanctity of Christ or is it a real transformation of the sinner's heart, consisting in the blotting out of sin, by the appearance of a new life? All Protestantism is divided here. « The essential principle of Protestantism », writes Bovon, « is the affirmation that whoever believes in Christ is justified. Whether this justification is imputed or real, is only a matter of shade¹ ». Yet, they must confess that there is a great deal of difference between being or being not transformed through justification. There exactly is the difference between the Protestant and the Catholic position.

II

The Catholic Doctrine on the Nature of Justification.

Exposition. — The Church teaches that by justification sin is blotted out and the soul is really transformed by grace. Moreover, justification effects a *real conversion*, for a new life, the life of grace, is given to the soul.

Grace and mortal sin cannot exist in the same soul. Both are states, one of life, the other of death, and are as incompatible as light and darkness. A mortal sin turns the soul away from God towards a creature, and grace, on

1. *Dogmatique chrétienne*, II, 264.

the contrary, unites the soul to God. As grace enters the soul, sin leaves it, and the more abundant the life of grace is, the more the soul dies to sin.

We do not mean to say that justifying grace destroys the effects of original sin in the soul. The concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life still remain. Though they are not destroyed, nevertheless the soul that remains in grace can gain the mastery over them, and can even hold them in check until the end of life.

This doctrine has been defined by the Council of Trent against Luther and Calvin¹.

Justification, then, means the remission of sin and sanctification. This also has been defined by the Council of Trent :

*Quoniam enim nemo possit esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur : id tamen in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimæ passionis merito, per Spiritum Sanctum charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhæret, unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem et charitatem*².

A distinction can be made between justification and sanctification, not that they are really distinct, but that they

1. DENZ., 792 : *Si quis per Jesu Christi Domini nostri gratiam, quæ in baptismo confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat ; aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet : sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non imputari : A. S. Manere autem in baptizatis concupiscentiam vel fomitem, hæc sancta Synodus fatetur et sentit : quæ cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus sed viriliter per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet : quinimo qui legitime certaverit coronabitur. Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit : A. S.*

See also DENZ., 799, 821.

2. DENZ., 800.

represent two phases of the same act. Justification designates the remission of sin, while sanctification denotes the communication of grace.

Let us trace this doctrine to its beginnings in Scripture and Patristic Tradition, and see how it was treated in Scholastic Theology.

1. *Holy Scripture*. — It is clearly taught in the Gospel of St. John that justification is more than a simple imputation of the justice of Christ. As a matter of fact, grace produced by justification appears as a new life, really communicated to the faithful¹. St. John describes the characters of this new life in beautiful language. It means freedom from sin (VIII, 24, ff.), unchangeable peace (XIV, 27), an invincible force (XVI, 33). Justifying grace, therefore, must be something else than a mere forensic attribution. It is a perfection which really transforms the soul and leads it from a state of sin to a state of sanctity.

According to St. Paul, the grace of justification is the life which transforms us and makes us like Christ. It makes us the adopted sons of God, His heirs and co-heirs with Christ (Rom. VIII, 17). Hence, justification is called regeneration, renovation (Tit. III, 5), the resurrection of the soul (Col. III, 1). We can conclude then, that in the mind of the Apostle justification is something more than the moral imputation of the sanctity of Christ².

2. *Tradition*. — St. John Chrysostom compares a justified man to a temple more resplendent than that of Solomon, since, instead of the ark and the cherubim, it contains Christ, the Father and the Paraclete³. St. Cyril of Alexandria compares grace to the divine image carved by the Holy

1. Jn. III, VI, XV.

2. The old Protestant theory of justification has been attacked by later Protestants because of the false exegetical principles on which it rests. See LAGRANGE, *La justification dans St. Paul*. Revue Biblique, 1914.

3. *Ad Theodor.*, I. P. G. XLVII. 278.

Ghost¹, a comparison which St. Ambrose makes use of in his *Hexameron*².

3. *Scholastic Theology*. — There were two favorite comparisons adopted by theologians. They were fond of comparing the action of grace upon the soul to an iron heated by fire to a point where it seems to have become fire. They also compared it to a light which lights up a transparent body, showing all its parts, giving it color, warmth and beauty³.

The teaching of tradition, then, is that justification really transforms the soul, that we really die to sin and really

1. *De Trin.*, VII, P. G. LXXV, 1088, 1089.

2. *Hexameron*, I. VI, 47; P. L. XIV, 260: *Pictus es ergo, o homo, et pictus a Domino Deo tuo. Bonum habes artificem atque pictorem. Noli bonam delere picturam, non fuco sed veritate fulgentem, non cera expressam sed gratia. Deles picturam, mulier, si vultum tuum materiali candore oblinas, si acquisito rubore perfundas. Illa pictura vitii, non decoris est: illa pictura fraudis, non simplicitatis est: illa pictura temporalis est, aut pluvia, aut sudore tergitur: illa pictura fallit et decipit: ut neque illi placeas, cui placere desideras, qui intelligit non tuum sed alienum esse quod placeas; et tuo displiceas auctori qui videt opus suum esse deletum. Dic mihi, si supra artificem aliquem inducas alterum, qui opus illius superioris novis operibus obducatur, nonne indignatur ille, qui opus suum adulteratum esse cognoverit? Noli tollere picturam Dei et picturam meretricis assumere, quia scriptum est: Tollam ergo membra Christi et faciam membra meretricis? Absit (I Cor., VI, 15). Quod si quis adulterat opus Dei, grave crimen admittit. Grave est enim crimen; ut putes quod melius te homo, quam Deus pingat. Grave est ut dicat de te Deus: non agnosco colores meos, non agnosco imaginem meam, non agnosco vultum, quem ipse formavi, rejicio ego quod meum non est. Illum quære qui te pinxit: cum illo habeto consortium; ab illo sume gratiam, cui mercedem dedisti. Quid respondebis?*

3. ST. BERNARD, *De dilig. Deo*, c. x: Quomodo stilla aquæ modica, multo infusa vino, deficere a se tota videtur, dum et saporem vini induit et colorem; et quomodo ferrum ignitum et candens igni simillimum fit, pristina propriaque forma exutum; et quomodo solis luce perfusus aer in eandem transformatur luminis claritatem, adeo ut non tam illuminatus quam lumen ipsum esse videatur: sic omnem hanc in Sanctis humanam affectionem necesse erit a semetipsa liquescere atque in Dei penitus transfundi voluntatem. Alioquin quomodo omnia in omnibus erit Deus, si in homine quidquam supererit? Manebit quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria, alia potentia.

live with Christ, and finally, that Christ's justice and sanctity does not merely cover us, but makes us really just and really holy.

§ III.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF JUSTIFICATION.

There are, as might have been expected, certain consequences that necessarily flow from both the Protestant and the Catholic conception of justification.

Consequences of the Protestant Conception. — According to that idea of justification, once we are conscious that we have faith in Christ, we are and must be certain that we are justified. Consequently, justifying faith is not merely a means of salvation, it is a criterion of salvation also. Hence the first characteristic they assign justification is that it is *certain*¹.

Since justification consists in the imputation of the justice of Christ, the grace of justification ought to be the same for all who believe. The second characteristic, then, is *equality*.

Finally, they claim that no matter how disordered a life may be, the soul that believes, is justified and remains justified. Consequently, *justification remains as long as faith lasts and cannot be destroyed except by the loss of faith*.

Luther foresaw this last consequence only too well, and sought to avoid its disastrous effects. He declared that a

1. Whether Luther looked upon his system as a *means* of justification or a *criterion* of justification is a mooted question. Some have claimed that he sought a criterion of justification. But the great majority claim that he sought a means of justification.

Calvin seems to have sought rather a criterion of justification. But soon his followers looked for both a means and a criterion.

dissolute life was a sure sign that the soul never possessed justifying faith.

Consequences of the Catholic Conception. — The Catholic Church denies that justification possesses the three characteristics assigned it by Protestants.

1. No one, the Council of Trent defines, can or should believe by divine faith that he is justified. It emphatically reproves this kind of religious preoccupations on account of their consequences. Still the Fathers of the Council aim specially at the state of society in the sixteenth century, as can be seen by their definition¹.

If we cannot have faith about our justification, we may nevertheless have full assurance, based on a good conscience and the consciousness of duty accomplished, that we are in the state of grace. Besides, we have always the knowledge that God never abandons a man of good will, *Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam*.

2. The Church further teaches that the grace of justification is distributed unequally. Justification means the real communication of the justice or sanctity of Christ to the soul, and hence is developed in accordance with the dispositions and efforts of the individual. Hence the Council of Trent defined that justifying grace is proportionate to the works of Christians². This is *de fide*.

1. DENZ., 802 : *Quamvis autem necessarium sit credere, neque remitti, neque remissa unquam fuisse peccata, nisi gratis divina misericordia propter Christum : nemini tamen fiduciam et certitudinem remissionis peccatorum suorum jactanti, et in ea sola quiescenti, peccata dimitti vel dimissa esse dicendum est, cum apud hæreticos et schismaticos possit esse, imo nostra tempestate sit, et magna contra Ecclesiam catholicam contentione prædicetur vana hæc et ab omni pietate remota fiducia... Nam sicut nemo pius de Dei misericordia, de Christi merito, deque sacramentorum efficacia dubitare debet ; sic quilibet, dum seipsum, suamque propriam infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia formidare et timere potest ; cum nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, cui non potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecutum.*

2. DENZ., 799 : *Demum unica formalis causa est justitia Dei, non qua*

3. The Church likewise teaches that the grace of justification is lost by any mortal sin, be it a sin against faith or against any other virtue. This is but a natural consequence of the general doctrine of grace. Mortal sin turns the soul completely away from God, the supernatural end of man, whereas grace is the union of the soul with God, and hence both states are mutually exclusive. This has also been defined by the Council of Trent ¹.

Still the loss of grace does not mean the loss of the virtue of faith. This virtue remains, unless forfeited by a sin against it, or a wicked life which practically amounts to a profession of incredulity.

ARTICLE II.

Justifying Grace.

The Question Stated. — Justification really transforms man, for the soul is no longer under the dominion of sin, and the Holy Ghost dwells in it to transform it into the likeness of the holy soul of Christ.

As the Greek Fathers gave an explanation of justifying grace different from that of the Latin Fathers, *we shall study them successively*. Then we shall consider the *effects* of this grace, in the soul, and finally *its properties*, i. e. *the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost*.

ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qua videlicet ab eo donati, renouamur spiritu mentis nostræ, et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et cooperationem.

1. DENZ., 837 : *Si quis dixerit nullum esse mortale peccatum, nisi infidelitatis, aut nullo alio quantumvis gravi et enormi præterquam infidelitatis peccato, semel acceptam gratiam amitti : A. S.*

§ I.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE GREEK FATHERS.

The Scriptural Basis of the Doctrine. — According to the Gospel of St. John, grace is the very life of Christ, which has its beginning in Baptism and which develops during the whole of man's earthly existence¹. The perfection of this life consists in the love of God². Christ communicates this life in sending His Spirit, namely, the Holy Ghost³.

This doctrine is similar to that of St. Paul. For him, Christian perfection consists in imitating Christ and in living the very life of Christ (Gal. II. 19-20; Philipp. I. 21). This life is created and developed in our soul by the Spirit of Christ, the Holy Ghost who takes up His abode in our hearts (Rom. V. 5, VIII. 11-14; I Cor. III. 16. VI. 17-19). He who does not possess the Spirit of God cannot be called a Christian (Rom. VIII. 9).

Hence according to the doctrine of the New Testament, justifying grace consists in the communication of the life of Christ by the Holy Ghost, who comes to us and takes up His abode in our souls for that very purpose.

All the Greek Fathers took over the Scriptural idea and evolved it in their discussions on this point. They always consider grace in the concrete, namely, as the Holy Ghost transforming our souls. In their teaching, grace means a double gift, an *uncreated gift*, the Holy Ghost conjointly with the Father and the Son, and a *created gift*, the sum total of all the dispositions which He produces in us. To be logical, we shall first consider *the part that the Holy Ghost*

1. JN. III. VI.

2. XIV. XV. XVI.

3. XVI.

plays in our sanctification, and the work which He accomplishes in each one of us.

The Part that the Holy Ghost plays in our Sanctification.

— The Greek Fathers always considered grace in connection with the mystery of the Trinity. Grace for them was but the life of the Trinity in man. And hence we must, if we wish to understand their position on grace, know how they interpreted the dogma of the Trinity.

Greek thought fixed primarily on three distinct persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, personality being conceived as logically prior to the nature. So intimately are they united that one cannot be without the other. The Father is but begetting the Son, the Son is but begotten of the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds necessarily from the Father as begetting the Son, or from the Son as begotten of the Father.

The divine life or the Trinity is then *one and the same infinite life which is bound up in three principal centres or in three foci of life*. It is a movement which begins with the Father, passes through the Son to the Holy Ghost, whence it returns to the Father, by passing back through the Son. This active relation of one divine Person with the other so much so that each Person calls for the other two, and yet is distinct from them (*περιχώρησις* or *circuminsessio*), constitutes the divine life or the Trinity.

If this Trinitarian conception be admitted, it is easy to determine the part of the Holy Ghost in all the external works of the Trinity. He is the term of the divine life, τέλος. Consequently, all that is done outside of the divine life, is performed by the Holy Ghost, and hence He is the source of all the divine operations *ad extra*, πηγὴ χάριτος, ἁγιότητος, ἁγιασμοῦ χορηγός.

Although He is the author of all these works, He is not alone in His operations, for the other two Persons share equally with Him. The action He performs is that of the

divine Spirit who proceeds from the Father through the Son. If the work is *especially* attributed to the Holy Ghost, it is because He is the term of the divine life. Such is the rôle of the Holy Spirit in all divine external works.

But how does He fulfil His office in the work of sanctification?

According to the Greek Fathers, the Holy Ghost does not come to us because we have received sanctifying grace, but He sanctifies souls by giving Himself to them, namely by uniting Himself with them, just as one perfume is united to another. The fundamental substance of grace, *ὑλη*, is according to Origen, the Person of the Holy Ghost ¹. Didymus ², St. Basil ³, and especially St. Cyril of Alexandria ⁴, who has been surmamed the Doctor of sanctifying grace ⁵, speak of the action of the Holy Ghost in the same manner. This is why the Holy Ghost is salled *the Gift*, and this does not mean only the grace produced, the effect, but also the cause, the Holy Ghost Himself. Hence, the Holy Ghost sanctifies our souls by the fact that He is given to them, and that He is given to them personally.

Yet, as the Holy Ghost cannot be without the Son who is begotten of the Father, the three divine Persons come to the soul that is sanctified ⁶. The indwelling, or at least the *passive indwelling* belongs equally to the three Persons. The *act of indwelling* or the *active indwelling* appears to be the *special function* of the Holy Ghost.

Were they asked why sanctification was produced by a communication of the august Trinity, the Greek Fathers

1. *Com. in Joan.* II. 62, P. G. XIV. 129.

2. *De Spiritu Sancto*, IV., P. G. XXXIX. 1035.

3. *Adv. Eunom.*, V., P. G. XXIX. 772.

4. *De Trin. dial.* VII, P. G. LXXV. 1085.

5. Cf. J. MAHÉ, *La sanctification d'après saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie*, *Revue d'Histoire ecclésiastique*, jan. 15, 1909. — L. VERPEAUX, *Le rôle personnel du Saint-Esprit dans la sanctification des âmes*, Dijon, 1910.

6. See ATHANASIUS, *Ad Serapion.*, ep. I. 30-31, P. G. XXVI. 600-601.

would reply, because of God's love for mankind. So great is the love of God for man, that He wishes to be communicated to him ¹.

The Work which the Holy Ghost accomplishes in each one of us. — Didymus calls the Holy Ghost the seal of the Son. His mission is to imprint upon us the image of the Son, the Incarnate Word ². St. Athanasius adopts the same terminology ³. God, writes St. Cyril of Alexandria, makes us participants in the divine nature by showing us the Holy Spirit, who, in turn makes us participants in the same nature, by making us like to the Son and in giving us the right to be called the children of God, and even gods ⁴.

Hence, the action of the Holy Ghost indwelling in us, is to imprint the image of the Son on our souls, and to make us like to the Word Incarnate ⁵.

But what is the meaning of this expression?

When the Word united Himself hypostatically to His humanity, He sanctified it ⁶. But this sanctification was accomplished by the Holy Ghost who proceeds from the Son and the Father. This Holy Spirit created, then, all the super-

1. Cf. BASIL, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 39, P. G. XXXII. 140.

2. *De Spiritu Sancto*, 22, P. G. XXXIX. 1052. « As the Son is the image of the invisible God and the form of His substance, whoever is formed according to His image, is formed according to the image of God... In like manner the Holy Ghost, as He is the seal of God, those who receive the image of God, in being marked by the Holy Ghost, are established in the resemblance of the wisdom and knowledge of Christ: moreover they are penetrated by faith. »

3. *Ad Serapion.*, ep. III. 3, P. G. XXVI. 630. « This seal, the Holy Ghost, impresses on us the image of the Son, so much so that we are possessed of the form of Christ (Ἡ σφραγίς δὲ τὸν Υἱὸν ἐκτυποῖ, ὡς τὸν σφραγιζόμενον ἔχειν τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ μορφήν). »

4. *De Trin.* dial. VII., P. G. LXXV. 1098.

5. Cf. DE RÉGNON, *Études sur la Sainte Trinité*, XXVI. 484-485.

6. PETAVIUS: *Pater ecce, atque Spiritus Sanctus in homine Christo non minus manet quam Verbum; sed dissimilis est τῆς ἐνυπάρχουσας modus. Verbum enim præter communem illum, quem cum reliquis eundem habet, peculiarem alterum obtinet, ut sit formæ instar, divinum, vel Deum potius facientis, et hunc Filium. De Trin.*, l. VIII, c. VI, 8.

natural dispositions in Christ's human soul. These dispositions can be reduced to perfect love of God and complete detachment from earthly things. Thus transformed, the human soul of the Saviour was taken up by the same vital movement which constitutes the Holy Ghost, viz., it was wholly referred to the Word and, through Him, to the Father.

In His design of sanctifying man, Christ the Incarnate Word acts in the same manner. The immediate sanctifying principle is also the Holy Ghost. He it is, that produces in the soul of the disciple dispositions similar to those which He has realized in the soul of the Master. As a consequence of this transformation, the soul of the disciple, like that of his Master, is taken up by the same vital movement which constitutes the Holy Ghost. Hence, through the Holy Ghost, the soul is directed wholly towards the Incarnate Word, and through Him towards the Father; it is entirely referred first to the Son and, through Him, to the Father.

Therefore, to employ the language of St. John and St. Paul, a Christian is one who lives the very life of Jesus. On the one hand, the Holy Ghost who sanctifies the human soul of Jesus does also sanctify the soul of the Christian; on the other hand, in sanctifying the soul of the Christian, the Spirit of Jesus has no other design than to realize these dispositions of union with God and detachment from the world, which He produces in their plenitude in the soul of Jesus¹.

1. In his excellent work on *Christian Life and Virtues*, Bishop GAY has made a good use of that beautiful Greek theology inspired from the New Testament and especially from St. John's Gospel.

« As all the Fathers and Doctors assert, what the Word truly gave as dowry to His Humanity, was the Holy Spirit, Who proceeds from Him as from the Father, and Who is substantially the fulness of sanctity (Acts X. 38). This was the life-giving, and infinite unction with which He anointed this Nature which He borrowed; this was the treasure which He appropriated to it, this was the inexhaustible resource which He gave to it, in order to live in this world, and to perform all His works. Whence it comes that in possessing Himself, and

From the foregoing remarks we can form some idea of a mere creature reaching the greatest height of sanctity.

The Trinity abides in that soul, and the Spirit, who proceeds from the Father through the Son, comes and sanctifies it according to the measure of its possibilities. Now, the Holy Ghost is the very same spirit who sanctifies the soul of Jesus. Truly then can it be said that Jesus is living in His disciple. He lives in him, in His Spirit of sanctity, in the plenitude of His power, in the perfection of His ways,

Himself alone, as to the hypostatic union, this holy Humanity, the Word never operated in, nor caused this sacred Humanity to operate, except through His Holy Spirit. The Scripture says this several times in explicit terms, particularly as to Our Lord's going into the desert (St. Luke iv. 1), and as to His oblation on the Cross (Heb. IX. 14). But it was the same in all His acts, and it is a matter of which theologians have no doubt, that Our Lord did nothing as Man, but by the impulse of the Holy Spirit, and in dependence upon Him.

Now this mystery of the dowry is co-extensive with the union. We also, in espousing the Word, receive all kinds of created graces; it must be so, because otherwise all our powers remaining purely human, we should be incapable of treating supernaturally with God, of seeing Him, of hearing Him, of sharing His life, of acting as He acted, and of giving Him glory. All our being, then, is adorned, enriched, filled with these supernatural gifts, which are like the jewels with which our Heavenly Bridegroom decorates us. But this does not wholly satisfy His love for us, His members, nor does it satisfy His love for His own Humanity. In a measure, doubtless, and after a manner, much less perfect, yet real, He brings us, and settles on us this sublime dowry, which is His Divine Spirit. At the same time that we have the fruits, we have the root; with the created gifts, we receive the gift which is uncreated; with the gifts of His love, we possess love itself; so that by Jesus, in Jesus, and as Jesus, we have in us, and belonging to us, the Holy Spirit, Who becomes our Spirit, our own and characteristic Spirit; according as it is written, « he who is joined to the Lord is one Spirit (1 Cor. vi. 17) and elsewhere, » if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His « (Rom. VIII. 9); and, on the contrary, true Christians, the true brethren of Christ and His members, the true children of the Father, they are those whom the Spirit of God animates and governs (Rom. VIII. 14). Such, then, thanks to Jesus Christ, is our regular relation with this Third and Adorable Divine Person, Who unites the Two from Whom He proceeds, and terminates in the Divinity, the eternal evolution of that life which is all being. We are not only here His Abode and His Temple; we become his means, His agents, His organs. The Holy Spirit is in us, as the living and permanent foundation of our supernatural state, and He becomes in it the principle of all the works which this holy state ought to produce. » II. 280-281.

in the verity of His virtues and in the communication of His divine mysteries.

Moreover, this means also that the Christian is living in Christ. All the divine life imparted starts from Jesus, and by virtue of the intimate union of the three Persons of the Trinity, all converges to Him.

This is the Greek teaching in regard to the part that the Holy Ghost plays in the work of our justification, and the effect He has upon our souls. Its great advantage lies in this that it gives an easy explanation of the nature and effects of justifying grace. Grace is realized in all its plenitude in the holy soul of Christ. We are invited to imitate our model by abandoning ourselves to the Spirit whom He has sent.

§ II.

THE DOCTRINE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE IN SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

The origin of this doctrine in the pelagian controversy. — Both St. Ambrose and St. Augustine were familiar with the doctrine of the Greeks, and both bear unmistakable signs of its influence. Like the Greeks, they too, admitted a double gift in grace, an uncreated gift, which is the Holy Trinity, and a created gift which is the effect of the Holy Ghost upon the soul¹. Under the influence of the Pelagian

1. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Trinit.*, XV, 46; *P. L.*, XLII, 1093 : *Quid vero fuerit causæ, ut post resurrectionem suam, et in terra prius daret et de cælo postea mitteret Spiritum Sanctum; hoc ego existimo, quia per ipsum donum diffunditur charitas in cordibus nostris, qua diligimus Deum et proximum, secundum duo illa præcepta in quibus tota lex pendet et prophetæ. Hoc significans Dominus Jesus, bis dedit Spiritum Sanctum, semel in terra propter dilectionem Dei... Dominus ipse Jesus Spiritum Sanctum non solum dedit ut Deus, sed etiam accepit ut homo; propterea dictus est plenus gratia et Spiritu Sancto.* See also the canons of the Council of Orange, where sanctification is considered throughout as the work of the Holy Ghost. DENZ. 177, 179, 180, 198 : *Diffundit enim charitatem in cordibus nostris Spiritus Patris et Filii quem cum Patre amamus et Filio.*

controversy, the latter, the created grace, was more and more looked upon in the abstract and its concrete element was lost sight of. Thus it happened that it was studied and analyzed according to the principles of the philosophy of Aristotle. At the time of St. Thomas, this doctrine, was, because of his own brilliant efforts, brought out in the clearest terms. But even after him, it received further development.

The doctrine of the nature of justifying grace at the time of St. Thomas. — In the twelfth century, the attention of scholars was drawn to the determination of the perfection that displaced the state of sin in man.

Peter Lombard claimed that it was the Holy Ghost. He asserted that justifying grace is identical with charity, and charity is the Person of the Holy Ghost¹.

This seems to be a teaching closely allied to that of the Greek Fathers. But, as a matter of fact, there are some striking differences. The Greek Fathers distinguish two gifts in the justifying grace, the one uncreated, viz., the three divine Persons in the Trinity, the other a created gift, which is the effect produced in our soul by the Holy Ghost, namely, the impress of the Son of God, or better a likeness to the life of Christ. Peter Lombard did not draw sufficiently this distinction, for it seems that he merely recognized the uncreated gift (the Holy Ghost) in sanctifying grace.

Now at that time more than at any other this doctrine was to meet with a great storm of protest. Sanctifying grace was more or less regarded as a *forma informans animam*, the soul which is substantially united to the body, being its *materia informata*. To assert that the Holy Ghost

1. *Sent.* I. dist. XVII. c. iv : *Quod non est dictum per causam illud : Deus caritas est, sicut illud : Tu es patientia mea et spes mea.* This position is sometimes assigned to Petavius. but the learned Jesuit was too familiar with Greek theology to commit a mistake like this. See his criticism of Peter Lombard, *De Trin.* VIII. vi, 9.

was the form of the soul was to invite the severest criticism. That the Person of the Holy Ghost together with the Father and the Son came to the soul and dwelt there was readily granted, but always on the supposition that in His mysterious way the third Person of the Blessed Trinity was united to the soul through some created *form* of a mysterious nature. Two gifts were therefore said to be in sanctifying grace, namely the Holy Trinity (uncreated gift) and the form resulting from the action of the Holy Ghost in the soul (created gift). But what was the nature of this form and to which category did it belong?

St. Thomas taught that justifying grace, considered as a created gift, consists in a quality which belongs to the species of habit¹.

What is a habit? It is a permanent quality which perfects the very substance of the soul, or the faculties of the soul disposing them to act more easily for good or evil. There are two kinds of habit, the one perfecting the soul in its being, and the other perfecting the faculties of the soul in order to assist them in the performance of their proper actions.

According to St. Thomas, justifying grace consists in the habit which perfects the substance of the soul, and diffuses itself to all its faculties. Inasmuch as it perfects the substance of the soul, it constitutes the essence of justifying grace; and inasmuch as it diffuses itself to the soul's faculties, it constitutes the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Whilst grace proper makes us *participants* in the divine essence, by rendering us *like unto God*, the infused virtues give us a *share*, but always *in likeness*, in the knowledge and charity of God².

1. *Summa theol.* I^a, II^æ, q. cx, a. 2.

2. *Sum. theol.*, I^a II^æ, q. cx, a. 4 : *Respondeo dicendum, quod ista questio ex præcedenti dependet. Si enim gratia sit idem quod virtus, necesse est, quod sit in potentia animæ sicut in subjecto : nam potentia animæ est*

This is a summary of the doctrine of St. Thomas in regard to justifying grace. According to him, sanctifying grace is always *entitative* or *static*, inasmuch as it perfects the substance of the soul, and *operative* or *dynamic*, in as far as it perfects the faculties of the soul.

Towards the end of the thirteenth century, Duns Scotus cast reflection upon the Thomistic teaching, by declaring that the relation between charity and sanctifying grace is so intimate that charity must be identified with it. Any distinction between the two can never be real, but merely logical.

This bears many points of resemblance to the teaching of Peter Lombard, the only difference being that the renowned Franciscan made charity a created gift.

On the other hand, Scotus flatly denied the Thomistic conception, saying that justifying grace was not an *entitative habit*, but merely an *operative habit*.

To follow this doctrine, one was forced to abandon the Aristotelian comparison¹ of the life of grace with man's natural life. But as the principles of Aristotle gained more and more influence, Scotism fell proportionately in theological circles. To-day the Thomistic view holds almost complete sway, and has been taught in all schools and universities since the fourteenth century.

Still we should not leave this subject, without saying a word on the original and interesting attempt of Baudier, S. J.

proprium subjectum virtutis. Si autem gratia differt a virtute, non potest dici quod potentia animæ sit gratiæ subjectum; quia omnis perfectio potentia animæ habet rationem virtutis, unde relinquitur quod gratia, sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat subjectum prius potentiis animæ, ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animæ. Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei, et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum per virtutem caritatis, ita etiam per naturam animæ participat, secundum quamdam similitudinem, naturam divinam per quamdam regenerationem, sive recreationem.

1. Aristotle distinguished the operations performed immediately by the faculties deriving their activity from the same common source, the substance.

and Jovene, S. J., both late of the Catholic University of Paris.

These authors make sanctifying grace consist in two gifts, the one uncreated and the other created. The *uncreated gift* is the whole Blessed Trinity; but in a special manner, the Holy Ghost¹; the *created gift* consists in the work wrought by the Holy Ghost in the soul; but, this advent of the Holy Ghost *precedes logically* the state of grace in our souls². According to their teaching, the soul is no longer like a miserable dwelling which a king desires to beautify before his visit. On the contrary, the human soul was created by God to be the temple of the Holy Ghost and

1. These authors have revived the view of Petavius. The three divine Persons equally dwell in the soul, but only the Holy Ghost is united to the soul. Cf. P. JOVENE, *De vita deiformi*, thes. XX : *Quamobrem item quæritur utrum solus Spiritus Sanctus dicendus sit formaliter et terminative unitus animæ Deiformi? Dux referuntur theologorum sententiæ, quamvis ut verum fatear, dux illæ opiniones non videntur versari circa idem. Theologi enim qui negant unionem Deiformem esse propriam Spiritui Sancto, ideo forsan negant quia unionem veri nominis inter Deum et animas Deiformes non agnoscunt, sed simplicem inhabitationem, ad quam deprimunt quæ Patres de unionem, conjunctionem, participationem Dei, verbis adeo magnificis extollunt. Jamvero si nihil nisi inhabitatio Divinitatis asserenda esset, non viderem quomodo theologi insignes tamdiu ancipites et inter se oppositis sententiis pugnantes esse potuissent. Una tantum sententia præformari posset, inhabitationem toti Trinitati communem, Spiritui Sancto per appropriationem adscriberem. Verum, unionem proprie dicta semel admissa, quæque toto cælo distat ab inhabitatione stricte sumpta (illi enim theologi nunquam dicerent, Deum inhabitare animam ut anima inhabitat corpus), jam non video quomodo dux esse possint opiniones theologicæ, i. e. in traditione fundatæ. Cf. *Lithographed notes*. Paris, 1880-1881.*

2. BAUDIER, *De gratia*, cap. præm., a. 2; — pars II, c. 1, a. 1, *Lithographed notes*, Paris, 1885-1886. — P. JOVENE, *De vita Deiformi*, thes. XIX : *Catholicus et adæquatus consortii intellectus, et verbo Dei tum scripto, tum tradito exhaustus, duplici constat elemento, infinito altero increataque, finito altero ac creato, scilicet Divinitate physice, immediate, accidentaliter tamen, animæ regenerandæ unita, et insuper qualitate, eidem animæ expressam, formalem, imo univocam, Divinitatis similitudinem indente. Quæ quidem assimilatio, Patribus præeuntibus, nedum præcedat Divinitatis cum anima unionem, prorsus subsequitur ut ignitio ignem, ut radius solem, ut character sigillum, ut imago exemplar. Quamobrem Deiformitas ex præhabito divinæ naturæ consortio resultans, optime a Dionysio fuit descripta : Ad Deum, quanta fieri potest, assimilatio et unio.*

was destined to be transformed by His presence. If it does not attain its destiny, it is not as God wishes it to be, and consequently it is in the state of sin. But when the Holy Ghost is granted unto it, it is in the condition God wishes it to be and consequently in the state of grace.

They compare the Holy Trinity to a most brilliant light, and the human soul to a beautifully carved crystal. Despite its beauty and shape, the crystal will appear shapeless and colorless if kept in the dark. But as soon as it is exposed to the rays of the sun, it becomes resplendent with light which flashes from it in a variety of marvellous rays. Just so with the human soul; admirably shaped by the hand of the Almighty, it is placed in the darkness, as a consequence of Adam's sin. But if it agrees to come into the light of the Sun of justice and truth, it will reflect in a thousand ways the light that it receives.

Such is the conception of Baudier and Jovene in regard to justifying grace. Their doctrine consists chiefly in two main features :

1. They revived the almost forgotten teaching of the Greeks, and gave it an honorable position in theology.

2. They completed the Greek doctrine by asserting that the transformation which is effected in the soul is merely posterior to the presence of the Divinity. This posteriority is but logical, for the soul is justified as soon as, or by the fact that the Trinity has taken up its abode there.

This doctrine is not new, although some have insisted that it is. It is simply a revival of the old Greek idea under a new and more complete form.

In conclusion, let us remark that the Church has given the widest latitude to theologians in all that concerns the nature of sanctifying grace. Still, she has defined that the state of grace or the work of the Holy Ghost in the soul is not the justice of Christ or His sanctity imputed to the soul, but a justice like His own really developed in the soul by the presence of the Holy Ghost. This doctrine was taught

by the Fathers of the Council of Trent against the Protestants¹.

§ III.

THE EFFECTS OF JUSTIFYING GRACE.

The Question Stated. — We say a soul is in the state of grace, when the Holy Ghost together with the Father and the Son dwells there and produces those dispositions which He wrought in the soul of our Lord. This action of the Holy Ghost upon the soul produces some effects, or *prerogatives*.

These effects are four. Justifying grace gives us *a participation in the nature of God*; it makes us *joint heirs with Christ and heirs of God*; it makes us *the adopted sons of God*; it forges between man and God *the closest bonds of friendship*.

Justifying Grace gives us a participation in the Nature of God. — In the Second Epistle of St. Peter, it is said that gifts of salvation are bestowed on us, that through these we may become *partakers of the divine nature (consortes divinæ naturæ)*, having escaped from the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world². The same doctrine is embodied in the First Epistle of St John, where grace is called the seed of God, *Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet*³, hence we are called children of God, and such we are⁴.

These texts evidence the fact that between the just soul and God there exist the closest bonds conceivable. And yet they merely express, though more forcibly, the doctrine embodied in the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul.

1. DENZ., 799, 821.

2. I. 4.

3. III. 9.

4. III. 1.

What they signify is, that by grace, we live the very life of God.

He who has received sanctifying grace possesses the Holy Trinity. Furthermore, the same Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son has created and developed the perfections which He produced in the soul of Christ, in the soul of the Christian, transforming it more and more into a likeness of the Word Incarnate.

This is why we can say that the soul no longer lives, but Christ lives in it; and this is why we say the soul has been made a *partaker* of the *life* or *nature* of God.

However, when we make use of this expression, we do not mean that it can be interpreted literally.

The soul participates in the nature of God *secundum quamdam similitudinem*, says St. Thomas¹. The Holy Trinity dwells in the soul of the just man as in a temple. God gives Himself to the soul that He sanctifies, and it is in this uncreated gift that justifying grace consists. At the same time, the Holy Ghost creates in the soul of man, dispositions similar to those created in the soul of our Lord. Now, since He had made Christ's soul as like unto the divine nature as possible, therefore, the Holy Ghost makes the soul of man like unto the very nature of God. This is the meaning of the expression, *Participatio naturæ divinæ*, or *divinæ naturæ consortium*.

Justifying Grace makes us Joint Heirs with Christ and Heirs of God. — This doctrine is explicitly stated in the Epistle to the Romans. This name of heirs is one of the many titles employed by St. Paul to express the close relation that exists between Christ and the Christian¹.

By dying on the cross, Christ died to sin, and at the same time His soul was glorified. Three days later, by His resurrection, His body was also glorified. This is what St. Paul calls

1. *Summ. theol.* I^a II^æ, q. cx. a. 4.

2. *Rom.* VIII. 15-17.

the heritage that Christ received from the Father (*the heritage of God*). Like Christ, the soul that receives sanctifying grace, dies to sin. Endowed with this new life on the day of Baptism, the Christian should develop it in him all his days, until it reaches its culmination in glory and, at the end of the world, in the resurrection of the body. Thus, the Christian *participates*, like Christ, *in the heritage of God*. Therefore, he is *the heir of God and joint heir with Christ*.

By Sanctifying Grace we are made the Adopted Sons of God. — If we are made *joint heirs with Christ*, it is because we are with Him *the sons of God*.

Christ, inasmuch as He is the Word Incarnate, is the only Son of the Father, the true Son of God. The Christian who receives sanctifying grace is made like unto Christ by the same Spirit that animated the holy soul of Jesus. This is why the just man can say that he lives the *same supernatural life* that Christ lived¹. Consequently he is the *brother* of Christ, *an adopted brother*, it is true, since his only right to this title lies in the fact that Christ has taken him as a brother, in dying for him on the cross in order to gain eternal life for him. At the same time the Christian becomes the *adopted brother* of Christ, he also becomes the *adopted son* of God.

But the Fathers and theologians interpreting the words of the first Epistle of St. John, *Filii Dei nominemur et simus*, and, *Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, semen ipsius in eo manet*, do not hesitate to claim that we are even more than the adopted sons of God. Grace makes us the adopted sons of God, *sed non sine aliqua cognatione*.

1. The Spirit that sanctified the soul of Christ, writes Thomassin, is the same Spirit that sanctifies us. But whilst the Holy Ghost gave the humanity of Christ a superabundance of His favor (*largissime*) which lasted forever (*permanenter*) and from which all the divine effusions proceeded necessarily (*causaliter et principaliter*), the Christian soul, however, receives the same Spirit sparingly (*parcius*), is capable of losing Him (*amissibiliter*) and receives Him because of Jesus Christ who is in him (*propter Christum et in Ipso*). *De Incarn.* VI. ii.

What meaning do they assign to this expression?

Adoption implies a *juridical process* which establishes a relation between the adopted and the adopter based on some existing conformity of sentiments. The act which makes us sons of God is more than this, since it transforms our souls in conformity with the soul of Christ. In this act, then, there is more of *generation* than *adoption*. And this is what the Fathers and theologians mean, when they say that we are the adopted sons of God, *sed non sine aliqua cognatione*.

Sanctifying Grace binds us in the Closest Friendship with God. — Justifying grace restores man to that condition which he held in the beginning, in which he was destined by God to live with Him in the closest bonds of life and love.

Inferior creation glorifies God by serving man. But man's end is of a higher plane. God created man in order to live in Him by the Spirit that proceeds from the Father through the Son and to unite Himself, through him, to all creation. This is why man was made the *son of the Father*. He should respond to this favor by loving God with filial love. But if he is the son of the Father, it is because he is *the brother of the only Son of God*. Therefore, he should act as a brother of Christ, by loving Him, living in Him, thinking as He thought, desiring what He desired. Further, he should act as a servant acting in the interest of his master, that is, he should promote the glory of the Father and further the interests of the kingdom of God. In other words, he should live *through Christ, like Christ, and for Christ*¹.

1. This beautiful and simple truth seems to have been understood better by the early Christians than by the Christians of to-day. Traces of this belief are found in the museums of Christian archeology. There we find inscriptions where the Christian is called *the well-beloved lamb of God*. A child was called *agnellus*, little lamb. Again the Christian is represented as a fish, or little fish (*pisciculus*) that swims in the waters of supernatural life. Every one knows that the symbols of the *Lamb* and *Fish* represent Christ. Some-

Whoever lives in this fraternal union with Christ, is at the same time the temple of the Holy Ghost. Even though the Holy Trinity dwells in the soul of the just man, the work of transformation which is effected there, is nevertheless *the immediate effect of the Spirit* who proceeds from the Father through the Son¹.

Such is the Christian life considered in its concrete reality. It all centers around the love of God. But what a love, since to express the Christian life completely, three expressions, the most sacred in human language, must be employed, namely, *brother, son, and temple*. The Christian is one who is marked with the seal of the Most Holy Trinity, and it is easily conceived from this why the Christian life should be lived in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

The centre of the Christian life is union with Christ, the only Son of the Father. The Catholic priest is united to Christ as no other Christian is. In virtue of his sacerdotal character, he is made a partaker of the Priesthood of Christ, whereby He offers Himself eternally for the salvation of mankind. This union represents the highest participation in Christ, to which a simple creature can be called, since it is a partici-

times the *pisciculi* are painted or carved with an anchor, which is a symbol of the faith that unites them to Christ. Cf. DOM LECLERCQ, art. *Agneau*, in *Dict. d'Arch. chrét.*

Often the Christians took the name *Theophoros* or *Christophoros*. Such was the name borne by St. Ignatius of Antioch, for his letters begin with this formula : *Ignatius called also Theophoros*. When about to undergo martyrdom this title was flung at him in mockery, his sentence of death began thus, *Ignatius who claims to possess in himself the crucified One...*

1. The early Christians gave ready assent to these dogmatic assertions. So strongly were they persuaded of the truth of the fact that the Holy Ghost comes to the soul to transform it, that they called the souls of their dead, Holy Ghost. REDDIDIT. DEO. SPIRITUM. SANCTUM, is the epitaph of a SEVERAE. certain Leopardus. Another inscription bears this beautiful epitaph : LEUCES. FILIAE. CARISSIMAE. POSUIT. ET. SPIRITO. SANCTO. SUO. Cf. MARTIGNY, art. *Le Saint-Esprit*, in *Dict. des Antiq. chrét.*

pation in Christ, acting both as God and man, in order to effect the salvation of the world¹.

§ IV.

THE PROPERTIES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE.

The Infused Virtues. — Since the thirteenth century, theologians have recognized a twofold element in justifying grace. One, which adheres to the substance of the soul, is called the *entitative element* or *static element*; the other, which influences the faculties of the soul, is called the *operative* or *dynamic element*, or the *infused virtues*. *Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam*, writes St. Thomas, *homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei, et, secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum per virtutem caritatis, ita etiam per naturam animae participat, secundum quamdam similitudinem, naturam divinam, per quamdam regenerationem sive recreationem*².

1. According to the teaching of St. Thomas, the property of the sacramental character is to unite the Christian to the mediative and redemptive work of Christ. By the baptismal character, he receives an initiation into this work. Whence it is that the Christian should so unite himself to Christ as to offer to God his homage, to adore Him, to pray to Him, and to offer himself up to Him. In fact, Christ is, as Father Olier puts it, the *great Worshiper* of God. The Christian, because of the character of Baptism, is called to unite himself to Christ, in order to offer, with Him, the *religious homage of humanity* to God the Father. By the character of Confirmation, the Christian is strengthened in his baptismal character. The character of Orders associates the Christian in the most intimate act of the redemptive work of Christ. It gives him the right to offer Jesus Christ in sacrifice in union with Christ the High Priest, for it makes him a *minister of Christ the High Priest*. Cf. *Summa theol.* III^a, q. LXIII, a. 1, 2, 3.

This dogmatic consideration leads to moral reflections of the greatest importance. The Priesthood of Christ rests upon His divinity. To be the Priest of the New Law, Christ had to be Son of God. Since our priesthood is but a participation in the Priesthood of Christ, since it is of the same order as that of Christ, it should rest on a sanctity as high as we possibly can make it.

2. *Sum. theol.* I^a II^{ae}, q. cx., a. 4.

This conception is based on the comparison of the life of grace with the natural life. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the faculties are regarded as modes which necessarily flow from the substance of the soul. And so the infused virtues are considered as the properties of justifying grace.

These virtues are divided into two classes, theological and moral, inasmuch as they have God as their direct object, or are only a means of attaining to God.

The Thomistic doctrine in regard to the relation of the infused virtues to sanctifying grace has never been defined by the Church. The Council of Trent (sess. VI. c. vii) simply declared that the Christian, by justification, receives the charity of Christ, which means that he obtains the remission of sins, and, at the same time, receives the life of faith, of hope and of charity. The Council avoided anything like a systematisation of the doctrine: hence we are free to do the same. But what it does declare is the close relation that exists between faith, hope and charity¹.

Although one cannot believe without hoping and loving, still, as this same Council teaches, faith can exist without charity in the soul of the sinner, but it is dead and useless, *fides mortua seu otiosa*. It is lost only by a denial of faith², or by a life of such viciousness as is tantamount to its

1. DENZ., 800 : *Quamquam enim nemo possit esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini Nostri Jesu Christi communicantur: id tamen in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimæ passionis merito per Spiritum Sanctum charitas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhæret, unde in ipsa justificatione cum remissione peccatorum hæc omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, spem et charitatem: nam fides nisi ad eam spes accedat et charitas, neque unit perfecte cum Christo, neque corporis ejus vivum membrum efficit: qua ratione verissime dicitur, fidem sine operibus mortuam et otiosam esse...*

2. Ibid., 808, 838 : *Si quis dixerit, amissa per peccatum gratia, simul et fidem semper amitti: aut fidem, quæ remanet, non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva; aut eum, qui fidem sine charitate habet, non esse christianum: A. S.*

denial. The same is the case, but in a lower degree, with the virtue of hope¹.

The Gifts of the Holy Ghost. — As regards the gifts of the Holy Ghost, they consist in certain habitual dispositions, produced by the Holy Ghost in the soul which is in the state of grace. Their value lies in the fact that they enable the Christian to practice a holy life more easily, and aid him in the dangers that he must encounter.

Yet it is not well to separate too sharply the gifts of the Holy Ghost from the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity, no more than it is to separate these virtues from fundamental grace. Justifying grace is summed up in the admirable dispositions which the Holy Ghost creates and develops in us, in order to make us like Christ's sacred humanity.

1. DENZ., 798.

CHAPTER III

MERIT.

Christ is the Author of grace. By His life, His sufferings and His death on the cross, He has merited salvation for mankind. In its application, grace is, as it were, suspended, until the individual cooperates with the Saviour and thus merits to have it given to him. This cooperation means a life lived according to that of his divine Model, a life of union with Christ and renunciation to self, which will win for him an abundance of grace here upon earth. This grace is the foundation of the glory that is to be his in heaven. This is merit in its concrete form. But to understand it thoroughly, we must consider the various aspects that it reveals, therefore we must treat it from an abstract point of view.

This chapter is divided into three articles. In the first of these, we shall consider *the nature of merit*; in the second, *the existence of supernatural merit*; and in the third, *the object of merit*.

ARTICLE I

The Nature of Merit.

Object. — We shall first consider *natural merit* and then by analogy, we shall more easily define *supernatural merit*.

§ I.

NATURAL MERIT.

Notion. — When a man gains an advantage for another, he is said to have merited a recompense. Hence natural merit is the right to a reward because of an advantage gained for another.

Conditions. — Three conditions are necessary : 1° a human act, 2° procuring a real advantage, 3° for another. Its essential feature is the right to a recompense or reward, *Jus ad præmium*.

Basis of Merit. — It is based on simple justice or equity. A man is made the recipient of something that his reason tells him is an advantage for him, and this same reason tells him that in simple justice he ought to reward the one who bestows it. Equity, then, is the foundation of merit of the individual in regard to his neighbor.

Equity is further the basis of merit of the individual in regard to society and to God.

When an individual works for the benefit of another, he is at the same time furthering the good of society at large, and if his efforts procure notable and important advantages, he merits a recompense from society, in equity.

Moreover, in working for the betterment of society, the individual is contributing to the establishment of order and to the glory of God. Hence, in the name of equity, God will reward his acts.

Different Species. — Merit, as we have said, is the right to a reward, and this right is a strict right, for it is founded on natural equity or justice. Scholastic theology calls this *meritum de condigno*, because it is based on the value, the excellence or the *dignity* of the work performed.

Opposed to this there is another kind of merit, which is not a strict right to a reward. This is because that right is not founded on natural equity, but is nevertheless granted for motives of fitness, charity or liberality. This is called *meritum de congruo*.

Let us consider the first of these two a little further. A man has gained a distinct benefit from another; now if he works for the benefit of his benefactor, he deserves a reward only when the person for whom he is toiling, has made promise to this effect. In this case, the worker is, after all, fulfilling a duty of gratitude. The merit here is called *meritum de condigno, ex condignitate*, by a *relatively strict right*.

But suppose one has not been awarded anything, the merit of his work is by an *absolutely strict right, meritum de condigno ex rigore justitiæ*.

No man can ever merit by an absolutely strict right, from God, either in the supernatural or in the natural order. All that he possesses, he has received from God, and his duty is to refer all back to God. All he has a right to, is a reward founded on the promise of God.

But in regard to other men or society at large, man can merit in any of these various manners.

§ II

SUPERNATURAL MERIT.

Notion. — Just as in the natural order, so also in the supernatural, whoever performs a supernatural action wins a supernatural reward from God. The difference between the two is at once apparent. Natural merit is based on an act of the natural order, and its object is a reward within the same order; supernatural merit is a right founded on a work performed with the assistance of grace, and it gives the right to a recompense within the supernatural order.

Hence it can be defined, *Jus ad præmium supernaturale*.

Conditions. — Just because supernatural merit is a right founded on a supernatural work and gives the right to a supernatural recompense, it demands certain conditions which must be examined with care. Some are demanded *on the part of the one to whom the reward is due*, others are demanded *in the action which is performed*, and others still, *on the part of God who gives the recompense*.

1. *The Conditions demanded on the part of the one who merits the reward.* — They are two, namely that he should be *in statu viæ* and *in statu gratiæ sanctificantis*.

a) He must be *in statu viæ*.

The very idea of merit demands a time of probation, that is to say, a period when the alternative of doing good or committing evil is given to men. This period ends with the closing of our earthly lives. The time of merit, then, extends from the first dawn of reason until death. After we have passed the portals of this life, we can no longer merit, but we are in a position to receive a reward in proportion to our works. As the time of our earthly existence is merely a journey towards a better life, theologians have called it *status viæ*¹.

1. This is the doctrine of the Church. Although it has not been defined, it must be regarded as *certain*, for it can be proved from Scripture and tradition.

The teaching of the O. T. on this point is explicit. There it is said in so many words that the time of trial, that is of meriting and demeriting, ends with death.

It is likewise the doctrine of the N. T. After death, man is definitely settled in his fate. The wicked rich man, spoken of in Lk. XXI, is forever deprived of that living water which would put him in possession of eternal life. Jn. IX. 4, makes for the same conclusion. There we are told that the time that shall follow death is a dark night in which no man can work. St. Paul agrees with both also. In 2 Cor. V. 1-10, he tells us that we are in a period of probation. After death, we shall all be hailed before the tribunal of God, and there we shall receive reward or punishment for our deeds. Heb. IX. 27 asserts that judgment comes immediately after death.

In the third and fourth centuries, there was an opinion widely spread in the East which asserted the pre-existence of souls, claiming that they would all regain

b) He must be *in the state of sanctifying grace*.

This is so obvious that it needs little comment. There must be some proportion between the work accomplished and the reward granted. Therefore, to merit a supernatural reward which consists in the increase of grace or in the possession of glory, the work winning the reward must be performed by a soul in the state of grace¹.

2. *Conditions required in the act itself*. — First of all, it must be *a human act*, that is it must be an act performed with the advertence of the intellect and the consent of the will. Further, it must be an act *morally good* in its *object*, its *circumstances* and its *end*. Supernatural merit is gauged by the amount of natural energy expended in the act. And this is why the life of the Christian must rest on natural probity. It develops in proportion as the natural virtues progress. Integrity in natural life is the soil in which the supernatural life is planted. If it thrives, the plant will also thrive. If it no longer contains nourishment for the higher life, the latter will not bring forth fruit and will soon wither and die.

This human act, morally good, must also be *supernatural in its motive and in its principle*, that is, it must be performed under the inspiration of a motive supplied by faith, and with the help of divine grace.

their former existence in happiness and peace. After adopting it for a time, St. Jerome vehemently attacked it and helped much to bring it into discredit. St. Augustine gave it the final blow. And from his time, it has always been admitted in the Church that the time of merit ends with death.

See further our remarks on the eschatological idea in tradition.

1. This doctrine is *certain*, both from Scripture and tradition. In Jn. XV, it is said that to gain the fruits of salvation, one must have the life of Christ within himself. This life is none other than the state of grace. St. Paul brings this out clearly in I Cor. XIII, where he claims that all works done without charity are vain and useless.

The Fathers never denied it. It was only when men began to teach that man was essentially corrupt and had to depend entirely upon the will of God for good actions, that it was denied that man could merit even in the state of grace. Both Calvin and Jansenius were forced to this position by their systems.

But does this suffice? Should not charity enter into it? It is commonly accepted in theology that the faith required here, must be so strong as to carry with it, at least, the beginning of charity.

Nevertheless, nearly all theologians admit that a human act contains *virtually at least* all the required supernatural conditions, when it is morally good and is performed by one who is in the state of grace. As a matter of fact, it is impossible that one should possess the supernatural life, without feeling the influence of that life on all the good actions that he performs. Ascetic theology advises the just man to renew from time to time his sentiments of faith and charity by making acts of both virtues, so that the supernatural life which animates him, may the more influence all his actions, even those of a most profane nature.

The more perfect our supernatural acts are, the greater the merit we gain. But the renewal of intention insisted upon by ascetic theology, is implicitly contained in the fulfilment of ordinary duties and the daily practice of the usual religious exercises.

3. *Conditions required on the part of God the Rewarder.* — God will reward no action that is not performed in accordance with His divine will and does not contribute to His glory. Both these conditions are realized by the Christian performing a human action morally good, in the state of grace.

Another condition is required on the part of God, and this is His promise of a reward. Man owes everything to God, and hence in performing a good act, God is not bound to reward man *by an absolutely strict right*, but *by a relatively strict right*.

This promise is made to those who receive the sacraments. Viewing the teaching of the N. T. where our Saviour promises the kingdom of God to those who live by His example, and the doctrine of the Fathers who reproduce the teaching of

our Lord, it appears that this promise is also made for every good work performed in the state of grace.

Because of this promise, the sacraments and good works. (the sacraments *ex opere operato*, the good works *ex opere operantis*), merit grace *de condigno* by strict right. These are the only means of meriting *de condigno*.

The Basis of Supernatural Merit. — If we can merit grace by strict right, it is then because we are in the state of grace, and because God has promised to reward those who would live in such disposition. But if we are in the state of grace, it is because Christ has made us like unto Himself by the communication of the Holy Spirit. United to Him, we will as He willed, we think as He thought, we feel as He felt, we adore the Father with Him, we return thanks to the Father with Him, and ask with Him, for all things that we stand in need of. In other words, we live a life such as He lived, always seeking the glory of the Father and the establishment of the kingdom of God within ourselves and throughout the world.

God owes to Himself to recompense the works of His Son, and of those who cooperate with Him. He accepted the two great mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption for mankind's salvation. And hence if He did not reward the works of one who is united to Christ, He would be at variance with Himself, for both His absolute truth and justice would be at fault.

Finally, if the work of the Christian in the state of grace is meritorious by a strict right, if his prayer is infallibly heard, if his penitential works gain for him the remission of venial sin, and if his perfect contrition wins for him pardon for mortal sin, it is because he forms a moral whole with Christ, to whom God can refuse nothing. Christ is truly He by whom we go to the Father (*Via*); He is the Light which enlightens us (*Veritas*); He is the Life which animates us (*Vita*); He is He without whom salvation is impossible (*sine*

quo non est salus); in one word, He is our Saviour. He is the foundation of merit.

Different Species. — Supernatural merit, as we have described it thus far, is called merit *de condigno*.

There is another kind which is called *de congruo*, because it proceeds not from justice, but rather from fitness. This is the merit of him who cooperates with the first actual grace given to him, and thus wins another grace to help him on his way. It is also the merit of the just man who by his good life gains the grace of final perseverance.

ARTICLE II

The Existence of Merit.

The Question Stated. — The Protestants were the first to deny the existence of merit, being forced thereto by the view they took of the condition of human nature. Being the slave of concupiscence, it could do nothing but sin. Hence merit is impossible. God does not justify man because of his merit, but because such is His will. Luther claimed that man conditioned the divine will by faith. This disposition is not a work meritorious for justification, but *a conditio sine qua non* for the imputation of Christ's justice to the soul. For Calvin, faith did not condition the divine will, but on the contrary, it is the decree of justification that conditions faith. But despite their differences, the two great reformers were agreed on the impossibility of merit.

This doctrine opened the way to grave difficulty and serious consequences which made themselves felt even in the early days of Protestantism. By its denial of merit, Protestantism destroyed all initiative in man and killed all development of Christian life.

Present day Protestants no longer cling to the ideas of

their forefathers. They have recognized the consequences of their doctrine and they have striven to get around them. The old idea of justification still prevails, but a new idea, that of sanctification, has been launched. For this, man must follow after Christ, living a life of charity and renunciation. This is equivalent to an admission of the existence of merit. But they avoid any detailed exposition of the subject and strive with might and main to escape the direct consequences of such a teaching. Hence, we are forced, despite their late concessions to our doctrine, to substantiate the two principal theses of Catholic doctrine, namely, *the existence of merit*, and *the manner in which the just can merit for others, and in particular for the souls in purgatory*.

§ I.

GOOD WORKS ARE TRULY MERITORIOUS

The Teaching of the Church. — As we said in the previous article, a good work is an act morally good performed by a Christian in the state of grace. The Church claims that such an act is truly meritorious.

This is *de fide* from a definition of the Council of Trent. « If any one shall say that good works performed by the just do not *truly* merit an increase in grace as also eternal life, let him be anathema¹. »

This doctrine is found in Scripture and tradition.

1. DENZ., 842 : *Si quis dixerit, hominis justificati opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam bona ipsius justificati merita; aut ipsum justificatum bonis operibus, quæ ab eo per Dei gratiam et Jesu Christi meritum, cujus rivum membrum est, fiant non vere mereri augmentum gratiæ, vitam æternam, et ipsius vitæ æternæ, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem, atque etiam gloriæ augmentum* : A. S.

Note the expression, *non vere mereri*, i. e. *de condigno*. The Fathers of the Council did not care to embody this latter formula, in their definition.

Scripture. — The Synoptics tell us that God will reward those who are persecuted for His sake¹, and also those who have assisted their neighbour for His sake². This recompense is the kingdom of God. Therefore, our Lord declares that those who live in union with Him and perform good works, will be rewarded with the kingdom of God, that is, will merit to enter it.

The same teaching is found in the writings of St. Paul, but with more details. Gazing upon the near approach of death, he is filled with a feeling of joy at the thought of his good works which he knows will win for him a crown of justice from a just Judge. The same crown can be gained by all who have lived in the hope of the return of the Lord³.

The Epistle of St. James, which insists on the necessity of good works, naturally presents merit and reward as motives for these deeds. « My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations; knowing that the trying of your faith worketh patience. And patience hath a perfect work, that you may be perfect and entire, failing in nothing. But if any of you want wisdom, let him ask it of God, who giveth to all men abundantly, and upraideth not, and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering. For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, which is moved and carried about by the wind. Therefore, let not that man think that he shall receive any thing of the Lord. A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways. But let the brother of low condition glory in exaltation. And the rich in being low, because, as the flower of the grass, shall he pass away. For the sun rose with a burning heat, and parched the grass, and the flower thereof fell off, and the beauty of the shape thereof perished; so also shall the rich man fade away in

1. MATT., V. 11, 12.

2. MATT. XXV, 31-46.

3. II *Tim.*, IV, 7-8.

his ways. Blessed is the man that endureth temptation, for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him »¹.

The doctrine of merit for good works is therefore taught in clear terms in the various writings of the N. T. Even the actual tendency is to claim that the teaching of Christ consisted only in inviting men to love the Father and remain united with Him, in order to gain the Kingdom open only to those who will have merited it by their good works. Those who sum up in this way the doctrine of Christ have probably never given the N. T. a careful reading, and if they have, their interpretation reflects no credit on their insight. What Jesus proposed to men as the goal of their lives, was not happiness in itself, but rather God reigning in their hearts through truth and love.

Patristic Tradition. — So clearly was this doctrine taught in the Gospels and Epistles, that it was never denied by the Fathers. They were satisfied to develop it.

It will suffice to cite the testimony of St. Augustine who naturally enough would have been led to deny the existence of merit by his doctrine on predestination. In his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, he teaches that our merits are dependent on those of Christ. In rewarding them He crowns His own gifts². But they are none the less true merits, he writes to Sixtus³.

1. I, 2-12.

2. *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 15; P. L., XLIV, 890-891 : *Si enim merita nostra sic intelligerent [pelagiani], ut etiam ipsa dona Dei esse cognoscerent, non esset reprobanda ista sententia. Quoniam vero merita humana sic prædicant, ut ea ex semetipso habere hominem dicant, prorsus, rectissime respondet Apostolus : « ...Quid habes quod non accepisti ? » Prorsus talia cogitanti verissime dicitur : dona sua coronat Deus, non merita tua. Si tibi a te ipso, non ab illo, sunt merita tua... mala sunt, quæ non coronat Deus... Si ergo Dei dona sunt bona merita tua, non Deus coronat merita tua tanquam merita tua, sed tanquam dona sua.*

3. Epist. CXCIV; P. L., XXXIII, 876 : *Quæ igitur sua merita jactaturus*

On the whole, the doctrine of St. Augustine is exactly that which the Church has always taught. If we make merit mean something that possesses a value independent of the merits of Christ, then the works of man have no merit as far as heaven is concerned. But if we make it mean the right to a reward, founded on a life lived in union with God, then man can merit heaven. His merit is only a relatively strict right, because it rests on a divine promise¹.

The Council of Orange understands merit in this sense, and cites the authority of St. Augustine for its definition. A recompense is due to all good works which, however, can be performed only by the assistance of an entirely gratuitous grace².

§ II

THE JUST MAN CAN MERIT FOR ANOTHER, AND IN PARTICULAR FOR THE SOULS IN PURGATORY

The Analysis of Merit. — All good works contain a multiple value which needs to be examined with the greatest

est liberatus, cum si digna suis meritis redderentur, non esset nisi damnatus? Nullane igitur sunt merita justorum? Sunt plane, quia justi sunt. Sed ut justi fierent, merita non fuerunt: justi enim facti sunt, cum justificati sunt; sed sicut dicit Apostolus: Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius (Rom., III, 24).

1. Protestants and Jansenists have wrongly attributed to S. Augustine the teaching that merit is impossible. As we are concluding our *Studies* on a subject where St. Augustine's teaching has been twisted and turned by heretic after heretic, let us make a general observation which shows how truthfully this great Doctor held to the doctrines of the Church. If we take up his works, we shall find that in his doctrinal teaching there are two features more or less apparent, the one more important than the other. First of all, he insists on the necessity of grace for the performance of good actions. Then he seeks to justify his position, or rather the doctrine of the Church, and for this he is drawn into assertions which are more or less exact. But this is secondary in his teaching. Yet the Protestants and Jansenists make it primary.

2. DENZ., 191: *Debetur merces bonis operibus, si fiant: sed gratia, quæ non debetur, præcedit, ut fiant.*

care. Above all it gives an increase of sanctifying grace. This is what is called *meritorious value*.

But as the increase of sanctifying grace entails the lessening of the life of sin, the good work also possesses a *propitiatory value*, for it makes us pleasing to God, *Deum facit propitium*.

Now, sanctifying grace is a principle of life, which cannot be exercised without the help of actual grace. Hence it possesses an *impetratory value*, for it gives us the right to actual graces.

Finally, good works which lead to the remission of sin, also lessen the temporal punishment due to them, and hence it has a *satisfactory value*.

Every good work then has four distinct values, a *meritorious*, a *propitiatory*, an *impetratory* and a *satisfactory value*.

The transferring of Merit. — It is universally admitted among theologians that the meritorious value of good works cannot be transferred to another. Understood in the strict sense, merit is said to be inalienable, for it rests on a personal right. Christ alone, as Head of the human race, could by a mysterious dispensation of God, merit for all men, even as Adam had plunged all his descendants into misery and sin.

As the propitiatory value is correlated to the meritorious, it is likewise inalienable.

Both the impetratory and satisfactory value of merit, however, can be transferred.

We can offer the impetratory value of our good works for others, which means that we can merit actual graces for others. This is what we mean when we ask another *to pray for us*¹.

1. We find this doctrine in the N. T. Christ commands His disciples to pray for those who persecute them. St. Paul prays unceasingly for those who have been confided to him, and he asks their prayers in return.

This teaching of the Master was always recognized in the Church. « We

Moreover, every just Christian can apply his merits to others, and especially to the souls in purgatory, as far as their satisfactory value is concerned. One may even take a vow to apply all the satisfactory value of his merits to the souls in purgatory¹.

pray that with your kingly power you be found to possess also judgment » writes St. Justin in I Apol. XVII. Tertullian, in his attempt to avert a persecution of the Christians, writes to Scapula to tell him that they whom he desires to strike, are not the enemies of the Empire, for they pray to God for the welfare of the emperor, *sacrificamus pro salute Imperatoris, sed Deo nostro et ipsius. Ad Scap. II, P. L. I, 700.*

1. Continuing the religious practice which has been in vogue since the time of the Machabees (2 Mac. XII, 43-46), Christian tradition has always maintained that the works of the just can assuage the pains of the souls in purgatory. Tertullian frowns on the second marriage of a widow, because she should pray for the soul of her departed husband to be freed from pain and also for a reunion on the day of resurrection. *Pro anima ejus orat, et refrigerium interim adpostulat ei et in prima resurrectione consortium, et offert annuis diebus dormitionis ejus (De Monog., X, P. L. II. 492).* St. Perpetua obtained the grace for her husband to pass from a state of misery to a state of bliss (*Passio S. Perpetuæ*, 7-8). Passing from Africa to Italy, we find some very significant inscriptions in the Roman catacombs. One, found in the cemetery of Callixtus, dating from the year 268 or 269, bears these words : *Marciane vias inter sanctis*. The cemetery of Domitilla contains these inscriptions, the oldest known, « Live in God », « Live in peace ». Again such epitaphs as *vivas in spiritu sancto; Spiritus in refrigerio; Spiritum tuum deus refrigeret*. Cf. MARUCCI, *Éléments d'Archéologie chrétienne*, I, 181-197. In the fourth century, St. Cyril testifies that the commemoration of the dead was in usage in the liturgy of Jerusalem. « We then pray for the holy Fathers and for the bishops who are dead; finally for those who were among us and members of our communion, when they departed this world, believing that their souls receive great solace from the prayers which are offered for them in the sacrifice offered on the altar » (*Catech. XXIII, v.*). St. Augustine, who recommended his mother to the prayers of the faithful, desired that we offered the divine sacrifice for the dead. *Ego itaque, laus mea et vita mea, Deus cordis mei, sepositis paulisper bonis ejus actibus, pro quibus tibi gaudens gratias ago, nunc pro peccatis matris meæ deprecor te; exaudi me per Medicinam vulnerum nostrorum quæ pendit in ligno, et sedens ad dexteram tuam, te interpellat pro nobis. Scio misericorditer operatam, et ex corde dimisisse debita debitoribus suis; dimitte illi et tu debita sua, si qua etiam contraxit per tot annos post aquam salutis. Dimitte, Domine, dimitte, obsecro, ne intres cum ea in judicium. Confess., I. IX, c. xiii; P. L., XXXII, 778. In the *De cura pro mort.*, c. iii; P. L., XL, 596 : ... non sunt prætermittendæ supplicationes, he writes, pro spiritibus*

The Dogma of Indulgences. — On the doctrine of satisfaction rests the dogma of indulgences. Indulgences are the superabundant satisfactions wrought by Christ and the saints, which the Church applies to those who ask for them and perform the works prescribed by her¹.

In her application of indulgences the Church followed at first the old penitential discipline. Then, instead of the public penances of former times, the Church substituted a penance relatively light and to it she attached the superabundant satisfactions of which she is the custodian. Hence, penance of to-day, be it ever so light, can produce the same satisfaction as the onerous penances of long ago².

Indulgences are of two kinds, plenary and partial. The former wipes out the full punishment due to sin, whilst the latter satisfies only for a part of it. The former is, as can be seen, of greatly more value. But we all should strive to gain as many as we can, both partial and plenary, so as to have the assurance that God will not hold us in account for anything.

mortuorum : quas faciendas pro omnibus in christiana et catholica societate defunctis etiam tacitis nominibus eorum sub generali commemoratione suscepit Ecclesia, ut quibus ad ista desunt parentes, aut filii aut quicumque cognati, vel amici, ab una eis exhibeantur pia matre communi.

The Council of Trent was merely repeating tradition, when it defined : *Si quis dixerit Missæ sacrificium... [non esse] propitiatorium... neque pro vivis et defunctis, pro peccatis, pœnis, satisfactionibus et aliis necessitatibus offerri debere* : A. S. DENZ., 950.

Before its definition this doctrine had been admitted in the liturgy of the Church, and this has been the case with several other dogmas. *Lex orandi, writes Pope Celestine I., statuit legem credendi.* DENZ., 139.

1. DENZ., 989 : *Cum potestas conferendi indulgentias a Christo Ecclesiæ concessa sit, atque hujusmodi potestate divinitus sibi tradita, antiquissimis etiam temporibus illa usa fuerit : sacrosancta Synodus indulgentiarum usum, christiano populo maxime salutare et sacrorum conciliorum auctoritate probatum, in Ecclesia retinendum esse docet et præcipit, eosque anathemate damnat qui aut inutiles esse asserunt, vel eas concedendi in Ecclesia potestatem esse negant.*

2. Like the old canonical penance, indulgence obtains the remission of the temporal punishment due to forgiven sin.

The Dogma of the Communion of Saints. — Our doctrine of the transferring of merit is likewise the basis of the dogma of the communion of saints.

By His ignominious death on the cross, Christ has merited grace for all men. Whoever desires to appropriate the merits of the Saviour must suffer with Him. He thus enters into a participation of the life of Christ, and he merits to increase more and more in this life. An assembly of the disciples of Christ, living the same life as their Master, such is that grand society called the Church, triumphant, suffering and militant.

The vivifying principle of this great social body, is Christ. The faithful soul must achieve the Redemption of Christ in his own life, by appropriating the merits of his Saviour by good works.

Moreover, the members of this body, must all contribute to the salvation of the other members. The blessed in heaven intercede for their brethren upon earth and obtain for them many actual graces¹. In return, they receive mankind's veneration².

The just on earth offer their satisfactory works for the souls in purgatory³. These in return intercede for their benefactors, and they obtain actual graces for them.

But, if all these prayers are infallibly heard, it is because they proceed from just souls, that is, from those who are united to Christ, to whom God can refuse nothing. Jesus Christ, then, is the grand link uniting all the members of the Church, a link binding them to God, as well as to one another.

1. DENZ., 984, 998, 1060.

2. *Ibid.*, 998.

3. *Ibid.*, 535, 693, 780, 983.

ARTICLE III

The Object of Merit.

Division of this Article. — Here we intend merely to give a sort of summary of the various points we have brought out in the preceding pages. We shall briefly state what man can merit *before*, and what he can merit *after* justification.

Before Justification.

1. Left to himself, man cannot merit the first actual grace *de condigno*. But God, in His mercy, does not refuse to give this to all who try to lead a good moral life.

2. He who corresponds to the first actual grace, merits *de congruo* a new actual grace by which he can arrive at justification.

After Justification.

1. The just man who performs a good action merits *de condigno* an increase in sanctifying grace and actual graces necessary and sufficient for the performance of other good works:

2. The Molinists claim that sufficient grace is made efficacious by man's good will. The Thomists assert that the correspondence with sufficient grace merits *de congruo* efficacious grace.

3. The grace of final perseverance cannot be merited *de condigno*, but only *de congruo*.

4. The just man who dies in the state of grace merits heaven *de condigno*.

5. The just man can merit for others, as far as the impetratory and satisfactory value of his acts is concerned.

These various conclusions are a sufficient indication of the object of merit.

FOURTH DIVISION

MAN IN HIS FUTURE STATE : IN HEAVEN IN GLORY,
OR IN HELL IN MISERY.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

Man enters but gradually into the possession of grace, and then according to the measure of his cooperation with the sufferings of our Lord. Only in heaven does this grace attain its full development, at which stage it is called the *state of glory*.

Whosoever contumaciously refuses to correspond with grace during this life, renders himself forever incapable of sharing in glory, and consequently is *dammèd*.

Two ways stretch out before man in the supernatural life, the one leading to heaven and the other to hell. To one place he must go, and he can go to either if he will.

This is the doctrine of the Church and the answer she gives in regard to the future destiny of man, — the eschatological question as it is called¹. Our object here is to show how the Church arrived at this doctrinal precision.

Does death end all for man, and if there is a part of his being that remains after he has passed from this life, in what condition is he? This in short is the bare statement

1. It is thus called from the greek περί των εσχάτων which mean a treatise of last things.

of the eschatological problem. Two elements are implied here, namely, the fact that something does survive death, and the nature of this survivance. This must be kept in mind, for often these two questions have been confounded.

No one will dare deny that the problem of man's last end, with that of the existence of a personal God from which it is inseparable, is the religious problem *par excellence*, and one that is calculated to make every man pause and think ¹.

What is the reason for all this?

On the one hand, there is in the very depth of the human soul *an immense craving for the infinite, for pardon, for peace and joy*. Always the same longing is there, although it may at different times appear under different aspects, and hence it is often expressed in different language. Some have called it religion, others have given it the name of action. We claim that it is our soul bared in its true light ².

On the other hand, and this is a fact known to all, the world has never given the satisfaction that the soul craves ³.

Irresistibly the soul reaches out to another world for

1. Many men scarcely give much thought to this, because they are too much concerned with the things of the world. But these are not the ones who should be appealed to, for they are ignorant men.

2. At times we are weary with the things of the world. Nothing satisfies us and we are caught up by a sadness that we can scarcely explain and that makes life almost unbearable.

Now, if we determine to analyze this inquietude we shall soon find that there is within us *an immense craving for pardon, for the infinite, for peace and for joy*.

3. Perhaps our own conscience might give us a decisive answer here. But let us rather consider the case of others. How many there are who, when passing through a moral crisis (as every one does when coming to full consciousness of himself), unable to understand Christ who never fails in such hours to visit such souls and offer them the gifts of salvation, have resolutely decided to seek after such and such worldly pleasure, in order to obtain the happiness which their souls were craving for. One man pursues pleasure, another riches, another honors, and others still, work, either manual or mental. They have subjected to the one aim in view, all their aspirations, feelings and activity.

But how many have succeeded in obtaining that happiness so eagerly sought?

Almost all have confessed towards the end of their lives that their pursuits

the attainment of the infinitely true, the infinitely good and the infinitely beautiful, in forgiveness, peace and joy. Thus the eschatological problem springs from a double source, man's inner consciousness of his own longings and the disproportion that exists between his aspirations and the world in which he lives.

This is so true that there is not a nation nor a people that has not some eschatological ideas.

Catholic dogma only treats of the Christian eschatology, and if it does examine that of other religious systems, it is only with the view to bring out more clearly its own doctrine.

The problem is a vast one. Both in the Old and New Testaments, it underwent a gradual development. Greek philosophy made use of the old Jewish ideas on this point. These in turn were modified by Origen who built his system on the philosophy of Plato. He in turn was lost sight of in the scholastic explanation based on the Aristotelian philosophy, a form in which we have it to-day.

Our *Studies* here shall be divided into three chapters.

Chapter I. — *The Eschatology of Holy Scripture.*

Chapter II. — *The Eschatology of Tradition.*

Chapter III. — *The Eschatology in Scholastic Theology and the Positive Theology of the XVIIth and XVIIIth Centuries.*

have been failures. They may have honors, wealth and pleasure, but their soul is not satisfied. The craving for the infinite, for pardon, for peace and joy is as irresistible as it ever was. But now it has become a pain and anguish, since it is now accompanied by an awful remorse for having failed to attain the true aim of life.

CHAPTER I

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

To present the matter in a better light, we shall study the eschatological idea as contained in both the Old and the New Testaments, in successive articles.

ARTICLE I

The Eschatology of the Old Testament.

To get a correct idea of the eschatological teaching of the Old Dispensation, we must study its development in two distinct periods of Jewish history. The first of these periods dates back *to the beginnings of Israel as a nation* and extends *to the last years of the captivity*. The second begins with *the closing years of the exile*, and ends *with the coming of the Messias*.

§ I.

THE PERIOD FROM THE DAWN OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL LIFE TO THE LAST YEARS OF THE EXILE.

The Belief of the Hebrews in a Future Life. — It is indisputable that Jewish belief in a future life dates back to a high antiquity.

This becomes immediately clear from the prevalent practice of invoking the dead¹. This custom was so deeply rooted in the religious practices that, despite the many protests against it from priest and prophet, it flourished for centuries. These prophetic protests were engendered by no hesitancy or doubts as to the survival after death, but because the religious leaders of Israel looked upon this custom as derogating from a prerogative due to God alone.

The Israelites found no difficulty in subscribing to the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, because they were firmly convinced that death was not a complete annihilation of human nature. The history of their prophets Elias and Eliseus afforded them with examples which they could not doubt. Thus Elias raised the son of the widow of Sarepta to life². Eliseus gave life to the dead child of the Sunamite³, and after his death a dead man was brought to life by mere contact with his bones⁴.

They believed that some part of man's being did remain after death. The question then naturally arises, What element did remain? In Genesis, we find the statement that the dead are united to their ancestors⁵, even when they have not been buried in the same tomb with them⁶. It was this belief in the future life which prompted the cry of David at the death of his son, « I shall go to him rather, but he shall not return to me »⁷.

Still the element that survives after death shows little signs of activity. Man after breathing his last, becomes a weak and insignificant shadow⁸ lacking memory and will⁹,

1. I *Kings* XXVIII. 3-20. IV *Kings* XXI. 6. Is. VIII. 19; XIX. 3; XXIX. 4.

2. III *Kings* XVII. 17-24.

3. IV *Kings* IV. 17-37.

4. *Ib.* XIII. 21.

5. *Gen.* XV. 15.

6. *Ib.* XXXVII. 35.

7. II *Kings* XII. 23.

8. *Ps.* LXXXVII. 11-13; Is. XVI. 9-10; XXVI. 14, 19.

9. *Ps.* VI. 6; Is. XXXVIII. 9-19.

and reduced to live in a state of semi-wakefulness, wherein consciousness was deadened.

Their place of abode was called *Sheol*, which like the Hades of the Greeks, was a subterranean region, dark as night¹, secured by gates² which could be opened only by the most powerful incantations, and from which as a rule, no one ever returned³.

As a final remark, it must be added that all men have to pass into this shadowy state⁴.

What must we think of the Hebrew belief in a future life? — From the brief summary of their view of the future life, we see that the Hebrews firmly believed in a life after death, although all their theology throws little light on the condition of man in the state to which death has consigned him. They had an answer to the first part of the eschatological problem, namely they held that something did survive after death, but they had a very hazy notion regarding the second part, namely, how men fared in the other world. Hence it can be easily conceived how the belief in the future life, although real, exercised so little influence on the religious and moral life of the Jewish people.

It further follows that, if it is wrong to deny that any such belief existed among the Jews, it is likewise far from scholarly to attribute to them and their times, all the eschatological data of the New Testament.

For a long time, these beliefs in another existence remained as it were undeveloped and stationary. It seems that the prophets added little to the doctrine, and their ideas of the state of the element that survived in man, were far from being clear and precise⁵. Taken in its Vulgate reading, the

1. JOB X. 21-22.

2. IS. XXXVIII. 10.

3. JOB VII. 9; XVI. 22; XVII. 13-16.

4. I *Kings* XXVIII. 19; JOB. XXX. 23.

5. Those who maintain the contrary view, usually cite Is. XXVI. 18-19 and

Book of Job¹ embodies a doctrine which is quite explicit. But in the Hebrew text, it is hard to find any concept of the resurrection of the flesh, at least a clear and practical concept².

§ II.

THE PERIOD FROM THE CLOSING YEARS OF THE CAPTIVITY TO THE ADVENT OF THE MESSIAS.

From the last years of the captivity, that is to say, from the second half of the sixth century B. C., the eschatological ideas of the Jews underwent a considerable development.

Ezech. XXXVII. 1-14, in their defense. But the passage of Ezechiel has not the force that is sometimes attributed to it. The dry bones, which under the action of the spirit of the Lord, were reunited so that « they stood up an exceeding great army », is a symbol which the prophet employs to picture the future resurrection of the people of Israel. Again and again the prophets had foretold the destruction of Israel because of the nation's sins, but they never for a moment believed nor intended to convey the belief in a complete annihilation of the race. A part of the Jewish nation would survive the judgments and the chastisements of God, and they would form a new people of the Lord. This is the restoration that the prophet has in mind. Still, if the vision of Ezechiel had no direct bearing on the resurrection of the flesh, it was not without influence on the later development of the eschatological doctrine, especially in bringing out the distinction between the elements that went to make up man. Moreover, the comparison employed by Ezechiel to depict the new birth of the ancient race, conveys this much, that although he had no intention of dealing directly with the reviving of the human organism, it was not an idea foreign to the times.

As to the passage of Isaias, we shall find, if we carefully read the whole of the twenty-sixth chapter, that it too, contains a prediction of the restoration of the people of God. The wicked have been exterminated, they are dead, and shall not rise again, 14. Then, by the power of the spirit of God, the nation shall be reconstructed, more extended and shall become more prosperous, 15-19.

1. Job XIX. 25-27.

2. In the Hebrew text we only find the germ of the resurrection of the flesh. Its whole tenor denotes that the doctrine was at best but imperfectly understood.

A place where the Jews achieved some renown and occupied posts of importance, was the city of Alexandria. Its school was famous throughout antiquity. For the sake of clearness, we shall first study the teaching of the Jewish school of Alexandria, in the period which extends from the last years of the third century B. C. to the end of the second century. After this, we shall consider the belief of the Palestinian Jews. We know that in this arrangement we are not chronological, but we prefer to sacrifice chronology for the sake of logic.

The Immortality of the Soul and the Alexandrian Jews. — In the scholastic discussions of the Jews of Alexandria¹, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul was separated from the idea of the resurrection of the flesh. According to the Book of Wisdom, which embodies a résumé of the doctrines of the Alexandrian school, the soul of man is spiritual². It is encased in a corruptible body as in an earthly habitation which « presseth down the mind that museth upon many things »³. If its conduct is good during its earthly pilgrimage, it will enjoy eternal happiness with God⁴.

1. Alexandria was founded in 332 B. C., by Alexander the Great. Because of the commercial advantages which it afforded, the Jews settled there in large numbers, so much so that they formed a considerable part of the city's population. The death of Alexander made the Ptolemies masters of Egypt, and they hastened to bring scholars, philosophers and artists from Greece to the city of Alexandria. The Jews entered heart and soul into this literary and philosophical movement. In a few years they had assumed an important position in making their city one of intellectual renown. The great preoccupation of their leaders was to show that the best wisdom of the Platonic system had been borrowed from the Pentateuch. The most celebrated Jewish scholars were Philo (20 B. C. ? — 50 A. D. ?) and Aristobulus, the teacher of Ptolemy Evergetes ; the latter's great work was a commentary on the Pentateuch interpreted in the light of Grecian philosophy. From Aristobulus to Philo, there were many other authors who did some similar work, but their books are unfortunately lost.

2. *Wisd.* VII. 2, 6; VIII. 19-20.

3. *Ib.* IX. 15.

4. *Ib.*, IV, V, VI. 19-20; VIII. 17; XV. 3.

The souls of the wicked, on the contrary, will be made to suffer for their crimes¹.

One of the predominant features of the Alexandrian eschatology, is the clear distinction that it draws between the soul and the body. This led to the further conclusion that once the soul is liberated from its prison, the body, it is in a better position to fulfil its own proper operations. Finally, we find taught here, in the clearest terms, the doctrine of a final reward for the just and the punishment of the wicked.

The Eschatology of the Palestinian Jews. — Under the various influences that came to bear upon it after the return from captivity, the eschatology of the Jews of Palestine was subjected to a remarkable modification.

The prophets were unwearied in pointing out the infidelities of the people of Israel, and also in announcing the near approach of a day, wherein the punishments of God would fall upon the guilty. This day they referred to as the day of *Yahweh*, the day of the judgment of *Yahweh*, the day which would mark the manifestation of the divine justice in meting out punishment for the iniquities of the people. Usually, they pictured this judgment as a complete destruction of the guilty nation. But there was always an under-current to their utterances which supposed that a portion of the people would eventually be saved. The judgment itself is to consist in a process of selection, the good are to be separated from the wicked; the latter are to be utterly blotted out, and the former, a small number — the tenth part of the whole nation — shall return to their native land after their exile².

God would form a new alliance with the remainder of His nation, thus giving birth to a new Israel, a new people

1. *Ib.* IV, V.

2. AMOS, IX. 9-15; IS. VI. 11-13. XVII. 1-6; JER. IV. 27; EZECH. IX. 4

of God, graced with both material and spiritual blessings, the chief of which was that from it was to spring the Anointed of God, the Christ, the Son of God.

Hence, according to the prophetic teaching, a terrible visitation is to desolate the people of Israel, in which nearly all shall perish. Only those shall escape this universal destruction, who have remained faithful to the Law. These shall be the stones upon which the new theocratic kingdom shall be founded. The eschatology of the Prophets, as can be seen easily, was *primarily national*. In the perspective of their thought, there was only question of the annihilation of the wicked and the salvation of a remnant of the people. Therefore, as a matter of fact, all their fulminations could interest only those who were actually to be the witnesses of the divine judgment. But since it was always represented as imminent, the individuals of each succeeding generation could and did anxiously inquire whether the predicted desolation was to fall upon the nation during their life-time. So by degrees, this national eschatology became a kind of *individual eschatology*.

This eschatology, viewed in either its national or individual aspect, concerned itself only with the living. That it could or did concern the dead, entered not in the least into their philosophy or theology.

After the captivity, the Palestinian eschatology was modified and this modification affected chiefly two points, namely, the condition of the wicked who shall be excluded from the kingdom, and the fate of those who had died before the advent of the kingdom of God.

The prophets had declared that the iniquitous would be annihilated on the day of the judgment of the Lord. They foretold a terrible punishment, but they said nothing of the nature and the manner of this punishment.

Nevertheless, in the sixty-sixth chapter¹ of the prophecy

1. Verses 18-24.

of Isaias, we have a clear description of the condition of the wicked at the end of time. The inspired writer sees the new kingdom of God, as it were, in a remote vista. Not only the just of Israel, but all the just of the whole world are called to be citizens. He sees before him the city of Jerusalem together with the valley of Gehenna, where the waste of the city is burning, and where human carcasses are decomposing and being eaten by worms. The fire is always kept up and worms do not die, because there is always waste in the city and always new carcasses. This is the spectacle before the people's eyes both in entering and leaving the Holy City. These two visions become intimately associated in the soul of the prophet, and hence it seems that the second plays the part of allegory in his delineation of the first. Just as the valley of Gehenna lies outside the real Jerusalem, and is used as a place where the rubbish of the city is burnt and decomposes, so outside the new Jerusalem, the kingdom of God, there shall also be a valley of Gehenna, where those cast from the kingdom shall burn and be decomposed. They shall have, then, to undergo a double chastisement. First, they shall be excluded from the kingdom, and secondly they shall have to undergo a punishment, which in intensity finds but a faint type in the horrors of Gehenna.

While there can be no question that the prophet has in mind the fate of the wicked who shall be alive at the coming of the judgment of God, can we assert that he also had in mind the dead who had led impious lives? We can, but we must confess that this latter point is not brought out with the same clearness that is given the first, and is therefore rather vague.

For a clear expression of this phase of the doctrine we must resort to the Book of Daniel. After having described the fall of the Persian and the Greek empires¹, the inspired

1. XI. 1-20.

writer attempts to rekindle the courage of the Jews, by keeping before their minds that the God who delivered them from the yoke of the Persians and the Greeks will surely deliver them from the tyranny of Antiochus Epiphanes¹. Further on, he announces the near approach of the realization of the Messianic hope, employing for this purpose, a language that is unique in Biblical literature². « At that time shall thy people be saved, every one that shall be found written in the book. And many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake, some unto life everlasting and others unto reproach. »

This doctrine is not an isolated instance in the Palestinian literature of the time. It is also found in II Mach., where the belief in the resurrection of the flesh is connected with the idea of expiation for the dead³.

From this time onward, this doctrine became the accepted belief of Palestine, and became one of the pet teachings of the Pharisees as we are informed by Josephus⁴. The Sadducees, in the time of our Lord rejected it, and it became between the partisans of these two sects, one of the main points of dispute in their many religious debates⁵.

To sum up, the just are destined for eternal life and the kingdom of God, while the wicked are doomed to hatred and damnation. But before either sentence can be realized, both just and wicked must rise again in the flesh⁶.

1. XI. 21-45.

2. XII. 1-3.

3. XII. 39-46. Judas Machabeus took up a collection which he sent to Jerusalem « for sacrifice to be offered » for the sins of those who fell in battle, under whose tunics objects consecrated to idols were found. This was done in order that the slain might be numbered among the elect on the day of judgment.

4. *Antiquities*, XVIII. 2.

5. Cf. LAGRANGE, *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs*, pp. 177-185.

6. We must not lose sight of the principle according to which man neither lives nor acts completely except with body and soul united. This belongs not only to the theology of the Old Testament, but also to the theology of

Was the eschatology of the Palestinian Jews colored by the belief of the Alexandrian Jews? — To explain the manner in which the Jews came to admit the resurrection of the flesh is a problem whose solution is sought in vain by those who deny revelation.

Rationalists explain the matter by asserting that the later Palestinian conception is but the offspring of the old Hebrew idea formed and shaped in line with the Alexandrian teaching.

We are far from denying that the Alexandrian school did influence the Palestinian belief in this as well as in other doctrines. The most cordial relations existed between them. It was only when Philo began to teach his rationalistic theology, that the Palestinian Jews looked upon their Alexandrian brethren as heretics. Furthermore, the Essenes, a sect held in high esteem in Palestine, in the time of our Lord, adhered faithfully to the eschatological doctrine of the Book of Wisdom¹.

Nevertheless it is quite difficult to explain the formation of the Palestinian idea of eschatology solely by the influence

St. Paul. The Thessalonians could not feel that all was well with their dead, without this belief, that before the coming of the Lord, they all would rise in the flesh, Cf. I Thess. IV. 13-18; 2 Thess. II. 1-12. And the Apostle himself claims that a denial of this hope would mean that « they also who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished ». Cf. I Cor. XV. 12-18.

1. Cf. JOSEPHUS, *Wars of the Jews*, II. 18. « Our war with the Romans gave abundant evidence what great souls they (the Essenes) had in their trials, wherein, although they were tortured and distorted, burnt and torn to pieces, and went through all kinds of instruments of torment, that they might be forced either to blaspheme their legislator, or to eat what was forbidden them, yet could they not be made to do either of them, no, nor once to flatter their tormentors, or to shed a tear; but they smiled in their very pains, and laughed those to scorn who inflicted the torments upon them, and resigned up their souls with great alacrity, as expecting to receive them again. For their doctrine is this: That bodies are corruptible, and that the matter they are made of is not permanent; but that the souls are immortal, and continue for ever; and that they come out of the most subtile air, and are united to their bodies as in prisons, into which they are drawn by a certain natural enticement; but when they are set free from the bonds of the flesh, they then, as released from long bondage, rejoice and mount upward. And this is like the opinion of the Greeks... »

of the Alexandrian eschatological teaching. According to the Alexandrian idea, the resurrection of the body was not at all necessary for the manifestation of the new life. In that system the soul and the body were as distinct as they possibly could be. The flesh was a sort of check to the activity of the soul, and hence the soul could not enter into eternal life until it had been wholly freed from the tyranny of the body. There is then an irreducible point of distinction between the eschatology of the Alexandrians and that of the Palestinians. For the former, the liberation of the soul from the body is necessary for the manifestation of the new life; for the latter, the soul cannot take possession of the new life, unless it first be united to the risen body. From this much we can conclude, that if the Alexandrian teaching did influence the Palestinian, this influence does not afford a complete explanation.

Was the Jewish eschatology influenced by the belief of the Persians? — In the time of the Machabees, the Palestinian Jews enjoyed the most friendly relations with the Persians. Did the Persian thought influence theirs? Like the Jews, the Persians too, expected a Messiah, at whose coming the dead were to rise again. Reunited to their bodies, they were to be rewarded or punished for all eternity according to their works¹.

There are quite a few writers who claim that the Jewish eschatology took its origin from the Persian teaching.

But Lagrange has shown that the sacred book of the Persians, the *Avesta*, was composed from various documents dating from different periods, the oldest of which goes back to the ninth century before Christ. Some are of the second century, others of the time of Philo, and others from the era which marked the closing of the old and the beginning of

1. Cf. CHANTEPIE DE LA SAUSSAYE, *Manuel d'histoire des religions*, 475-476.
— V. HENRY, *Le Parsisme*, Paris, 1905.

the Christian era. Lagrange further claims that all the Persian teaching in regard to the Messiah and the eschatology, such as the resurrection of the dead, was certainly borrowed from the Jewish ideas on these points. According to him, there is nothing in the Persian beliefs which affords an explanation of the development of the Jewish eschatology¹.

The True Explanation of the Palestinian Belief. — As neither the Alexandrian nor the Persian religious systems can give an explanation for the existence of the Palestinian belief, may we not conclude that no outside influence had any share in its development? To every Christian, the thought immediately presents itself, that it was all due to *the work of God, who throughout the centuries was making the revelations to His people more and more exact*. This conclusion, the simplest of all, is the one which history substantiates.

Let us now study the development of this belief in Israel.

The great burden of the prophetic utterances was the announcement that Israel would be destroyed because of its sins. But they always let it be understood that this destruction would not carry with it a complete annihilation. A small part of the nation would escape the divine judgment, and they were to be the nucleus around which the new people of God was to be formed. This resurrection was presented by Ezechiel as a resurrection of the people. From this idea, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, it was but a step to the belief in the resurrection of the individual, considered in the totality of all his constituent elements, and even the resurrection of all who had died since the beginnings of Hebrew history. Even another step would be taken, also under the guidance of the Holy Spirit: the souls were to return to this earth and be united once more to their bodies, and the resurrection was to be the

1. *La Religion des Perses*, in *Revue biblique*, April 1904.

condition of the future life. Until then, eternal life could not be enjoyed nor could the torments of Gehenna be suffered¹.

According to this explanation, the development of Jewish eschatology must be considered solely as *the result of the progressive revelations made by God to the Jewish nation*, or better, what amounts to the same thing, as *the result of the growth of the faith, truly supernatural, which God kept alive in the hearts of His people*.

Slowly, step by step, this doctrine was, under the influence of the light of the Holy Spirit, made an exigence of the divine justice, whereby the people of Israel were to be re-formed as a nation in order to acknowledge and glorify the true God. Consequently, the good were rewarded and the wicked punished, not only during their earthly lives, but also after death; and this reward or punishment concerned not only the soul, but the body as well.

Thus developed, it appears that the germs of this doctrine existed in the beginning, even before the Sacred Books were put into writing. The idea of the resurrection of the dead, which meant a reunion of the body and the soul was one of the basic beliefs of the old Semitic people according to Lagrange². The Hebrews kept this belief alive for centuries. So much did they probably exaggerate it, that their prophets were constrained to preach against it because it paved the way to idolatry. These ancient beliefs left their traces in the religious honors with which the Israelites surrounded their dead, in their custom of cal-

1. It may well be remarked that the epoch of the Machabees was peculiarly favorable for the development of the dogma of the resurrection of the flesh and the doctrine of another world. A great number of young men, remarkable for both piety and valor, had been put to death in the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes. Since they were not rewarded in life for their deeds, they must have received some recompense in another world. Hence they were to rise again to get their reward.

2. *Études sur les Religions sémitiques*, c. VIII, *Les Morts*, 5.

ling upon them, despite the protests of the prophets, and in the ease with which they accepted the resurrection of some of the dead. The permanence of these old beliefs facilitated the return of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead which entailed the union of the body with the soul. At a given time in the Jewish life, when the fear of idolatry was past, and monotheism universally received, the belief in the resurrection of the flesh became a fixed doctrine.

Conclusions. — The development of Jewish eschatology marks two distinct periods. As can be easily seen, the idea of remuneration or punishment in the next world was made more exact by the union of the eschatological ideas of these two periods.

Before the exile there was little speculation in regard to the reward or punishment of those who were not to witness the advent of the kingdom. But as this advent was always represented as imminent, every man was urged to live in the hope of being rewarded or in the fear of being punished. This idea of the kingdom, fascinated, as it were, Jewish thought and led it to consider exclusively the future, not the past.

From the last years of the captivity, the thought remained the same, that is, the Jews still dreamed of the kingdom. But they thought of the past also. The question began to be broached, What will happen to those who have lived in hope of the kingdom and have died before its establishment? The Spirit of God revealed that these generations would rise to be witnesses of the last things and to receive recompense or chastisement, for the hope in which they lived was not in vain.

Faith in God and His justice was after all the final inspiration of this doctrine, and the immediate cause of this development was the *Messianic hope*.

ARTICLE II

The Eschatology of the New Testament.

The Question Stated. — The eschatology of the O. T. betrays a certain number of ideas clearly expressed. The advent of the kingdom was imminent; it was to be preceded by terrible catastrophes, cosmological as well as social and individual. Then the Lord would appear above the clouds, surrounded by His angels. At His voice all the dead would rise, and they together with those still living would appear before Him. The good would be separated from the wicked. The former, reunited under His authority, would form the kingdom of God, wherein each one would be loaded with spiritual and material advantages. The wicked would be excluded from the kingdom and would be forced to undergo a punishment which was compared to the horrors of Gehenna.

The apocalyptic literature which appeared towards the end of the old or in the beginning of the new era, especially the Book of Henoch, developed the extent of the misfortunes which would precede the establishment of the kingdom of God, described the characters of the advent, and placed in relief its suddenness and exterior phases¹.

It was but natural that the N. T. should continue the eschatology of the Old. This it did in developing it in some parts and in putting aside some of its unessential elements.

For greater clearness, we shall consider *the eschatology of our Lord* apart from *that of the Apostles*.

1. HENOCH, XLVI-LXXI.

§ I

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF OUR LORD

A Difficulty to be solved. — At first sight it appears that there is a double doctrinal current running through the eschatology of the Synoptics. At one time, the kingdom of God is represented as being inaugurated with thunder and lightning and the sudden destruction of all things. This is especially true of the eschatological discourse reported in St. Matthew's Gospel (XXIV). At other times, it is represented as founded peacefully by the renovation of the hearts of men¹. This conversion is to be effected by sorrow for sin², and belief in Him whom God has sent³. All complying with these conditions shall be made sharers in the kingdom of God. The principal manifestations of the life of this kingdom shall be mercy, and the love of God and neighbour⁴. This life is the pledge of the eternal life.

Sometimes its advent is represented as near, at others, as somewhat distant⁵. Again it is described as present, in the sense that it is founded in the heart of man and develops in the measure that the Gospel is received, even as a seed planted in the earth which grows little by little and finally buds forth⁶. The kingdom of God is in the midst of you, our Lord told the disciples, and every one makes an effort to enter it⁷. Since the coming of the Kingdom is to coincide

1. MT. XVIII, 1-6; MARK IV 2.

2. MT. IV, 17; MK. VI, 12; LK. V, 32, XIII, 3, 5.

3. MT. IX, 2, 22; XV, 28.

4. MT. V-VII, LK. XXI. 12, XVI. 28, XXIV, 34.

5. MT. XIII, 24-30, 31-32, 33; 1-12, 14-19; MK. XIII, 34-35. LK. XIX. 11-27.

In these various passages, our Lord seeks to calm the impatience of His disciples who expected the end of all things very soon. The most significant of all is Lk. XXI. 24, where it is declared that the end of the world shall not come till the time of the nations shall be fulfilled.

6. MT. XIII. MK. IV. 14-34.

7. LK. XVII. 20-21.

with the defeat of the devils, and since the devils are now cast out and overcome, then is the kingdom of God come upon men¹.

On some occasions it is offered to the children of Israel alone, as was the case in the cure of the daughter of the Chanaanitish woman whom Christ rebuked for having appealed to Him, claiming that He was sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel². On others, it is open first to the children of Israel and then indirectly to the gentiles³. Again it is offered to all men without distinction, as is evidenced by the Sermon on the Mount which was addressed to all mankind⁴. Furthermore, when He was saying farewell to the world, Christ commissioned His Apostles to evangelize all men⁵.

Thus the kingdom of God appears under a double form in the Synoptics. On the one hand, it is *catastrophical, to be in a future more or less distant, and primarily national*. On the other hand, it is *spiritual, present because Christ has come, and universal*. This double aspect requires some explanation.

Solutions of the Difficulty. — Two solutions, both extreme, have been proposed. One maintains the first aspect of the case, whilst the other takes the second aspect, and both exclude the texts and passages which make for the opposite side, each one following a peculiar conception of the way the Synoptic Gospels were written⁶. Neither is satisfactory because both are too absolute.

1. MT. XII. 28.

2. MT. XV. 21-28.

3. MT. VII. 27.

4. MT. V-VII.

5. MT. XXVIII. 19-20; Mk. XVI. 15.

6. The first has been asserted by Loisy, and the second by Wellhausen. Both are condemned by the decree of the Holy Office *Lamentabili sane exitu*, July 3 1907, prop. 33. DENZ., 2633.

Could not both aspects be reconciled?

It cannot be denied that the kingdom consists primarily in the interior life in both its moral and religious aspects, which began with the Messianic announcement of the good tidings, developed by the spread of the Gospel, and gained the mastery over sin through the death and resurrection of Christ. Moreover, its realization shall find place in man's conscience until the end of time.

Comparing their doctrine with that of St. Paul, the Synoptics, far from excluding this interpretation, really favor it.

Now why would not this moral reformation be preceded by an upheaval of nature? There is nothing against such a position.

But it must be remembered that it was not only the contemporaries of Jesus who should die and be judged according to their works, but the Jewish nation had also to be crushed and dispersed, because of their infidelity.

In Mt. XXIV, Jesus asserts that immediately after the days of tribulation the end of the world would follow. And, as if to show that these two catastrophes, the destruction of the Holy City and the end of the world, were to take place at the same time, He says explicitly that the Son of man shall come, and this generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled. According to the discourse reported in Matthew, it appears that the end of the world will follow closely upon the ruin of Jerusalem. But in other Gospel texts, especially in Luke, this is not the case¹. A long time was to elapse between the two events, in order to make Christianity felt in the world. Thus Christ conditioned His moral teaching by a third eschatology, that of the entire world. Then He shall come in all the majesty of His glory, in order to perfect and consummate His kingdom. The dead shall rise, and all

1. LK. XXI. 24

men shall appear before Him to be judged. The good shall receive a reward both in body and soul, and the wicked shall in like manner be condemned to the eternal torment of hell.

To sum up, the primary teaching of Jesus referred to a kingdom founded on the interior life, already existing in the world. This doctrine was conditioned by the eschatology of each man individually, by that of the Jewish nation, and also by that of the entire world. This last event was to be followed by the reappearance of Christ upon earth, in order to effect the definite fulfilment of all things.

To put the matter simply, Jesus announced the *inauguration* of the kingdom based on the interior life, by the advent of a lowly Messias, and also the *fulfilment* of that kingdom at the end of time, by the glorious return of Christ. This, in short, is the eschatology of Our Lord. It was a continuation of the Jewish eschatology, but modified greatly by the universal character assigned to it. At the time of the Messias' advent, the Jews expected only a glorious Deliverer who was to renew the face of the earth. The grand perspective of the Book of Isaias had been lost sight of. There it was stated that the Servant of the Lord must first appear in lowliness and poverty, and not in glory. Jesus corrected this one-sided interpretation.

§ II

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE APOSTLES.

The Eschatology of the Acts of the Apostles. — Despite the utterances of the Lord, the Apostles were slow in grasping the import of His teaching. For a long time their ideas were confused on this point, as is evidenced by the difficult narrative handed down to us by the Synoptics.

Yet, on historical grounds, we can assert, that from the time of Pentecost, the doctrine of the Apostles differed

widely from that maintained in the purely Jewish circles. In the discourse of St. Peter to the multitude, he claimed that the prophecy of Joel had been fulfilled in Christ, and hence the kingdom of God had been established¹.

Despite this assertion, the Apostles were forced to recognize that all had not been accomplished. Without doubt, the Messiah had come to found a kingdom. The many miracles that marked the course of His ministry, His death, His Resurrection, and the descent of the Holy Ghost upon the Apostles, together with the prodigies that marked this event, all were irrefragable arguments for this position. But after all, these facts represented but a part of the Messianic program. The great catastrophes, the end of the world with its attendant miseries had not come to pass. Still the Apostles were firm in their hope that they would occur, but at a later date. This delay was caused by the great mercy of God, who would give the Jewish nation a chance of reforming and expiating their sins, especially the great crime of deicide. St. Peter expressed this view in his second discourse to the multitude².

Christ's advent, therefore, was viewed under a double aspect, one which concerned the past, bound up in His own earthly existence, and the other that took in the future, which would witness His triumphant return and the definite fulfilment of all things.

Thus under the direction of the Holy Ghost, the Apostles were enabled first to grasp more completely the meaning of Christ's teaching.

The Eschatology of the Pauline Epistles. — This was the general belief when St. Paul began to preach the Gospel.

1. *Acts* II, 14-41. Comparing this text with I. 6-7, where the Apostles anxiously question the Lord about the advent of the kingdom, we can well understand the transformation that the miracle of Pentecost produced in their minds.

2. *Acts* III, 12-26.

He made the eschatological question one of the principal subjects of his teaching, and hence it is that in his writings we find the best development of this doctrine.

The Thessalonians were worried about the state of those of their number who had died before the coming of the Lord. In his first Epistle addressed to them, St. Paul endeavors to calm their fears by portraying for them a description of the last things. The dead shall rise upon hearing the voice of the Lord; then the living shall join them, and all shall be taken up into the clouds to meet the Lord¹.

But this Epistle did not effect the desired result. Violent disorders broke out in their midst. Men were so firmly convinced of the near approach of the *parousia* that they no longer worked, but lived in daily expectation of the event.

This state of affairs called forth another Epistle. St. Paul urges them not to be troubled because it is necessary that there should be apostasies and that the man of sin be revealed. Christ will come to reward the just, and those that persecute them, He shall punish with an eternal chastisement².

Such is the eschatology of the Epistles to the Thessalonians.

St. Paul repeats this same doctrine in his first Epistle to the Corinthians but in a more complete form. When Christ shall come, the greater number of us shall be living. Those who are dead shall rise at the voice of the Lord. The living shall be transfigured even as Christ³, and then all the disciples of Christ, the risen and the transfigured, shall be put in possession of eternal life. They shall see God face

1. 1 *Thess.* IV. 13-18.

2. 2 *Thess.* II. 1-12.

3. « Behold I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet, for the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall rise again incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality ». 1 *Cor.* XV, 51-53. Translation from the Greek text.

to face¹, and shall enjoy their happiness in uninterrupted peace².

To sum up, St. Paul teaches that the present generation shall see the return of the Messiah, in majesty and glory. He shall judge the whole world. Still a certain time must elapse ere He shall come, for apostasy must appear and the man of sin must be revealed. When He shall come, those who have lived in Christ, shall rise from the dead if death has claimed them, and, if they are still living, their bodies shall be transfigured into glorified bodies. The wicked, and by these he seems to mean only those wicked who are living at the time of the advent, shall be made to submit to unutterable punishment³.

1. *1 Cor.* XIII. 12.

2. St. Paul is clear in telling us what shall happen to the living and the dead at the time of Christ's coming. Has he said anything about their fate in the interval between death and the resurrection of the dead? We find nothing on this point in *1 Thess.*, *II Thess.*, *1 Cor.* After he wrote his second Epistle to the Corinthians, he thought he would die before the coming of Christ, and would be among those whom Christ would raise up. Hence it was that he wanted to die soon. Cf. *2 Cor.* I. 9, IV. 14, V. 1, 8, 9. *Rom.* VIII, 23. *Phil.* I. 23. Then he adds that immediately after death, he would live with Christ and would have eternal life. According to this, we can conclude that St. Paul believed that the dead did not have to wait for the resurrection to enjoy their reward. This has been denied by some, as Bovon, *Théol. du N. T.*, II. 327-340, for nowhere can it be shown that the Apostle has given up his idea that man shall not enjoy his happiness until after his union with his body in the resurrection of the flesh. Thus, it is said, the Apostle maintains that Christ's advent was very near. Cf. *Phil.* IV. 5-6. The interval that ensued between death and resurrection never entered into his calculations at all. He likened the Christian to Christ who had to wait three days in the tomb before glorification. Although ingenious, this solution really does violence to several texts, especially that of *Phil.* I. 23. Perhaps St. Paul did not realize how many centuries must elapse before the coming of Christ. Still, he did assert that those who had died before this event had already been fixed in their eternal fate. Besides, a similar doctrine can be gleaned from the parable of Dives and Lazarus, where the former is punished and the latter rewarded immediately after death. The text of *Acts* VII. 56 might be invoked also. St. Stephen in the act of dying sees the glory that awaits him when death shall claim him.

3. It appears that the readers of the two Epistles to the Thessalonians and of the first to the Corinthians, were firmly persuaded that the parousia was near at

hand and that they themselves would be witnesses of it. There is nothing surprising in this. The Messianic work was incomplete, and they naturally expected the early return of the Lord to complete it. It was but natural then that they should look for His speedy return.

Was St. Paul imbued with this same idea? Dom Calmet claims that he writes as if he were. But this is only apparently so. He does this in order to propose it as an example. Cf. *Commentaire littéral sur les épîtres de Saint Paul*, II. 307.

On the other hand, Le Camus asserts that « the efforts to get rid of the evident illusion of the Apostle in regard to the proximity of the parousia are as superfluous as they are desperate... There is not one text, but a series of texts which would need violent interpretation to prove that the early Christians were not deceived in regard to the proximity of the parousia. To no purpose ». *L'œuvre des apôtres*, II. 343, n. 5.

But this solution is too bold and might prove offensive to pious ears. The opinion of Lemonnyer O. P., is less radical. In the time of St. Paul, he writes, the belief existed that « the parousia, if not imminent, is yet very near. St. Paul was under the impression that he and his contemporaries would still be living when it took place. Yet he is not certain of it, nor does he make it a part of his direct and formal teaching. This impression which he shared with his contemporaries must be traced to Jewish psychology as its original and true source. » Cf. *Épîtres de St. Paul*, I. 40.

We are told also by Père Magnien, O. P. that this solution really answers the objections brought by Canon Drach against the interpretation of Dr. Bisping. « The dogma of inspiration and inerrancy remains untouched, because St. Paul never taught anything on the proximity of the parousia, and if he has taught nothing, it is because his ideas on this subject were fluctuating, and never outside the domain of probability and opinion. » Cf. *La résurrection des morts d'après la première épître aux Thessaloniens*, Rev. bibl. July, 1907.

Even those more moderate interpretations do not tally with what we have to believe on the question, as stated in the recent decision of the Biblical Commission.

COMMISSIO PONTIFICIA DE RE BIBLICA

De Parousia seu de secundo adventu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi in epistulis Sancti Pauli Apostoli.

Propositis sequentibus dubiis Pontificia Commissio de Re Biblica ita respondendum decrevit :

I. Utrum ad solvendas difficultates, quae in epistulis sancti Pauli aliorumque Apostolorum occurrunt, ubi de « Parousia », ut aiunt, seu de secundo adventu Domini nostri Jesu Christi sermo est, exegetae catholico permissum sit asserere, Apostolos, licet sub inspiratione Spiritus Sancti, nullum doceant errorem, proprios nihilominus humanos sensus exprimere, quibus error vel deceptio subesse possit?

Resp. Negative.

II. Utrum prae oculis habitis genuina muneris apostolici notione et indubia sancti Pauli fidelitate erga doctrinam Magistri; dogmate item catholico de inspiratione et inerrantia sacrarum Scripturarum, quo omne id quod hagiographus

asserit, enunciat, insinuat, retineri debet assertum, enunciatum, insinuatum, a Spiritu Sancto; perpensis quoque textibus epistularum Apostoli, in se consideratis, modo loquendi ipsius Domini apprime consonis, affirmare oporteat, Apostolum Paulum in scriptis suis nihil omnino dixisse quod non perfecte concordet cum illa temporis Parousiae ignorantia, quam ipse Christus hominum esse proclamavit?

Resp. Affirmative.

III. Utrum attenta locutione graeca « ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόμενοι »; perpensa quoque expositione Patrum, imprimis sancti Ioannis Chrysostomi, tum in patrio idiomate tum in epistolis Paulinis versatissimi, liceat tanquam longius petitam et solido fundamento destitutam reiicere interpretationem in scholis catholicis traditionalem (ab ipsis quoque novatoribus saeculi XVII retentam), quae verba sancti Pauli in cap. IV, epist. I ad Thessalonicenses, 15-17, explicat quin ullo modo involvat affirmationem Parousiae tam proximae ut Apostolus seipsum suosque lectores adnumeret fidelibus illis qui superstites ituri sunt obviam Christo?

Resp. Negative.

Die autem 18 iunii 1915, in audientia infrascripto Reverendissimo Consultori ab Actis benigne concessa, Sanctissimas Dominus Noster Benedictus PP. XV praedicta responsa rata habuit et publici iuris fieri mandavit.

Romae, die 18 iunii 1915.

Laurentius JANSSENS, O. S. B.

Abb. tit. Montis Blandini,

Consultor ab Actis.

(*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, 20 July 1915, p. 357).

CHAPTER II

ESCHATOLOGY IN TRADITION

Our examination of the eschatology contained in Scripture must lead us to the conclusion that in its main lines at least, the Catholic doctrine on this point can be traced to the inspired books. Furthermore, we find in it the foreshadowing of those other doctrines which the Church in later years explicitly defined.

The Fathers of the Church adopted the teaching which Scripture afforded, and, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, and the stimulus of heresy, they gave it a greater precision and threw light on many of its details.

In its patristic setting, the eschatological doctrine assumed three distinct forms, namely, *the doctrine of the second and third centuries, the doctrine of Origen, and the doctrine of St. Augustine.* In these three phases shall we study our doctrine.

ARTICLE I

The Eschatology of the Fathers of the Second and Third Centuries.

The main idea of the Fathers of the second and third centuries was always to reproduce the Biblical teaching. They taught that after death, the souls of men descended to a place where they sojourned to await the day of resur-

rection. Hermas¹, St. Irenaeus², and Tertullian³ teach this explicitly.

1. HERMAS. *The Shepherd*, Sim. IX. 16.

2. *Adv. Hær.*, V. 31 : « For as the Lord went away in the midst of the shadow of death (Ps. XXII. 4), where the souls of the dead were, yet afterwards arose in the body, and after the resurrection was taken up into heaven, it is manifest that the souls of His disciples also, upon whose account the Lord underwent these things, shall go away into the invisible place allotted to them by God, and there remain until the resurrection, awaiting that event: then receiving their bodies and rising in their entirety, that is bodily, just as the Lord arose, they shall come thus into the presence of God. For no disciple is above the Master, but every one that is perfect shall be as his Master (Lk. VI. 40). As our Master, therefore, did not depart at once, taking flight to heaven, but awaited the time of His resurrection prescribed by the Father... so ought we also to await the time of our resurrection prescribed by God. » C. 32 : « It behoves the righteous first to receive the promise of the inheritance which God promised to the fathers, and to reign in it, when they rise again to behold God in this creation which is renovated, and that the judgment shall take place afterwards. For it is just that in that very creation in which they toiled or were afflicted, being proved in every way by suffering they should receive the reward of their suffering: and that in the creation in which they were slain because of their love to God, in that they should be revived again; and that in the creation in which they endured servitude, in that they should reign... It is fitting therefore, that the creation itself, being restored to its primeval condition, should without restraint be under the dominion of the righteous... Thus, then the promise of God, which He gave to Abraham, remains steadfast... His seed is the Church... Now God made promise of the earth to Abraham and his seed; yet neither Abraham nor his seed, that is, those who are justified by faith, do now receive any inheritance in it: but they shall receive it at the resurrection of the Just. For God is true and faithful. »

3. *De anima*, 55 : « With the same law of His being He fully complied, by remaining in Hades in the form and the condition of a dead man; nor did He ascend into the heights of heaven before descending into the lower parts of earth, that He might there make the patriarchs and prophets partakers of Himself. This being the case, you must suppose Hades to be a subterranean region, and keep at arm's length those who are too proud to believe that the souls of the faithful deserve a place in the lower regions. These persons who are servants above their Lord, and disciples above their Master, would no doubt spurn to receive the comfort of the resurrection, if they must expect it in Abraham's bosom... How, indeed, shall the soul mount up to heaven, where Christ is already sitting at the Father's right hand, when as yet the archangel's trumpet has not been heard by the command of God, when as yet those whom the coming of the Lord is to find on earth, have not been caught up into the air to meet Him at His coming, in company with the dead in Christ, who shall be the first to arise? To no one is heaven opened, the earth is still safe for him, I would not say it

Tertullian gives us a description of the abode of the departed souls. According to him, it is a vast deep subterranean space divided into two parts, the one higher and the other lower, both being separated by abysmal depths.

The first of these is called the *sinus Abrahæ* and is the abode of the just souls. The other which he calls *ignis* or *infernus* is the prison house of the wicked. This description is very much like the one given in St. Luke's Gospel¹, from whence Tertullian, as he himself confesses, drew it.

Besides these two abodes, there is another which he calls *paradise* situated upon earth, but yet in a high place. This is destined for the martyrs, who, according to the testimony of St. John and St. Perpetua, have gained the privilege of entering therein even before the end of the world.

Development of the Patristic Eschatology. — In reproducing the eschatology of the Bible, the Fathers of the second and the third century strove to bring out certain details, hitherto obscure, into clearer light.

Unlike the Jews, they did not make the inhabitants of the other world half conscious shades. On the contrary, in their teaching, the souls that had departed this life, are full of life, capable of joy or sorrow, because by a sort of particular judgment all knew to which state they were destined¹.

is shut against him (*nulli patet cælum, terra adhuc salva, ne dixerim clausa*). When the world, indeed shall pass away, then the kingdom of God shall be opened. » Nevertheless, Tertullian adds that by a special privilege the souls of the martyrs are admitted to the terrestrial paradise, there to await the day when they can claim the happiness of heaven.

1. XVI. 22. Cf. above p. 295, note 2.

2. TERTULLIAN, *De anima*, 58 : « All souls, therefore, are shut up within Hades : do you admit this? It is true whether you say yes or no : moreover, they experience there punishments and consolations; and there you have a poor man and a rich (Lk. XVI. 22). And now, having postponed some stray questions for this part of my work, I will notice them in this suitable place, and then come to a close. Why, then, cannot you suppose that the soul undergoes punishment and consolation in Hades in the interval, while it awaits its alternative of judgment, in a certain anticipation either of gloom or of glory? You reply : Because in the judgment of God its matter ought to be sure and safe,

Progressive as they were over the old teaching, these ideas in no way formed an obstacle to the current belief in the near advent of Christ and the end of the world. To this belief there was added another, already mentioned in the Apocalypse,¹ namely, that after the second coming, Christ would reign a thousand years upon earth. This belief, which is called millenarism or chiliasm, found a ready welcome in the hearts of the Christians who anxiously waited for the end of persecution and longed to take part in the triumph of the Church. So widespread was this idea, that we find many of the Fathers firmly wedded to it².

The teaching of the third century in regard to the eschato-

nor should there be any inkling beforehand of the award of His sentence; and also because the soul ought to be covered first by its vestment of the restored flesh, which, as the partner of its actions, should also be a sharer of its recompense. What, then, is to take place in the interval? Shall we sleep even when men are alive; it is indeed the business of bodies to sleep, to which also belongs death itself, no less than its mirror and counterfeit sleep.... What, would you have hope be still more confused after death? Would you have it mock us still more with uncertain expectation? Or shall it now become a review of the past life, and an arraignment of judgment, with the inevitable feeling of a trembling fear? But, again, must the soul always tarry for the body, in order to experience sorrow or joy? Is it not sufficient, even of itself, to suffer both one and the other of these sensations? How often, without any pain to the body, is the soul alone tortured by ill-temper, and anger, and fatigue, and very often unconsciously, even to itself?... Full well then does the soul even in Hades know how to joy and to sorrow even without the body.... Therefore, for this cause it is most fitting that the soul, without at all waiting for the flesh, should be punished for what it has done without the partnership of the flesh. So, on the same principle, in return for the pious and kindly thoughts in which it shared not the help of the flesh, shall it without the flesh receive its consolation ».

1. XX. 4-15.

2. Cf. JUSTIN, *Dial.* 80-81. This famous apologist declares the truth of this teaching and attempts to prove it from Scripture. He knows that the Gnostics reject it entirely, but adds that those who are orthodox in all things (ὀρθογνώμονες κατὰ πάντα) agree with him and claim that this is but a fulfilment of the prophecies of Ezechiel and Jeremias : Καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν γενήσεσθαι ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ χίλια ἔτη ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ οἰκοδομηθεῖσῃ καὶ κοσμηθεῖσῃ καὶ πλατυνθεῖσῃ, ὡς οἱ προφῆται, Ἰεζεκιὴλ καὶ Ἠσαΐας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὁμολογοῦσιν.

IRENÆUS, *Adv. Hær.* V. 33; P. G. VII. 1213-1214 : « The blessing of Isaac with which he blessed his younger son (Gen. XXVII. 28)... belongs unquestion-

logy was then briefly this : Christ would surely come a second time. At the sound of His voice all the just shall rise from the dead. Their bodies shall appear the same as those they possessed during life, with this exception that they will be freed from some humiliating necessities. As regards the just who are still living, they, too, shall be freed from the same necessities. And then Christ shall make Himself the head of the society of the just and shall reign a thousand years. After this reign, the wicked shall rise, and then the great and last judgment shall take place. The just shall receive the reward of their labors, which means freedom from all suffering and a participation in the very life of God. Their bodies will be transformed, or to use the expression of Ter-

ably to the times of the kingdom, when the righteous shall bear rule upon their rising from the dead; when also the creation, having been renovated and set free, shall fructify with an abundance of all kinds of food.... As the elders who saw John, the disciple of the Lord, related that they had heard from him how the Lord used to teach in regard to these times, and say : The days will come, in which vines shall grow, each having ten thousand branches, and in each branch ten thousand twigs, and in each twig ten thousand shoots, and in each one of the shoots ten thousand clusters, and on every one of the clusters ten thousand grapes, and every grape when pressed will give five and twenty metretres of wine. And when any of the saints shall lay hold of a cluster, another shall cry out, 'I am a better cluster, take me; bless the Lord through me'.... And these things are borne witness to in writing by Papias, the hearer of John, and a companion of Polycarp, in his fourth book (for there were five books composed by him). And he says in addition : Now these things are credible to believers. And he says that when the traitor Judas did not give credit to them, and put the question, 'How then can things about to bring forth so abundantly be wrought by the Lord?' the Lord declared, 'They who shall come to these times shall see' ».

TERTULLIAN, *Adv. Marc.* III. 24; *P. L.* II. 355 : « But we do confess that a kingdom is promised to us upon earth, although before heaven, only in another state of existence; inasmuch as it will be after the resurrection for a thousand years in the divinely-built city of Jerusalem, which the Apostle calls 'our mother from above'.... This both Ezechiel had knowledge of and the Apostle John beheld. And the word of the new prophecy which is part of our belief attests.... Is it not just that God's servants should have their joy in the place where they have also suffered affliction for His name's sake? Of the heavenly kingdom, this is the process. After its thousand years are over, within which period is completed the resurrection of the saints, who rise sooner or later according to their deserts... »

tullian, they will be *angelicized*. Their reward shall endure for all eternity¹.

As for the wicked, they shall endure an eternity of pain and suffering, amidst the flames of Gehenna, which, although burning them, shall never consume them.

ARTICLE II

The Doctrine of Origen.

Origen came out flatly against the eschatological doctrine of his contemporaries.

According to him, the souls of the departed did not descend into the lower regions in order to wait there for the second coming of Christ. The souls of the just went to paradise where they were taught as in a school². Not one of them received the full reward of his merits before the last judgment. As for the souls of the wicked, they were detained upon earth, held there by their love for the things of the world and by the weight of their iniquities; as a rule, they were to be found in the neighborhood of tombs, and they remained in

1. This teaching lasted until the fourth century when all persecutions had ceased. The Protestants revived it in the sixteenth century. Some of their writers, however, even now appear to make it the object of their hope in more or less a vague manner. Cf. GRÉILLAT, *Exp. de théol. systém., Dogmatique*, IV. p. 524.

2. *Periarchon*, l. II, c. xi; *P. G.*, 245-246 : *Puto enim quod sancti quique discendentes de hac vita permanebunt in loco aliquo in terra posito, quem paradysum dicit Scriptura divina, velut in quodam eruditionis loco, et ut ita dixerim, auditorio vel schola animarum in quo de omnibus his quæ in terris viderant, doceantur, indicia quædam futurorum licet per speculum et ænigmata, tamen ex aliqua parte conceperant, quæ manifestius et lucidius sanctis in suis et locis et temporibus revelantur. Si quis sane mundus corde et purior mente et exercitior sensu fuerit, velocius proficiens, cito ad aeris locum ascendet et ad cælorum regna perveniet...*

this condition until they had expiated their crimes¹.

Origen likewise vehemently attacked the doctrine of millenarism, claiming that there could not be two resurrections, but only one at the end of time². Moreover this resurrection would not consist in the re-formation of the organism which served as the mansion house of the soul, for the soul at this time would come in possession of the ethereal body which it had in the beginning³.

In the beginning of things, God had given an ethereal body to the soul He had created. Because of its fall, that soul was precipitated into matter. Death frees it from the dominion of matter. Still the ethereal body remains enmeshed in the folds of the material body, and gains its freedom only at the end of time when it shall be united with the soul.

Further Origen was unsparing in condemning the doctrine which spoke of a last judgment and that also which assigned blessedness to the just and punishment to the wicked. He claimed that the Biblical description of the final judgment was a figure taken from human tribunals. The memory of each one will reproduce all his actions and the judgment will follow instantaneously⁴.

1. *Contra Celsum*, VII. 5; *P. G.* XI. 1425 : « It is believed not only among Christians and Jews, but also by many others among the Greeks and the Barbarians, that the human soul lives and exists after its separation from the body; and reason supports the idea that pure souls which are not weighed down with sin as with a weight of lead ascend on high to the region of purer and more ethereal bodies, leaving here below their grosser bodies along with their impurities: whereas souls that are polluted and dragged down to earth by their sins, so that they are unable even to breathe upwards, wander hither and thither, at some times about sepulchres, where they appear as the apparition of shadowy spirits, at others among objects on the ground ».

2. *Periarchon*, II. XI, 2-5; *P. G.* XI. 241-245.

3. *Contra Celsum*, V. 18-19; *Periarchon*, II. 10, 3.

4. *In epist. ad Rom.*, I. IX, 41; *P. G.*, XIV, 1241-1242 : ... *Cujus [judicii] species, ut notior hominibus fieret, judicandi forma ex his quæ inter homines geruntur assumpta est, quo scilicet nosceremus quia sicut judex iste terrenus celsiorem quemdam locum quod tribunal appellatur, ascendit, ut*

He argued that there would be different degrees in the rewards and punishments meted out to men. Both are spiritual in nature. The happiness of the just consists in the ever increasing progress they make in their knowledge of God¹. The punishment of the wicked consists solely in remorse of conscience², which shall by no means be eternal³. As a matter of fact, the punishment shall be admin-

ex eo altior et eminentior cæteris qui judicandi sunt, fiat, ne conspectum ejus lateant vel reorum supplicia, vel allegationes innocentium; ita intelligamus et judicem omnium Christum natura et majestate cunctis eminentem introspicere corda et conscientias singulorum, manifestare occulta, et oblecta revelare, ut et bonis actibus laudem tribuat et mali pœnam quam merentur excipiant... Nudabitur enim universæ, ut ego arbitror, creaturæ rationabili cor nostrum et revelabuntur occulta vel etiam manifestabuntur... Hoc est quod arbitror indicari per Danielelem ubi dicit: « Et libri aperti sunt » qui scilicet in corde nunc involuti sunt et oblecti, continentes quidem scripta quæ gerimus et notis quibusdam conscientiæ sulcati, nec tamen ulli nisi soli Deo cogniti. Isti ergo libri animæ nostræ, vel hæ cordis nostri paginæ aperientur in conspectu throni flammæ ac percurrentis ante Vetustum dierum. Videbunt hæc, et legent etiam angeli et illa millies millia angelorum... et ita criminum nostrorum in quibus nunc unum saltem testem pati confundimur celestium tunc virtutum testes catervas innumerabiles patiemur.

1. *Periarchon*, II. 11; *P. G.* XI. 246-248.

2. *Ib.* II. 10, 3-4: *Videamus nunc quid sibi velit ignis æterni comminatio. Invenimus namque in Isaia propheta designari uniuscujusque proprium esse ignem quo punitur. Ait enim: « Ambulate in lumine ignis vestri et in flammam quam accendisti ». Per quos sermones hoc videtur indicari quod unusquisque peccatorum flammam sibi ipse proprii ignis accendat, et, non in aliquem ignem qui antea jam fuerit accensus ab alio, vel ante ipsum substituerit, demergatur. Cujus ignis materia atque esca nostra sunt peccata, quæ ab apostolo Paulo ligna et fenum et stipula nominantur... Anima, cum multitudinem malorum operum et abundantiam in se congregaverit peccatorum, competenti tempore omnis illa malorum congregatio effervescit ad supplicium atque inflammatur ad poenas. Cum mens ipsa vel conscientia per divinam virtutem omnia in memoriam recipiens, quorum in semetipsa signa quædam et formas, cum peccaret, expresserat, et singulorum quæ vel foede ac turpiter gesserat, vel etiam impie commiserat historiam quamdam scelerum suorum ante oculos suos videbit expositam, tunc et ipsa conscientia propriis stimulis agitur atque compungitur et sui ipsa efficitur accusatrix et testis...*

3. *Ib.* III. 6, 3: *Sic ergo finis ad principium reparatus et rerum exitus collatus initiis, restituet illum statum quem tunc habuit natura rationabilis, cum de ligno sciendi bonum et malum comedere non egebat; ut amoto omni*

istered *pedagogically*, that is, medicinally, and hence will produce the betterment of the culprit.

Such is the eschatology of Origen. In criticizing the opinions of his contemporaries, he formulated a new system all his own. Taken as a whole, it may be summed up under the four following headings : 1). The universal *reestablishment of beings in their primitive condition*; 2) *the denial of the eternity of suffering*; 3) *the denial of the existence of fire in hell*; 4) *the denial of the resurrection of the flesh*.

The Teaching of the Origenists. — In spite of the protestations of St. Methodius, bishop of Tyre, who accused the great Doctor of Alexandria of dualism in his distinction of spirit and matter, and who bitterly fought the theory of the pre-existence of souls and their final re-establishment, the doctrine of Origen received a great welcome in the Oriental schools and soon gained many adherents, in the third century.

In the fourth century, Didymus, then the head of the Alexandrian school, continued to teach the eschatological doctrines of Origen, and his efforts were crowned with considerable success. In the same period, we find the Cappadocians and in particular St. Gregory of Nyssa maintaining a sort of modified form of Origenism, admitting all the teaching of the great scholar with the exception of the theory of the pre-existence of souls¹.

Criticism and Condemnation of Origenism. — It did not take long before very pronounced murmurings were heard against the system of the renowned Alexandrian.

malitia sensu, et ad sincerum purumque delerso, solus qui est unus bonus Deus hic ei fiat omnia, et non in paucis aliquibus vel pluribus, sed in omnibus ipse sit omnia.

1. *De hominis opificio*, 28, P. G. XLIV, 232. — *Catechetica oratio*, 26, P. G. XLV. 69. — *De mortuis*, P. G. XLVI, 524.

This was quite natural, because the theory of the pre-existence of souls and the final re-establishment of beings in their primitive condition, carried with them the denial of the resurrection of the body and that of the eternal pains of hell. St. Epiphanius, bishop of Cyprus forcibly brought out these two consequences of Origen's system, and attacked the philosophical basis upon which it was built. At first a follower of Origen, St. Jerome deserted his party and took sides with St. Epiphanius. Theophilus, the patriarch of Alexandria, declared against it and took measures to have it officially condemned. St. Epiphanius convened a council of the Oriental bishops at Cyprus, and there procured the first condemnation of Origen. By the aid of St. Jerome, he had the good fortune to have this condemnation ratified by Pope Anastasius. He convoked a council of the bishops of Egypt at Alexandria, and anathematized Origenism in the year 399.

These condemnations were a terrible blow to the theories of Origen. Still they were taught, especially by the monks of Egypt who had fled to Palestine and Constantinople. Various provincial synods, especially that of Constantinople held in 543, anathematized this new form of Origenism¹. The system fell more and more into disrepute, when at the fifth ecumenical council convened at Constantinople in 553, Origen's name was reckoned among the heretics who were condemned in the eleventh anathema².

It seems, however, that all these official denunciations did not in any way affect the teaching of Origen in regard to the unreality of the fire of hell. Hence, even while Origenism was being stamped out in the East, St. Ambrose taught, without exciting the least opposition, that the « fire of

1. For a long time it was thought these were the acts of the ecumenical council held in 553.

2. DENZ., 223. Origenism was not formally condemned at this council, as is sometimes declared.

hell » was metaphorical, that is, a metaphor to express a spiritual pain, such as remorse of conscience¹.

ARTICLE III.

The Eschatology of St. Augustine.

General Character of the Augustinian Eschatology. — St. Augustine was familiar with the teaching of Origen because St. Ambrose, one of his preceptors, was strongly imbued with the doctrines of the Alexandrian school. There are many passages which show just how exact this knowledge really was².

On the other hand, he soon became familiar with the doctrines of Tertullian and St. Cyprian. The consequence was that his own system was a sort of middle position

1. *Exp. evang. sec. Luc.*, l. VII, 205; *P. L.*, XV, 1754 : *Ergo neque est corporalium stridor aliquis dentium, neque ignis aliquis perpetuus flammarum corporalium, neque vermis est corporalis. Sed hæc ideo ponuntur, qui sicut ex multa cruditate et febres nascuntur et vermes, ita si quis non decoquat peccata sua, velut quadam interposita sobrietate abstinentiæ, sed miscendo peccata peccatis, tamquam cruditatem quamdam contrahat veterum et recentium delictorum, igne aduretur proprio, et suis vermibus consumetur.* This passage is taken almost word for word from the *Periarchon* of Origen, cf. l. II, c. x, 4; *P. G.*, XI, 237.

2. *De Civ. Dei*, XXI, 17; *P. L.* XLI, 731 : *Nunc jam cum misericordiis nostris agendum esse video, et pacifico disputandum, qui vel omnibus illis hominibus, quos justissimus Iudex dignos gehennæ supplicio judicabit, vel quibusdam eorum nolunt credere poenam sempiternam futuram, sed post certi temporis metas pro cujusque peccati quantitate longioris sive brevioris, eos inde existimant liberandos. Qua in re misericordior profecto fuit Origenes qui et ipsum diabolum atque angelos ejus post graviora pro meritis et diuturniora supplicia ex illis cruciatibus eruendos atque sociandos sanctis Angelis credidit. Sed illum et propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines et misericordias, a statutis sæculorum intervallis ab istis ad illas, atque ab illis ad istas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immerito reprobavit Ecclesia.*

between the exaggerations of the Origenists and the theories of the African Fathers of the third century.

Exposition of the Augustinian Doctrine. — Like Origen, he rejected the idea of the millennium, and claimed that there would be but one resurrection, at the end of time. But, like the African Fathers, he understood the resurrection of the flesh as referring to the very body which during life was animated by the soul.

Following the teaching of the ecclesiastical authors who had preceded him, he taught that the resurrection of the flesh would follow the general judgment.

He contradicted the theory of the universal salvation of all men and claimed that the pains of hell were eternal. For him these pains meant the loss of God and torture by fire.

St. Augustine was not ignorant of the fact that many authors had assigned a metaphorical meaning to the fire of hell, by making it refer to remorse of conscience, and he freely granted that one could hold this opinion and still be orthodox¹. But as far as he was personally concerned, he refused to admit it, because the pain of fire is a far different pain than that which results from remorse of conscience. It may not perhaps be the fire that man comes in contact with here on earth or the fire of volcanoes, as

1. *De civitate Dei*, l. XXI, c. ix, 2; *P. L.*, XLI, 723 : *Utrumque autem horum, ignem scilicet atque vermem, qui volunt ad animi pœnas, non ad corporis pertinere, dicunt etiam uri dolore animi sero atque infructuose pœnitentis, eos qui fuerint a regno Dei separati; et ideo ignem pro isto dolore urente non incongrue poni potuisse contendunt: unde illud Apostoli est: « Quis scandalizatur, et ego non uror? » (II Cor., xi, 29). Eundem etiam vermem putant intelligendum esse..... Qui vero pœnas et animi et corporis in illo supplicio futuras esse non dubitant, igne uri corpus, animam autem rodi quodammodo verme maroris affirmant. Quod etsi credibilius dicitur; quia utique absurdum est, ibi dolorem aut corporis, aut animi defuturum. Ego tamen facilius est ut ad corpus dicam utrumque pertinere, quam neutrum; et ideo tacitum in illis divinæ Scripturæ verbis animi dolorem, quoniam consequens esse intelligitur etiamsi non dicatur, ut corpore sic dolente animus quoque sterili pœnitentia crucietur.*

Tertullian said¹, and in this sense it can be said to be metaphorical, but it is over and above all, corporal, and is really a source of torment to the damned².

Like Tertullian and Origen, St. Augustine claimed that the general judgment is but the ratification of the judgment which is pronounced immediately after death. After this judgment, the soul is definitely fixed in the fact of the assurance of happiness or misery. Hence he identifies the particular judgment and the determination of the fate of the soul, and never does he separate these two points in his teaching³.

But the main characteristic of St. Augustine's eschatology is the precision which he gave to the doctrine of Purgatory. In the New Testament, fire is the means to be employed in the punishment of the wicked in eternity, although in some passages it is represented as a means of purification⁴.

1. *Apol.*, XLVIII: P. L. I. 527-528.

2. *De civit. Dei*, l. XX, c. xvi: *Judicatis quippe his qui scripti non sunt in libro vitæ, et in æternum ignem missis (qui ignis cujusmodi et in qua mundi vel rerum parte futurus sit, hominem scire arbitror neminem, nisi forte cui Spiritus divinus ostendit), tunc figura hujus mundi mundanorum ignem conflagratione præteribit.*

3. Cf. especially *Com. in Ps.* XXXIII, P. L. XXXVI, 321. Explaining the 22nd verse of this psalm, *Mors peccatorum pessima*, St. AUGUSTINE resorts to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, recorded in Lk. XVI. 19-26. Death comes and definitely fixes the fate of both in eternity. The rich man goes to hell and undergoes various torments, and Lazarus is taken by angels to the bosom of Abraham.

Likewise TERTULLIAN in showing that the soul receives an installment of bliss or misery, employs the same parable. There is nothing excessive in their teaching. The basis of the doctrine that man's fate is determined immediately after death, or which amounts to the same thing, the beginnings of the dogma of particular judgment, can be found, then, even in the New Testament. It was not explicitly taught by the early Christians, but we can find insinuations here and there in the early writings.

4. MATT. III. 11; V. 26., 1 PET. I. 7. Often the text of 1 Cor. III. 15, is given the same meaning. This text reads: *Si cujus opus arserit, detrimentum patietur: ipse autem salvus erit, sic tamen quasi per ignem.* But the context signifies merely the teacher who confounds Christianity with other doc-

The Fathers of the second and third centuries were familiar with these texts and commented upon them. But the majority of them were of the opinion that this purification by fire would take place on the day of judgment. According to their teaching, the fire which purifies the souls of men is the same that will transform the world. Yet we have seen that Origen admitted that the souls of the wicked will be subjected to a purifying fire immediately after death, although this fire must be understood metaphorically, and not literally. In like manner, Tertullian taught that the soul of the just man will, in his abode with the dead, receive an assurance of his future glory which shall be proportioned to his holiness and can be increased by the intercessory prayers of the living¹.

St. Augustine took over the teaching of Origen and Tertullian and taught that the purification by fire takes place between death and the last judgment. We must admit the existence of purgatory, he claims, otherwise the good works that we apply to the souls of our departed would be useless. Hence according to this holy doctor, the doctrine of purgatory must be regarded as implicitly embodied in a practice which dates from the earliest Christian antiquity².

trines from human wisdom; he will lose the special reward promised by the Apostle. He shall be saved however, but with great difficulty.

1. *De monogamia*, x: *Enimvero et pro anima ejus mariti defuncti orat mulier vidua et refrigerium interim adpostulat ei, et in prima resurrectione consortium, et offert annuis diebus dormitionis ejus*. He counsels prayer for two things, *refrigerium* and *prima resurrectio*. Tertullian claims that all the just will not rise at the same time, but according as they have satisfied for their sins.

St. CYRIL OF JERUSALEM has expressed himself similarly. « In making remembrance of the patriarchs, the prophets, the Apostles, and the martyrs, we make supplication to God to favorably receive our prayers by the merit of their intercession. We then pray for the holy Fathers and for the bishops who are dead; finally for those who were among us and members of our communion, when they departed this world, believing that their souls receive great solace from the prayers which are offered for them in the sacrifice offered on the altar. » (*Catech.* XXIII. v.).

2. *Enchirid.*, LXIX; *P. L.*, XL, 265: *Tale aliquid etiam post hanc vitam*

At the time of St. Gregory the Great, the doctrine of purgatory was widespread. He gave further development to the doctrine by his writings, especially by the accounts he gave of the appearances of the dead and their report of their sufferings. Like St. Augustine, he called this purifying fire *purgatorius ignis*¹.

Consequences of the Augustinian doctrine on Purgatory.— The doctrine of purgatory brought about some modification in the piety of the Christians.

From the very beginning of the Church, and even before its appearance, as we glean from the second Book of Machabees², there existed the custom of praying for the dead. They were always looked upon as a part of the Christian community and were granted the right to share in all spiritual advantages. By these means, Christians hoped to increase the happiness of the dead or to procure an alleviation of their sufferings.

At the time of St. Augustine, prayers were not offered for those who had been declared saints, because they were deemed to be in possession of eternal life. But they were offered, and in a special manner, for those who were in purgatory.

As the doctrine of purgatory was more and more diffused, this practice gained in proportion. In his exposition of the

feri [purgationem per ignem], incredibile non est, et utrum ita sit, quæri potest : et aut inveniri, aut latere, nonnullos fideles per ignem quemdam purgatorium, quanto magis minusve bona pereuntia dilexerunt, tanto tardius citiusque salvari; non tamen tales de quibus dictum est, quod regnum Dei non possidebunt, nisi convenienter penitentibus, eadem crimina remittantur. Convenienter autem dixi, ut steriles in eleemosynis non sint, quibus tantum tribuit Scriptura divina, ut earum tantummodo fructum se imputaturum prænuntiet Dominus dextris, et earum tantummodo sterilitatem sinistris : quando his dicturus est : « Venite, benedicti Patris mei, percipite regnum » ; illis autem : « Ite in ignem æternum. » MATTH., XXV, 34, 41. See also *De octo Dulcitii quæstionibus*, I, 13; P. L., XL, 156.

1. *Dial.* IV. 39-40, P. L., LXXVII 393-397.

2. XII. 39-46.

sacrifice of the Mass, St. Gregory the Great recommended it especially, as a means to assist the souls in purgatory. From his time onward, assistance at the great sacrifice which was always looked upon as an exercise of piety *par excellence*, now assumed even greater importance. The practice of *concelebration* so long in vogue was abandoned so that priests could offer up the sacrifice individually. This they did as much for their own personal perfection as for the souls in purgatory.

Such is the eschatology of St. Augustine. It is not the material eschatology of Tertullian nor the spiritual eschatology of Origen. Our saint took a midway position. Besides, the fusion of these two eschatological systems aided in developing what neither had precisely expressed, the doctrine of purgatory.

From this time on the Catholic doctrine was complete. Everything is ready for the synthesis left by the theologians of the Middle Ages.

CHAPTER III

ESCHATOLOGY IN SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY AND IN THE POSITIVE THEOLOGY OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.

The theologians of the Middle Ages sought to synthesize the Scriptural and patristic doctrine on the eschatology. Every synthesis must rest on a philosophical system. The philosophy of Aristotle was employed here. Hence their work, far from being a mere classification, embodies a co-ordinate, exact and complete series of ideas.

As it was especially during this period that the Church defined her eschatological doctrine, we shall give here a summary of the theological conclusions, to which later we shall join the definitions of the councils.

There are mainly five conclusions that have been accepted by theologians.

1. Immediately after death, the soul is judged; this is called *particular judgment*.

2. If a person dies in the friendship of God, he immediately enters *heaven*¹. If, on the other hand, he dies God's enemy, he is forever barred from the presence of God. This is *hell*.

3. If he dies in God's friendship, but is nevertheless,

1. Heaven is primarily a state. But it is also a place. Likewise hell and purgatory are places. What is the nature of this place? Has it a definite location? These are questions which cannot be answered.

bound by the effects of sin, he is separated for a time from the divine presence. This is *purgatory*.

4. At the end of time, the soul will be united to the body which it possessed during life, and it too shall participate in the soul's bliss or misery. This is the dogma of *the resurrection of the flesh*.

5. The general resurrection will be followed by the *last judgment*.

ARTICLE I.

The Particular Judgment.

Résumé of the Argument from Tradition. — The doctrine of a particular judgment was taught as early as Origen and Tertullian. St. Augustine modified their doctrine and came to the following conclusions : Immediately after death, the soul of every man will be judged according to his works, both good and bad. After this judgment, the soul is definitely assigned to its eternal abode, or it has the assurance that it will possess this state in the future. Hence, in the mind of St. Augustine, the doctrine of particular judgment and that of the determination of the soul's fate, are identical. Put in this form, this doctrine can be traced back to the N. T.

The Scholastic Synthesis. — The theologians of the Middle Ages took up the doctrine of St. Augustine.

They went further and sought to determine the nature of that judgment. They claimed that it was of a special nature. It consists in the soul's consciousness that it has done well or has acted ill, for, as St. Thomas puts it, God makes use of the sinner's conscience, *Deus in suo iudicio utitur conscientia peccantis, quasi accusatore*¹. This doctrine was taught by Origen.

1. *Summa theol.* II^o II^o, q. LXVII. a. 3.

Immediately after death, the soul sees whether it is or is not in conformity with truth, justice, and with absolute beauty. If it is, it reaches out, as it were, to the infinite. If it is not, it pronounces its own sentence of damnation. Hence, our conscience, which approves or disapproves our actions here below, will after death pronounce the sentence of bliss or torment upon us.

This particular judgment begins even before death. In the last moments, the soul very often receives a special enlightenment which enables man to see at once all his evil actions. This, according to the teaching of St. Gregory the Great, is the dawn of heaven which appears, in which the lights of the life beyond are still blended with the darkness of earth¹. By this light, the soul is solicited by God's grace, to repent, to love and have confidence in the mercy of God. At the same time, it is violently tempted to remain in sin by its evil propensities and the influence of the demon. This is, as it were, the prelude of the particular judgment which is soon to be pronounced.

The definition of this Doctrine. — Put into this form, there is nothing surprising in this doctrine. Rather it is in conformity with what we know of the conduct of God in

1. *Dial.*, l. IV, c. xli; P. G., LXXVII, 397 : ... *Quantum præsens sæculum propinquat ad finem, tantum futurum sæculum ipsa jam quasi propinquitate tangitur, et signis manifestioribus aperitur. Quia enim in hoc sæculo cogitationes nostras vicissim minime videmus, in illo autem nostra in alterutrum corda conspiciamus; quid hoc sæculum nisi noctem, et quid venturum nisi diem dixerim? Sed quemadmodum cum nox finire et dies incipit oriri, ante solis ortum, simul aliquo modo tenebræ cum luce commixtæ sunt, quousque discedentis noctis reliquæ in lucem diei subsequenter perfecte vertantur, ita hujus mundi finis jam cum futuri sæculi exordio permisceatur, atque ipsæ reliquiarum ejus tenebræ quadam jam rerum spiritualium permixtione translucent. Et quæ illius mundi sunt, multa jam cernimus, sed necdum perfecte cognoscimus, quia quasi in quodam mentis crepusculo hæc velut ante solem videmus.* See MASSILLON, *La mort du pécheur et la mort du juste*.

regard to sinners and the knowledge we have of our souls.

Yet this doctrine is regarded only as *certain*. The only council that said anything at all on this subject, is that of Florence. But it speaks of it only in general terms, for it declares that man's fate is definitely fixed after death¹.

ARTICLE II.

Heaven or Hell.

The Question Stated. — All men are destined to occupy one of two places in eternity, heaven or hell. These are two states which are opposed to each other².

§ I.

HEAVEN.

Division of the subject. — There are two parts to the teaching of theologians on this point. On the one hand, they affirm that *the just shall see God face to face, and that,*

1. DENZ., 693 : *Illorumque animas qui post baptismum susceptum, nullam omnino peccati maculam incurrerunt, illas etiam, quæ post contractam peccati maculam, vel in suis corporibus, vel eisdem exuta corporibus, prout superius dictum est, sunt purgata, in calum mox recipi et intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro meritorum tamen diversitate alium alio perfectius. Illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, pœnis tamen disparibus puniendas.*

2. Still there is an intermediary place which is neither heaven or hell. This is the place where the souls of infants who die without Baptism go. It is called *limbo*. Here they can know God in an abstract manner, mediately, and can enjoy a certain amount of happiness. On the other hand, they do not suffer the torment of hell. Purgatory is likewise a middle place between heaven and hell. But all who are suffering there have the assurance of reaching heaven.

because of this vision, they shall be filled with infinite happiness. On the other hand, they claim that *the reward of heaven is proportioned to the merits gained during life.* These two propositions are *de fide*, for they were defined in the *decree of union* of the Council of Florence¹.

The just shall see God face to face and shall gain infinite happiness from this vision. — Reason and faith tell us that the *objective end* of man is God, and that his *subjective end* is the knowledge of God.

But the knowledge of God which reason proposes to us as the final term of human intelligence, and that which faith presents as the reward of the just, are entirely different.

As a matter of fact, the end of man, according to reason, is God known by an abstract, indirect, and mediate knowledge. It is God known by the means of the idea of perfection in the world, but transposed in an indefinite manner, so as to represent less and less imperfectly the infinite reality. This knowledge is followed by a proportionate love.

Now, the end of man, according to faith, is God not only known abstractedly, but known by the knowledge of vision. The human soul attains God directly and immediately, because of the supernatural assistance of grace which will be infinitely perfected after death².

Heaven, then, is a state which consists primarily in the vision of God, which affords the soul possessing it, infinite happiness. This is the happiness for which man was created and constituted in the state of grace. Consequently

1. DENZ., 693.

2. The beatific vision is nothing but the full expansion of justifying grace. To form some idea of it, we must take into account the nature of justifying grace, which is the union of God with the soul. After death, this union becomes closer, and hence the soul sees God directly and immediately.

there is nothing passive in it : it is the most intense *act* which a creature elevated to the life of grace can perform.

But God for us, is the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. To get a notion of heaven, we must, then, bear in mind the nature of sanctifying grace. Here on earth, this grace makes us children of God the Father, brothers of Christ and temples of the Holy Ghost. In other words, the just man is the Christian who lives the life of the Son by participating in all His mysteries and His redemptive work.

Now, heaven is the same life, but freed from all its trials and elevated to the infinite.

The Most Holy Trinity is the object of the vision and happiness of the saints. No one can represent what this happiness must be. There is nothing in the world that can give us even the faintest idea of it. We see God as He is, in the mystery of His ineffable Trinity. Dante the theologian-poet has given a beautiful description of heaven¹.

The Reward of Heaven is proportioned to the Merits gained in Life. — In other words, the just will possess God in the beatific vision in the measure that he has merited upon earth. Yet despite this, the happiness of

-
1. « With fixed heed, suspense and motionless
 Wondering I gazed ; and admiration still
 Was kindled as I gazed. It may not be,
 That one who looks upon that light, can turn
 To other object, willingly, his view.
 For all the good, that will may covet, there
 Is summed ; and all, elsewhere defective, found
 Complete. »

His language soon fails him and then he bursts forth :

O speech !

How feeble and how faint art thou, to give
 Conception birth. Yet to this what I saw
 Is less than little. O eternal light !
 Sole in thyself thou dwell'st, and of thyself,
 Sole understood, past, present, or to come. »

Paradise, Cary's ed. 461.

heaven is infinite. Between these two aspects of the question there seems to be some contradiction. If heaven's glory is proportioned to merit, how can it be infinite? In the divine presence, the soul knows what merits are its own, and knows also the will of God to reward according to the measure of those merits. This knowledge demands, in all truth and justice, that man should expect a reward only in proportion to these merits. This reward is infinite in the sense that the soul possesses all the happiness that can be ascribed to it.

§ II.

HELL.

The Question Stated. — The soul that dies at enmity with God is condemned to the eternal pains of hell. Hell consists of the privation of God and of torment produced by a corporeal cause, whose nature is not known, but which is commonly designated by fire.

From the thirteenth century onward, the preoccupation of theology and theologians was mainly to teach with more precision the doctrine of the Fathers on this point. Several councils explicitly declared on certain features of it.

I.

The Teaching of Theologians.

Division of the Subject. — The work of theologians may be summed up in these three main propositions, namely, *objections against the eternity of the pains of hell are not conclusive, the nature of hell is what tradition has made it, and there is no mitigation to the torment of hell.*

Answer to the Objections brought against the Eternity of

the Pains of Hell. — The burden of all the arguments, is that the sanctity, the justice and the outraged mercy of God demand an eternal punishment, because sin, by its innate malice, bars man forever from the possession of the happiness that he persistently refused in life.

In the abstract, these arguments are not so telling, but considered in the concrete they gain considerable force.

Let us consider for a moment what God has done for man. In the natural order He has given him all that he possesses. In the supernatural order, God does all in His power to make him repent and bring him to His own divine life. He never ceases trying, and until death He is ready to accept from him contrition and sorrow.

On the other hand, consider the continual ingratitude of man, who misuses all his gifts in the natural order, and refuses the paternal intervention of God in the supernatural. Then we can comprehend why God withdraws from man for ever. The law of love demands an entire surrender, but only when love is reciprocal. When this reciprocity is refused till the end of life and when love is continually cast aside, the law of love also demands that it be withdrawn for ever¹.

The Nature of the Pains of Hell. — God rejects the soul that has rejected Him in life, and casts it from His divine presence. Hence, this soul is excluded for ever from the supernatural order, and consequently from the beatific vision. This deprivation is the main punishment of the damned.

Barred from the supernatural order, the soul is plunged in deep misery. The will, says St. Thomas, manifests itself to the conscience by a twofold tendency. First, there

1. LACORDAIRE, *Sanction du gouvernement divin*, conf. 72.

is a longing for *universal good*. Then, there is a tendency toward *particular goods*, which the intelligence represents as a commingling of good and evil.

The former appears to the conscience as necessary, whilst the latter is free. Such is the nature of our voluntary activity.

In His infinite wisdom, God will never change the nature of His creatures, therefore, our wills will be the same after death as they are now¹.

But what happens after death?

Immediately after death, the *free will*, which in life held itself aloof from God, can no longer tend to God; for God is now unattainable. It then turns away from God towards creatures. But they no longer delight, and no matter in which direction the soul turns, it comes to nothing.

On the other hand, the *necessary will* can only tend to universal good which is God. Though reaching out for Him, it never possesses Him. The result is that the soul of the damned is tormented with agonizing anguish absolutely indescribable. The desire for happiness inherent in its very nature, wholly unsatisfied and no longer able to find any compensation for the loss of God in delusive pleasure, renders it utterly miserable.

This pain is greatly increased by the knowledge of all the happiness the soul has lost, of all that God has done to save it, and by the consciousness of having, by its own deliberate folly, forfeited the heavenly bliss. To this immensurable anguish is added the bitterest remorse.

This spiritual pain has been called by theologians, *the pain of loss, poena damni*.

Over and above this, the soul is made to suffer material torment, *the pain of fire*.

According to St. Thomas, this pain consists in this, that

1. *Quæst. disp. de veritate*, q. xxiv, a. 10-12.

the soul is shut up by fire within a determinate place, racked with the knowledge that it could have, had it wished, avoided this awful place¹.

At the end of time, the body will be joined to the soul, and it too will be forced to undergo this punishment.

Is this fire real? St. Thomas claims that it is. He makes it identical with the fire we are familiar with²: still it is permissible to take a less realistic view of the matter, and to admit with St. Augustine, that the damned are tormented by a corporeal cause, whose nature is unknown, and which is commonly referred to, in lieu of a better expression, as fire³.

1. *III^o Supplem.*, q. LXX, a. 3: *Et ideo dicendum, quod corpus in spiritum naturaliter agere non potest, nec ei aliquo modo obesse, vel ipsum gravare, nisi secundum quod aliquo modo [spiritus] corpori unitur: sic enim invenimus quod corpus « quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam » (Sap., ix, 15). Spiritus autem corpori unitur dupliciter. Uno modo ut forma materiae, ut ex eis fiat unum simpliciter: et sic spiritus unitus corpori et vivificat corpus et a corpore aliquantulum aggravatur. Sic autem spiritus hominis vel demonis igni corporeo non unitur. Alio modo sicut movens mobili vel sicut locatum loco, eo modo quo incorporalia sunt in loco: et secundum hoc spiritus incorporei creati loco definiuntur, ita in uno loco existentes quod non in alio. Quamvis autem res corporea ex sua natura habeat quod spiritum incorporeum loco definiat, non tamen ex sua natura habet quod spiritum incorporeum loco definitum delineat, ita ut alligetur illi loco quod ad alium divertere non possit: cum spiritus non sit ita in loco naturaliter quod loco subdatur. Sed hoc superadditur igni corporeo, inquantum instrumentum est divinae justitiae vindicantis, quod sic detinet spiritum; et ita efficitur ei poenalis, retardans eum ab executione propriae voluntatis, ne scilicet possit operari ubi vult et secundum quod vult... Oportet ergo omnes praedictos modos in unum colligere ut perfecte videatur quomodo anima ab igne corporeo patiatur; ut scilicet dicamus quod ignis ex natura sua habet quod spiritus incorporeus ei conjungi possit, ut loco locatum; sed inquantum est instrumentum divinae justitiae, habet ut ipsum quodammodo retineat alligatum, et in hoc veraciter ignis iste est spiritui nocivus: et sic anima ignem ut sibi nocivum videns, ab igne cruciatur. See also *Sum. contr. Gent.* IV. xc. — *Quaest. de verit.* q. XXVI, a. 1.*

2. *Ibid.*, q. LXXIV, a. 3, 9.

3. A question arises here, namely, how can a spiritual substance be affected by a material one, or better how can it be subjected to the same conditions as a material substance? This is no more difficult than the union of the spiritual ele-

Is there any mitigation in the torment of the damned? — In several of his writings, St. Augustine grants that although the pains of the damned are eternal, they can nevertheless be mitigated. Thus in his *Enchiridion* he writes: « Let them think, if it pleases them (those who argue against the eternity of the pains of hell) that the pains of the damned are, after a certain lapse of time, mitigated up to a certain point; even then it can be easily understood that the anger of God, that is, damnation is still theirs, so that in His anger, that is, remaining in His anger, He does not continue His mercies by making an end of the eternal punishment, but by giving some alleviation and cessation from it ». (cxii).

A similar doctrine is found in some of the writings of St. John Chrysostom¹. St. John Damascene favored it, as did many of the other Fathers².

St. Thomas puts the question, whether the eternal pains of hell are not repugnant to the divine mercy. To this he answers in the negative. Can the text of Ps. LXXVI, 8. *Numquid in aeternum irascetur Dominus?* be urged against this position? No, for if applied to the souls of the damned it can mean that their punishment is only mitigated, but never ended. *Vel dicendum quod hoc intelligitur de misericordia aliquid relaxante, non de misericordia totaliter liberante, si extendatur, etiam ad damnatos*³.

All the patristic testimonies as also all the theological authorities on the mitigation of the eternal pains of hell, have been collected and compared by Emery in a remarkable dissertation on this point⁴.

ment in man, his soul, to his body, the material element. Throughout life the soul is made subject to matter. The difficulty lies not in the fact, but in the manner.

1. *In epist. ad Philipp.*, hom. III. 4.

2. *De iis qui in fide dormierunt*, P. G. XCV, 247-278.

3. *III^æ Supplem.*, q. xcix. a. 3, ad 4^{um}.

4. *Dissertation sur la mitigation des peines des damnés*, Migne, *Œuvres complètes de J. A. Émery*.

From his compilation we can deduce two main conclusions :

1. The doctrine that makes for the mitigation of the pains of hell, in the sense that they shall gradually grow less until they are finally wiped out, must be rejected, for tradition never taught it, and even fought against it.

2. The doctrine of the mitigation of the pains of hell can be admitted, if understood in any of the following forms.

a) The pains of hell can be diminished by God, who desiring to manifest His mercy together with His justice, refrains from punishing such and such a sinner with the penalty that fits his crimes. But once diminished, there is no more mitigation in store for the sinner. This appears to be the opinion of St. Thomas.

b) The mitigation may consist in the suspension, for a certain period of time, of part of the punishment of this or that damned soul. This appears to be the view of St. Augustine.

In conclusion, let us say, that the Church has never pronounced officially on the opinion either of St. Augustine or St. Thomas.

II

Definitions of the Councils.

The Dogma of the Eternal Pains of Hell. — It was no long before the Church began to crystallize her teaching in regard to the condition of those who died in enmity with God. Yet she has not given as much attention to the nature of the pains of hell as she has to their existence.

It is an article of faith, that the wicked must suffer eternal punishment. In 553, the second ecumenical Council of Constantinople, cited Origen, with Nestorius and Eutyches, among heretical teachers, because he had maintained the pre-existence of souls and the universality of salvation¹.

1. DENZ., 223.

Before this time, Origenism had been condemned in several particular councils, notably by the synod of Constantinople in 543. Hence, the Athanasian Creed written probably about this period, declares that the damned are sentenced to an eternal punishment¹. In 1215, the Lateran Council defined that the damned suffer eternal punishment², and the Council of Florence renewed this definition³, as did also the Council of Trent⁴.

It is therefore, a dogma of our faith, that a person dying in a state of enmity with God, must bear the penalty of an eternal torment.

The Dogma of the nature of the Pains of the Damned.
— It is likewise *de fide* that the damned suffer the loss of the beatific vision, that is, that they suffer *the pain of damnation*.

But has the Church ever defined that there is another pain distinct from the pain of damnation, which consists in a material cause, commonly designated as fire?

It is true that the Athanasian Creed affirms the existence of an eternal fire. But is this fire material and corporeal?

We have a decree of the Sacred Penitentiary, dated April 30, 1890. A pastor of the diocese of Mantua asked if absolution could be given those who denied the reality of the fire of hell, claiming that it was metaphorical. The answer came, not to absolve them, but to instruct them⁵.

1. DENZ., 40.

2. DENZ., 429.

3. DENZ., 693.

4. DENZ., 835.

5. The case in detail is this : « A penitent declares, among other things, that he believes that the fire of hell is not real, but metaphorical, that is, that the pains of hell, whatever they are, are called fire, because fire produces most intense pain, and in order to express the intensity of the pains of hell, the best figure is that of fire.

It is therefore asked, whether this opinion may be left to spread and absolution be given to such a penitent. It is not question merely of an isolated

This decision does not settle the question finally, nor does it definitely fix the doctrine of the Church. Yet, it makes this teaching theologically *certain*, because it is founded on Scripture and the tradition of both Fathers and theologians and has been declared true by the Sacred Penitentiary¹.

ARTICLE III

Purgatory.

A Résumé of the Argument from Tradition. — The doctrine of purgatory was taught as early as Tertullian and Origen. St. Augustine added more precision to their teaching. He saw the beginnings of this doctrine in the old custom of praying for the dead. At the time of St. Gregory the Great, this belief was widespread and exercised a beneficent influence over the faithful.

The Scholastic Teaching. — The efforts of the Schoolmen lay principally in showing the fitness of this doctrine, which they held to be an article of faith.

After death, the soul that enjoys the friendship of God, is given heaven as its reward. On the other hand, any one

instance, but this opinion is prevalent in a certain country where on all sides is heard the remark, Tell it to the marines that there is fire in hell ».

To this the Sacred Penitentiary replied, that these penitents must be instructed, and if they refused to heed, to deny them absolution.

Sacra Penitentiaria ad premissa respondit : hujusmodi penitentes instruendos esse ; et pertinaces non esse absolvendos. Datum Romæ, in Sac. Penit., die 30 aprilis 1890.

1. This doctrine seems correctly appreciated by Suarez in his *De Angelis*, VIII. c. XII, 9 : *Nihilominus certa et catholica est, ignem qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus, ut in illo crucientur, verum ac proprium ignem corporeum esse. Hic est communis consensus scholasticorum omnium... imo est communis sensus Ecclesiæ et catholicorum ut experientia notum est.*

dying in His enmity, wins for himself the eternal pains of hell. But is there not a middle place between *this state of absolute happiness*, which is heaven, and *the state of absolute damnation*, which is hell? There should be, if there is an intermediate position between *absolute friendship* and *absolute enmity with God*, which respectively carry with them heaven or hell at the moment of death.

The existence of venial sin gives the explanation, as does also the temporal punishment due to sin. This intermediate place is called purgatory.

All theologians are agreed on this point. But here the agreement ends, for they are greatly divided as to what the soul expiates in this state.

According to St. Thomas, the soul is in purgatory mainly to expiate the temporal punishment due his pardoned sins. Venial sin also can be wiped out by an act of love for God, but there remains the punishment due them, which must be wiped out in purgatory¹.

But this solution opens the way to some difficulties. The remission of sin, even venial, can be accomplished only by the performance of a meritorious work, that is, by a work which can merit an increase of sanctifying grace, and therefore effect the wiping out of venial sin. St. Thomas claims that venial sin can be remitted in purgatory. But all merit ends with death. Hence it seems much better to assert that the soul in purgatory expiates only the punishment due to its pardoned sins, *solummodo satisfatitur*.

1. *Quæst. disp. de malo*, q. vii, a. 11, ad 9^m : *Dicendum quod remissio venialis peccati in purgatorio quantum ad penam est ex parte purgatorii, quia homo patiendo exsolvit quod debet, et ita cessat reatus; sed quantum ad culpam non remittitur per penam neque secundum quod actu sustinetur, quia non est meritoria, neque secundum quod recogitatur. Non enim esset motus caritatis quod aliquis detestaretur peccatum veniale propter penam; sed magis esset motus timoris servilis, vel naturalis. Remittitur ergo in purgatorio veniale quantum ad culpam virtute gratiæ, non solum secundum quod est in habitu, quia sic compatitur veniale peccatum, sed prout exit in actum caritatis detestantis veniale peccatum.*

If this view be adopted, it can be argued that the soul, at the time of death, is so enlightened by God's grace that it can and will make acts meriting the remission of all venial sins. This second opinion is more in conformity with the economy of the supernatural life. Yet either may be accepted.

As regards the nature of the pains of purgatory, theologians are not so explicit. The greatest suffering comes, they say, from the fact that the soul realizes that it must wait for its happiness and that between it and God there is some opposition, not because it is guilty of sin, but because it is still condemned to the temporal punishment due to sin, which the soul must expiate. This pain is great because the soul now sees sin in all its enormity, and loves God with an intense love. Hence the hatred of sin which increases in it in proportion as the love of God increases, becomes a source of misery, impossible to describe. It is very much like the misery of one, who, delicate and affectionate by nature, is forced to live continually in the presence of his bitterest enemy. Yet the soul in purgatory is so intimately united to the will of God and so completely transformed in to it, that it is always satisfied to undergo whatever it ordains. If such a soul were admitted to the presence of God, without expiation or before this expiation was completed, she would suffer still more on seeing that, on her account, the justice of God has not obtained full satisfaction¹.

1. Cf. SUAREZ, *De purgatorio*, disp. XLVI, sect. III : *Talis enim est visio et beatitudo cælestis ut possessio illius vel per diem excedat omnia bona hujus vite simul sumpta, et per diuturnum tempus possessa ; tale est etiam bonum illud ut si opera nostra vel afflictiones per se spectentur, esset superabundans præmium illorum, etiamsi ad breve solum tempus concederetur ; ergo a contrario retardatio tanti boni et privatio ejus, licet temporalis, maximum malum est, infinite (ut sic dicam) excedens omnia hujus vite nocumenta. Rursus animæ illæ sanctæ ponderant et expendunt optime gravitatem illius mali, et quod gravissime pungit, cognoscunt sua culpa et negligentia illud sustinere. Ac denique vehementer amant Deum et consequenter eadem intensione appetunt illum videre ; se etiam ordinalissima charitate*

To this punishment, the theologians of the Latin Church have added the pain of fire, somewhat similar to hell-fire. But the theologians of the Greek Church would never admit this.

The Doctrine defined. — The dogma of the existence of purgatory was defined by the Council of Florence, in 1439¹, almost in the terms of the profession of faith imposed upon Michael Paleologus, and sanctioned by the Council of Lyons of 1274². The Council of Trent repeated this definition, against the theories of Luther and Calvin³.

As clear as the definition of the Church was in regard to the dogma of the existence of purgatory, just so much was she silent in regard to the nature of the punishment endured there. After defining the existence of purgatory, the Fathers of the Council of Trent merely recommended that preachers should avoid uncertain and improbable statements on purgatory, lest they foster superstition and cause scandal⁴.

ARTICLE IV

The Resurrection of the Body.

A Résumé of the Argument from Scripture and Tradition. — We have seen that according to the teaching of Scripture, the soul could not enter fully into possession of eternal life, until it was united to the body. Hence, from this we can conclude that the resurrection of the body is indispensable for the manifestation of the new life. Such was the doc-

diligunt; ergo necesse est ut vehementem tristitiam inde concipiant. See the work of St. Catherine of Genoa on this point.

1. DENZ., 693.

2. DENZ., 464.

3. DENZ., 983.

4. DENZ., 983.

trine taught during the first two centuries by the Fathers of both the East and the West.

In the last half of the third century, it was given an entirely new interpretation in the East, although the West still clung to the Scriptural idea. Origen was the first to deny that the body would rise. Yet he maintained that finally the ethereal body would escape from the material body and be reunited to the soul. Origenism, however, was condemned several times from the fifth century onward. The doctrine which was to be adopted by the Church in the West was that of St. Augustine.

The Scholastic Teaching. — The theologians of the Middle Ages sought to explain the doctrine of St. Augustine and to refute the teaching of Origen.

On the one hand, St. Thomas taught that the body which shall rise is the one which our soul vivifies during our earthly existence. The justice of God demands that this should be so. It is so, not only because the body is the instrument of the soul in its actions, but also because it is united to the soul in such a manner as to form with it one and the same substance. All of man's actions should be imputed not to the soul alone, but to soul and body, because they are their natural cause, *operatio est conjuncti et non tantum animæ*¹. Justice demands that the reward or punishment should be given to the subject who merits. Therefore both body and soul should be rewarded or punished, *oportet quod ipse homo, compositus ex anima et corpore, operis sui mercedem accipiat*.

Furthermore, St. Thomas argues that the dogma of the resurrection would lose all value and meaning, if the body which is actually vivified by the soul would not rise. If, when the resurrection takes place, the soul were united to

1. *III^o Supplem.* q. LXXV, a. 1.

another material substance, then there could be no true resurrection, for this would be a new union of soul with matter, *nec dicetur resurrectio sed magis novi corporis assumptio*¹.

On the other hand, the holy Doctor examines the objections that have been brought against our dogma. He says it need occasion no surprise that our flesh can and should rise, for it differs vastly from the flesh of other animals, because it was created incorruptible. For this purpose God gave the soul a preternatural power whereby it was enabled to preserve the body indefinitely. This power was lost by the sin of Adam, and this explains why death entered the world².

He then sets about to answer the objections raised by science. God's justice demands the reunion of the body with the soul. Body and soul are the principles of all human actions, whether they be good or bad, and hence both should be rewarded or punished.

The principle indeed is very simple. But it is objected that if the body will rise, then it will either rise with all the elements which have entered into its organic constitution,

1. *Ib.*, q. LXXIX, a. 1.

2. *Sum. contr. Gent.*, l. IV, c. LXXXI: *Ad horum igitur solutionem considerandum est, quod Deus, in institutione humanæ naturæ aliquid corpori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus principiis debebatur, scilicet incorruptibilitatem quamdam, per quam convenienter sua forma coaptaretur: ut sicut anima vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam posset perpetuo vivere: et talis quidem incorruptibilitas etiam si non esset naturalis quantum ad actuum principium, erat tamen quodammodo naturalis ex ordine ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionaretur suæ naturali formæ, quæ est finis materia. Anima igitur præter ordinem suæ naturæ a Deo aversa, subtracta est dispositio quæ ejus corpori divinitus indita erat ut sibi proportionaliter responderet: et secuta est mors. Est igitur mors quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, considerata institutione humanæ naturæ. Hoc autem accidens sublatum est per Christum, qui merito suæ passionis mortem moriendo destruxit. Ex hoc igitur consequitur quod divina virtute, quæ corpori incorruptionem dedit, iterato corpus de morte ad vitam reparetur.*

or it will rise as constituted at a certain period in our lives, as for instance, at the time of death.

The first part of the dilemma is absurd. If the second be admitted, then the elements that rise would be those which entered only in a small degree in the activity of the soul.

We admit that our organisms are constantly being renewed by fresh material. But it must always be remembered that it is no less certain that in the midst of this influx and reflux, the body preserves its *individual and numerical identity*. Man always keeps *his* body, and does not receive a number of bodies during life. The one given at birth is the same that he yields in death.

What is the cause of this identity of the human body? Is it the permanent union of the body with one and the same soul, having always the same exigencies and consequently demanding in the body which is substantially united to it, the same structure and the same individual and numeric conformation? Does this identity result from the distinct vital principle which perseveres through the unceasing transformation of the human body? Either explanation can be admitted, for both enjoy about the same authority.

Hence, we must carefully distinguish between *the fact* of the individual and numeric identity of the body, and *the cause* of this identity. The fact is certain, the cause is not known.

In order that man may rise with his own body, it is necessary first of all that the soul be united to a body which is *individually and numerically identical* with the one that it possessed during life. Therefore, it must have the same structure, the same characteristics, and must be able to fulfil the same functions. In other words, the body which rises must have the same *individual and numerical qualities* as our earthly body, which distinguish it from every other body.

Is this the case in the resurrection of the flesh? Is this all that takes place? Or, is there more?

There are some who say no more takes place. Among these are Durand and several other theologians whose opinions are cited by Jungmann¹. Freppel affirms that this doctrine may be maintained without running counter to the definitions of the Church. In this case it would be true to say that we all rise, each with his own body, without perhaps a single one of the molecules which made up the body during life².

Yet if we want to in perfect accord with tradition and the definitions of the Church, we must admit more than this. Not only will our souls be united to a body individually and numerically identical with the one which it animates, but something in our bodies shall surmount all the evolutions of matter and last till the end of time. This will become the *substratum* of the risen body. Any one who is familiar with the many mysteries which surround matter will not be surprised at this declaration.

Our risen bodies shall be free from all earthly impediments and from henceforth they will be immortal. The body of the blessed shall be given many prerogatives. Suffering can touch it no more (*impassibilitas*), it will become resplendent with God's own light (*claritas*), obedience without fatigue shall be its great privilege (*agilitas et subtilitas*). It will enjoy eternal happiness, for the bliss of the soul will be communicated to it, *ad modum cujusdam redundantiz*, as St. Thomas puts it³.

The Definition of this Dogma. — The dogma of the

1. *De novissimis*, 241-245.

2. *Apologistes chrétiens*, 192-193.

3. *Suma contr. Gent.* IV, c. LXXIV-LXXXVIII. According to St. Thomas, the bodies of the elect before coming into possession of eternal life, must undergo a purification by fire. But this entails no suffering.

resurrection of the flesh, which was taught more or less explicitly by all the particular councils which condemned Origenism¹, is embodied in the Apostles' Creed as well as in that of Constantinople and the Athanasian. In the last named, it is declared that, at the coming of Christ, all men shall rise, *resurgere habent cum corporibus suis*².

The most explicit definition is that of the Lateran Council of 1215, directed against the Catharists. This definition embodied two points. All men, the good as well as the bad, shall rise from the dead. This resurrection will take place by the reunion of the soul to the body which it animated during life, *Omnes cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quæ nunc gestant*³.

ARTICLE V

The Last Judgment.

A Résumé of the Proof from Scripture and Tradition. — The doctrine of the last judgment is the earliest of all the eschatological ideas. It is also the one which is best calculated to emphasize the idea of God's justice, which has dominated all the developments of the eschatological doctrine. God's justice must be realized on earth, cried the prophets, so that the good may be rewarded and the wicked punished. This justice shall be manifested by a true revolution cosmic as well as social, during which the wicked shall be wiped from the face of the earth. The good shall be separated

1. HEFLE, II. 1133-1135.

2. DENZ., 40.

3. DENZ., 429. The Catharists of the eleventh century revived the Manichaean dualism. They maintained that the flesh, like all matter, is essentially an evil principle. It was given to man to torment the soul as an expiation of original sin. When the soul has finished its time of trial, it returns to God, and there can be no question of a reunion with the body.

from them, and shall be the members of the new kingdom of God. This is *the judgment of God*.

The doctrine of a future judgment was developed all through the Sacred Writings. At first it was thought that this judgment would only involve the living. Later, under the direction of the Holy Ghost, it was made to extend to the dead who were to rise again. From this time onward, the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh and the last judgment formed a single teaching.

The Fathers were content to reproduce the teaching of the Old and the New Testament. They gave no clear explanation of its nature. They merely urged the people to curb their impatience and to be resigned, for they were ignorant when the day of the Lord should appear.

The Scholastic Teaching. — According to St. Thomas, the end of the world will mark the destruction of the material world. All the dead shall rise. And then all matter, as also all flesh, shall be purified by fire. Whilst this fire will be a source of torment to the wicked, it will be only a purifying fire for the good. This universal conflagration will be followed by the general judgment¹.

But why will there be a general judgment distinct from the particular judgment? Since the soul is definitely settled in its fate after death, why should it submit to a second judgment?

Although the temporal life of man, says St. Thomas, ends with death, he goes on living in several ways. The good or evil works of man live after him, and have a salutary or evil influence upon the generations that succeed him. Moreover, the remembrance of a man lingers in the memory of those who come after him, and this remembrance is not always true to life. The bodies of the wicked are interred

1. *III^m Supplem.* q. LXXIV, a. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8.

in magnificent tombs and are often the object of great veneration, whilst the bodies of the just are buried in some obscure place and receive no consideration at all. Finally, man continues to live in his descendants, in the sense that he bequeathes them a good or a bad reputation. We all know of cases where a wicked generation followed a pious one and *vice versa*.

Although dead, man can be said to be actually doing good or evil, and God judges him according to the true state of affairs. This is why, at the end of time, there must be a final judgment that there may be a revelation of the merit of the good and the demerit of the wicked before the multitudes of human generations. Then and then only, will the divine justice be appeased¹.

It does not follow from all this that the soul receives a new reward or a new punishment. Immediately after death, it is judged according to its merits and demerits.

The Definition of the Church. — The doctrine of the last judgment is found in all the symbols, in the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, the Apostles' and the Athanasian.

The Council of Lateran defined that at the end of time, man shall rise with his own body, in order to be judged and receive a reward or punishment for his deeds².

1. *Sum. theol.*, III^a, q. LIX, a. 5 : *Et ideo de his omnibus perfectum et manifestum judicium haberi non potest, quamdiu hujus temporis cursus durat. Et propter hoc oportet esse finale judicium in novissimo die, in quo perfecte id quod ad unumquemque hominem pertinet quocumque modo, perfecte, et manifeste judicetur.*

2. DENZ., 429 : *Venturus [Christus] in fine sæculi, judicaturus vivos et mortuos, et relditurus singulis secundum opera sua, tam reprobis quam electis : qui omnes cum suis propriis resurgent corporibus, quæ nunc gestant, ut recipiant secundum opera sua, sive bona fuerint, sive mala : illi cum diabolo pœnam perpetuam, et isti cum Christo gloriam sempiternam.*

CONCLUSION

We cannot bring to a close our *Studies* on the supernatural life better than by a description of how it has been realized in the ever Blessed Virgin Mary. No simple creature ever possessed grace in such a plenitude and in such degree as was hers. Rightly then, have the generations of Christians hailed her with the words of the angel Gabriel, *Ave, Maria, gratia plena.*

Our conclusion shall be, at the same time, an exposition of the *dogma of the Glories of Mary.*

Since Mary is, according to the flesh, the Mother of the only Son of God, she must have possessed all the sanctity that a simple creature can possess. This is the principle which marks the basis of the dogma of the Glories of Mary. It follows logically from the two great dogmas of the divinity of Christ and the divine maternity of Mary.

To Mary, therefore, must be attributed the life of grace in all its fullness. This does not mean that she possessed the plenitude of grace that adorned the holy soul of Christ. Nor does it mean that grace was not developed in her. But it does mean that, at every period of her life, she was in possession of all the grace that she could receive, so much so that she was never lacking in those supernatural perfections which, morally speaking, could be hers.

This principle being admitted, we can gauge the extent of the graces conferred on Mary. According to a theological

conception, generally attrituted to Duns Scotus, the plan of God in the creation of the world, was primarily the glorification of the Incarnate Word, by the domination which He exercised over the angels, mankind, and all other creatures. According to this plan, all inferior creation was destined for man; mankind and angels were destined for Christ. The perfection of these creatures was to be measured by the degree of intimacy that should exist between them and Christ. If then the grandeur of man is measured by the grandeur of the world, and the grandeur of the Word Incarnate by the grandeur of the world, of men and of angels, what must be the grandeur of Mary, who, in this same divine plan, would enjoy the most intimate relations with the Incarnate Word, an intimacy never accorded to any other creature! So abundantly is the life of Jesus communicated to her, that there appears to be no better expression, to convey an idea of this mysterious union, than the opening words of the beautiful sulpician prayer : *O Jesus vivens in Maria.*

Predestined from all eternity to be the Mother of the Word according to the flesh, God prepared, from all eternity, the graces which were demanded by her dignity. From the very moment that God decreed the Incarnation, He also foresaw the unique rôle that Mary was to play in His design by becoming the human Mother of His only Son. Verily, God created and disposed all things for her and for His Son, and consequently through her and through His Word. It is this thought that has inspired the sacred liturgy in its application to Mary of what is said of Wisdom in Ecclesiasticus (XXIV) and Proverbs (VIII).

Let us consider the execution of this divine design. In the very moment of her conception, God, by a special privilege, preserved her from *the stain of original sin* and *the frailties of the flesh*. But this, after all, is but the negative of the divine plan, as immunity from sin is effected by the communication of grace. Thus, at the same time that Mary

was preserved from original sin, she was filled with the Holy Ghost who proceeds from the Father through the Son. From her conception, she was wholly vivified by the life of the Son, and possessed all the graces that could be hers. This is her *Immaculate Conception*.

In proportion as Mary developed the life of grace in her, the more was the mystery of the Messiah, the Son of God and Incarnate Word, revealed to her. At first, as the Fathers of the Church claim, she was ignorant of the part she was to play in the Incarnation. Like many other pious souls of Israel, she thought that she was but a servant destined to make known the Messiah. By her correspondence with the action of the Spirit of God in her soul, she *merited in some manner*, as the Church chants in the *Regina Coeli*, to participate in the mysteries of Jesus, not only as servant, but as Mother.

She was informed of the intimate union that would exist between her and the Incarnate Word, and she conceived, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, the only Son of God the Father. In the mystery of the Incarnation, Mary is truly *the Mother, according to the flesh, of the only Son of the Father*.

From the time of the Annunciation, Mary lived *in union with the Word Incarnate, as His Mother*. Thus she lived with Him until the end of His earthly life, sharing all His mysteries, mysteries of suffering and mysteries of glory. In other words, she shared the life of God made man, sacrificing all for mankind with Him and like Him.

After the death and ascension of Christ, she remained upon earth, living in the Apostolic circle, edifying them by her life of sanctity, guiding and encouraging them. Death at last claimed her. But it was fitting that her eminent sanctity should save her body from the corruption of the grave. She was raised up from the dead *and carried to heaven*. The assumption of Mary is *a certain doctrine*. No other basis for this doctrine is needed than the fact that the divine maternity demanded it.

But if Mary lived the life of Jesus, she must have lived

that life for men, for Jesus gave His life for mankind. This is why we consider the Blessed Virgin in her relations with men.


The Holy Ghost who sanctified the human soul of Christ, is He whom the Saviour sends to sanctify the souls of His disciples. Living the same life as Jesus, we are truly made His brothers. From this, it is clear that Mary could not be the Mother of Christ, without at the same time adopting us as her children. This is by no means a passive adoption. From the very moment of the Incarnation, Jesus was living in Mary as in His Mother. On the other hand, the life of Jesus was a life of sacrifice for us which ended in His great sacrifice on Calvary. Since Jesus lives in Mary, in such a manner that all the life of this privileged creature is absorbed in that of her Son, with Jesus she must have effected the mystery of our salvation. Rightly does theology call her *the Co-redemptrix of the human race*, a title which means that, whilst Christ won redemption for us by His passion, Mary merited it also, not in strict right, but in a sense of fitness, by her compassion. Mary has then adopted us as her children, an adoption which was ratified by the last words of her Son to her on Calvary. If we give the name, adopted mother, to one who has sacrificed herself for us, with how much greater reason ought this title to be given to Mary! For us she gave her life; nay, she went even farther, she gave the life of her only Son.

This title of Co-redemptrix of the human race that we give to Mary, is the foundation of her intercessory power because of which she is hailed as the *Mediatrice of grace*. In heaven, Christ the Redeemer continues to offer His merits to God the Father for our salvation. Our prayers and our works are not meritorious unless performed in union with Christ, the Redeemer to whom God can refuse nothing. Performed in union with Christ, our works are necessarily accomplished in union with Mary; for in heaven Jesus still associates Mary in His life, just as He did when upon earth. It is then the prayer of Jesus living in Mary, and, we can say, of Jesus

living in all the souls sanctified by Him, that God the Father hears, when He sends us the Holy Ghost. The Word Incarnate and, close to Him, Mary are before the face of the Father. Jesus offers the merits of His passion, and Mary offers the merit of her compassion. And then out of regard for the passion of the Son and the compassion of Christ's august Mother, the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son, comes to take up His abode in us in order to make us like the Son.

This is the conception that inspired the writings of the saints and directed their piety. Christian artists have vied with one another in portraying Mary close to Jesus, interceding with Him for us. May this thought inspire the heart of every Christian, every seminarian and every priest, and may it aid us to have recourse to the ever Blessed Virgin in order that we, too, may become saints. *Ave, Maria, gratia plena.*

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